Plus ça change?: Media Control Under Xi Jinping

Abstract

Ever since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, the government has tightened social, political, and economic controls in China and placed a renewed emphasis on CCP ideology. To what extent are Xi’s measures a continuance of policies established by his predecessors Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–2012)? Do they reflect a new direction for CCP media management? What is the agenda behind these changes and what do they tell us about the CCP’s hold on power? This article analyzes trends in media control during the Jiang and Hu eras and then examines to what extent Xi’s initiatives are a new direction.

Notes

^1. Wang Xiangkun, “Lixiang xinnian shi gongchandang ren jingshen shang de ‘gai’” (Ideals and Faith Are the “Calcium” of Party Members), Renmin ribao, December 5, 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1205/c40537-23757123.html, accessed March 20, 2015.

^2. Angus Grigg, “How China Stopped Its Bloggers,” Australia Financial Review, July 4, 2015, www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150703-gi34za, accessed July 4, 2015.

^3. “The more things change, the more they stay the same.” An epigraph by Jean-Alphonse Baptiste-Karr in his weekly magazine Les Guêpes, January 1849.

^4. Zhan Jiang, “Makesi zhuyi xinwen ziyou guan zai tan” (Revisiting Marxist Theories of Press Freedom), Renminwang, December 2, 2004, http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22100/41466/41467/3027978.html, accessed July 23, 2015.

^5. The current campaign to promote theories of Marxist journalism was launched in September 2013. CCTV has a web page dedicated to the campaign. See www.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/cctv_xwg/index.htm, accessed July 24, 2015.

^6. Karl Marx and Frederik Engels, “The German Ideology,” cited in Michael Curran and Janet Woollacott, “The Study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches,” in Culture, Society and the Media, eds. Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran, and Janet Woollacott (London: Methuen, 1982), 22.

^7. Karl Marx, “On Freedom of the Press,” 1842, https://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/marx/works/1842/free-press/ch06.htm.

^8. V. Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?” www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/v.htm.

^9. Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?”

^10. Jiang Zemin, “Guanyu dang xinwen gongzuo de jige wenti,” Shisanda yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 770–71.

^11. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989).

^12. ‘媒体公器论’； ；第四权利’. NBTX 13 (2003): 13.

^13. Neibu tongxin (hereafter NBTX) 1 (2005): 1.

^14. NBTX 15 (2007): 18.

^15. NBTX 15 (2003): 4.

^16. As discussed in Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); see also Anne-Marie Brady, ed., China’s Thought Management (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).

^17. Xuexi chubanshe, ed., Quan guo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian hui bian (Collected Articles from the National Conference on Propaganda and Thought Work) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1994), 358–61.

^18. Michel Schoenhals discussed the tifa in Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics (University of California at Berkeley, China Research Monograph 41, 1992).

^19. See Brady, Marketing Dictatorship.

^20. See Anne-Marie Brady, “Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP’s ‘Taiwan’ Frames,” China Quarterly 223 (September 2015): 786–806.

^21. “Guanyu yinfa “Guanyu jianli weiji weigui baokan jinggao zhidu de yijian”;“Weiji weigui baokan jinggao zhidu shishi xize de tongzhi” (Notice on issuing “Suggestions on the Establishment of Newspaper Disciplinary Violations Warning System” and “Details of the Newspaper Disciplinary Violations Warning System”), NBTX 19 (2000), full text available at www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61303.htm, accessed March 8, 2016. Previously such information would be restricted to the few who could access internal bulletins such as the Central Propaganda Department’s Internal Digest (内部通信).

^22. On this topic see Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” Working Paper, 2016, http://gking.harvard.edu/50c.

^23. “Deng Xiaoping Nanxun jianghua,” http://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/zjgc/20111231/5389402.shtml, accessed July 7, 2015.

^24. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhengce fagui yanjiushi, ed. Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui xuanbian 1996–1997 (Selected Policies and Regulations on Propaganda and Culture 1996–1997) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1998), 28.

^25. Wang Handong, “China’s Sandwich Media: Between Politics and Markets,” University of Canterbury Working Paper, 2006.

^26. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhengce fagui yanjiushi, ed. Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui xuanbian 1996–1997 (Selected Policies and Regulations on Propaganda and Culture 1996–1997) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1998), ii.

^27. Han Licheng, “Luoshi de guanjian zaiyu chuangzaoxing de gongzuo,” January 26, 1996, Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhengce fagui yanjiushi, ed. Shida yilai xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo de lilun yu shixian (Theories and Practice of Propaganda Thought Work Since the 14th Party Conference) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1997), 238.

^28. Xuexi chubanshe, ed., Quan guo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian hui bian (Collected Articles from the National Conference on Propaganda and Thought Work) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1994), 294.

^29. Jiang Zemin, “Zai quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua,” January 24, 1994, Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhengce fagui yanjiushi, ed. Shida yilai xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo de lilun yu shixian (Theories and Practice of Propaganda Thought Work since the 14th Party Conference), Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1997, 10.

^30. Jiang Zemin, “Zai quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua,” 22.

^31. Renmin Ribao, January 1, 1999, 1.

^32. Quanguo xuanchuan ganbu peixun cankao ziliao, ed., Xuanchuan ganbu peixun cankao ziliao (Propaganda Cadre Training Reference Materials), 4 vols. (no publisher or place of publication identified, 1999), vol. 1, 133.

^33. “Ideological Work Fruitful over Past 13 Years,” 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2002, www1.china.org.cn/english/features/45918.htm, accessed July 28, 2015.

^34. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “Journalist Persecuted in Purge on Liberalism,” South China Morning Post, July 5, 2000.

^35. Stratfor, “Beijing’s Anxiety,” www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/080800.ASP, accessed August 8, 2000.

^36. Josephine Ma, “State Publications Face Revamp, Axe,” South China Morning Post, September 6, 2000.

^37. “Tougher Rules for Media,” Hong Kong Mail, February 19, 2001.

^38. Interview with Chinese media consultant, October 2005.

^39. “China Licenses Journalists, Issues Propaganda Tests,” The Age, December 10, 2002.

^40. NBTX 19 (2003): 4.

^41. Xinhua News Agency, January 8, 2003.

^42. NBTX 13 (2003): 14.

^43. Congressional Executive Commission on China, www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/092203/huchen.php?mode=print.

^44. Jiao Guobiao. “Declaration of the Campaign against the Central Propaganda Department,” www.zonaeuropa.com/20040505_2.htm, accessed July 28, 2015.

^45. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 59.

^46. “Building Harmonious Society CPC’s Top Task,” China Daily, February 25, 2005.

^47. Lora Sabin, “New Bosses in the Workers State: The Growth in the Non-State Sector Employment in China,” China Quarterly 140 (1994): 944–70.

^48. “China Vows Equal Treatment for Private Sector Talents,” China Daily, June 9, 2010, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/09/content_9953634.htm, accessed July 28, 2015.

^49. “Zai xianjinxing jiaoyu huodong xuanchuan zhong ying zhuyi bawo de jige wenti,” NBTX 17 (2005): 5.

^50. “China: Central Propaganda Chief Admits Losing Control over Media,” BBC Monitoring Media, May 7, 2006; original source Cheng Ming, May 1, 2006.

^51. NBTX 15 (2006): 9 and 2007/15: 1.

^52. NBTX 15 (2007): 1.

^53. NBTX 15 (2007): 1.

^54. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 86.

^55. Xuexi chubanshe, ed., Quan guo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian hui bian (Collected Articles from the National Conference on Propaganda and Thought Work) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1994), 358–61.

^56. Committee to Protect Journalists, “2014 Prison Census: 221 Journalists Jailed Worldwide,” https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2014.ph, accessed July 24, 2015.

^57. “China’s New Leaders,” CNN.com, November 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2012/11/world/china-new-leadership/, accessed July 29, 2015.

^58. Mao Zedong Nanfang juece (Mao Zedong’s Southern Decisions), Chapter 9, October 29, 2013, http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/1029/c85037-23365010.html, accessed July 23, 2015.

^59. “US and EU Criticise Chinese Journalist’s Jailing for Release of Document 9,” The Guardian, April 17, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/gao-yu-and-document-no-9-china-jails-journalist-for-leaking-state-secrets, accessed March 8, 2016.

^60. “Document No. 9,” www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation, accessed June 30, 2015.

^61. “Zhong ban fa (2013) 9 hao wenzhang” (CCP General Office [2013] Document 9), http://bit.ly/1KutyPL, accessed June 30, 2015.

^62. “Shouquan fabu: Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding (Authorized Release: The CPC Central Committee’s Decision to Deepen Overall Reform), Xinhua, November 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm, accessed July 1, 2015.

^63. “Learning the News,” Global Times, December 17, 2013, www.globaltimes.cn/content/832671.shtml#.UrE5HvQW1HV, accessed July 1, 2015.

^64. Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Bottom Line and the Party Line (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998).

^65. “Lu Wei: Ba wangshang yulun gongzuo zuowei xuanchuan gongzuo zhong zhong zhi zhong” (The Online Media Should Be a Top Priority of Propaganda Work), Renmin ribao, September 17, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/m/2013-09-17/033728232935.shtml, accessed July 24, 2015.

^66. “Yuan zhongyang wai xuan ban fu ju ji ganbu gaojianyun bei kaichu dangji he gongzhi (Former Deputy Director of the CCP Central Foreign Propaganda Department Gao Jianjun Expelled from the CCP and Public Office), Renmin ribao, September 26, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0926/c1001-25742539.html, accessed July 24, 2015.

^67. Supreme People’s Court, Legal Interpretation no. 21 (2013), http://chinalawtranslate.com/spc-and-spp-interpretation-on-internet-speech-crimes/?lang=en, accessed July 24, 2015.

^68. “Silent Contest,” http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/6168/92/. The film is available on Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=85&v=M_8lSjcoSW8, accessed July 29, 2015.

^69. See Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 151–71, and Brady, “Unifying the Ancestral Land.”

^70. Zhongxuanbu, ed., Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua duben (A Reader of Xi Jinping’s Important Speeches) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2014).

^71. Qian Gang, “The Missing Speech,” September 4, 2014, http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/04/35905/, accessed July 24, 2015.

^72. “He A’erbaníya junshi daibiao tuan de tanhua” (Talk with Albanian Military Delegation), May 1967, www.mzdbl.cn/maoxuan/huibian/aerbaniyajunshidaibaotuan.html, accessed July 24, 2015.

^73. CCP Party Literature Research Office and China International Publishing Group, eds., Xi Jinping: The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014).

^74. “Xi Jinping ren zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu zu zhang” (Xi Jinping to Chair the Central Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform), Xinhua, December 30, 2013, accessed July 21, 2015.

^75. “Zhongyang wangluo anquan he xinxi hua lingdao xiaozu chengli: Cong wangluo daguo mai xiang wangluo qiangguo” (Establishment of Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group: From Internet Medium Power to Internet Great Power), Xinhua, February 27, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-02/27/c_119538719.htm accessed July 30, 2015.

^76. “Jiefangjun fu zongzhang sunjianguo shang jiang: Zhongguo you bei qinlüe weixian” (PLA Deputy Chief Sun Jianguo: China at Risk of Invasion), Liaowang dongfang zhoukan, March 4, 2015, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-03-04/101031565883.shtml, accessed July 30, 2015.

^77. “China Voice: Cyber Security High on China’s Agenda,” July 9, 2015, Shanghai Daily, www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=291666, accessed July 29, 2015.

^78. “Huang Kunming renzhongxuan bu changwu fu buzhang, zhongyang wenming ban zhuren” (Huang Kunming Appointed as Vice Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, Director of the Office for Spiritual Civilisation), Renmin ribao, January 4, 2015, http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2015/0104/c139617-26317375.html, accessed July 24, 2015.

^79. “Jing Junhai ren Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuan bu fu buzhang” (Jing Junhai becomes Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department), Sina, July 13, 2015, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-07-13/213032103429.shtml, accessed July 14, 2015.

^80. Rick Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5–7.

^81. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 142.

^82. See Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 57.