![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical study on the topic of first secretaries-in-residence. It explains the operation, effectiveness, and deficiencies of the system and seeks to enhance understanding of rural governance in China among the academic community.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Yijun Liu and Hans H. Tung for their feedback and reviewers of Problems of Post-Communism for providing very detailed suggestions.
Notes
1. Looking at this from a political development perspective, Lucian W. Pye mentions several crises that threaten regime survival, one of which is the crisis of political penetration (Pye Citation1966, 62–66).
2. To quote Prasenjit Duara, clan members form a “cultural nexus of power” and look out for one another (Duara Citation1988, 5).
3. Interview with F, a township party secretary, December 16, 2018.
4. The first secretary title dates back to May 1948 when the CCP established its North China Central Bureau to manage the affairs of the northern provinces, and Liu Shaoqi was appointed as the bureau’s first secretary. After the party came to power in China, it continued the system and appointed a first secretary to each local party committee (together with various secretaries and deputy secretaries). After the beginning of reform and opening-up, the first secretary post was gradually eliminated from the local committees, which now have only one secretary and several deputy secretaries. However, the first secretary post has been retained by some social organizations, such as the Communist Youth League of China, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the China Association for Science and Technology.
5. Interview with P, a graduate village cadre, October 18, 2017.
6. “A sheng pinkuncun dang zuzhi diyi shuji guanli banfa” [Province A’s administrative rules for deploying first secretaries to poverty-stricken villages], provided by Official G of Province A’s POD, October 11, 2017.
7. Interview with Official G of Province A’s POD, October 11, 2017.
8. Statistical data provided by County H’s POD, April 16, 2017.
9. “A sheng pinkuncun dang zuzhi diyi shuji guanli banfa.”
10. Interview with Official G of Province A’s POD, October 11, 2017.
11. Interview with a secretary from Village Z in County H, May 2, 2017.
12. Interview with first secretaries A1 and A2 of a village in County H, April 7, 2017.
13. In this article, these are mainly ethnic minority areas in southwestern China.
14. Interview with A4, first secretary of a village in County H, October 24, 2017.
15. The appraisal items have an impact on the style of governance adopted by the cadres (Edin Citation2003; Heimer Citation2006, 124–126; Sun Citation2003, 35–52).
16. “H xian ‘diyi shuji’ guanli banfa” [County H’s administrative rules for deploying first secretaries to poverty-stricken villages], provided by the County H Organization Department, April 16, 2017.
17. Ibid.
18. Interview with Official G of Province A’s POD, October 11, 2017.
19. Interview with A8, a former first secretary of a village in County H, November 1, 2017.
20. For discussions of cadres who falsified their administrative achievements, please refer to (Cai Citation2004; Sorace Citation2017; Sorace and Hurst Citation2016).
21. Interview with the director of County H’s Organization Department, July 8, 2017.
22. Interview with Villager C3, December 1, 2017.
23. Interview with Villager C, November 7, 2017.
24. Interview with Villager C2, November 12, 2017.
25. A natural village (or tun/small village) is a settlement that has been formed naturally by one or several families. There are usually multiple natural villages within an administrative village.
26. Interview with first secretary A7 of County H, October 22, 2017.
27. Interview with Villagers C4 and C5, December 2, 2017.
28. Interview with Village Cadre B1, December 1, 2017.
29. Interview with Village Cadre B1, December 12, 2017.
30. Interview with A4, first secretary of a village in County H, October 24, 2017.
31. Interview with A5, first secretary of a village in County H, October 5, 2017.
32. The alliance has an internet platform dedicated to disseminating and sharing information related to industrial development.
33. Interview with A7, a first secretary in County H, October 22, 2017.
34. So-called entrepreneur cadres emerged in local governments around China in the 1990s when the market economy began to flourish. These cadres’ hands-on business experience means they can make a useful contribution to economic development efforts (Chen Citation2015a, 262–265).
35. Interview with N1, a rural wealth enabler, December 8, 2017.
36. Interview with N2, a rural wealth enabler, December 8, 2017.
37. Interview with A13, a first secretary in County H, November 17, 2017.
38. Interview with F, a township party secretary, December 16, 2018.
39. Interview with A9, a first secretary in County H, December 30, 2018.
40. Individual villages were closed and isolated units during the Mao Zedong era. This resulted in the formation of a honeycomb structure, which hindered the state’s political control over the grassroots (Shue Citation1988).
41. For related discussions, please refer to (Forster Citation1997).
42. There is no set length of time during which first secretaries are assigned to an impoverished village. It seems that the provincial government can post multiple first secretaries until the work of poverty alleviation is completed, at which point the MVCs resume control.
43. Liuguan were officials assigned to ethnic minority regions by the central government during the Ming and Qing dynasties. They were tasked with enforcing imperial rule and combatting the influence of local elites, or tuguan, who tended to resist state policies (Took Citation2005).
44. Interview with officials from local organization departments, May 26, 2014.
45. For further discussion of this issue, please refer to (Manion Citation2017; O’Brien and Li Citation2001).
46. Interview with a student of the CCP’s Party School, September 18, 2017.