The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet De Facto States: A Paired Comparison of Transnistria and the Donetsk People’s Republic

ABSTRACT

What explains the economic endurance of the post-Soviet unrecognized states? Drawing insights from the scholarship on economic institutions, rentier states, and patron–client relations, this article explores the resource-extraction strategies of the post-Soviet de facto states via a paired comparison of Transnistria (PMR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The authors conceptualize the post-Soviet de facto states as rentier clients and discuss the defining characteristics of PMR’s oligarchic model and DPR’s provisional dirigiste system. The two secessionist regions manage production, trade, tax, construct budgets, and shape property rights regimes, while receiving vital aid from the patron-state.

Acknowledgments

We thank the editor and the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. We try to avoid terminological battles by emphasizing the lack of international recognition as the shared feature of the two contested areas. Hence, we refer to Transnistria and the DPR as “de facto states” (see Pegg 1998; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012; Pegg and Kolstø 2015, 193), “unrecognized states,” “disputed territories,” “de facto authorities,” “uncontrolled areas,” “breakaway regions.” We use “parent-state” to signify Ukraine and Moldova and “patron-state” to mean the Russian Federation. These terms are widely used in English-speaking academia. For an account of how phraseology varies across the region see Coppieters (2018).

2. Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Syria, and Nauru have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

3. The same NGO was active in both eastern Ukraine and Crimea after 2014.