Southeast Asia in Kazakhstan’s Omnidirectional Hedging Strategy

ABSTRACT

The article examines Kazakhstan’s relations with Southeast Asia, an area of study which has been given little attention so far. It firstly analyzes Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy, arguing that Kazakhstan has been trying to pursue an omnidirectional hedging strategy by diversifying its partners to enhance its strategic space. Secondly, it looks at how Southeast Asia is seen as part of this strategy, particularly as alternative economic partners for Kazakhstan. It argues that there are greater opportunities for enhanced economic interaction due to Kazakhstan’s central role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that is shifting toward Asia, and reinvigorated economic diplomacy. Thirdly, it examines Kazakhstan’s relations with five key Southeast Asian states – Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand – which are Kazakhstan’s largest trading partners in the region and arguably viewed as the Southeast Asian countries with the most potential to play a role in Kazakhstan’s omnidirectional hedging strategy.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the journal’s two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that helped improve and enrich the article. He also thanks his wife, Sirinapa, for her love, patience and support. The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not represent those of the Royal Thai Government or any other organization. Any errors found herein are also the author’s own.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The focus is on Kazakhstan’s relations with key Southeast Asian countries rather than with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been addressed in Rangsimaporn (2020). Nonetheless, as ASEAN encompasses nearly all of the Southeast Asian countries with the exception of Timor-Leste, the article will also touch upon ASEAN’s economic significance as a regional bloc.

2. However, Kazakhstan’s new Foreign Policy Concept for 2020 (2020) does not mention any particular Southeast Asian country but merely stated the need to strengthen relations with the region.

3. On balancing and bandwagoning see Waltz (1979) and Walt (1987).

4. On Kazakhstan’s concerns regarding Russia, especially after its annexation of Crimea, see Nursha (2018, 647–60). On concerns regarding China see Le Corre (2019) and Burkhanov and Chen (2016).

5. On Kazakhstan’s attempts to assert its independence from Moscow and Beijing see Vanderhill, Joireman, and Tulepbayeva (Vanderhill, Joireman, and Tulepbayeva 2020, 980–6).

6. Author’s interview with a Kazakhstani foreign policy expert, Nur-Sultan, Nov. 1, 2019.

7. According to one survey conducted in Kazakhstan in February 2020, Russia was the preferred partner while China was viewed negatively (Laruelle et al. 2020).

8. Author’s e-mail correspondence, Aug. 19, 2020.

9. Author’s conversation, Nur-Sultan, Jan. 30, 2019.

10. Author’s conversation, Nur-Sultan, Feb. 19, 2019.

11. Kazakhstan and China are connected by two railway lines at Dostyk and Khorgos (Bitabarova 2018, 161–5).

12. In terms of cost, however, railway transport is approximately three-to-four times more expensive than transporting by sea between China and Europe, despite China currently heavily subsidizing these international rail connections. Once China ends such support in 2021, competitiveness will erode even further (Simon 2020).

13. Author’s interviews with Kazakhstani experts, Almaty, Sept. 16, 2019, Nur-Sultan, Nov. 1, 2019, and Aug. 19, 2020 (email). See also Le Corre (2019); Burkhanov and Chen (2016).

14. Author’s interviews with Kazakhstani experts, Nur-Sultan, Nov. 1, 2019; Aug. 19, 2020 (email); Oct. 8, 2020; Oct. 4, 2020 (online).

15. Author’s interview with Kazakhstani expert, Nur-Sultan, Feb. 18, 2021.

16. The admiration was mutual. In the early 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew called Nazarbayev a “rising star” and predicted that “if Nazarbayev will be at the helm of the Republic, Kazakhstan will have a much higher chance of success” (Cited in Kanap’ianova 2018, 175).

17. Author was note-taker at the meeting between the Thai and Kazakhstani foreign ministers during the UN General Assembly in New York, Sept. 25, 2009.

18. Author’s meeting with Thai Commerce Ministry official, Nur-Sultan, March 13, 2019.

19. Also, author’s meeting with Thai Commerce Ministry official, Nur-Sultan, March 13, 2019.

20. Author’s participation in a meeting between a Thai investment delegation and Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Ministry, Sept. 5, 2019. See also Satubaldina (2020).

21. Author’s interview with Kazakhstani expert, Almaty, Sept. 16, 2019; meeting with Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry official, Nur-Sultan, Oct. 16, 2020; conversation with AIFC official, Nur-Sultan, Feb. 4, 2020.

22. Author’s conversations with Malaysian diplomat and Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry official, Nur-Sultan, Aug. 24, 2020 and Oct. 16, 2020, respectively.

23. For excellent analyses on Kazakhstan’s politics, economy and foreign relations in the aftermath of Nazarbayev’s resignation in March 2019, see Bohr et al. (2019).

24. Recent examples include Kazakhstan’s rare official protest against Beijing regarding an article published on a Chinese website that questioned Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity in April 2020 and its rejection of a Russian proposal to have a consolidated EAEU response to Western sanctions against Moscow and Belarus in June 2021 (“Kazakhstan Protests” 2020; “Kazakhstan Rejects” 2021).