Environmental Regionalism and International Organizations: Implications for Post-Communism

ABSTRACT

Regional international organizations (IOs) are considered to be among the most efficient platforms in promoting an environmental agenda at global, regional, and national levels. Yet, the dialogue between studies of global environmental politics and comparative regionalism is quite recent. The emergence of non-democratic regional organizations (NDROs) is among the most recent discoveries in comparative regionalism and their implications for environmental politics are to be considered. How do NDROs matter in promoting an environmental agenda? How do IOs advance the environmental agenda across the post-Communist region? This Special Issue aspires us to answer these questions through establishing a deeper dialogue between studies of environmental regionalism and authoritarian regionalism. This introduction lays out the theoretical ground for the collection of articles in this Special Issue. It proposes a definition and typology of environmental regionalism (ER) that distinguishes between democratic and autocratic ER. It then analyzes the contributions to the Special Issue within this new theoretical framework.

Introduction

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and others play an immensely important role in promoting sustainable development and an environmental agenda (see Buntaine and Parks 2013; Conca, Thwaites, and Lee 2017; Dalmer 2021; Kuyper and Bäckstrand 2016; Tosun 2011; Selin 2012; Zawahri and Weinthal 2014).¹ Within this context, regional international organizations (IOs) have been acknowledged to be among the most efficient ones (e.g., Conca 2012). This is not surprising, as the EU is a world-recognized front-runner in advancing an environmental agenda and democratization within and beyond its neighborhood (Andonova 2003; Andonova and Tuta 2014; Di Ciommo, Thijssen, and Sayós Monràs 2018; Lankina, Libman, and Obydenkova 2016a; Mišić and Obydenkova 2021; Selin and VanDeveer 2015). Therefore, it is to be expected that studies on comparative regionalism and on global environmental politics are in intense dialogue. Yet, this dialogue is quite recent and some of the innovations in both sets of the literature are to be considered. The emergence of new types of regional IOs led by non-democratic states, known as authoritarian regionalism (AR) or non-democratic regional organizations (NDROs), such as the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), may challenge the existing rules of the game, as previous studies have already demonstrated (Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2008; Cooley 2015; Libman and Obydenkova 2018a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019).² While these are the most prominent and better-studied examples of NDROs, they are certainly not the only ones. NDROs have become significant new actors in global politics and have been proven to be associated with democratic backsliding, falsification of electoral outcomes, declines in human rights, and corruption, but also with boosting regional economic cooperation dependent on extractive industries (mainly oil and gas) (Allison 2008; Collins 2009; Cooley 2015; Hobson 2012; Izotov and Obydenkova 2021; Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2016). With the emerging studies of NDROs, new questions are to be asked.

Analysis of the implications of NDROs and IOs composed of democracies is crucial to advance our understanding of the nexus of environmental regionalism and political regimes. How do NDROs matter in sustainable development and, specifically, in promoting the environmental agenda? How do autocracies matter in regional IOs in relation to the sustainable development goals? How does the EU, composed of democracies, advance the environmental agenda across the post-Communist region? To answer these questions, this Special Issue aspires to establish a deeper dialogue among three sets of studies—on environmental regionalism, on authoritarian regionalism, and on post-Communist political regimes. The role of both democracy-led regional IOs (e.g., the EU) and autocracy-led regional IOs (e.g., the SCO, EAEU, EDB) must be considered while addressing these questions. This introduction aims to lay down a theoretical ground for the collection of articles in this Special Issue.

The Special Issue unfolds through two sections with four articles in each section. The first section looks into the little-studied phenomenon of non-democratic states and their implications for sustainable development within regional IOs. The first four articles analyze the role of autocracies in regard to different aspects of the environmental agenda within regional organizations: the Russia-led EDB and EAEU, the China-led SCO, and Russia’s role in the Arctic Council (AC). The EDB, EAEU, and SCO are all examples of non-democratic regional organizations (NDROs) (Obydenkova and Libman 2019). In contrast, the AC is an example of an IO generally composed of democracies, where Russia Is the only non-democracy but plays an important role and influences the agenda setting of the AC.

The second half of this Special Issue switches the attention from regional IOs led by (or established by) large states (Russia and China) to embrace a bigger sample of post-Communist states (PCS)—a region of highly heterogenous political regimes (Frye 2010; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Hale 2005; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). The first two contributions in this section look into the EU’s involvement in external environmental governance in former Soviet states. The final two contributions present a bird’s eye analysis of PCSs at an international level (their strategies as actors in global climate forums) and a national level from a large historical perspective (cutting down emissions over the 1970–2015 period). The issue pays special attention to the role of political regimes and regional organizations in the promotion of different aspects of the environmental agenda across national, regional, and global levels.

This article proceeds as follows. The next section looks at the recent studies of environmental regionalism (ER) emerging in global environmental politics literature. The third section looks into the importance of political regimes in studies of both environmental politics and comparative regionalism. Section four introduces a definition and typology of environmental regionalism with a split into democratic versus autocratic ER. Section five analyzes the articles in this Special Issue and their contributions to environmental regionalism and comparative regionalism. The conclusion outlines a new research agenda building on environmental and authoritarian regionalism studies and on the insights of the contributions to this Special Issue.

Environmental Regionalism

Recently, scholars have started paying more attention to the importance of regions and the “regional” in studies of environmentalism and have coined a number of new concepts, including regional environmental governance (REG) (Conca 2012; Gruby 2017; Haas 2016; Klinke 2012; Schwindenhammer 2018). “REG” has often been used interchangeably with “environmental cooperation” (e.g., Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012), “environmental regionalism,” “regionalization,” “the regional in environmental cooperation” (Schwindenhammer 2018, 86), and also “new environmental regionalism” (Balsiger 2012). Balsiger considers environmental regionalism in direct connection with sustainable development, defined as a “procedural norm for reconciling the tradeoffs between environmental, economic, and social dimensions of wellbeing” (2012, 58).

Scholars acknowledge that the regional dimension in environmental governance “has been a neglected topic in the scholarly literature on international relations and international environmental politics” (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012, 1) as well as in the literature on comparative regionalism (Haas 2016).³ According to Balsiger and Prys (2016), about two-thirds of all international (environmental) treaties can be defined as regional according to the UN Environment Programme. Despite this, regional environmentalism has “received scant attention or been conceptually and empirically lumped together with global treaties” (Balsiger and Prys 2016, 239). Building on previous studies,⁴ Gruby stated that recently “REG has emerged as a distinct subdiscipline within the global environmental politics literature, signalling its recognition as a phenomenon” (2017, 10). REG was acknowledged to be more efficient in policy diffusion and implementation as compared to global-level governance (Conca 2012; Gruby 2017). Specifically, the studies argued that regional environmental governance has been more efficient in diffusion of norms, values, and scientific information, dissemination of technical know-how, participation of different societal actors at different levels of decision-making, polycentricity and decentralization, social awareness, and collective actions (Conca 2012; Klinke 2012; Libman and Obydenkova 2014; Ostrom 1990; Selin 2012). Norm diffusion is especially prominent in the discussions of REG, as regions are arguably “more conducive to promoting norm diffusion than other regulatory entities” (Schwindenhammer 2018, 86). Regional cooperation is also associated with increases in both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of policies (Schwindenhammer 2018, 86). To sum up, studies on environmental politics have argued and proved that REG is more successful in achieving its goals as compared to policies on either global or national scales.

However, the focus of environmental regionalism studies has been mainly on democratic regions, that is, democracy-composed regions and/or democracy-composed regional IOs such as the EU. Studies on REG are acknowledged to be Europe- and North America–centered (Gruby 2017, 11; see also Conca 2012). For example, Balsiger (2012) focuses on analysis of environmental regionalism and sustainable development in the European Alps—a region composed of democracies. Although a few studies have considered democracies outside of Europe and North America, these, too, have been democracy-centered (for example, studies of Micronesia by Gruby 2017). Only recently have scholars questioned various issues of environmental governance outside of democratic regions. Yet those studies are not stories of success when it comes to promoting sustainable development. For example, Elliott (2012, 38) brilliantly analyzed environmental governance in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and concluded that “regional environmental structures under ASEAN […] have generally failed to offer effective channels of communication for, or democratic representation of, a wider range of stakeholders, including civil society groups and local communities.”⁵ A lack of security, just like a lack of democracy, also damages the prospects for efficient policies of sustainable development (for example, in the Hindu Kush–Himalaya region and its implications for South Asia in general; see Matthew 2012). Therefore, dialogue with the scarce studies specifically on authoritarian regionalism (AR) seems to be timely and relevant for policymakers and scholars.

Through better understanding of AR in connection to environmental regional cooperation, we make an important step in preventing and solving global environmental challenges and potentially improving implementation of environmental policies across the world’s regions. It is no longer sufficient to refer to REG as one monolithic concept. New distinctions must be introduced through the singling out of democratic environmental regionalism and autocratic environmental regionalism. The latter concept would contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding of ways to improve efficiency in REG.

The studies on AR have indeed been completely detached from the studies on environmental regionalism. In other words, REG does not consider the insights from AR and, vice versa, studies on AR have not yet engaged with the literature on REG. Amplifying the studies on environmental regionalism to include various non-democratic regions and regional IOs led or influenced by autocracies, thus, would seem to be the next important step in advancing the field and cross-disciplinary dialogue. This Special Issue aims to trigger deeper engagement across these highly related yet divided literatures. To establish such a dialogue, it is important to say a few words on the importance of political regimes in comparative regionalism and in environmental regionalism studies.

Political Regimes and Environmental Politics

How and why do political regimes and AR matter in the environmental agenda and politics? The effects of political regimes on different aspects of sustainable development—including but not limited to the fight against climate change, deforestation, water and air pollution, the nuclear supply chain, greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), or poverty—are, at best, mixed (e.g., Ang and Fredriksson 2021; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Fredriksson and Mohanty 2021; Obydenkova 2022a; Burnell 2012; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013). At a national level, the nexus of democracy and various aspects of environmentalism (from policies to outcomes) remains contradictory. Bättig and Bernauer (2009),for example, examined a large sample of 185 nation-states over a fifteen-year period (1990–2004), tracing the effects of democracy on commitments to climate change policies and emissions. They find that democracy appears to trigger higher levels of political and legal commitments to fight climate change, but it does not seem to result in a decrease in emissions. In contrast, Winslow (2005) demonstrates that democracy is associated with better control over environmental quality, specifically with the decrease in the urban air concentration of various pollutants. A few studies directly connect political regimes to carbon emissions, GHG trading, international environmental commitments emphasizing the importance of hybrid political regimes, and multiple issues of political legitimacy and justice (e.g., Hall, Lenz, and Obydenkova 2021; Hobson 2012; Kneuer 2012; Obydenkova and Salahodjaev 2017; Page 2012). Furthermore, Burnell (2012) linked international support for democracy to (international) climate change action. Indeed, some studies have demonstrated that both democratization and climate change policies are interlinked and share some of the same challenges—for example, the resource curse. With a resource curse, the economy is dependent on extraction of oil and/or gas, and this becomes an obstacle for both democratization and the development of renewable energy (e.g., Fuhr and Wykes 2012). Therefore, to solve at least some environmental challenges, engaging with non-democracy is inevitable.

A few recent studies have argued that what actually matters for successful implementation of different policies is not democracy per se but rather democratic capital stock (that is, historically accumulated experience under democracy), which is significant also for modern economic and social development (Ang and Fredriksson 2021; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Iman, Nazarov, and Obydenkova 2022; Nazarov and Obydenkova 2021a, 2021b). Scholars further agree that historical legacies and the legacies of Communism in particular may affect modern economic development and social inequality, corruption and human rights, quality of mass media, transparency, civil society and social movements, political trust, and social capital (Arpino and Obydenkova 2020; Beissinger and Kotkin 2014; Lankina, Libman, and Obydenkova 2016b; Libman and Obydenkova 2021; Iman et al. 2022; Nazarov and Obydenkova 2020; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Schalatek 2012). This variety of historical legacies in post-Communist Eurasia at all levels (from public trust to elite corruption, attitudes to international and national commitments of policymakers) matters for multiple aspects in governance, including for advancing goals within regional (environmental) governance.

Despite the general positive effects of democracy for sustainable development, the growing literature on authoritarian environmentalism (or environmental authoritarianism) poses further theoretical and empirical challenges to consider. Environmental degradation, overpopulation, poverty, and fossil-fuel-based economic development are properties of many developing regions but also of economically strong autocracies (e.g., China). Recent studies have raised the question of whether these major issues of sustainable development requiring radical and efficient solutions can be best handled within the framework of authoritarian governance and have challenged the role of liberal democracy in solving ecological issues (Ahlers and Shen 2018; Beeson 2010; Eckersley 2020; Gilley 2012; Han 2015). Authoritarian environmentalism is understood as total governmental control over all decision-making processes concerning environmental challenges (see Beeson 2010; Eaton and Kostka 2014; Obrien 2020). Not surprisingly, some studies have argued for the incompatibility of authoritarian environmentalism and democracies (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Obrien 2020).

To complicate the matter further, it is important to underline how heterogeneous non-democracies are, from closed and isolated North Korea, Belarus, and Venezuela, on the one hand, to the rising global activities of China on the other.⁶ Given the variety of non-democratic states, it is safe to assume they behave differently in terms of dealing with environmental challenges within their borders but also globally and in their respective regions. On the other hand, democracies in both Europe and Americas have recently witnessed the wave of populism that was associated with downgrading the importance of sustainable development, environmental protection, climate change, and with prioritizing national economic benefits (e.g., see Buzogány and Cotta 2021; Huber 2020; McCarthy 2019). Thus, it would be an oversimplification to believe “one size fits all,” that is, conveniently splitting the world into two presumably homogenous groups of “pro-environmental democracies” versus “environmentally hostile autocracies.”

The varieties of non-democratic regimes refer not only to different governing styles within their own borders but also across their respective regions and globally. At a national level, a few studies have demonstrated radically different strategies for environmental conflict management in China and in Russia (Demchuk et al. 2021).⁷ At a global level, studies have pointed to a variety of international behaviors of autocracies. China and Russia, for example, exhibit very different strategies in terms of their participation in high-level forums on energy governance (Tosun and Shyrokykh 2021).

Autocracies have become more willing to devise environmental policies because these are an easy way to increase their internal and external legitimacy (Hall, Lenz, and Obydenkova 2021; Obydenkova 2022b). China has positioned itself as a “champion” in the fight against climate change, even though its record is “mixed” at best (Teese 2018; Losos et al. 2019). China is the most prominent case of rhetorical support for sustainable development but certainly not the only one. Its large neighbor, autocratic Kazakhstan, has also been generous in discussion of issues of sustainable development and prioritizing the environmental agenda. In 2016, Kazakhstan finally ratified the Paris Climate Agreement and followed up with a proposal for new environmental legislation aimed at sustaining biodiversity and the introduction of tariffs to encourage renewable energy sources, among other issues (Cohen 2021; Poberezhskaya and Bychkova 2021). Yet some recent studies have questioned both the sincerity and the feasibility of the environmental promises made by Kazakhstan (e.g., Poberezhskaya and Bychkova 2021). Cohen (2021) indicates that the former Soviet Central Asian states could account for 5 percent of global renewable energy (solar and wind energy). However, to this day, Central Asia relies heavily on the fossil-fuel economy and is dependent on extractive industries (e.g., Cohen 2021; Poberezhskaya and Bychkova 2021). This illustrates that even such economically strong states as China and Kazakhstan are willing to seek legitimacy through environmental posturing, even if they do not live up to their own commitments. Consequently, autocracies may adopt and rhetorically support environmental policies, but in the absence of transparency may fail to actually implement them.

Finally, at a regional level, non-democracies launch their own regional IOs or participate in IOs launched by fellow autocracies, boosting legitimacy (Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2016; Hall, Lenz, and Obydenkova 2021; Obydenkova 2022b; Cooley 2015). The best example is arguably the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the largest regional infrastructure development project in the world. It is not a formal regional organization, yet the initiative is intended to boost economic cooperation and economic development in Eurasia. The large-scale negative environmental impacts of the BRI are becoming apparent. Multiple studies point to a certain hypocrisy in China’s stand on the BRI, as well as a general lack of clarity and transparency (Losos et al. 2019; Teese 2018). Despite promising to adjust the BRI project to match the goals of sustainable development, China seems to continue to invest intensively in fossil fuel industries and develop further the extraction of natural resources within the framework of the BRI, as well as in the SCO in Central Asia and in the Arctic region together with Russia using regional cooperation platforms (Losos et al. 2019; Teese 2018; see also Lavelle 2021; Agostinis and Urdinez 2021 in this issue). The outcomes of this regional economic cooperation would cause unprecedented destruction of biodiversity, massive deforestation, a radical decrease in water quality, and an increase in GHGs, among multiple other environmental damages (e.g., Losos et al. 2019; Teese 2018). Therefore, regional IOs may play a crucial role in either augmenting environmentally destructive regional economic development or, vice versa, sustaining, limiting, and controlling it.

The studies on AR are relatively recent and need to catch up with recent advances in the literature on REG described above. Similarly, studies on environmental regionalism can significantly benefit from the insights of AR literature. Both literatures need to establish a dialogue and to engage with each other’s findings. How and why do environmental challenges matter for AR? And how does AR matter in regard to the sustainable development agenda? To answer these questions, we need to consider the combination of political regimes, regional organizations, and environmental regionalism that unfolds throughout the contributions in this Special Issue outlined below.

Environmental and Authoritarian Regionalism

Environmental regionalism has multiple approaches and definitions (e.g., as described above, it is often used interchangeably with “environmental cooperation” or “regional environmentalism,” among other terms) and may or may not be associated directly with specific regional IOs.⁸ For example, Balsiger (2012, 58) defines “new” environmental regionalism as a “recent trend involving initiatives that seek to territorialise environmental governance at the level of transboundary ecoregions, such as mountain ranges or river basins.” In this Special Issue, however, our theoretical departure point is comparative regionalism, that is, studies of regional IOs. In these studies, environmental regionalism (here used interchangeably with REG) is inherently interlinked with regional IOs. Haas explicitly connects the analysis of REG to such IOs as the EU, the AC, and ASEAN, among other regional IOs (2016, 449). Thus, regional environmental governance (or, as referred here, environmental regionalism) is part of comparative regionalism studies. Hence, the implications of the latest innovations in studies of comparative regionalism, such as authoritarian regionalism (AR), must be considered for environmental regionalism (ER).

In this Special Issue, environmental regionalism (ER) is defined as a trend to introduce an environmental agenda within regional IOs (e.g., in legal documents or on social media) and as the environmental agenda (broadly interpreted) of regional IOs (that is, the way it is institutionalized and/or implemented by IOs). Furthermore, this Special Issue expands the focus of ER from traditional actors (so-called democratic regional IOs such as the EU or the AC) to consider relatively new actors (non-democratic regional IOs such as the SCO, the EDB, and the EAEU).⁹ Overall, we can single out three dimensions within ER as defined above:

• First, as an official part of the agenda of regional IOs, as a set of environmental norms, values, principles, and/or commitments outlined in legal documents (e.g., founding agreements, follow-up decrees, treaties) of regional IOs (that is, institutional ER);

• second, as rhetorical (or discursive) environmental commitments expressed by the leaders of regional IOs and on behalf of IOs (e.g., on social media or in official statements and mass media), representing reflections and consideration of environmental issues beyond legal documents (discursive or rhetorical ER)¹⁰;

• third, as environmental outcomes (consequences) associated with the activities of regional IOs (e.g., consequences of construction projects, trade, foreign direct investments) and follow-up strategies of regional IOs, ranging from (a) taking outcomes into account and adjusting strategies to prevent or repair damage, to (b) ignoring environmentally destructive outcomes and damage (consequential ER).¹¹

The above definition of ER allows us to expand our understanding and analysis of ER beyond regional organizations with a pronounced environmental focus (such as, for example, the Black Sea Commission, the Nile Basin Initiative, or the Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development). It also goes beyond consideration of regional IOs with a strong environmental agenda (such as the EU and the AC) and allows us to study environmental agendas and politics across different regional IOs (especially those without clear environmental commitments). This definition allows us to amplify analysis of ER to encompass regional IOs led by autocracies where an environmental agenda may be almost non-existent, but the environmental damages associated with the activities of those IOs can be destructive at a global level. Therefore, connecting ER explicitly to all regional IOs (including the NDROs) is highly important as it sheds more light on the environmental consequences of their activities. In other words, it puts NDROs on the spot in the academic debate. In the long run, this focus could become an excellent preventative step in avoiding or at least softening the environmental destruction that can be triggered by NDROs (see case studies in this Special Issue by Agostinis and Urdinez 2021; Ambrosio, Hall, and Obydenkova 2021; Hartwell 2021).

Following the split in the studies of regionalism into IOs composed of democracies and NDROs, the next step is to consider two types within ER. The first type of ER is democratic environmental regionalism (DER)—that is, environmental regionalism in regional IOs composed of democracies (e.g., the EU). The second type of ER is autocratic environmental regionalism (AER)—that is, environmental regionalism, as defined above, associated with NDROs. Splitting ER into these two types opens up a number of opportunities for advancing studies on the role of regional IOs in global environmental politics—from successful implementation of an environmental agenda in some cases to devastating ecological consequences in other cases. This Special Issue follows this typology of ER and splits the contributions into two groups as detailed below.

Contributions

The first section consists of four articles and looks into the little-studied phenomenon of non-democratic states and their implications for the environment in regional IOs: the Russia-led EDB and EAEU, the China-led SCO, and the role of Russia in the AC. The EDB, EAEU, and SCO are all examples of NDROs. In contrast, the AC is an example of a democratic IO where Russia plays an important role and influences the agenda setting.

Autocratic Environmental Regionalism: The Role of Russia and China

The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) vs. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

The article by Ambrosio, Hall, and Obydenkova compares the agenda of sustainable development in legal documents and social media of the EBRD and the Russia-led EDB. The authors build on the recent literature on banks (private and multilateral regional development banks) and the implications for different aspects of world politics and different aspects of the sustainable development agenda (e.g., Ben-Artzi 2016; Djalilov and Hartwell 2021; Gutner 2002; Obydenkova and Rodrigues Vieira 2020; Obydenkova, Rodrigues Vieira, and Tosun 2021). The article uncovers a few similarities between statements on the environmental agenda in the founding agreements and other legal documents of both banks. Is this a diffusion of environmental values from the EBRD to the EDB? Or is it just mimicry on the part of the EDB and an attempt to augment its international and national legitimacy? Further comparative analysis of the social media outputs of the EBRD and EDB during the COVID-19 pandemic indicates imitation on the part of the EDB, and the absence of implementation of the environmental policy outlined in legal documents of the EDB.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

The article by Christopher Hartwell continues the discussion of NDROs, focusing on the implications of the EAEU for sustainable development. Hartwell conducts analysis of the effects of membership of the EAEU for three indicators of pollution: CO₂ intensity, GHG total, and energy per capita. He demonstrates a significant positive association between membership and pollution. Hartwell places his finding within the literature on trade liberalization in the absence of political liberalization. He shows how membership in the EAEU has been associated with environmental damages. As a solution for policymakers, Hartwell suggests considering the introduction of polycentricity and decentralization, empowering sub-national and local actors, and the search for alternatives to Soviet-era industries. The article contributes to studies on the nuclear supply chain as a Soviet legacy (see Hanaček and Martinez-Alier 2021). Those changes would be possible after breaking with illiberal regionalism and introducing political liberalization and accountability of governments—aspects that are absent in non-democracies.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The third paper, by Giovanni Agostinis and Francisco Urdinez, continues the discussion of AR and sustainable development by focusing on the China-led SCO. The authors contrast rhetorical (discursive) support for sustainable development versus real policymaking steps. In line with previous research on the topic, rhetorical support by China for the environmental agenda in the SCO seems quite ambitious. On the other hand, the authors point out that around 85 percent of funds coming from China to other member-states of the SCO are meant for the development of fossil-fuel projects, which are harmful for the environment. Only 15 percent of Chinese investments are delegated to projects on renewable energy within the member-states of the SCO. Another related finding is the predominance of bilateral projects within the SCO. Indeed, previous studies also pointed out that autocracies tend to be more efficient at a bilateral level and prefer this format even within multilateral platforms such as the SCO.¹² Despite the ambiguous impact of Chinese policies on sustainable development within the SCO, China remains the only leader in environmental politics in Eurasia in terms of investments into renewable energy projects.

The Arctic Council (AC) and Russia

The fourth paper, by Kathryn Lavelle, looks into the role of Russia in the AC. The AC is an excellent addition to the discussion of REG and the role of autocracies. On the one hand, the AC is an informal regional IO (forum) composed of democracies except for one member-state, namely Russia. Yet Lavelle points out that Russia’s role in both the founding and functioning of the AC has been a crucial component of its success.

The Arctic region itself has become an epicenter of global warming, melting ice, and changes in biodiversity. Despite being so environmentally fragile, the Arctic has also became a hot spot for geopolitical security issues as well as for the extraction of natural resources and economic benefits, triggered by Russia. Lavelle finds that while Russia has made a few (modest) rhetorical statements about climate change in its Arctic policy, the main priority of its policy there has been reconstructing its military presence that declined after the end of the Cold War, extracting natural resources, and realizing the benefits of melting ice for new maritime routes. In 2017, Russia launched the construction of the Yamal liquefied natural gas plant with loans not only from Russia but also from China’s banks, which will increase carbon production.¹³ Nonetheless, the AC is one of the few remaining regional IOs that still serves as a platform for negotiations between the Western democracies and Russia, particularly on environmental issues. Moreover, the AC demonstrates the importance of regional governance for engaging with non-democracies in combating challenges to sustainable development, such as climate change. The Russian Arctic will face many challenges associated with infrastructure and health as the permafrost melts.

It is safe to conclude, then, that similar to the EDB, the EAEU, the AC, and the SCO (first four papers), non-democratic polities within regional governance seem to diverge from their rhetorical statements. Table 1 demonstrates a comparative approach to regional IOs as actors and their implications for environmental regional governance.

Table 1. Environmental Regionalism and International Organizations: The Case of Post-Communist Eurasia

Tripod
Regional IOs	Issues	Contributions by:
Autocratic Environmental Regionalism: NDROs and the role of autocracies
The EDB (vs. EBRD)	Agenda setting in documents; Legal documents as commitments; Social media as implementation.	Thomas Ambrosio, Stephen Hall, Anastassia Obydenkova
The EAEU	Effects of membership for air pollution (emissions)	Christopher Hartwell
The SCO	Rhetoric versus actions	Giovanni Agostinis and Francisco Urdinez
The AC	Image building; Search for Legitimacy; Rhetorical commitments	Kathryn Lavelle
Democratic Environmental Regionalism: The EU and post-Communist Eurasia
The EU	1) EU climate governance in FSRs 2) EU environmental CSOs in FSRs 3) EU and emissions in PCSs	1) Karina Shyrokykh 2) Aron Buzogany 3) Zafar Nazarov and A. Obydenkova
Post-Communist Eurasia	Environmental behavior at: 1) National level (emissions); and 2) Global level (climate forums)	1) Zafar Nazarov and A. Obydenkova 2) Jale Tosun and Mile Mišić

Democratic Environmental Regionalism: The EU and Post-Communist Eurasia

The second half of this Special Issue switches the focus of analysis from the large states (Russia and China) to embrace a bigger sample of PCSs. Indeed, post-Communist Eurasian states compose a unique region sharing a number of important similarities and historical legacies that marked their development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.¹⁴ Post-Communist Eurasia has passed through Communism; it experienced regime transition in the 1980s and 1990s (and in some cases democratization) influenced by the EU but also by Russia, China, and historical legacies. To sum up, post-Communist Eurasia is unique in many ways. The second section of this Special Issue thus considers the nexus of PCS and environmental governance from different perspectives, examining the implications of IOs for post-Communist Eurasia. It unfolds through the following four papers.

The EU External Climate Governance and Former Soviet Republics (FSRs)

The article by Karina Shyrokykh (2021) analyzes the EU’s external climate governance across six FSRs and looks into the triggers for the EU initiative. The article considers three logics behind the EU actions: self-interest (engagement with states to secure EU energy—Ukraine and Azerbaijan); functional logic (entails promotion of country- and sector-specific climate policies); and civilizing logic (promotion of climate policies equally across all the states involved—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine). After a detailed analysis of EU climate initiatives toward FSRs, the author concludes on the importance of all three logics with some predominance of the functional approach in the external climate governance of the EU. The author points out that the EU is the major actor in climate governance in Eurasia. Russia has been suspicious of the EU’s initiatives in FSRs, including the environmental ones (as Lavelle’s analysis also demonstrates). Russia attempts to impede those regional initiatives by offering competing economically beneficial projects (e.g., the EAEU; see Libman and Obydenkova 2018b). This argument echoes the findings of Hartwell on the consequences of membership in the EAEU and its implications for pollution.¹⁵

EU Environmental Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and FSRs

The article by Aron Buzogony continues zooming into EU external governance and environmental CSOs in two FSRs—Georgia and Ukraine. The article looks into the support provided by the EU for environmental reforms, social networks, and CSOs in former Soviet Eurasia. Buzogony singles out three perspectives of the EU influence on environmental CSOs in FSRs: resource mobilization aimed at funding; the opportunity perspective (e.g., provision of the EU association process, participatory rights, coalitions between CSOs and pockets of administration); and discourse (called “frames”). This EU initiative, as argued, may contribute to the diffusion of environmental ideas influencing public opinion and the environmental standing of civil society in the long run.

Global Forums on Climate Action and PCSs

The article by Jale Tosun and Mile Mišić (2021) places the post-Communist region, consisting of 28 PCSs, within the global context. It analyzes the participation of PCSs in global forums on climate action and investigates the reasons behind their participation. The analysis demonstrates that the most important motivation of PCSs is to gain access to knowledge via participation in global forums on climate action. The authors argue that PCSs are under pressure to fulfill obligations regarding the reduction of their GHGs. Participation in these forums is a tool for achieving this goal. The forums are viewed as sources of information on strategies, technologies, and policies to fulfill environmental obligations. They have become platforms of diffusion of relevant knowledge and sharing successful practices employed in member-states. Obviously, the next step on the agenda would be to ask whether participation in these global forums on climate action has had any influence on actually decreasing GHG emissions in PCSs. This will stay on the agenda for further studies.

Emissions and PCSs: Impact of History and the EU

The final article, by Zafar Nazarov and Anastassia Obydenkova, looks at one of the biggest challenges of climate change: the reduction of carbon emissions. The authors approach this issue by including the entire sample of all PCSs from a historical perspective covering the period 1970–2015. How have PCSs differed from the rest of the world in terms of carbon emissions during the period of Soviet rule and since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991? Answering this question sheds more light on modern trends and challenges in studies of carbon emissions and climate change, but also on the importance of political regimes. Analysis reveals that autocratization (democratic backsliding) has been associated with an increase in emissions. In contrast, democratization and EU membership have been associated with a decline in carbon emissions (controlling for all key variables crucial in emissions studies).

Conclusion

As the discussion above demonstrates, studies on authoritarian and environmental regionalisms share a few common aspects and can learn from each other’s insights. Their deeper engagement with each other’s findings could improve cross-disciplinary dialogue and push forward studies on sustainable development in general. The first aspect is the importance of the regional level. Scholars of REG have argued that a regional approach to sustainable development should open the path to more efficient global environmental governance (Conca 2012, 131), but it also opens the path to more efficient environmental policies at the national level, serving as a platform for diffusion of environmental norms, standards, and values, enhancing learning across states, and triggering spill-overs from regional to national levels. The AC demonstrates this in this Special Issue (see Lavelle 2021). The AC is a regional IO composed of democracies—except for Russia. Yet Russia being a member of this regional democratic club with partners concerned about sustainability and climate change among other issues has important implications. It is safe to assume that membership in this organization constrains and adjusts, at least to some extent, Russia’s foreign policy in the Arctic. It is also a platform for diffusion of norms and ideas.

Another issue uniting the studies on authoritarian and environmental regionalisms is the importance of legitimacy. In fact, the entire emergence of REG “is embedded within struggles for resources, recognition, and legitimacy within interlinked political and policy processes at multiple levels” (Gruby 2017, 25; my emphasis). Legitimacy is also one of the main driving forces behind the launching of regional IOs by both Russia and China. Those regional IOs are meant to boost the image of the leading states and to demonstrate the existence of international partners, to augment national and international legitimacy (see Ambrosio, Hall, and Obydenkova 2021 in this Issue). Rhetorical imitation of the values of sustainable development within these regional IOs plays a pronounced role in augmenting self-legitimacy and their image-building (e.g., Hall, Lenz, and Obydenkova 2021). A few studies have already discussed how these NDROs use the democratic vocabulary to imitate democracies-composed IOs (see Libman and Obydenkova 2018a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019). However, researchers have yet to consider how NDROs employ the ideas of sustainable development to augment their reputation in the eyes of national and international audiences. How can rhetorical statements and environmental commitments be further converted into policy implementation? How can the multilateral platforms of regional IOs be used in more successful and efficient implementations of environmental commitments? Such questions are highly important yet difficult to answer within the context of a lack of transparency and increasing security concerns, and they will remain on the research agenda.

To conclude, the studies on authoritarian and environmental regionalisms share a number of overlapping ideas and mutually important insights but have developed in parallel universes so far. These separate sets of literature need to engage with each other’s findings to advance our understanding of NDROs as actors for sustainable development and their role in global environmental politics. NDROs are highly important actors in world politics and economic development as well as potentially destructive for the environment if they are left unnoticed, under-studied, or ignored. Engaging with these actors through different regional platforms can be a more efficient way to advance the global goals of sustainable development, among other issues. Establishing scientific dialogue across studies on authoritarian and environmental regionalisms could be a crucial first step in this direction for both scholars and policymakers.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. I thank all my fellow contributors to this Special Issue for their inspiration, multiple rounds of feedback, and mutual support through many months of working on this project. I am especially grateful to Kathryn Lavelle, Jale Tosun, Christopher Hartwell, Giovanni Agostinis, Francisco Urdinez, Mile Mišić, Karina Shyrokykh, Stephen Hall, Aron Buzogány, Zafar Nazarov, and Thomas Ambrosio.

2. NDROs are regional IOs founded by and led by autocracies or whose membership is predominantly composed of non-democratic states, as defined in Obydenkova and Libman (2019). NDRO as a concept was first introduced in Libman and Obydenkova (2013) and is synonymous with the term “authoritarian regionalism” (Cooley 2015; Libman and Obydenkova 2018a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019).

3. The notions of “regionality” and of REG are still in development and scholars approach them differently (e.g., Debarbieux 2012). For example, some studies focus on REG through the lenses of regional international treaties or agreements (e.g., Balsiger and Prys 2016; Conca 2012; Gruby 2017). Conca (2012) defines progress in REG through “treaty-oriented grand strategy” (p. 127). It is not the purpose of this article to go into the detail of these theoretical debates and approaches. Here I follow the studies cited above and use REG, environmental regionalism, and regional environmentalism interchangeably.

4. Studies by (Balsiger and Prys 2016; Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012).

5. According to Freedom House, within the ASEAN at least a few states were defined as not-free (e.g., Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the rest as partly free (https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-net/scores).

6. The variety of non-democracies is also discussed in Obydenkova and Libman (2019).

7. Demchuk et al. (2021) demonstrated that in China, local government allies with people against the central government; in contrast, in Russia, people are ignored altogether; local government allies with business actors or with the central government.

8. “REG” was included in the wide set of studies of comparative regionalism (Börzel and Risse 2016 by Haas 2016). Thus, “regional governance” is part of regionalism studies.

9. For a detailed discussion of why non-democratic regional IOs are considered to be new actors of world politics, see Obydenkova and Libman (2019).

10. Rhetorical ER is obviously less binding than institutional ER but also interrelated with institutional ER (as it may build on existing legal commitments, if any). Yet, it is a highly important reflection of how regional IOs may matter in solving or ignoring unexpected environmental challenges, or in a worse scenario, how a regional IO can be held accountable for the emergence of these challenges.

11. Three aspects of ER (institutional, discursive, and consequential) are overlapping and are not mutually exclusive.

12. Studies explain this through the lack of trust in institutions associated with multilateralism and increased trust in personalities over institutions (Obydenkova and Arpino 2018; Obydenkova and Libman 2019). The issue of trust in a personality (a feature of bilateral relations) over institutional trust (multilateralism) is a predominant feature of China´s but also Russia´s foreign policies. Chinese subsidies and the role of trust in foreign policy also explain Russia´s support for expansion of the AC and possible backing of Chinese admission to the AC as an observer-state in 2013.

13. Yamal is the name of one of the Russia-owned regions in the Arctic.

14. On historical legacies, see Beissinger and Kotkin 2014; Libman and Obydenkova 2021; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017.

15. An example of competing offers on the part of Russia would be the membership in the EAEU, which does not entail any clear environmental conditionality, in contrast to the initiatives launched by the EU. On competition between the EAEU versus EU, see Libman and Obydenkova 2018b; on the EAEU see Hartwell 2021.