ABSTRACT
While Karácsony’s win as Budapest’s Mayor seemed a significant breakthrough in challenging Hungary’s illiberal populist regime, opposition mayors in populist regimes are understudied, so the nature of the breakthrough was unclear. As illiberal populist regimes are as dense vertical networks, to expand liberal democracy, opposition mayors make governance networks more horizontal by increasing information, expanding participation, limiting the ruling party’s rent-seeking and clientelism, and (re)creating social solidarity. Central governments try to counter these efforts. Karácsony’s progress and challenges in Budapest illustrate this network model.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank András László Pap, Balázs Dobos, Dániel Oross, Sherrill Stroschein, and Márton Rövid for their insights, help in arranging meetings, and/or reading versions of this article.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).