Michael Oakeshott’s Skepticism

Abstract

In the debate about Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy there is very little agreement on the theoretical and historical meaning of his skepticism. Starting from the assumption that skepticism is not a fixed theory but a tradition of ideas, this article draws on both published texts and archival materials to contend that Oakeshott developed his thought by confronting himself with, and even merging, different strands of skepticism: the ancient, the modern, as represented by Hobbes and Montaigne, and the idealist, as conceived by F. H. Bradley. The article firstly shows Oakeshott’s awareness of ancient skepticism, even though its impact on his thought is contested and controversial. With regard to modern skepticism, it looks at how Oakeshott defines Hobbes’s skepticism in his “Introduction to Leviathan.” It also examines the relevance of Montaigne to Oakeshott’s image of conversation, his idea of human agency and conception of politics. Finally, the article illustrates the influence of Bradley’s skepticism on Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and reveals the consistency between Oakeshott’s skepticism and idealism. What emerges is a complex picture, in which Oakeshott’s skepticism is a constellation of elements taken from a variety of sources.

Acknowledgement

I am very grateful to David Boucher, Bruce Haddock, Bill Mander, and Efraim Podoksik for their comments on earlier versions of this article. I also thank the participants to the 2011 meeting of the British Idealism Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association and to the 2013 conference of the Michael Oakeshott Association.

Notes

1. Michael Oakeshott, “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” in The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 172; “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1991), 493; hereafter abbreviated as “VP” and cited in the text; “Political Education,” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 44; The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).

2. Neal Wood, “A Guide to the Classics: The Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott,” Journal of Politics 21 (1959): 647–62; Paul Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 140–56; Roy Tseng, The Sceptical Idealist: Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of the Enlightenment (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003); Aryeh Botwinick, Oakeshott’s Skepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

3. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); hereafter abbreviated as EIM and cited in the text. Though widely shared, the interpretation according to which Oakeshott was an Absolute Idealist in his Experience and Its Modes is not unanimous; see Efraim Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), 43.

4. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); hereafter abbreviated as OHC and cited in the text. Steven A. Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000); James Alexander, “Oakeshott as a Philosopher,” in The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott, ed. Efraim Podoksik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9–41.

5. Cf. John Christian Laursen, “Oakeshott’s Skepticism and the Skeptical Traditions,” European Journal of Political Theory 4 (2005): 37–55.

6. Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity, 35–36.

7. Michael Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan,” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 221–94.

8. Hume is little present in Oakeshott’s texts and notebooks. However, Roy Tseng shows some affinities between Oakeshott and Hume in his “Scepticism in Politics: A Dialogue between Michael Oakeshott and John Dunn,” History of Political Thought 34 (2013): 143–70. See also W. John Coats, Oakeshott and his Contemporaries (London: Associated University Press, 2000), 89–102.

9. This is contended in Laursen, “Oakeshott’s Skepticism and the Skeptical Traditions,”40-41.

10. On the relevance of the British Idealist context, see David Boucher, “Oakeshott in the Context of British Idealism,” in The Cambridge Companion, 247–73. On that of German philosophy, see Efraim Podoksik, “Oakeshott in the Context of German Idealism,” in The Cambridge Companion, 274–95.

11. Eduard Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. Oswald J. Reichel (London: Longmans, 1840); Alfred W. Benn, The Greek Philosophers, 2 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1882); John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: A & C Black, 1920); Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1906), and Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors (London: Methuen, 1918); James F. Ferrier, Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1866); George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates (London: J. Murray, 1867); Thomas H. Green, “The Philosophy of Aristotle,” in Works, ed. R. L. Nettleship and P. Nicholson, 5 vols. (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1997), 3.46–91; Bernard Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (London: Rivington Percival, 1895). On the influences of these studies on Oakeshott’s thought, see Eric Kos, Michael Oakeshott, The Ancient Greeks and the Philosophical Study of Politics (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007).

12. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/4/1. Parts of this notebook are now published in Michael Oakeshott, Notebooks 1922–86, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2014), 22–23.

13. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/4/1, 20. This passage is not included in the recent edition of Oakeshott’s notebooks.

14. Oakeshott’s notes on De re publica are to be found in some loose papers in LSE/OAKESHOTT/3/17. The episode is also presented in Plutarch, Cato Maior 22–23.

15. Michael Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, ed. Terry Nardin and Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), 163–64.

16. Alexander, “Oakeshott as a Philosopher,” 23.

17. On the relation between theory and practice in Oakeshott, see Davide Orsi, “Oakeshott on Practice, Normative Thought and Political Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2015, doi:10.1080/09608788.2015.1007117. See also, Terry Nardin, “Oakeshott on theory and practice,” Global Discourse, 2014, doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.976921.

18. On Oakeshott’s international political theory see, Davide Orsi, “Michael Oakeshott’s Political Philosophy of Civil Association and Constructivism in International Relations,” Journal of International Political Theory, 2015, doi: 10.1177/1755088215575091.

19. Cf. Oakeshott, “Thomas Hobbes,” in The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 110–21, and “Dr. Leo Strauss on Hobbes,” in Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 132–49.

20. On this point, see Ian Tregenza, “Oakeshott’s Contribution to Hobbes Scholarship,” in The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott, 274–95; and a rather critical account in Noel Malcom, “Oakeshott and Hobbes,” in A Companion to Oakeshott, 217–31.

21. See Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 44–63.

22. Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan,” 226 n. 3.

23. Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan,” 239, 249 n. 16.

24. Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan,” 245.

25. Cf. John Christian Laursen, “Oakeshott’s Skepticism and the Skeptical Traditions,” 40.

26. See, for example, Antoine Compagnon, Nous. Michel de Montaigne (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980); Marcel Conche, Montaigne et la philosophie (Villiers-sur-mer: Éd. de Mégare 1987), 41. On the relation between Hobbes and Montaigne, see Gianni Paganini, Skepsis: les débats des modernes sur le scepticisme (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 2008), 171–227.

27. For a description of the notebooks, see Luke O’Sullivan, “Editorial Introduction,” in Oakeshott, Notebooks, ix–xxxv.

28. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/13. See Oakeshott, Notebooks, 284. On Oakeshott’s acquaintance with Montaigne in his early years, see Robert Grant, Oakeshott (London: Claridge Press, 1990), 4.

29. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/20; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 517, 520.

30. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/14, 36.

31. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/19, 11; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 482.

32. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/20, 69; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 521.

33. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/1/19, 15; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 483–84.

34. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/4/3; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 307–363.

35. LSE/OAKESHOTT, 2/4/3, 2; see Oakeshott, Notebooks, 309.

36. LSE/OAKESHOTT/2/4/3, 17; see, Oakeshott, Notebooks, 324 n. 44.

37. Michel de Montaigne, “On some verses of Virgil,” in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (London: Hamilton, 1958), 3.5, 671. All citations from this edition will be referred to by book number, followed by chapter and page numbers.

38. LSE/OAKESHOTT/1/1/46, now in Michael Oakeshott, What is History?, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), 187.

39. See Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 73–74.

40. See also Oakeshott, EIM, 48; OHC, 12–19.

41. See, Edmund Neill, Michael Oakeshott (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 11–78.

42. Montaigne, “That to philosophize is to learn to die,” in Complete Essays, 1.20, 62. This passage is quoted in French in Oakeshott, OHC, 73 n. 1.

43. Biancamaria Fontana, Montaigne’s Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 124–28.

44. Montaigne, “By diverse means we arrive at the same end,” in Complete Essays, 1.1, 5.

45. See Noël O’Sullivan, “Oakeshott on Civil Association,” in A Companion to Oakeshott, 290–311.

46. Cf. Ian Tregenza, Michael Oakeshott on Hobbes: A Study in the Renewal of Ideas (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003). See also Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, 77–123.

47. See Fontana, Montaigne’s Politics, 35–42. See also Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 244–308.

48. Montaigne, “Of custom, and not easily changing an accepted law,” in Complete Works, 1.23, 77–90.

49. Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, 75–76; see also Hartle, Accidental Philosopher, 220.

50. Michael Oakeshott, “On Being Conservative,” in Rationalism in Politics, 435. See Timothy. Fuller, “Foreword,” in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, 13–21; Patrick Riley, “The Voice of Michael Oakeshott in the Conversation of Mankind,” Political Theory 19 (1991): 334–35.

51. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), viii.

52. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Kegan Paul, 1892), 3.363.

53. On the evolution of Hegel’s thought on skepticism, see Kenneth R. Westphal, “Hegel’s Manifold Response to Scepticism in The Phenomenology of Spirit,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 103 (2003), 149–78.

54. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2.330.

55. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977), 23.

56. William Mander, British Idealism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 69.

57. Henry Jones, “Idealism and Epistemology,” in The Scottish Idealists, ed. David Boucher (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 106–40.

58. LSE/OAKESHOTT/18/1. Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart, Philosophical Studies (London: E. Arnold 1934), 186–87.

59. Robert Stern even considers British idealism as a non-metaphysical form of Hegelianism; see his, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 117–42.

60. See, for instance, F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 590–91.

61. Bradley, Appearence and Reality, 1.454. See Mander, British Idealism, 114–15.

62. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 433, 440.

63. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, x, 429.

64. David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, British Idealism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2012), 40.

65. On this point, see William Mander, An Introduction to Bradley’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 158–64.

66. David Boucher, “The Victim of Thought: The Idealist Inheritance,” in A Companion to Oakeshott, 59.

67. Luke O’Sullivan, “Editorial Introduction,” in Michael Oakeshott, Early Political Writings, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 30. The quote is from a 1925 ms entitled “A Discussion of Some Matter Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy,” now in Early Political Writings, 66.

68. On Oakeshott’s conception of philosophical criticism, see Davide Orsi, “Philosophy and Criticism: Conversation in Oakeshott’s Thought,” Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 18 (2012): 7–29.

69. This can be found in Oakeshott, EIM, 82; “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” 181; “VP,” 491–95; and OHC, 3 n. 1.

70. This is contended in Steven Anthony Gerencser in The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, 3, 6, 35–37. See also Terry Nardin, The Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2001), 44–45. I am instead elaborating on the interpretation defended in Boucher, “The Victim of Thought: The Idealist Inheritance,” in A Companion to Oakeshott, 58–64.

Additional information

Funding

I gratefully acknowledge a Research Training Support Grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.