Science contra the Meditations: The Existence of Material Things

ABSTRACT

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes intends to prove that material things exist. His proof, which centers on the origin of the ideas of material things, has frequently been judged weak. But there is another proof—centered on the existence of one’s own body—that assumes as a starting point the feelings of pain and pleasure, which recent interpreters consider more substantial than the proof from the ideas of external objects. I argue that the doubt raised in the Sixth Meditation regarding the deceptions of internal senses, such as pain and pleasure, suggests that the most critical doubt about the existence of one’s own body comes from that very science that the Meditations intend to validate, in particular from physiology. As the proof of the existence of one’s own body grounded on pain and pleasure exploits the results of Cartesian physiology, it is precisely these feelings that show that it is not possible to prove that one’s own body and external bodies exist. Thus, instead of permitting a simpler answer to the question of the existence of one’s own body and external bodies, Descartes’ novel theory of physiology makes it impossible to give a satisfactory solution to exactly this question. This conclusion, moreover, is confirmed by Descartes’ followers such as La Forge and Malebranche.

KEYWORDS:

• Descartes
• Sixth Meditation
• existence of material things
• physiology

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Marion, Sur la pensée passive de Descartes, 95.

2. See Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité. VI° Eclaircissement, Oeuvres Complète (OC) III, 60–64; Elucidations of the Search after Truth, Elucidation Six, 572–74; Leibniz, Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum, II,1, in Leibniz, Die philosophische Schriften, IV, 366–67. The weaknesses of this proof are recalled and stressed by Marion, Sur la pensée passive de Descartes, 36–49.

3. Marion, Sur la pensée passive de Descartes, 89.

4. See Chamberlain, “The body I call ‘mine’.”

5. Marion, Sur la pensée passive de Descartes, 96.

6. Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, VII, 20; Philosophical Writings of Descartes, II, 12. Hereafter all references in the text are to the Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Adam and Tannery, cited as AT, followed by volume and page numbers; to Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, cited as CSM, followed by volume and page numbers; and to Philosophical Writings, Vol. III: The Correspondence, translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny, cited as CSMK followed by page numbers.

7. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, IV, §§190–95. See Kambouchner, Descartes et la philosophie morale, 77–114.

8. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy II, §2.

9. Kambouchner, “Meditation sixième,” 194.

10. Ibid., 177.

11. See Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes; Bitbol-Hespériès, La médecine et l’union dans la Méditation sixième; Meschini, Neurofisiologia cartesiana.

12. Fracastoro, Turrius.

13. Descartes reports the same case in Principia philosophiae IV, §196. See Bitbol-Hespériès, La médecine et l’union dans la Méditation sixième.

14. Kolesnik-Antoine, “‘Comme un pilote en son navire’.”

15. Scribano, “Quel che Dio non può fare.”

16. Malebranche, Elucidation Six, 571; OC III, 58.

17. Ibid., 570; OC III, 56.

18. Scribano, Macchine con la mente, 34–40.

19. La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, 229.

20. Ibid., 221.

21. Ibid., 253.

22. Malebranche, Elucidation Six, 570; OC III, 56.

23. Ibid., 571; OC III, 59.

24. Ibid., 571–72; OC III, 59.

25. Regius, Explicatio Mentis Humanae, 344; Cordemoy, Six Discours, 154–55; Malebranche, Sixth Elucidation, 574; OC III, 64.

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Notes on contributors

Emanuela Scribano

Emanuela Scribano is Professor Emeritus of the History of Philosophy at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy. She has published widely on the history of modern philosophy, mainly on Descartes and Spinoza. Her publications include L’existence de Dieu. Histoire de la preuve ontologique de Descartes à Kant (Seuil, 2002); A Reading Guide to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (St. Augustine’s Press, 2016); and Anges et bienheureux (Vrin, 2021).