Notes
Notes
1. Cf. N. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981); H. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); H. P. Reeder, “Wittgenstein was Never a Phenomenologist,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20.3 (1989): 257–77; S. S. Mulhall, On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing and Aspects (London: Routledge, 1990); L. Nagl and C. Mouffe, eds, The Legacy of Wittgenstein: Pragmatism or Deconstruction (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2001).
2. Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
3. As Wittgenstein says in 2.13, “In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.” And later, at 2.221, “What a picture represents is its sense.”
4. In an apparent effort to combat the threat of relativism, Lawn also shows how Wittgenstein promotes a version of naturalism, whereby all human beings possess an innate, trans-historical capacity for certain gestures and expressions (119–23).