Hendrik de Man and Attila József: On Soft and Hard Conditions of Socialism

Abstract

This article compares Hendrik de Man's (1885–1953) neo-Marxist approach with that of the Hungarian poet Attila József (1905–37). It suggests that de Man's “refinement” of Marxism amounts to foregrounding psychological aspects; he tends to replace “hard,” political or economic elements of Marxist and neo-Marxist theories with “soft,” psychological elements. For him Intellectual Socialism stands in opposition to Labor Socialism. This view may have challenged the synthesis-makers, including József, who sees himself as a “proletarian poet”: in his poetry he formulates the optimal relationship between the new intelligentsia and the proletariat, addressing the philosophical dilemmas raised by de Man. Whereas for de Man, Marx and philosophical Marxism are both of the past, demanding a mechanical interpretation, for József, Marxism—approached with no intention at revision—is a valid theory that calls for certain adjustments. His aspiration, even if unintended, is a correction and criticism of de Man's superficial categorization. Whereas de Man finds in Marxism the deterministic logic of eighteenth-century natural science, which analogy justifies its psychological refinement, for József the notion of law is always bound to society and history.

Notes

NOTES

1. Attila József, “Hegel—Marx—Freud,” ‘Szép Szó’ 21.4 (January–February 1938): fasc. 1, 18. All quotations from the Hungarian were translated by the author.

2. In the Preface to his major work, de Man explains what he wanted to accomplish by labeling his “relativization” of Marxism an “exceeding” of it and not a “revision,” “continuation,” “accommodation,” or “progress.” Such a distribution of terms indicates his eclecticism. “Exceeding” suggests a contrast with the developments up to that point; this pragmatic psychological term is not theoretical or in any other way scientific. Hendrik de Man, Zur Psychologie des Socialismus. Zweite neue umgearbeitete Auflage (Jena, 1926; rpt., 1927), 4; [The Psychology of Socialism, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928)].

3. See Udo Leuschner, Entfremdung—Neurose—Ideologie (Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1990), S. 126–34; and Piet Tommissen, “Hendrik de Man: Wanderer zwischen den politischen Welten. Jenseits von Karl Marx,” in http://www.jungefreiheit.de (1998, no. 35, p. 21).

4. See Endre Kiss, “Történelem és világnézet. A II. Internacionálé irodalomfelfogása Németországban,” in “A marxista irodalomelmélet története” [“History and View: The Second Internationale's Concept of Literature in Germany”], in A History of Marxist History of Literature (Budapest, 1981), 91–125; “Geschichte und Weltanschauung, Literaturtheorie bei Franz Mehring und,” in “Die Neue Zeit,” in Annales Universitatis Scientiarum de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, Sectio Philosophica et Sociologica, Tomus 17 (Budapest, 1983), 231–49.

5. De Man posits “Weltgefühl” (some kind of “feeling of the world”)—that is, the psychological realities—in the center of the interpretation of intellectual processes; in using the terms “psychological Stoss,” and “psychological jolt” (from American English) he indicates his line of thought, and thus the innovation of his whole Marxist-critique. See Psychologie des Sozialismus, 4–5. This reality is summarized by Leuschner: “With Hendrik de Man, psychology substitutes philosophy multiple times.” See Leuschner, Entfremdung—Neurose—Ideologie, 128.

6. This is shown in the characteristic title of one of his works: The Remaking of a Mind: A Soldier's Thoughts on War and Reconstruction (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1919), a modified edition of which was published in Brussels under the title La Lecon de la Guerre.

7. One consequence of de Man's eclectic discourse is that still today he is recognized as an economic psychologist in the professional literature.

8. Attila József, “Új szocializmust! Hort Dezső könyve” [“New Socialism! Dezső Hort's Book”], in Összes Művei [Complete Works]), vol. 3 (Budapest, 1958), 176–79. It is known that Hendrik de Man was popular among the young Hungarian left-wing intellectuals (see, for example, Pál Sándor's memoirs). But because de Man was seen as a “revisionist” all along, his reception could only be part of the “secret” history of the movement. Thus, the real history of Marxism was annihilated by official Marxism and existing socialism.

9. Although József was familiar with several “planist” approaches, as may be seen in his other works, he may have consciously limited himself to the universal philosophical aspects in this review.

10. See Endre Kiss, “A történelem futószalagán. József Attila marxizmusáról” [“On the Production-Line of History: Attila József 's Marxism”], in Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980), nos. 5–6, 581–90.

11. József, Complete Works, vol. 3, 178.

12. Ibid.

13. In this work, Die sozialistische Idee, de Man partly re-formulates Weber's critical approach against the specific Marxian view of history by developing the concept of “Socialism as a consequence of protestant ethics.”

14. József, Complete Works, vol. 3, 178.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. Another example of the severance of “social existence” or “social ontology” may be found in the following passage: “First, we should work out today's whole giant mechanical culture and find that we don’t have to search for the source of recurrent disturbances in each man's relation to the other only in the lack of physical power, i.e. in that we’re at the mercy of external nature and that we’re at the mercy of our own fancies and those of others; moreover, the more protected we are outside, the more defenseless we are inside.” See: http://www.magyarirodalom.elte.hu/ja, no. 80.

17. See, for example, this remark: “In the following—concordant with his former writings—he (József) doesn’t consider the sociological, but the philosophical subject-matter of Marxism important”: Miklós Szabolcsi, Kész a leltár [The List is Ready] (Budapest, 1998), 525. To summarize the antagonism of de Man and József: for József, Marxism (with the exception of Freudism) is psychology itself, while for de Man, all psychological theories are overvalued, while Marxist theories have definitely lost their value. The following sentence by de Man summarizes this point: “Marxism is incompetent to explain how this mass affect originates. The rationalist foundations of the doctrine impose an obstacle. To the Marxists it seems that the class struggle, the struggle for surplus value which expands into a struggle for socialization, is the direct and necessary consequence of a particular mode of production, of an economic category”: Documentary Study of Hendrik de Man, Socialist Critic of Marxism, comp. trans. and ed. Peter Dodge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 146.

18. This hypothesis could simplify several points in József 's biography and career. Dodge also touches on de Man's role in the development of this new class: “With the publication in 1926 of his critique of Marxism entitled The Psychology of Socialism he became a figure of international importance in Continental intellectual circles. At the same time he was regarded as a renegade by the socialist Old Guard and as such was effectively removed from influence within the parties claiming Marxist orthodoxy by a policy of ostracism. For the wider public (!) however, the singular attraction of the book lay in the fact that, while the object of the attack was familiar, the intent of the author … corresponded to the need of many a socialist sympathizer” (Dodge, Documentary Study, 135).

19. Ideal work, the outlines of which de Man takes from William Morris and John Ruskin, might be defined as follows: “The greatest happiness is the satisfaction of our highest impulses, and there is no higher one than the drive to create, the constructive instinct” (Cf. Le Control Ouvrier, in Documentary Study, 102). But, whereas according to Morris's or Ruskin's views, the praise of handicrafts is mixed with utopist and romantic elements, the “joy of work” is a legitimate demand.

20. De Man, Psychologie des Sozialismus, 163.

21. Here is the most developed formulation of de Man's philosophical credo, the duality of hard and soft points (from La Crise du Socialism): “I made a considerable effort to explain that … there were no ultimate causes, ideological or economic, known to social science. It is precisely this principle of causality that I am attacking. And the method of this attack is psychoanalytic: I have tried to demonstrate that all causal sociological theory is only a scientific disguise of an emotional evaluation of motives, that each sociological system establishes its ultimate historical causes from the present-day motives with which it is concerned” (Documentary Study, 164). The soft interest also refers to objective elements that were omitted from Marxist research up to that time, like the problems of nation or nationalism. In this respect, József follows de Man (see Documentary Study, 176–77).

22. De Man, Psychologie des Sozialismus, 163.

23. It should be re-emphasized that in his own way of theory building, de Man was the most efficient spokesman and representative of the so-called “Intelligenzlersozialismus.” This giant categorization (which had a more defining role in neo-Marxism than the Hungarian movement at the time) is criticized by Robert Michels, who sees de Man's political-sociological views on the intelligentsia as invalid [Robert Michels, Masse, Führer, Intelektuelle (Frankfurt, 1987), 208–9].

24. De Man, Psychologie des Sozialismus, 163.

25. An example of a theoretical dimension may be found in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, 164; de Man tends to turn to this intellectual method as he seemingly acknowledges the importance of “hard” motives, then, by making them seem alternative and competitive, he makes the choice between them dependent on “soft” motives. Another example may be found in Le controle ouvrier: “When we propose to study the psychological aspect of workers’ control or any other institution, we wish to treat the question from the viewpoint of the soul of the men who are involved in that institution. … in entering into the path of workers’ control the union movement is going to encounter more and more often questions of a moral content, psychological questions, indeed what can be called the psychology of technology. … It must give to these questions a much greater importance than they have been granted up until now” (Documentary Study, 110).

26. De Man, Psychologie des Sozialismus, 164. One of the most important features of de Man's intellectual attitude is that, while he talks as a critic of doctrines and organizations on behalf of the new intellectual class, he sees it as a deficiency of historical Marxism that socialism was not the intellectual product of the working class but of other groups of society: “Socialist teachings are not a product of the awakening of class consciousness among the workers; on the contrary, they are an essential preliminary to such an awakening. … Socialists teachings, those of Marx and Engels not excepted, sprang from other sources than the class interest of the proletariat. They are products, not of the cultural poverty of the proletariat, but of the cultural wealth of instructed members of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy” (Documentary Study, 143). As a representative of the anti-mechanical and the soft view, he doesn’t notice the contradiction, when he draws attention to the academic degrees of the working class leaders (i.e. not intellectuals) with an intention of unveiling (Cf. 153).

27. One of many examples: De Man, Psychologie des Sozialismus, 164.

28. At this point, leitmotives of great poems, which can also be taken as theses, acquire philosophical significance that cannot be substituted by the concept of traditional conceptual poetry.

29. See http://www.magyarirodalom.elte.hu/ja, no. 80.

30. It is surprising that the “soft” and “psychologizing” de Man is Leninist on this question (another example of his eclecticism). Here is an example from Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus: “The proletariat is not a reality but a concept” (Documentary Study, 149).

31. See the Preface to Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus; but the contrast itself often appears in the argumentation of every significant work, in the spirit of de Man's well-known theoretical work. Here is a typical description from Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus: “our historical study of Marxism and the Marxist movement will show us that the method is rooted in the philosophical theories that were dominant during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, theories which may provisionally be summarized in the catchwords ‘determinism’, ‘causal mechanism’, ‘historicism’, ‘rationalism’, and ‘economic hedonism’” (Documentary Study, 104).

32. De Man eliminates the “hard” factor of social interests with the theoretical catch already mentioned: he makes them seem alternative, competitive, controversial, so it becomes inevitable to trace them back on the sphere of “soft” psychology. While making these efforts, he seems to confuse (one example: La Crise du Socialisme, 1927) the sensitivity for soft elements of society and history with the question of the validity of scientific rationality: “I dispute that the social attitudes of individuals and of masses can be explained by causality” (Documentary Study, 163).