Funding Poverty Law in an Era of Decentralization

ABSTRACT

This article explores intergovernmental relations, discretionary authority and the effect of state political ideology on the nature of civil legal representation in the United States. I examine support for legal services from 1996 to 1999 using data gathered by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC). A Heckman (1976) selection model is employed to test several hypotheses regarding states' decisions to supplement the federal funding for legal services. I find that state citizen political ideology, economic capacity of the state, and institutional design shape the decision-making environment for civil legal services. In addition, I find evidence that suggests that states are sensitive to shifts in intergovernmental relations in the area of legal services.

KEYWORDS:

• Poverty law
• legal services
• state funding
• Legal Services Corporation
• federalism

Thanks to Susette Talarico, Scott Ainsworth, Stefanie Lindquist, Mark Kessler, Stephen Wasby, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this project. All errors remain my own.

Notes

1. From 1975 to 1981 LSC appropriations grew from $90 million to $300 million in 1980 to $321 million in 1981 (LSC Fact Book 1987). The political environment was marked by relatively little opposition to LSC programs, due in large part to both the political insularity of the organization as well as the restrictions placed on its law reform activities. All of that changed with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Though a powerful coalition of supporters were able to protect the LSC from abolition, the Reagan administration sought to limit the activities (and funding) of the LSC by distributing the responsibility for legal aid to the private sector—to private attorneys, through an emphasis on pro bono representation. Consistent with this approach, the LSC appropriation for fiscal year 1983 was $241 million (LSC Fact Book, 1984).

2. Other important sources of funds include contributions connected to the Violence Against Women Act, the Older Americans Act, Title XX (social services block grants), revenue sharing, and community development block grants. Also, providers may receive financial support generated from Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), cy pres awards, state bar association contributions, the United Way, and foundation grants for example.

3. Drawn from an analysis of state funding for legal services from 1985–1990 (Harward, 2007).

4. No data other than LSC data are available prior to 1996. Since 1996 the American Bar Association has maintained a tracking system for funding for state legal services providers (the Project to Expand Resources for Legal Services, or PERLS network). I have opted to use the LSC data for the 1996–1999 years in part because the effect of the changes in rules is only felt by LSC recipients. Future research on funding strategies of states may do well to begin to bridge the two sets of data to provide a comprehensive account of funding for legal services in each state after 1996.

5. The Alaska outlier has been excluded from the independent equation estimating the likelihood of a state choosing to appropriate. There is no good theoretical reason why Alaska's high transportation costs, remoteness, and so forth should affect the state's decision to appropriate or not appropriate. Morever, its inclusion in the second independent equation, reflecting the amount of a state's appropriation, contributes very little to the analysis. Its effect is marginal, adding very little to the model, and has therefore been excluded from the reported results in the second equation. Excluding all AK observations from the estimation had little effect on the model coefficients and overall results.