The Natural Behavior Debate: Two Conceptions of Animal Welfare

ABSTRACT

The performance of natural behavior is commonly used as a criterion in the determination of animal welfare. This is still true, despite many authors having demonstrated that it is not a necessary component of welfare – some natural behaviors may decrease welfare, while some unnatural behaviors increase it. Here I analyze why this idea persists, and what effects it may have. I argue that the disagreement underlying this debate on natural behavior is not one about which conditions affect welfare, but a deeper conceptual disagreement about what the state of welfare actually consists of. Those advocating natural behavior typically take a “teleological” view of welfare, in which naturalness is fundamental to welfare, while opponents to the criterion usually take a “subjective” welfare concept, in which welfare consists of the subjective experience of life by the animal. I argue that as natural functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding welfare, we should move away from the natural behavior criterion to an alternative such as behavioral preferences or enjoyment. This will have effects in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in how we provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting.

KEYWORDS:

• Animal welfare
• natural behavior
• teleological welfare
• subjective welfare

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Kim Sterelny and Ben Fraser for assistance and comments on drafts of this article. Thanks also to three anonymous reviewers, whose detailed comments helped to improve and clarify this manuscript.

Notes

1. There can be additional reasons aside from welfare to prefer natural behavior for zoo animals – the maintenance of wild behaviors in animals that may be released, as well as the educational benefits to (and esthetic preferences of) the viewing public – but most often they are emphasized for welfare reasons.

2. See Swaisgood (2007) for a useful summary of theories about the relationship between behavior and welfare in this sense.

3. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

4. This means that welfare concerns only apply to those animals capable of experiencing mental states (sentience). Exactly which animals are sentient is then a matter for empirical investigation. See Jones (2013) for an overview on the current state of research in this area.

5. Thanks to Ben Fraser for this example.

Additional information

Funding

This research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.