Coming into the cold: Asia's Arctic interests

Abstract

In their Arctic strategy documents, the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the USA) all point to increased traffic and regional activity as a promising economic possibility and a security and governance challenge. These developments have not gone unnoticed by non-Arctic states who have demonstrated an increasing interest in the region, most noticeably through their successful applications to gain permanent observer status in the preeminent regional forum – the eight-country Arctic Council. We argue that the rising interest of non-Arctic actors highlights some interesting questions about how governance in the region will develop and how Arctic states envision the region's global significance. This article engages with questions about Arctic governance through a study of the Arctic interests of four Asian states (China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) and how Arctic states are meeting this increased interest. We focus on the varied reception of non-Arctic states by established Arctic actors, namely the USA, Russia, and Norway, and how they have reacted to the idea of Asian observer states in the Arctic Council. This study is primarily based on a set of qualitative interviews with civil servants and nonstate actors engaged in Arctic governance, media reports and primary documents.

Introduction

In their Arctic strategy documents, the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the USA) all point to increased traffic and regional activity as a promising economic possibility and a security and governance challenge. These developments have not gone unnoticed by non-Arctic states who have demonstrated an increasing interest in the region (Blunden 2012; Jakobson and Lee 2013; Manicom and Lackenbauer 2013; Wegge 2012), most recently through their successful applications to gain permanent observer status in the preeminent regional forum – the eight-country Arctic Council. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is now recognized by nearly all state and nonstate actors interested in Arctic developments as the basis for the Arctic's legal regime and the division of responsibilities between coastal states, we argue that the rising interest of non-Arctic actors highlights some interesting questions about how governance in the region will develop and how Arctic states envision the region's global significance.

This article engages with these questions about Arctic governance through a study of the Arctic interests of four Asian states (China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) and how Arctic states are meeting this increased interest. While both the more novel and long-standing Arctic interests of Asian states have been sufficiently mapped out elsewhere, the reaction of Arctic states to this rising interest has remained understudied.

Consequently, we focus on the varied reception of non-Arctic states by established Arctic actors. This is done through case studies of how the USA, Russia, and Norway have reacted to the idea of Asian observer states in the Arctic Council. In other words: to what extent do the USA, Norway, and Russia welcome Asian countries into the Arctic cold? These countries are selected as the USA and Russia are important in setting the overall tone of Arctic politics (Wegge 2011; Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud 2013), while Norway is an important policy entrepreneur in the region and invests a significant amount of funding and political capital in shaping Arctic governance (Jensen and Hønneland 2011; Tamnes 2011; Wilson Rowe 2013).

We first introduce some conceptual background and then explore the broad lines of how Arctic governance has developed in the post-Cold War period. Next, we present the Arctic policies and interests of four Asian countries with expressed interest in the Arctic – China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. The responses of the USA, Norway, and Russia to these states' increased interest are then examined and the overall significance (or lack thereof) of new actors in Arctic governance is discussed in the conclusion.

This study is based on interview data and document and media analysis. More specifically, we carried out a set of 27 qualitative interviews with civil servants and nonstate actors engaged in Arctic governance (see Appendix 1). American, Russian, and Norwegian media before and after the Arctic Council 2013 ministerial meeting (during which the Asian states in question were granted permanent observer status, along with Italy and India) and primary documents outlining the Arctic policies and interests of all seven countries were also analyzed.

Analyzing the ‘conduct of conduct’ in Arctic politics

Although less common today than five years ago, ‘Race for the Arctic’ and the ‘New Cold War’ remain regular newspaper headlines when it comes to coverage of Arctic affairs. In popular media, the Arctic is often portrayed as a zone of potential conflict – with unresolved boundary issues, rapidly changing sea ice cover and tempting natural resources forming a potentially explosive political cocktail.¹ However, the region possesses a strong track record of post-Cold War peace and cooperation (Stokke and Hønneland 2007) and political leaders and civil servants representing Arctic states have gradually become a coordinated chorus extolling the peacefulness of the region (Wilson Rowe 2012).

During the Cold War, the Arctic's primary significance in international relations was as the shortest distance between the two superpower opponents of the Cold War – the USA and the Soviet Union (Young 1992). Following the end of the Cold War, the governments and peoples of the Arctic increasingly engaged in a range of cooperative activities designed to address issues of shared concern and to raise the profile of the Arctic as a political and geographical region. The subsequent proliferation of activities aimed at promoting stable and ongoing cooperation in the circumpolar North had to do with the Arctic being a relatively secure source of nonrenewable resources (oil, gas, and minerals), awareness of the heightened impact of global environmental problems (such as global warming and transboundary pollutants) on the Arctic environment, and the increased politicization of Arctic indigenous peoples (Keskitalo 2004; Kraska 2011; Stokke and Hønneland 2007; Tennberg 2000; Young 1992, 2009).

This focus on the North led to the creation of several new international organizations and cooperative endeavors in the 1990s, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). The Arctic coastal states such as Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the USA have also taken to meeting biannually to discuss issues of particular interest to Arctic coastal states more specifically. In particular, these states have been coordinated in asserting the primacy and sufficiency of existing international law, which gives these coastal states a special responsibility and authority in regional governance questions (Ilulissat Declaration 2008; Wegge 2011).

This article draws especially upon the debates around non-Arctic states' applications for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council and thus the forum – and that process – merit more attention here as background for the country-specific analyses that follow. The Arctic Council has high-level representatives from all of the eight Arctic states (Canada, Finland, Greenland/Denmark, Iceland, Norway Russia, Sweden, and the USA), indigenous peoples of the Arctic region participate as ‘permanent participants,’ and a number of non-Arctic states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have observer status. Permanent observers are allowed to attend Council meetings and submit written statements (and may, at the discretion of the Chair, make oral statements as well). Decision-making within the Council is contingent upon full consensus and council membership and decisions at all levels are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight Arctic states with the involvement of the permanent participants (Arctic Council 2013a).

The Council operates on several levels with Senior Arctic Officials (representing their respective countries) meeting at least once a year and higher-level ‘ministerial meetings’ occurring every second year. The Council's six working groups, focusing on different aspects of the Arctic environment and economy and involving both civil servants and expert contributors, meet several times a year according to their own work plans. The Council's work is also supported by ad hoc expert and task force groups.

While the Arctic Council has long been focused on environmental cooperation and assessment, the activities of the Council have expanded markedly over the last years with the production of guidelines for economic activities as well (AMAP 2007; AMSA 2009). Notable also are the first two legally binding agreements that have been added to Arctic governance on search and rescue and oil spill preparedness (signed by all Arctic states at Arctic Council ministerial meetings in 2011 and 2013, respectively). As is explored below, this growing range of activities taking place under the auspices of the Council and also more clearly articulated Arctic interests and policies coming from the Arctic states themselves have been key factors in drawing the attention of non-Arctic states northwards.

Critical response to the European Union (EU) and China observer applications in advance of the Council's 2011 ministerial meeting in Nuuk was likely the source of a decision to revise application procedures for aspiring Arctic Council permanent observers (Interview #9). The amendment (the ‘Nuuk criteria’) requires hopeful observers to submit comprehensive applications detailing how they fulfill the seven observer criteria,² which include recognition of the Arctic states' sovereignty and jurisdiction of the region and of UNCLOS as the prevailing legal framework for the Arctic as well as demonstration of Arctic interests and both financial and material contributions to the work of the Council (Arctic Council 2013b). At the meeting, the Nuuk criteria stipulation was formally approved. China and South Korea, among others, needed to then rework their applications while other interested parties, such as Singapore and Japan, began developing their applications in keeping with the new criteria.

Though all applicants were on the 2013 Kiruna ministerial docket, how decisions would be made was not publicly revealed prior to the meeting. In the weeks leading up to the ministerial various speculations were made, some believed that the delay tactic would be revisited and all applications would be confronted with additional application criteria while others predicted a divided room in which the EU and China applications constituted the crux of disagreement (Interview #5). According to one interviewee, it was understood that making permanent observer application decisions in Kiruna was going to be a minister-level discussion and a late-night affair where everybody put out their concerns on the table (Interview #1, Interview #9, Kommersant 2013).While some states, namely Norway and Denmark, publicly went out with their support for the impending applications early on, others, such as the USA, Canada, and Russia, were taciturn and apparently critical of certain applications or undecided (Interview #6, Interview #9). One interviewee speculated that US silence was likely linked to a new Secretary of State, staff limitations and lack of mandate and others noted that the Swedish SAO had been refused in his request for states to reveal their positions in advance of the 2013 Kiruna ministerial meeting (Interview #6, Interview #9).

Though ultimately accepting of the Asian states' applications, Arctic Council member states were also cautious to set boundaries for the permanent observers, as manifested in the Artic Council's Observer Manual (Interview #1, Interview #2, Interview #3, Interview #9). The manual, which was formally approved at the Council's 2013 Ministerial, sets specific criteria across the board for both previous and incoming permanent observers. The manual has a focus on form and procedure within the Arctic Council – who sits where and who is allowed to speak in what order – as well as limits on the financial contributions of observers to Arctic Council work. For example, permanent observers cannot make financial contributions that are greater than those from Arctic states, unless granted special approval. Several interviewees expressed concern that more observers may result in greater restrictions and more rules of procedure, although all agreed that the actual impact on observer participation remains to be seen and depends on the extent to which the manual is actively implemented (Interview #3, Interview #8, Interview #9). Other informed sources identified Russia and Canada as the main drivers behind the manual, and explained that other Arctic states simply went along with the manual or used it as a bargaining chip (e.g. refusing to approve the manual unless observer applications were approved) (Interview #6).

While one could argue that permanent observers have a fairly marginal role in the work of the Arctic Council, the question of observers still clearly created debate amongst the eight Arctic states and the permanent participants. That the observer applications were seen as dramatic or problematic by some key actors ties in with broader questions in international relations. Scholars of international relations working in a more constructivist paradigm, particularly those studying the role of the so-called ‘emerging powers’ or rapidly growing economies in global governance, look closely not only at the intentions or agendas of these emerging powers but also how other countries respond to them. For example, scholars have argued that a key factor to China's peaceful rise in international relations has been the ability of the USA to accommodate and adapt to China's quest for status and recognition (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). This politics of engagement and adjustment often goes beyond classic realist concerns with material wealth and national security, encompassing the pursuit of national respect and status in an international arena that may have little to do with concrete cost-benefit calculations (Wolf 2011).

At the same time, constructivist approaches to analyzing global governance, with a focus on networks, learning, and gradual normative change, have been criticized for underestimating or ignoring the questions relating to power (which has often been the purview of more realist international relations work). One way of drawing on the strengths of both constructivist and realist insights is to take a cue from Neumann and Sending (2010, p. 7), who argue that we should instead focus on the development and techniques of the ‘conduct of conduct’. In other words, we should examine the concrete practices of governance and seek to understand the rationale and interests that undergird them. This allows us to acknowledge the influence of socialization, norms and ideas without losing sight of how power relations, understandings of sovereignty and techniques of discipline may be exercised in new forms (Neumann and Sending, pp. 656–657). Seen in this light, the debates around the 2013 Arctic Council permanent observer applications and the reactions of key Arctic states to these applications are an ideal moment from which to consider the changing ‘conduct of conduct’ in circumpolar governance. We return to this broader issue in the concluding section.

Asian states and Arctic politics

China, South Korea, and Japan have long-standing polar research traditions, including, for example, research stations on Svalbard, and all four countries analyzed have well-developed stakes and participation in development of maritime governance more broadly. Over the past five years, however, Arctic questions have garnered increasing attention domestically within these countries and the Asian states' Arctic interests have been more strongly advertised internationally, especially for an audience of Arctic states and in light of the observer applications to the Arctic Council (Jakobson and Lee 2013; Stokke 2013). In this section, we briefly summarize the driving factors that China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea's have identified as underlying their growing interest in the Arctic region. This serves as an important basis for understanding how these countries have been received by Arctic states, which is the focus of the next section. It is these reactions and interactions that help us understand what significance non-Arctic states may have for debate around and developments in the ‘conduct of conduct’ of Arctic politics. The analysis is organized in keeping with the following questions: (1) What are the Arctic interests of these states? and (2) how do they relate to the current state of Arctic governance?

Arctic interests

China sees the Arctic as an important environmental zone and as an arena for economic opportunities. Chinese representatives argue that China's Arctic interest is grounded in China's northerly geographical location, concern about global climate change and interest in the potential impact on China of new Arctic shipping routes affecting energy and trade (Huikang 2010; Zhao 2013). As one Chinese official interviewed put it, these interests are crosscutting and environmental preservation goes hand-in-hand with commercial interest: ‘The Chinese view on the Arctic is to preserve it to use it’ (Interview #14). The long-term commercial opportunities in the Arctic are likely overshadowed, however, by a concern for the possible economic threats that global climate change and, more specifically, changing Arctic weather patterns could have for Chinese agriculture (Endresen 2013). Further climate change could adversely affect agricultural and food production domestically and, by extension, the social contract in China (Jakobson and Lee 2013, p. 4, Interview #14).

Political activities within the Arctic region have also served to sharpen Chinese attention. The country reacted to Russia's brash symbolic flag planting on the Arctic seabed in 2007 and has noticed the spread of Arctic Council activities from research to questions of sustainable development (Huikang 2010). There is also a concern that the Arctic states may change their open, legal-minded tune and adopt policies maximizing their own interests to the detriment of others when the economic potential of the region becomes clearer (Jakobson and Lee 2013). In this way, being on the inside early is cast as a positive advantage and Chinese actors present Chinese involvement in the Arctic Council as a way of making the body more transparent, credible, and prestigious (Cheng 2013; Huikang 2010). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the Arctic is not a top foreign policy priority for China and that the economic possibilities are objects of part of long-term thinking, rather than of immediate interest (Jakobson and Lee 2013).

Japan positions itself as a maritime state with an extended polar tradition that is able and willing to make important contribution to Arctic scientific cooperation (MOFA 2013b; Interview #11). Japan has contributed actively to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), which is one of the Arctic Council working groups (Kira 2012), and its scientific presence on Svalbard is frequently underlined (MOFA 2013b, Interview #11). Concern for global climate change is also underlined, although to a lesser extent than in Chinese and South Korean diplomatic discourse (Interview #11). The country's more political engagement with the region, for example appointing an Arctic Ambassador in advance of the Kiruna ministerial (MOFA 2013a), has been pushed forward by the growing attention paid to the Arctic by its regional neighbors China and South Korea (Interview #10, Interview #2).

While economic motives have been cited by media as Japan's primary interest in the region, shipping routes from the High North to Japan have been deemed an unprofitable endeavor for the time being by commercial actors, particularly when it comes to container shipping reliant on punctual delivery and multiple destinations (JIIA 2013; Tonami and Watters 2012). Nonetheless, government actors, such as the newly appointed Arctic Ambassador and Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, remain interested in the route, particularly as it relates to questions of energy security through liquefied natural gas (LNG) transports from Norway and Russia (Reynolds 2013, Interview #10). Security concerns have a modest to nonexistent place in Japanese public thinking around the Arctic (Interview #11).

In expressing its Arctic interests, South Korean actors have primarily focused on environmental and economic aspects and opportunities, rather than any more security oriented or explicitly political concerns (Lee 2013, Interview #15). Like China and the other East Asian states, this is a way of indicating Arctic interest in an unthreatening manner and also highlights areas where Korean actors have a substantial contribution to make and can ‘contribute with resources and not just piggyback on others’ (Interview #17). Korea has an extensive polar research program, realized primarily through the Korean Polar Research Institute (Interview #17, Interview #15). From an environmental perspective, Korean governmental representatives emphasize how climate change is a ‘global drama which calls for global efforts’ and is something worrying to Koreans as ‘global citizens’ (Lee 2013; Interview #15). In this context, the Korean ambassador to Norway characterized the Arctic as a ‘barometer of our planet's changing climate’ (Lee 2013).

From a more purely political perspective, being involved in Arctic politics is a way for the country to play a role in global governance and enhance the country's international profile (Interview #15, Jakobson and Lee 2013). Security concerns are limited to a general interest in global security, although more explicitly acknowledged than by other East Asian state interviewees. As one interviewee put it, ‘Korea is concerned with Arctic security in the same way that Norway is concerned with East Asian security’ (Interview #15). In other words, non-Arctic states would like to be assured that they can operate in a secure environment provided by the Arctic states. Economic interests include new shipping routes and energy opportunities – mostly out of a desire to be well-positioned for shipbuilding, shipping and energy opportunities in the distant future as Korean actors are keenly aware of the lack of immediate commercially viable options for Arctic shipping (Interview #15, Interview #16, Interview#18).

Singapore – as a low-lying state along a tropical meridian – was seen by many as an unlikely applicant for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. The city-state, a global maritime hub with connections to more than 600 ports and over 120 countries, applied for permanent observer status based on its first-hand maritime traffic management expertise, experience in offshore and vessel construction, oil spill management expertise and scientific research contributions (MFA of Singapore 2012; MPA 2013). Despite its small size, Singapore is renowned for its long-standing history of global and regional governance in the maritime domain (MFA of Singapore 2012, Interview #23).

In pursuing its interest in gaining permanent observer status to the Arctic Council, Singapore appointed a Special Envoy for Arctic Affairs, who oversees a working group cutting across ministries domestically (Interview #19). The country has few concerns about the notion of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) undermining its position as a transport hub for ships transiting the Malacca Strait, primarily due to the unlikelihood of the NSR operating as a profitable channel for commercial goods beyond natural resources extracted from the Arctic region itself (Watters and Tonami 2012, Interview #21, Interview #24). Rather, the region is viewed as a market opportunity in sectors critical to Singapore's economy, namely offshore platforms and support vessels for Arctic conditions (Interview #22). Environmental concerns also weigh in since the low-lying island state is concerned about the impact that climate change can have on sea-levels (Interview #23). Security issues are primarily relating to safety and Singapore actively highlights areas where their expertise will be politically relevant and marketable around such issues, relating for example to Arctic safe oil rigs and ship safety (Interview #24, Interview #23).

In sum, all the countries emphasize environmental and scientific concerns as well as commercial interests. They vary in the extent to which and how the accent is placed on political and security concerns, if at all. This may well be a reflection of how key actors within these countries conceive of their Arctic interests. It may also be a clear reflection of the ground rules laid out by the eight Arctic Council states in Nuuk in 2011, which demonstrated where they expected observers to have capacity and make a contribution.

Relationship to Arctic governance

All of the East Asian observer applicants underlined that they respected the sovereignty of Arctic states and accepted the premises of international law in governing the region, in particular UNCLOS (Jakobson and Lee 2013; Zhao 2013; Singapore's Fulfillment of the Nuuk criteria, Interview #15, Horinouchi 2010). This was a clearly stated demand from the Arctic states in the Nuuk criteria that all applicant countries were willing to fulfill and an important moment in disciplining the conduct of conduct of Arctic politics. If non-Arctic states wanted to participate in the leading Arctic forum, even in the rather marginal role of observer, they would have to acknowledge some basic principles laid down by Arctic states, most notably the preeminence of Arctic states. The East Asian countries are clearly not interested in any direct challenge to Arctic governance and, if they were, status as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council would be a weak position from which to make such a challenge. It should also be noted that UNCLOS also gives non-Arctic states important ‘user rights,’ for example of navigation and innocent use of the Arctic Ocean, and respect for UNCLOS serves the interests of Asian states' in other nationally important maritime questions.

At the same time, these countries do push a slightly different picture of Arctic affairs that is interesting in the longer-term and an issue we return to in the conclusion, namely how key actors understand the role of the Arctic in a broader context. In creating a ‘space’ for themselves in Arctic politics, China, South Korea, Singapore, and, to a noticeably lesser extent, Japan underlined the global nature and significance of the Arctic region. Korean interviewees, for example, forward the notion of Arctic ‘user states’ (Interview #16) and argue that Arctic states will ‘achieve their objectives better by recognizing the contributions and legitimate interests of non-Arctic states. We share an interest in a sustainable Arctic’ (Interview #17, also Interview #15). China had gone much further than the other East Asian states in its framing of the Arctic as a ‘common heritage of mankind’ and this particular representation of the Arctic was noticeably dampened following the issuance of the Nuuk criteria (Jakobson and Lee 2013).

The emphasis on the global nature of the Arctic still remained, as demonstrated by the Chinese Ambassador to Norway's speech in 2013: ‘In spite of their regional nature, the Arctic issues also include trans-regional ones, such as climate change, maritime shipping and so on, which need to be addressed with joint efforts of the international community’ (Zhao 2013). For Singapore, improved cooperation between littoral states and ‘user states’ must be pursued (Tonami and Watters 2013). As one interviewee from Singapore put it (Interview #22), ‘It is our opinion that Arctic states should bear in mind that action in the region can affect the whole world and should include other states in polar matters. The Arctic states must regulate activity properly.’ Rather than the notion of an inland sea shepherded almost exclusively by the Arctic coastal states that became dominant in the post-Ilulissat years (Wegge 2012), we see that East Asian states have engaged in some creative work in ‘framing’ the Arctic in a way that lends logic to the notion of their participation in Arctic politics.

Reception by key Arctic states

Although the East Asian states clearly do not have a radical agenda when it comes to Arctic governance and permanent observers have a relatively marginal place in the formal workings of the Arctic Council, the question of observers was hotly contested and points to some interesting junctures and tensions within Arctic governance. This is particularly interesting given the agreement that is obvious across Arctic coastal states policy documents in understandings of drivers of Arctic change (climate change, natural resources, increased activity), attention to the peaceful nature of the region and support for the primacy of international law (Wilson Rowe 2012). While Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden were openly welcoming of non-Arctic states' applications to the Arctic Council after the Nuuk ministerial in 2011, Russia and Canada were more clearly skeptical and the US position was not actively communicated. Canada's concerns about the 2013 group of observer applications was primarily directed toward the EU's application for observer status (particularly in light of the EU's ban on the import of seal products), as well as a concern about the potential inefficiency of and the dilution of Permanent Participants privileges in a broadened Arctic Council (Interview #5, Interview #9, Interview#25).

As case studies, we have elected to focus on Norway – as a representative of the ‘positive’ Nordic states – and the Arctic region's two ‘superpowers,’ Russia and the USA. We illustrate how these countries have responded to the Arctic involvement and interests of Asian states and discuss the various motivations and concerns that are reported by interviewees to be instrumental in shaping these responses.

Norway

The North has long been an area where Norway has been an international relations entrepreneur (Hønneland and Rowe 2010). By 2004, the idea of the ‘High North’ as a politically coherent concept emerged encompassing both domestic and international political aims, accompanied by a cavalcade of policy documents relating to the Arctic published between 2003 and 2011 (Jensen and Hønneland 2011; Jensen and Skedsmo 2010). In international relations in the Arctic, Norway has sought to distinguish itself through a role as a ‘convenor’ in Arctic affairs – bringing together different kinds of actors and interests – and also as a ‘bridge builder,’ especially in assisting other countries’ in their relationship to and understanding of Russian northern policy (Wilson Rowe 2013).

Similar to its other Nordic regional partners, Norway has been forthcoming and welcoming of Asian states’ Arctic interests (MFA of Norway 2013; Utenriksdepartement 2011, p. 78). The Arctic state proclaimed its support of the Asian states inclusion in the Arctic Council early and continued to play a role in the states’ ultimate acceptance and inclusion in Kiruna (Interview #6, MFA of Norway 2013). Official representatives explained that Norway supports the Asian states not only because they fulfill the Nuuk criteria, but also because it views the countries as a source ‘for revitalization of the Arctic Council’ (Interview #6). Norway was active in making the Council's Observer manual more ‘welcoming,’ having initially perceived it in its original form as a way of ‘minimalizing observers’ and being overly concerned with an emphasis on superficial issues, such as who sits where at Arctic Council meetings (Interview #6).

This is because, in Norway's eyes, the issue is not too much observer participation, but rather too little; how to engage new observers more and to use them as a source of renewal and ideas is a perceived challenge for the Arctic Council. On their end, Norway intends to initiate bilateral dialogs with the new observer states, as well as some old observers, in order to overcome this perceived hurdle and to ensure that observers do manage to make a contribution to Arctic politics (Interview #6). As Foreign Minister Barth-Eide put it in Kiruna, ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’ (MFA of Norway 2013).

This receptive attitude toward the Asian states can be in part explained by an interest in revitalizing the Arctic Council, but also Norway's position as a ‘small state’ in international relations. The Arctic – where Norway has invested significant political and economic capital – can be seen as a unique arena for the country. In the Arctic, it meets important Asian states with rapidly growing economies with a good set of cards to play and Asia is seen as an increasingly important arena for Norwegian foreign policy (Utenriksdepartement 2009). From its perch in the Arctic, Norway can be important for Asian states as gatekeeper and facilitator and this could have positive spin-offs in other bilateral, regional and international settings.

The additional contact Norway can have with these countries via the Arctic is explicitly mentioned as a positive in Norwegian policy documents and interviews (Utenriksdepartement 2011, p. 16, Interview #6). Relations with China in the Arctic and elsewhere were rendered problematic for some years due to the Chinese response to the Nobel Peace Prize award to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010. While this has since been resolved, Norway in the meantime developed especially close bilaterally ties to Singapore, South Korea, and Japan on Arctic issues (Interview #6). South Korea has prioritized Norway for Arctic cooperation and recent bilateral interactions between Norway and Singapore have also strengthened collaborative commitments and interest in the region (MFA of Norway 2012). This open position is also facilitated by few security concerns in Norway's High North. As epitomized by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low tension,’ Norway does not foresee any impending security threats or challenges in the region. Rather, it emphasizes the safety aspect of Arctic activity, with one informed security expert explaining that ‘safe, secure, predictable’ would be Norway's mantra on Arctic issues (Interview #7).

Russia

Russia is the largest ‘Arctic’ state geographically and an important regional and global actor in energy markets that are increasingly looking northwards. Of all Arctic petroleum production, 80% of the oil and 99% of the gas come from Russia (AMAP 2007). Recent strategy documents about or relating to the Arctic make it evident that Russian policymakers are keenly aware of the value of Arctic resources and see them as a key element in the future of the Russian economy. Kristian Åtland, based on a review of recent major policy documents relating to the Arctic (the 2008 Arctic Strategy, the 2009 National Security Strategy, and the 2010 Military Doctrine), puts it this way: ‘Whereas Russia's Arctic policy in the past was governed by national security interests, it is now increasingly governed by national economic interests and the interests of companies closely associated with the Russian state’ (Åtland 2011).

In terms of Arctic international politics, Russia has sought to pursue a positive image and an increased leadership role (with greater and lesser degrees of success) in areas of key national interest over the past 5 years (Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to the existing and great potential importance of Arctic resources for the Russian economy, a tension remains between a more internationalist/global framing of the Arctic and a concern about the dilution of Russia's sovereign privileges. The internationalist attitude was expressed clearly by Russia's Senior Arctic Official, Anton Vasiliev, who argued that ‘the Arctic is awaiting our attention and it awaits attention not from any one given country but from the entire global society’ (Morozova 2008).

There are, however, those who are unconvinced. Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Analysis, Vagif Guseinov, explicitly worried about ‘internationalizing’ Arctic problems as this could give undue influence to China, NATO, and the USA (Guseinov 2009). Russia's special envoy to the Arctic Artur Chilingarov stated plainly: ‘It is no secret that polar countries are trying to make the Arctic an international resource. We, however, must make it plain to the global community that we will not give up our interests in the Arctic’ (Krans 2008, see also Krutikhin 2013). As one Russian journalist from the state-owned Rossiskaya Gazeta reported from Kiruna: ‘Members of the council do not hide, that it is with difficulty that they find a balance between protection of the regional identity of the Council and development of mutually beneficial cooperation with non-Arctic states’ (Vorob'ev 2013).

The question of observers thus ties in with a central tension in how Russia approaches the Arctic and how it envisions the Arctic region's place in the world. It also ties in with broader issues in Russian foreign policy – the country's diplomats and politicians have long harbored uncertainties about the likelihood of realizing Russian national aims in multilateral settings (Legvold 2009). Out of the Asian applicants, Russia was primarily opposed to China's application as they felt it was purely ‘economic reasoning’ about China's size that spoke in favor its application (Chernenko 2013). Nonetheless, Russia did accede to the observer applications (MFA of Russia 2013), although perhaps more to avoid ‘breaking the consensus’ (Kommersant 2013) rather than from real enthusiasm or sense of possibility from an expanded contact network within the Arctic Council.

Consequently, Russia's reception of the Council's Asian newcomers interested in the Arctic was packaged with a concern for how it might negatively affect the effectiveness of work in the Arctic Council and attended by very explicit rules of conduct (Kommersant 2013). The country was one of the major proponents of the ‘Observer manual’ described above, which has a number of quite specific rules that limits the status and could be applied to limit the actual levels of participation of observers in Arctic Council work.

How other Arctic states relate to the new permanent observers was also an issue for Russia. An interviewee from the Russian diplomatic service stressed that all political or governance discussions with non-Arctic states should be handled in a multilateral setting, preferably in the Arctic Council (Interview #4). At the same time, it is recognized that Russia and other Arctic states stand to benefit from closer bilateral relations with ‘Asian tigers’ in the commercial and scientific spheres (Interview #4). Recognizing that the Council newcomers provide access to and insight into important niche markets, namely shipbuilding and oil rig building, Russian actors suggested that it was useful and appropriate for the members of the Council to have bilateral relations with Asian states and are especially interested in South Korea's and Singapore's shipbuilding expertise (Interview #4).

USA

Similar to Russia, the US' official reports and strategies relating to the Arctic highlight increasing interest on behalf of policymakers in Arctic resources and recognition of the numerous challenges that lie ahead. Though the USA ranked sovereignty and security as its top priority in its 2013 strategy, it characterized the Arctic region as ‘free of conflict’ and elaborated on the need ‘to seek to work with other states and Arctic entities to advance common objectives in the Arctic region in a manner that protects Arctic states’ (White House 2013, p. 6, 10). The changing conditions in the Arctic are a focal point of the USA. The negative impacts of climate change are a highlighted concern for Secretary of State Kerry, a staunch proponent of climate change mitigation since his political debut in the 1980s (Ghattas 2013).

It was reported that the USA, represented by Secretary Kerry, was catalytic in bringing about a united approval of the permanent observer applications (Interview #6, Myers 2013, Interview #2, Interview #26).³ As reflected in the US National Strategy for the Arctic region – released by the White House immediately prior to the 2013 Kiruna ministerial and was the first clear public signal of where the US stood on the issue of new observers – the USA encourages international cooperation with non-Arctic stakeholders. The document states that the USA and other Arctic nations should seek to work with interested parties to advance common objectives in a manner that protects Arctic states’ national interests and resources (White House 2013, p. 10).

Informed US sources believed that the new additions will change neither the nature nor the workings of the Council (Interview #1, Interview #2). As one US official sees it, the Asian States contributions and influence will mostly be centered toward arenas where they can gain some limited influence, such as participation in working groups or building rapport with permanent participants (Interview #1, Interview #2).

The question of observers thus seems like it was a straightforward opportunity for a pragmatic approach to politics. It has been suggested that the Asian states’ applications were an occasion for the USA to put substance to its pivot to Asia, as declared by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and echoed by other interviewees (Clinton 2011, Interview #2). Furthermore, keeping interested non-Arctic parties inside the Arctic Council tent was seen as important for maintaining the preeminent role of the Arctic Council (Interview #2). Although the USA does not share Nordic countries hope of expanding the activities of the Arctic Council from ‘decision shaping’ to ‘decision making,’ the USA wants to make sure the Council stays the primary forum in the Arctic (Interview #1) and ‘for facilitating Arctic states’ cooperation on myriad issues of interest within its current mandate’ (White House 2013, p. 9).

In line with other Arctic states, the US reception of the Asian states came hand in hand with reminders of responsibilities. Secretary of State Kerry insinuated the responsibility inherent in becoming a permanent observer in his remarks upon the signing of the Kiruna declaration. Tapping into the Asian states’ own discourse about their Arctic interests, Secretary Kerry warned that proactive measures and efforts taken by the USA and other nations to combat climate change would be wiped out by ‘China or another nation’ using coal firepower and underlined the importance of countries like China and the USA pursuing responsible growth ( U.S. Department of State 2013a, 2013b). Secretary Kerry also merged the concept of the Arctic as part of the common heritage of mankind and the borderless concern related to climate change by describing the Arctic as ‘a precious treasure for all of the world’ (U.S. Department of State 2013a). Kerry's framing of the Arctic as a global commons likely resonated well with incoming Permanent Observer Asian states, namely China and Japan. This global framing also points us in the direction of some of the most important questions about the ‘conduct of conduct’ in the Arctic – a discussion to which we now turn.

Concluding thoughts

In this article, we have sought to illustrate some of the key interests and concerns that motivated China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea to underline their interest in Arctic affairs – primarily through their Arctic Council permanent observer applications – and have analyzed how Norway, Russia, and the USA have met this growing interest. The debates around these observer applications serve as a useful window onto how the ‘conduct of conduct’ is developing in Arctic politics more broadly.

While the Asian states have done little to coordinate their Arctic initiatives amongst themselves, their approach to Arctic politics has included largely the same emphases. They are particularly interested in economic opportunities and environmental issues, primarily climate change and other issues that lend themselves to cooperative scientific research. In keeping with the Nuuk criteria, these countries have outlined areas of Arctic governance where they have a demonstrable interest and capacity to contribute and political/geopolitical rhetoric was consistently absent or toned down in how these countries expressed their interests in Arctic affairs.

While these Asian states were cast in the role of ‘newcomers’ to the Arctic Council, it is worth noting again that much of their Arctic involvement, for example in scientific research or Arctic Council working group participation, is long-standing and that their broader commercial and scientific interests can be pursued in other multilateral or bilateral settings. So, how do these the Arctic coastal states differ in their approach to this issue? And, given that Asian states are not quite the Arctic newcomers they were cast as, why was the debate around these countries’ observer applications the subject of late-night negotiations?

The reactions of Norway, Russia, and the USA to the growing interest of non-Arctic actors have been marked by a number of specificities that could be contributed to specific national interests or foreign policy traditions. Such concerns could include, for example, that Russia overall prefers smaller multilateral clubs as opposed to broad tents in international relations and fears China's rise, the strong outrage in Canada's domestic North over the EU's ban on seal products, Norway's interest in joining regional bodies in the Pacific as an observer and the US' ‘pivot to Asia.’ However, this varied reception of Asian states’ applications also speaks to some divergences and questions in how Arctic governance should take shape.

Our interviews with Arctic states suggest that there are important junctures ahead relating to how the Arctic Council should develop and how Arctic states place the emphasis between the Arctic's regional and global significance. For example, there is disagreement about how the Arctic Council should develop. Not all countries are for the often-discussed idea of the Arctic Council growing from its current ‘decision shaping’ status to a ‘decision-making’ body. That the USA remains committed to the Arctic Council as a ‘forum’ and against a substantially expanded remit may have made it easier to give a pragmatic ‘yes’ to further observers. If the Council remains a ‘forum’ for coordination, the composition of the observer membership has less import for US Arctic interests. Canada and Russia, on the other hand, were concerned that a greater number of Arctic Council participants, even in the capacity of observers, could make arriving at consensus more difficult and time-consuming, particularly if the desired goal of a strengthened mandate for the Council were to be achieved.

Other interviewees suggested that the Arctic countries’ reactions to the observer applications had much to do with how different Arctic states envisioned the Arctic's place in the world. How tied into global process and politics do the key Arctic states like to envision the region? To what extent does a more ‘global’ vision of the Arctic serve to weaken or strengthen the influence of the Arctic states themselves? These questions of how to represent and understand the political significance of the Arctic have direct consequences for the extent to which non-Arctic states belong in the preeminent Arctic body.

Thus, while the Arctic states were able to come up with a shared list of rules for the non-Arctic states with the Nuuk criteria and the observer manual, they are not in full agreement about how the ‘conduct of conduct’ should develop in the region more broadly. This is perhaps why the rhetoric about observers – which could be described as a tempest in a teapot – was one of the warmer debates in Arctic politics of late.

Notes

1. See Wegge (2011) and Young (2009) for an analysis of this tendency.

2. Observer applications must confirm that the applicant: (1) accepts and supports the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration; (2) recognizes Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic; (3) recognizes that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean; (4) respects the values, interests, culture, and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants; (5) has demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the permanent participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples; (6) has demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council; and (7) has demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with member states and permanent participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies (Arctic Council 2013b).

3. It should be noted that most interviewees suggested that these late-night negotiations centered much more around Canada, and to some extent Russia's, opposition to the EU's application, rather than with the Asian applications as such.

Appendix 1:

Coming into the cold: Asia's Arctic interests: interview Table

Table

S. no.	Position description	Date of interview (all 2013)
1	Arctic state – civil servant	30 May
2	Arctic state – civil servant/academic	22 May
3	NGO – international	29 May
4	Arctic state – two civil servants	29 May
5	Arctic state – civil servant	31 May
6	Arctic state – civil servant	4 June
7	Arctic state – military representative	30 May
8	NGO – international	24 May
9	NGO – international	28 May
10	Arctic state – civil servant	14 March
11	Asian state – civil servant	23 April
12	Asian state – academic	15 May
13	Asian state – civil servant	15 May
14	Asian – civil servant	14 May
15	Asian – civil servant	8 May
16	Asian state – academic	17 March
17	Asian state – academic	19 March
18	Asian state – commercial actor	19 March
19	Asian state – civil servant	1 March
20	Asian state – academic	15 March
21	Asian state – academic	12 March
22	Asian state – commercial actor	15 March
23	Non-Arctic state – civil servant	15 March
24	Asian state – diplomatic representative and commercial actor	29 April
25	Arctic state – civil servant	19 June
26	Arctic state – civil servant	16 July
27	Arctic state – military representative	21 June