Experimental Support for Conceptual Metaphors with an Episodic Memory Task

Abstract

The psychological reality of conceptual metaphor theory was tested with a standard episodic memory task unused in the metaphor literature. Presentation of items from the same conceptual structure over n trials leads to a buildup of proactive interference that is released (leading to increased recall) on trial n+1 if a new conceptual structure is engaged. This pattern was seen when the conceptual structures were putative conceptual metaphors and cannot be attributed merely to the recall of words from different semantic categories. A group of participants given explicit instructions about the nature of the conceptual metaphoric relation of the items presented on the first n trials initially produced poorer recall than when instructions were not provided. These data provide support for the effortless activation of conceptual metaphor and an indication that conscious consideration of the conceptual underpinnings disrupts the use of that information.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) Discovery Grant 06P0070 to the first author.