Control of a Terrorist Network: Lessons From the 9/11 Commission Report

ABSTRACT

The 567-page 9/11 Commission Report traces the actions of the Al Qaeda terrorists that led up to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and describes in detail the counter-terrorism activities of the organizations and offices in the American security community, focusing on the missed opportunities to prevent the attack. A careful analysis of the report permits us to identify the organizational, managerial, and cognitive preconditions of successful prevention. The analysis also shows that hard-to-control factors in the policy environment severely restrict the choice of prevention strategies. The pre-9/11 counter-terrorism measures of the U.S. were ill adapted to the special character of the threat posed by a transnational terrorist network.

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Renate Mayntz

Renate Mayntz ([email protected]) is emeritus professor working at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany, of which she was the founding director. Her current research concentrates on issues of global governance.