ABSTRACT
Drawing on theories of political competition, we explore the extent to which local public housing reform reflects the ideology of local ruling parties and local political preferences. Based on the citizen candidate and median voter perspectives, we hypothesize that left-wing party rule and pro-state preferences are associated with higher levels of government-owned housing. We test these hypotheses by analyzing the levels of housing stock held by English local governments during the period 2001–14. Our findings suggest that pro-state preferences matter more than left-wing party rule for the overall extent of public housing provision. By contrast, right-wing party rule is associated with the likelihood that a local government’s housing stock will be transferred out of the public sector, but pro-market preferences do not influence this decision. The implications of the findings are discussed in the conclusion.
Notes
The likelihood-ratio chi-square tests whether the dispersion parameter alpha is equal to zero. Large test statistics would suggest that the outcome variable is over-dispersed.
To the best of our knowledge, the fixed-effect approach cannot be extended to ZINB models.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
José M. Alonso
José M. Alonso ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Cantabria. His research interests include public service performance and public sector reform, with an emphasis on privatization, marketization and decentralization. He has recently published in journals including Public Administration, Public Management Review, and World Development.
Rhys Andrews
Rhys Andrews ([email protected]) is a professor of public management in Cardiff Business School. His research interests focus on the management and performance of public organizations. He is co-author of “Strategic Management and Public Service Performance and Public Service Efficiency: Reframing the Debate.”