The Political Economy of China’s Rising Role in Regional International Organizations: Are There Strategies and Policies of the Chinese Way Considered and Applied?

Abstract

In order to build up a wielding core role in Asia-Pacific region, China with a high intention and purpose tries to approach her surrounding neighboring nations for closer economic alliance as well as provides an opportunity of “South-South cooperation” to gain geographic “win-win” performance and more amicable settlement. It further depicts that China plays an indispensable and irreplaceable role in regional institutionalized construction, which can be considered as the Chinese way for strategic application. Basically, there are three major Chinese approaches of development strategy utilized on regional economic activities in order to accelerate and ascend China’s role on regional and trans-regional international organizations. Those are: (1) to play a role of promoter as booster/accelerator, such as for BRICS and RCEP; (2) to manage a role of active participator as communicator/supporter, such as for APEC and G20, and (3) to act a role of initiator as creator and chieftain, such as for OBORI, SCO, and BAF.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• political economy
• international organizations
• Chinese way
• APEC
• BRICS

As economy rising since 2000, China has started and gradually played a crucial role in regional and even in global economy and politics. China’s economy has exceeded France’s in 2002, Britain’s in 2006, and German’s in 2007. In 2010, China’s economy has surpassed Japan’s and become the 2^nd largest economy in the world. In 2017, China’s GDP has reached US$12.2 trillion, almost three times of Japan’s GDP.

It is very striking that China is very significantly increasing economic role in regional economic organizations and, in turn, giving more opportunity to increase exercises in political and diplomatic arenas after 2010. As shown in Table 1, China has actively engaged and wielded regional economic integration, formation, and operation in terms of percentage of China’s GDP, such as in APEC (23.7%), BRICs (67.8%), RCEP (56.5%), SCO (73.6%), BFA (46.6%), and G20 (22.2%).¹

Table 1. Economic statistics of China and international organizations.

	APEC	G20	OBOR	BRICs	RCEP	SCO	BFA
Population (billion)	2.9	4.5	4.4	3.2	2.2	3.0	4.2
China’s Population	44.8%	28.8%	29.5%	40.6%	59%	43.3%	30.9%
% of global population	38.1%	59.2%	57.8%	42.1%	28.9%	39.4%	55.2%
Total GDP (trillion US$)	48.5	66.1	34.9	21.1	26.2	19.4	30.6
China GDP (%)	23.7%	22.2%	39.9%	67.8%	56.5%	73.6%	46.6%
% of Global GDP	57.1%	75.6%	40%	24.1%	30%	21.8%	34.8%
Export Volume (trillion US$)	11.9	4.02	0.7743^a	1.7047	5.5	0.4573^b
Import Volume (trillion US$)	11.7	3.97	0.6661^a	1.5343
No. of members	21	19 + EU	140 plus 31 IOs	5	15	8	29

Notes: ^aThe China’s trade with OBOR countries in 2018.

^bTrade volume for G20 is only for 2021 Q1 and for the whole year will be around US$1.9 trillion.

Sources: 1. APEC from http://statistics.apec.org/; 2. G20: https://www.g20.org/; G20 GDP: https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/g20 and https://news.cnstock.com/news.yw-202105-4708318.htm; 3. OBOR: https://www.thenewslens.com/article/15329; “Projects worth $1 trillion fall under China’s One Belt, One Road initiative,” International Finance, from https://internationalfinance.com/projects-worth-1-trillion- fall-under-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/; http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202009/07/ t2020090735691674.shtml; https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/gbjg/gbgk/77073.htm; http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/553/9207.htm; 4. BRICs GDP: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/ Basic; https://www.sohu.com/a/248830915_100110525; 5. RCEP: https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx? nodeID = 1399; https://rcepsec.org/2020/11/26/asean-hits-historic-milestone-with-signing-of-rcep/; 6. SCO: http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2021-04-28/doc-ikmyaawc2397597.shtml?cref=cj; http://chn.sectsco.org/for_ media/20180606/441026.html; 7. BFA GDP: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Basic; http://www.bfa-istif.cn/ Default.aspx?lang = CN.

The rising China, threatening current American hegemon power, has led to inaugurate the scenario of USA-China trade war since 2018, on the one hand (Chen, 2014; Wan, 2021). Also, it has enforced and motivated China to deeply engage and participate regional and global economic affairs in order to expand trading market, heighten economic cooperation, and improve rapprochement, on the other hand. In doing so, China has been aggressively involving regional economic integration and establishment so that China can avoid American economic constraints as well as political confrontation. Undoubtedly, in order to build up a wielding core role in Asia-Pacific region, China with a high intention and purpose tries to approach her surrounding neighboring nations for closer economic alliance as well as provides an opportunity of “South-South cooperation” to gain geographic win-win performance and more amicable settlement (Soong, 2014). All these reflections and approaches can consider as the Chinese way of strategic application.

Concretely arguable, there are three major Chinese approaches of development strategy utilized on regional economic activities in order to accelerate and ascend China’s role on regional and trans-regional economic organizations. The first strategic way is to play a role of promoter as booster and accelerator, such as for BRICs and RCEP. The second strategic way is to manage a role of active participator as communicator and supporter, such as for APEC and G20. The third strategic way is to act a role of initiator as creator and chieftain, such as for OBORI, SCO, and BAF.

China’s purpose on foreign policy: Wolf-warrior and soft power diplomacy nexus

As strikingly known, China always uses balanced diplomacy between firmly defending national interests and enhancing soft power toward other countries after 2000. The former is quite politically considered while the latter is much economically deliberated and weighted. For that concern, wolf-warrior diplomacy can treat as a typical measure for the former situation in order to pursue/defend national interests and to meet/satisfy an extension of soaring nationalism at home. How to turn external wolf-warrior aggressive diplomacy into national dignity and pride becomes an important strategy for domestic expectation on nationalism. This is fully concerned by Xi Jinping’s power leadership in the recent years in order to regain the third term leader from 20^th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022.

Indeed, over the past few years, Xi has actively deployed reelection arrangements domestically and internationally. Internally, Xi tries to adopt tougher domestic control measures, actively promote industrial upgrading and development, as well as enhance the military’s combat power in order to practice the “Chinese Dream.”

Externally, Xi’s foreign strategy has two-aspect purposes: one is to show strength and toughness abroad with assertive and offensive diplomacy measure in order to win the support from domestic Chinese people. This is simply seen as wolf-warrior diplomacy to show China’s upgrading power in the world. The other is to eagerly integrate into the international community, attach importance to the development of economic globalization, make good use of soft power, and actively participate in or dominate regional international organizations to highlight China’s international importance.

Under such actions, Xi’s Chinese dream and reelection attempts have undoubtedly deepened the international community’s label on “China threat” and heightened the anxiety of the United States (America anxiety). In other words, when China’s rapid political and economic rise, it brought security threats to neighboring countries and the international community, and even challenged the world hegemony of the United States. It also triggered the Sino-US trade war, the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quad Alliance, and the Democratic Freedom Alliance and came to against China.

Nevertheless, on contrast, China actively joins international organizations for integrating regional economic, industrial, and trading in order to enhance and accumulate soft power and its influences as an amicable state. This is more important for China entering international market capitalism and integrating into economic globalization that can boost China’s economic growth as well as improve and maintain people’s living life. Without given well economic conditions for society, China will be forced to face severe challenges from domestic dissatisfaction that will directly threaten the current ruling legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party.

Since 2010, China’s GDP exceeded Japan’s as the world’s second largest economy, the Chinese have been encouraged and confident on national pride, which nationalism has been on the rise. As a result, China’s foreign policy has become more assertive as wolf-warrior diplomacy, which is gradually departing from Deng’s “taoguang yanghui” (韜光養晦, keep a low profile, that is hiding strength and biding time) dictum.

As known that during Deng Xiaoping period, China’s development doctrine followed the policy of “taoguang yanghui” in order to hide its capacity and to avoid international political and economic confrontation as well as vehemently controversies, instead of emphasizing the importance of cooperation, friendliness, and neighborliness. By contrast, under Xi’s rule, the wolf-warrior diplomacy becomes assertive, confrontational, and combative in relative to Deng’s advocacy in order to grab more national interests and to retain state dignity/glory. Therefore, it will be interested to examine Xi’s balanced foreign diplomacy and its transition. It will focus on how does Xi’s intention and purpose influence on China’s extension on international cooperation and engage international organizations. It is interested.

Besides, even China’s policy on domestic and foreign concerns is so different, but being always mutually supporting each other. Owing to domestic need, China’s policy toward foreign powers will become tougher and stronger in order to satisfy domestic citizens’ psychologic demand on national pride, compounded with past humiliated experience of being colonized and fulfilling China’s nation restoration dream. Simultaneously, as long as the perception of “China threat” and “American anxiety” perception, rising national confidence and nationalism, wolf-warrior diplomacy will be evidenced for external aggression and assertion returning to domestic comfort and consolation.

Due to soaring nationalism, show-toughness and autonomy diplomacy will be the first priority for China’s choice with historical complex of the unfortunate experience of being colonized for a hundred years. Nowadays, China is standing up and dare to say NO to great powers in the global community. In doing so, the CCP can definitely and increasingly achieve ruling legitimacy from the people.

A tough diplomatic stance toward the outside world can prove to some extent China’s confidence in the rise and the ability to say “no” to the United States. Nonetheless, China’s foreign strategy must adhere to a policy driven by soft power, which is conducive to the pursuit of economic, trade and investment cooperation, as well as cultural integration. China have to actively construct or participate in regional international organizations in order to strive for its greater economic interests and international markets, rather than for making enemies or competing with Western countries. Yet, doing in this way with low profile engagement, it might often go against the practice of satisfying domestic nationalist needs. In fact, it can be found from the considerations and niches that China actively promotes or establishes international regional organizations do as to gain pragmatic economic interests and ascend national importance in the regions.

Nowadays, the Chinese foreign ministry has taken an increasingly strident tone on trade dispute and retaliation against the United States, Australia, and other countries. This new approach, dubbed “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” seems popular inside China and reinforces a presumed transition of Chinese diplomacy from conservative, passive, and low-key to assertive, proactive, and high profile engagement. Obviously, wolf-warrior diplomacy, pursued offensives by Chinese diplomat, is used to defend China’s national interests often in confrontational and, at times, abusive ways, in order to directly attack and remonstrate foreign governments. As a result, wolf-warrior diplomacy is evidenced not only in combative words but aggressive and assertive actions.

China has increasingly hit back against perceived violations of its core interests by foreign countries with trade measures, travel bans, human right pressures, and diplomatic protests: an approach sometimes criticized as wolf-warrior diplomacy. The implementation of wolf-warrior diplomacy has encountered and incurred three challenges and worries: firstly, it is often tensely blamed for diplomatic setbacks with friendly partners that appeared open to closer ties with Beijing, such as the European Union and the Philippines. Secondly, China has also faced criticism over human rights abuses against the Uyghur Muslim minority group and the crackdown on Hong Kong pro-democracy campaigners, among other issues, which will be stigmatized and deteriorated of the application of wolf-warrior diplomacy. The last, China’s emphasis on the superiority of socialism and authoritarianism has caused some concern and distrust in the West that will lead to increase the anxious feelings of China threat.

After facing more setbacks on wolf-warrior diplomacy, Xi has firmly declared and urged that Beijing has to rethink communication strategy on the global diplomatic stage in order to make friends extensively, expand its circle of friends, to unite and win over the majority, and finally to revamp China’s image (Mcdonell, 2021). Furthermore, Xi openly urged Chinese officials to create a “trustworthy, lovable and respectable” image of China, in a sign that Beijing may be looking to smooth its hard-edged diplomatic approach on the one hand and to adjust the wolf-warrior diplomacy on the other hand (Bloomberg News, 2021). In short, Beijing should adopt “tone management” with a modest humble diplomacy for a better communication with the world. Also, it must try to tell a positive story about how China’s governance model is superior to Western democracies on economic development as well as social security and stability.

In fact, China’s image in the West has deteriorated since the pandemic, especially operated by wolf-warrior diplomacy with high profile of somewhat frenzy arrogant attitude of ruling group. According to the survey of Pew Research Center in 2020, it shows views of China across 14 countries have turned negative perception, also with little confidence in President Xi to do the right thing in world affairs. Across the 14 countries surveyed, a median of 78% say no confidence in Chinese President Xi to do the right thing to international affairs, with at least seven-in-ten in every country saying lack confidence in Xi. Only a median of 19% express any trust (Silver et al., 2020).

In fact, in the recent years, President Xi Jinping has advocated “a fighting spirit” on several occasions of speech to soldiers or party officials. This has apparently raised the morale of Chinese officials and diplomats, and encouraged a more assertive style.

Generally speaking, on the one hand, as China becomes more powerful, some other countries increasingly view its development as a threat to their national interests, but some as a help to their economic opportunity. On the other hand, many countries are generally unprepared or unwilling to accept China’s rise. Facing this distrust, China always believes the Western media portrayal of China is highly biased, often with ideological and racist tinges. As a result, from China’s perspective, wolf-warrior diplomacy is a direct response to “unfair” approaches by other countries, especially the way of US toward China and the Chinese people.

It is clear that wolf-warrior diplomacy is a kind of double-edged strategy. On the positive side, it is enhancing China’s national self-confidence for domestic soaring nationalism. Yet, on the negative side, it is hurting China’s foreign policy since it has generated pushback in return with some countries. For example, as Australia’s calls for an independent probe into the coronavirus’ origins, China has vigorously reflected an attempt to condemn or even sanction Australia. Therefore, how to avoid a belligerent approach on damaging China’s global image, to employ soft power with public governance will become important concerns.

China’s policy and strategy on international organizations of cooperation and connectivity: Returning stable public diplomacy with soft power and communication strategy

Throughout Asia, states are competing to build and leverage soft power using public diplomacy from civil society. Hereby, it would be argued that public diplomacy with soft power may be considered as a useful strategy for China to participate international affairs, which aims enable to influence and engage foreign publics. Implicitly and explicitly, with an emphasis of shifts from like wolf-warrior strategy to public diplomacy can strengthen the international public spheres with regard to the profoundly political and critical issues of the present era. Subsequently, promoting public diplomacy can both enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of states’ foreign policies on economic dispute and crisis with better governance and even to compete with USA tension (Proedrou & Frangonikolopoulos, 2012).

Indeed, it is very important with an emphasis of China’s development policy and communication strategy on international cooperation and connectivity thru participating international organization with smart public diplomacy (Creemers, 2015). The state may not play good roles on foreign affairs, but business and NGOs can play important and supplementary roles on it. The expanding role of public diplomacy on the Belt and Road Initiative or has enabled to secure and achieve a special niche with regard to foreign policy and diplomacy, notwithstanding China’s authoritarian state. It will be interested to ask China’s foreign policy either on highly related to opening-up policy and development aid/finance of free trade system, or fundamentally restructuring of current international economic regimes (Ohashi, 2018).

Moreover, asserting public diplomacy with soft power will be influential toward international community rather than wolf-warrior strategy. China’s soft power would reflect into two simple aspects: economic and cultural soft powers with Chinese characteristics, such as investment, trade, aids, profession training, food cuisine, travel, sports, Confucius Institute, educational exchange, panda presentation, technology, covid-19 vaccine, high-speed rail, innovational medicine, physical infrastructure, Peace Ark diplomacy, and so on (Zanardi, 2016). It is to highlight that public diplomacy can serve China’s political agenda and mirror Beijing’s efforts to increase domestic cohesion, re-gain international recognition as a great power and avoid repeating the Soviet mistake of focusing exclusively on hard power.

Besides, the soft power capital and public diplomacy strategies with well communication measures can improve a nation’s international status and positive recognition with more liberal concerns, such as providing opportunity on cooperation, implementing regional economic integration, and financing foreign aid and construction. In recent years, China has developed an increasingly ambitious public diplomacy program to enhance its soft power abroad, competition of adversarial public stakeholders from other countries. It also needs to shift from state-centric to more participatory and relational public-centric approaches by way of accelerating use of social media in public diplomacy (Zaharna, 2012). Yet, China’s conception of soft power focuses on top-down, state-centered image management, thereby overlooking the relational and context-dependent aspects of soft power. As a result, this produces struggle between public diplomacy and soft power, and it perhaps might aggravate rather than ameliorate tensions in the international community (Hall & Smith, 2013).

During the last two decades since Hu Jintao’s leadership, public diplomacy has been careful used and deployed to China’s role within the international community, which can be likely described as the “appeasement policy.” Besides, China’s soft power intentions also emerge from its instrumentalist use of diplomatic rhetoric. The several terms, indicated as political advocacy language, for public diplomacy are introduced in the 2000s basically marked as “reassurance diplomacy” to recalibrate the “multi-polarity” emphasis of the 1990s. Thus, several impressive terms have been deployed for “reassurance diplomacy,” including “responsible Great Power,” “multilateralism,” “good neighborhood policy,” “democratization of international relations,” “peaceful rise,” “peaceful development,” and “harmonious world.”

What will be different from Xi’s rule for China’s public diplomacy in the regional and international community? It is for sure that Xi would prefer to emphasize building strategic partnership with neighbor states in order to improve bilateral and multilateral relations with ASEAN, SCO, BRICs, APEC, and OBORI countries. Thus, as far as ambiguities, implications, impact, and tensions surrounding these terms in the 2010s from domestic as well as foreign situations are considered, China’s public diplomacy under Xi’s rule will be deliberate adjustments on engaging international community thru institutional building to promote business and private sector (or NGOs) relations as well as utilizing to promote the conceptual synergy of OBORI and China- ASEAN FTA. Doing in this way, it may be called as Chinese way of public diplomacy on foreign policy.

Basically, Xi Jinping and his predecessor leaders have “changed” and “unchanged” strategic applications in foreign relations and methods. The “unchanged” strategy is to follow the past development and inheritance of politics, such as to promote the strategy of cultural soft power, actively participate in economic globalization, and promote international trade. All are trying to implement a market economy with Chinese characteristics, so that economic development can improve China substantial status in the international arena, and actively participate in neighboring international economic organizations, as well as to enhance China's diplomatic and military strength.

On contrast, the “changed” strategy has been included several important policy measures, such as to allow China to step out of the restrained development of keeping a low profile and actively to implement Xi Jinping’s China’s dream, simultaneously to promote the “walk-out” strategy and the strategy of great powers, to expand maritime territories, to establish economic and trade integration in the Eurasian region, and from time to time to demonstrate foreign countries with wolf-warrior diplomacy. Adopting those approaches are intending to ensure national security and economic development. Yet, it not only triggers the Sino-US trade war, but also provokes confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Belt and Road Initiative vs. the Indo-Pacific strategy (or the Quad Alliance). Especially, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, he has actively participated in leading the development of regional political and economic organizations for three purposes: one can enhance China’s leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region, two can effectively confront the United States, and the last can satisfy roaring nationalism in China.

The structure for special issue: Design and focus

The primitive outline for this special issue will be constructed as Figure 1. Basically, some perspectives or approaches might be comprehensively integrated or applied here from role theory, institutionalism, structural dynamics, game theory (rational choice), neo-realism or neo-liberalism, development strategy, geo-politics and geo-economics, structural functionalism, zero-sum game, and hedging.

Figure 1. Major Research Design and Framework.

Source: made by author

Moreover, hereby the double two-level game analysis can be applied via politics vs economy as well as domestic vs foreign consideration so that four types will be conducted as the following Figures 2 and 3 shown. Four aspects of interaction relations will be analyzed for units of state. One is dealing with unilateralism or one-side dimension on state relations, such as deference, political value, protectionism, nationalism, and so on. Two is dealing with bilateralism on states, such as bipolarity, interdependence, mutual advantage, balancing, resisting, and so on. Three is possibly dealing with multilateralism on states, such as win-win-win, engagement and cooperation, power alliance, profit incentives, or even hedging. Four is dealing with neutralism on states, such as interest-oriented alliance, trading leadership, transforming or switching leadership, building institutional regulation and relational norms.

Figure 2. China’s Politics and Economy with Internal and External Purposes.

Source: made by author

Figure 3. Dynamic Analysis of Interaction and Relation between Political Economy and Internal/External Influences.

Source: made by author Note: arrow shows influence direction

The last, states will be treated as actors in relational patterns of powers and interests in the international relations and organizations. The role of China will be treated as the core gravity with role-playing, role-making, and role-acting mechanism and strategy. Role-playing can be seen as player, such as leading role, supporting role, service role, assistant role, participant role, followed role, competitive role, coercive role, and accompanied role. Role-making can be marked as provider, such as initiative role, integrative role, adaptive role, negotiable role, constructive role, creative role, facilitating role, partnership building, and confidence-security role. Role-acting can be treated as intended taker or promoter with application of strategy and policy instruments, such as aid, investment, trade, ODA, loan, security, grants, technology transfer, diplomacy, and covid-19 vaccine. Therefore, all these state-role analysis will be focused on evaluating, judging, calculating, perceiving, maintaining, operating, manipulating, hedging, resisting, balancing, compensating, building, sharing, implementing, initiating, promoting, leading, and interacting state actors between China and regional economic organization members.

Following the above discussion, the focus of handling in this special issue is first on how to effectively participate in and master the development of economic cooperation organizations in the region at present. Secondly, it will be on how to focus on the application of political and economic strategies of the so-called “Chinese way,” taking into account the domestic and international dual-link influence as well as political and economic strategic considerations.

In other words, from the above two focuses, there will be formed four types of possible development conditions and considerations as Figure 2 shown. These four types have important considerations and characteristics of their interconnection and linkage on mutual effects. The so-called Chinese method or approach of strategic application may have the effect of separating politics and economics and even cross-application at home or abroad. In short, currently, its simple logic is tended from economy-base of China’s reality toward politics-orientation of China’s dream that will threaten American hegemony and, in turn, will enhance the image of China threat around` the world. Internally, China’s political method emphasizes nationalism and political stability, while China’s economic approach pursues managed market economy and supports/protects domestic enterprises. Externally, China’s political method eventually ensures national security and national power/niche, while China’s economic approach achieve global and regional integration and market extension.

Furthermore, under the development of globalization and regionalization, The Chinese way or approach becomes very dynamic, flexible, exchangeable, and resilient for internality and externality. As shown on Figure 3, there may be internal political (nationalism) connection with the integration of external efforts for national security as well as engagement of international economic cooperation. On the one hand, by striving economic integration into the regional and international economy, it will be conducive not only to creating domestic economic benefits, improve national economic environment, and draw attention of external national security, but also to meeting the nationalist needs of the domestic people. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime will make good use of soft power and public diplomacy in the operation or formation of regional economic organizations that can also improve the external image of China and reduce the challenges from other countries. Thereby allowing China to be more integrated into building regional institutions and global economic development will help the CCP regime to earn its legitimacy of rule, internally and externally. After that, well engaged the international organization and constituting institutional superior will have the positive impact back toward the developmental state mode, or toward financial aid, foreign direct investment, COVID-19, or OBORI extension.

However, under the effect of global competition perhaps for hegemony, it may trigger confrontation between China and the United States, which in turn will create challenges for other countries to choose side, and even conduct tougher wolf-warrior diplomacy with the US. This may harm China’s friendly image in the international arena, but it can get the sentimental support from domestic people. Nevertheless, this negative effect may further influence other countries’ arrogant doubts about China, and prevent rising China’s political and economic power. Based on this, China’s development strategy toward regional or international organizations will be transformed into more flexible and well-intentioned participants. One will create more opportunities for economic cooperation, the other will enhance China’s positive international influence, and the third will allow China to win support and trust of its international partners. As a result, the influence of soft power and the application of public diplomacy will increase, while the application of wolf-warrior diplomacy will be relatively reduced. Thus, other Asia-Pacific countries may adopt a relatively low-profile participatory strategy to improve with China’s positive image in the international arena, and then achieve better results of economic benefits from China.

Again, it is noteworthy to define the so-called “Chinese way,” which indicates crucial four-feature elements and characteristics: one is implicitly influenced by China’s political history and culture. Two is to aggressively pursue the development strategy of a socialist market economy under the rule of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Three is to efficiently use economic development for domestic people’s satisfaction and, in turn, to ensure domestic political stability and the legitimacy of its rule. The last is to fulfill China’s dream and meet domestic nationalist sentiment needs. All these elements will apply to improve China’s position in international leadership as well as to create or change international or regional political and economic orders. The operation is through the interactive application of politics and economics intertwined with domestic and foreign influences, which can build up the most conducive to Chinese characteristics of strategy application.

Overall, the rising role of China in participating regional and world institutional organizations is very significant and remarkable since 2000. The active and vigorous participation on those international organizations for China has presented three important types of engagement under the application of soft power with public diplomacy as well as with well communication strategy. The empirical study structure on this special issue will be shown as Figure 4. Taking China as a major actor with an account of development policy and strategy involving with several important international organizations in order to gain relative better interests will be the major concern of this special issue.

Figure 4. The Fundamental Structure of Special Issue for the Chinese Economy.

Source: made by author

The first is to create and operate international organizations so that China can situate at the core of dominant position to designate norms and regulations as advocator, such as engaging OBORI, AIIB, SCO, and BFA (Boao Forum for Asia). In a sense, China provides a public good for its international engagement as rule-forming builder that can exclude and rule out Western powers’ participation.

The second is China’s participation as participator or supporter in international organizations to play an active participant role, that is, an important member of international organizations on equal status and privilege with other countries, such as engaging APEC, G20, and BRICs. Furthermore, under such norms and requirements of international organizations, how can China highlight as possible on the importance and contribution of development agendas, on the one way, and how to guide the development and direction of the organization, on the other way. This will be an important mode for China to participate in international organizations on conducting common institutional activities.

The third is China’s participation as promoter in international organizations does not appear as the main founder of the organization, but is hidden behind the organization and actively promotes the construction and formation of the organization. It does not highlight China’s dominant approach and can also take into account the equal status relationship with other member countries. Such as participation in RCEP, it is dominated by the name of ASEAN, yet the important driving force behind is China. Without China’s active promotion, it will be more difficult to complete RCEP formation.

Final remarks: Structure and arrangement of the special issue

Based on the above analytic frameworks, there are six delicate articles invited for this special issue to discuss how the role of China will play in terms of policy and strategy application in different important regional international organization to meet China’s ambition, purpose, and core interest.

The first article is titled as “The Political Economy of China’s Rising Role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Strategies and Instruments of Chinese Way,” and written by Van Hoa Vu, Jenn-Jaw Soong, and Khac Nghia Nguyen. It finds that China has actively participated in the APEC forum and becomes a major player with so-called Chinese approaches. It also emphasize that China’s purposes and intentions, especially under the attack of Covid-19, has led to strategic adjustments and flexibility in APEC. Politically, China aims to restore and expand its sphere of influence in the region, hedge against the US, and challenge to change the global governance system. Economically, China wants to promote trade liberalization and hence facilitate its domestic economic reforms to become the biggest economic power in the world.

The second article is title as “The Political Economy of China’s Rising Role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): Strategies and Instruments of Chinese Way,” and written by Wayne Tan and Jenn-Jaw Soong. It points out that China should better use the platform of RCEP to act as a supporter and promoter in order to create a more liberalized regional market. This pragmatic strategy approach reminds the leaders in Beijing that China should address friendly good-neighborhood policy with ASEAN countries in a defensive manner, based on strategic thinking of ‘one political step back for two economic steps forward.’ All these relative low profile strategies may consider as Chinese approach or Chinese way in RCEP.

The third article is titled as “The Chinese Way of Reforming Global Economic Governance: An Analysis of China’s Rising Role in the Group of Twenty (G-20),” and written by Xianbai Ji and Guanie Lim. It analyzes China’s participation and increasingly critical role in the G-20. China’s main priorities in relation to the G-20 evolved over time. China aspires to transform the G-20 from an ad hoc crisis management platform to one promoting proactive long-term global policy cooperation, partly in support of “a community with shared future for humanity” and the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, public distrust of international economic interdependence, populist backlash against neoliberal globalization, as well as geopolitical, ideological, technological tussles between China and the West collectively present significant challenges to the G-20.

The fourth article is titled as “The Political Economy of China’s Rising Role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Leading with Balance,” and written by Wen-Chih Chao. It stresses that the SCO has become the most important vehicle for Chinese cooperation with Central Asian member states and Russia. China seeks to play an active role and exert strong influence in the SCO for both economic reasons and strategic considerations. China aims to resolve territorial and border issues with Central Asian states, maintain stability in Xinjiang, develop the economy of western areas, and ensure energy security by playing a leading role in the SCO. Yetr, the China must still overcome numerous challenges, including reconciling mistrust and conflict among SCO member states, reducing Russian suspicion of Chinese intention, response to transformation of the SCO, and dilemmas regarding regional instability.

The fifth article is titled as “The Political Economy of China’s Strategic Layout in Europe: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Initiative,” and written by Pei-Shan Kao. It is from China’s strategic perspective, by means of the OBOR initiative, to analyze how China promotes its trade and economic growth and disseminate China’s values and soft power with countries along the routes. China assertively intends to connect Asia, Africa and Europe, in order to greatly strengthen China’s position and influence on the global stage. Yet, not every country welcomes China’s grand strategy and its well-designed layout in the regions. It will focus on exploring China’s strategic considerations and layout in Europe by the BRI projects, and also the attitudes and responses of Europe to China.

The last article is titled as “The Political Economy of China’s Rising Role in the BRICS: Strategies and Instruments of Chinese Way,” and written by Linlin Wang, Yanting Zhang, and Hanting Xi. It analyzes the formation and function of BRICS (i.e., Group 5) institution, and China’s role in BRICS from the perspective of political economy. As China increases political and economic strength, the influence of China’s role serves as an engine for BRICS development, from participant to practitioner and to leader. Under all these political and economic influences in BRICS, it gives China an opportunity to enhance South-South cooperation as well as South-North economic integration.

Notes

1 APEC stands for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; BRICs is for five emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; RCEP is the acronym to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; SCO is abbreviated for Shanghai Cooperation Organization; BFA represents Boao Forum for Asia; and G20 indicates Group of Twenty countries.