Do Local Government Executives Believe They Are More Political or Administrative? An Analysis of the Ethics of Administrative Officer Self-Perception

Abstract

This research focuses on the self-perceptions of managers in medium-sized localities. Using a survey of 249 mayors, chief administrative officers, and city managers the authors gathered data regarding the tasks these executives perceive themselves as performing. Using time allocation and function allocation models, the authors then searched for links between job titles and rates of administrative or political functions. The analysis finds that mayors allocate their time in more political areas, while city managers and chief administrative officers spend more of their time in administrative/managerial areas. While there was little difference in functional activity, self-perception between appointed chief administrative officers and city managers, mayors saw their functional role largely as managerial and political. The higher rate of managerial self-perception for mayors could lead to a lack of deference to the expertise of appointed chief administrative officers and city managers. The article theorizes that administrative and political management should not be treated as separate skill sets but should be interchangeable based on context.

Keywords:

• chief administrative officer
• city manager
• local government ethics
• mayor
• political

In 1908, the medium-sized, rural Virginia locality of Staunton hired Mr. C. E. Ashburner as the first city manager in the nation. Frustration among the city’s citizens with the lack of expertise and accountability in the administration of the council’s wishes was the main issue driving the position’s establishment. The council wanted to pave the city’s mud-filled streets but had no process for accounting for expenses. While the council appropriated money for the roads, it did not exercise enough oversight to make the city’s “superintendent of the streets” use it for paving (almost an early form of impoundment). The discussion among the council members started with a desire to hire an engineer. However, the council quickly realized that there were many other areas of administration where there was not enough accountability. The council’s original charge for the position was:

Regarding Staunton simply as a business corporation, it is evident that the same principles should be applied as would be applied in the case of any ordinary business concern. Therefore, your committees recommend that all administrative work of the city be placed in the hands of some competent salaried official, to be employed by the city, who shall undertake the management of streets, water, fire department and electric lights, insofar as the work … has been done under the supervision of the various committees. (ICMAML, 1954, p. 12)

The city’s problems with accountability and the delivery of services led the council to concentrate responsibility in the expertise of a managerial hire. However, the position was modeled on that of a business executive, even at its founding. Staunton’s example counters the early trends in hiring professional administrators for smaller towns and cities. While this initial attempt at institutionalizing a dichotomy between the politics of the council and the city’s administration was an anomaly, it faintly echoes the current local government managerial climate, post–New Public Management (Svara, 1998).

The academic study of government has dedicated countless conferences, articles, and books to the study of the intersection of politics and administration. Some of the greatest influences in the field (the big “W’s” of our field), from Wilson (1887) to Waldo (1948) to Wamsley (1990) to Wamsley and Wolf (1996), have parsed and examined the implications or reality of the inherent dichotomy of politics and administration.

The analysis in this article seeks to operationalize this discussion at perhaps its most grounded level; that is, the administration of medium-sized local governments (cities with between 10,000 and 250,000 residents). Understanding the intersection at this level is of particular importance because local government is the type of government that most people in the United States engage with most frequently. Typically, medium-sized localities have a council with a hired chief administrative officer (CAO) or city manager (CM) who serves as an at-will employee employed by the council. The councils of medium-sized localities often have limited experience in government, but view their political roles vis-à-vis a manager in starkly political terms (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Zeemering, 2008).

Local government is also one of the most challenging forums where public management occurs. As in Staunton, managers often grapple with the intricacies of service delivery in their towns and cities; local government executives must often navigate the dicey and fickle politics and diverse cultures of localities. While executives are viewed as experts in administrative matters, they are often expected to show neutral competence and steer clear of political disagreements. The focus in localities on service delivery can significantly impact the ethical environment of localities (Svara, 2015). This can be exacerbated by the political focus of elected officials modeling modern national discourse when they often have little experience in negotiating and governing (Vogelsang-Coombs & Miller, 1999).

Lack of knowledge among elected officials does not abrogate the executive’s responsibility to explain complicated scenarios to citizens and city council. Some of the greatest ethical challenges may come from agenda-setting for the most sophisticated aspects of local government, such as bonded indebtedness and federal and state grant management (Dye, MacManus, & Zooberg, 1969). By explaining and interpreting complex policies, administrators use their expertise to “frame” policy issues.

This article examines the self-perceptions of administrators in different roles in medium-sized local governments. The research design focused, first, on how managers perceive themselves and the types of tasks they engage in on a daily basis. Next, the analysis turns to the ethical implications of how managers view their roles regarding politics and administration (Zhang, Lee, & Yang, 2012).

Local government managers confronting the lack of comprehension among elected officials and organizations relating to the ethical responsibilities of administration presents a persistent challenge (see Figure 1). Executives balance their job security with elected leaders’ expectations of responsiveness, often grounded in a belief in neutral competence. It is all too easy in the modern local government context to simply ignore the latter responsibly and focus on acting merely as an extension of local elected decision-makers (Folz & French, 2005; French & Folz, 2004).

This article begins by focusing on understanding the complexity of the precarious ethical balance that local administrative leaders are forced to manage. Next, the article turns to a survey that explores the relationship between managers’ self-perceptions of their role as being akin to either elected mayors or hired city managers. Within this self-identity comes an ethical identity as either one who is an extension of electoral politics or a diminished rate of expertise and professional obligation. In a sense, this research explores the implications of local government executives considering themselves either politically or administratively driven and understanding the impact this has on ethical activity. The research expectation, based on the works of Rohr (1986, 1990) and Newbold (2010), is that managers who view themselves as engaging in more political behaviors will be less comfortable going against their council for something they view as being in the public interest (Potter, Olejarski, & Pfister, 2014).

In the United States, especially in smaller towns, managers are appointed by an entire council and serve as the chief executive officer. The council–manager form of government contrasts with the mayor–council form often found in larger municipalities. The traditional mayor–council form requires a separately elected executive mayor who serves as the chief executive officer of the city. Within this form of government, there also is frequently an appointed chief administrative officer (the title of this post varies) who executes the will of the elected mayor and council. This occurs under several different authority structures (Nelson, Gabris, & Davis, 2011; Rožen, 2013).

FIGURE 1 Proposed typology of ethical leadership for local managers.

UNDERSTANDING ETHICS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

While much research focuses on the legal and managerial requirements and authority for local government administrative officers (Nalbandian, 1999; Van Der Wal & De Graaf, 2007; Van Der Wal, De Graaf, & Lasthuizen, 2008), less frequently have researchers studied the symbolic impact of executives’ orientation toward political power. Rohr (1986) noted that there is a lack of understanding of the ethical context among elected officials. More recently, the International City/County Managers Association (ICMA) studied ethical contexts and ethics enforcement among local governments and found that both are lacking (ICMA, 2012a).

There is also a diminished focus among holders of master of public administration degrees on ethical orientations to management (Thomson, 2010). M.P.A. programs represent the largest source of the highest level of education for managers, resting at just under 40% according to ICMA (2012a). This leads to organizations being run by individuals who, if they are ethical, are not self-aware ethical operators. ICMA’s State of the Profession 2012 survey results showed that among the 2,030 local governments that responded to the survey, 86% had a code of ethics. Among those, the code of ethics covered all staff members and 79% of the local governments. Cumulatively, 56% of the local governments that responded had a code of ethics that included their employees—members. Additionally, 54% of the respondents answered affirmatively to the question regarding whether or not they offer ethics training to their employees. Among these respondents, 33% of governments provide ethics training annually, while 51% offer training “as needed.” Once again cumulatively, 27.5% of local governments provide ethics training “as needed,” while 17.8% of respondents were undergoing annual ethics training (ICMA, 2012b).

This survey fit neatly into several other areas of research that focus on ethics for administrators in localities. De Graaf (2011) argued that there are four approximate types of managers: “(a) by-the-book professionals, (b) society’s neutral servants, (c) the personally grounded, and (d) open and principled independents” (p. 285). It is not a stretch to understand the impact that these types of managers have on organizations. It is also not much of a stretch to argue that rule-bound professionals and neutral servants may be blissfully unaware of higher orders of ethics (Rohr, 1986).

The survey also dealt with the responsibility for enforcing ethics codes among local governments. Chief administrative officers were tasked with enforcing codes in 47% of the responding localities; in 10% of the cases, responsibility was delegated to other staff, while in 20% of the responding localities no formal enforcement mechanism existed. Other surveys have shown similar results. The ICMA Ethics Reports from 2008 and 2009 both verify, by the small number of public censures for acts, that effective ethical enforcement is difficult when attempted by a national organization. More effective systems of local government ethical enforcement rely on organizational values and self-aware administration (Bowman & Williams, 1997; Cooper, 2012).

There is a deep tension that manifests in the ethical oversight of local managers; this is the idea that an elected council should oversee all aspects of accountability for administrative officials. This tension presents an interesting application of the Friedrich and Finer debate regarding internal and external accountability. How is a city council to exercise oversight of an administrator when it has less knowledge than the executive and potentially more susceptibility to corruptive influences? Since there are so few external checks on administrative behavior, successful service delivery relies on an internal administrative check (Finer, 1940; Friedrich, 1965).

Carl Friedrich might agree that one of the significant, persistent ethics challenges for local government managers is that they have few mandated ethical-disclosure requirements, and it may be unrealistic for public managers to bring infractions to the attention of ICMA. There are other efforts at internal ethical enforcement, mainly through graduate education. For instance, there is a requirement for an ethics focus in master’s programs accredited by the Network of Schools of Public Policy Affairs and Administration (NASPAA). But this requirement does not touch all managers of medium-sized cities.

There is some evidence that ICMA’s external professional enforcement actions may rely too much on subjective character issues (Eskridge, French, & McThomas, 2012). Indeed, one of the great challenges of modern public administration is the attempt to find a useful source of professional enforcement for local government managers who are geographically diffuse and demographically diverse. Efforts to regulate the ethics of local managers through professionalism have made great strides, but it is a long, frequently uphill battle (Svara, 2015).

The ethical context for local managers is a troubling picture wherein the current context of public administration rests upon the leader of a politicized administration, sometimes without civil service protections, and sometimes accountable for the work of nonprofit and private enterprise contractors. The complexities that the modern networked local government context presents are well documented. These complexities are not only ethical, but also political and administrative. Structural and philosophical issues that underpin the balance of effective administration, political awareness, and ethical responsibility rest at the heart of the modern role of a local government administrator. In spite of this, there is also a well-documented disconnect between academic discussions of ethics and practitioner-focused street-level ethical guidance (Lewis & Gilman, 2005).

The authors’ survey of managers, focusing on the types of tasks in their jobs, also hints at these challenges. The analysis found that mayors view their time as being spent on more political activities. Meanwhile, city managers and appointed CAOs focus on policy and managerial activities. At the same time, when asked who they consider the most pivotal person in administrative matters in their organizations, 53% of mayors, 72% of CAOs, and 83% of city managers chose themselves. The survey data indicate that many local government elected officials and administrators may not be ethically self-aware and do not consider ethics when making decisions. The more important calculation rests in politics or in legality. This occurs for a variety of reasons. There is an increase in business-oriented managers at the local level. Along with business-oriented managers comes little or at least a different perspective on public service ethics. Furthermore, the sometimes simplistic delivery of services that occurs in many local governments does not wind itself to a reflexive ethical environment. Whether or not cities fill potholes or pick up trash may not always rise to the highest ethical level. Nevertheless, there is ample room for ethical failures to lead to challenges in service delivery. Corruption has led to situations where snow removal or policing only occur in wealthy neighborhoods. And firms that have received contracts to provide government services have declared bankruptcy, leaving municipalities without waste-removal services (Nabatchi, 2010).

At the heart of this complicated balancing rest discrete decisions that concretely test the priorities and emphasis managers symbolically place on varying types of behaviors. Mostly, managers must choose between allocating time and other resources to tasks that focus on policy, politics, or administration. This brings us to the deeper concern of the present research (Sinclair, 2005).

RESEARCH QUESTION

Is there a useful typology that can be developed that informs the role that manager self-perception plays in ethical leadership and the allocation of time to tasks?

To investigate this question, the analysis operationalizes duties as policy, politics, or administration through Newell & Ammons’s (1987) broad activity areas of policy, management, and political. This research defines policy activities as being similar to meeting with council members, agenda setting, or developing and advising on policy proposals. The analysis treats administrative activities as being similar to or encompassing staffing, budgeting, coordinating departments, evaluating, or directing. Finally, political activities are classified as ceremonies, public relations, speeches, and meetings with other governmental units. In addition, each manager was asked to identify their involvement level in the 13 activities that make up the four functional dimensions of mission, policy, management, and administration in Svara’s (1985) function allocation model.

Research Design

The study used a three-step design. Data collection focused on a survey (n = 249) with a 31% response rate. Relationships among the data were analyzed with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and ANOVA. The aim was to use this information to engage in grounded theory building to develop an ethical typology for local government (Glaser 1992).

The study utilized data collected from a random national survey conducted of municipalities in the United States drawn from a list of all 2,996 municipalities listed as either mayor–council (38.3%) or council–manager (61.7%) with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 as listed in the ICMA Municipal Year Book 2010 (ICMA, 2010). The survey for the study was delivered via postal mail and electronic mail to the persons acting as primary administrative officer (mayor, appointed CAO, or city manager) in a random sample of 800 municipalities. The sample included 502 council–manager (63%) and 298 mayor–council (37%) municipalities representing 49 states. Participants returned 270 surveys (a return rate of 34%). Four surveys were deemed unusable, three because of insufficient data completion in the survey, and one municipality’s population was considered outside of the study parameters. A further 13 surveys were discarded because they were completed by a staff member other than the person acting as administrative officer of the municipality. Of the 253 usable returned surveys, 88 (34.8%) came from mayor–council municipalities (municipal mayors completed 52 of these 88 [59.1%] surveys, and 36 [40.9%] were completed by appointed CAO’s working in mayor–council municipalities), and the remaining 165 (65.2%) were completed by appointed CAOs (city managers) working in council–manager cities (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 Time Allocation for Mayors, Chief Administrative Officers, and City Managers

Respondent	n	%	Politics	Policy	Management
Mayor	52	21%	22%	33%	44%
Appointed CAO	36	14%	10%	33%	57%
City manager	165	65%	13%	33%	55%
Total/Mean	253

Note: Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Participants were asked to rate the involvement levels of themselves and their city councils for the 13 activities developed by Svara (1985) to measure the mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensions of the administrator/council relationship. To capture the time allocation information, the participants were asked to allocate their individual work time among the three role activities discussed above (politics, policy, and management).

Survey participants were asked to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves for 13 specific related activities, three for mission activities, four for policy activities, three for administrative activities, and three for management activities.

The three mission-related activities were:

1. determining the purpose and services of municipal government,

2. developing strategies for future development of the municipality, and

3. setting long-term fiscal priorities for the district.

The four policy-related activities were:

1. establishing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs,

2. the budget process,

3. identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government, and

4. developing solutions to current issues.

The three specific administrative-related activities were:

1. evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs,

2. resolving citizens’ complaints about services, and

3. implementing programs and delivering services.

The three specific management-related activities were:

1. changing management practices or reorganizing city government,

2. hiring decisions about department heads, and

3. hiring decisions about employees below department-head level.

Three dependent variables representing each participant’s actual allotment of 100% of work time to each of the three role activities was captured for the analysis (see Table 1).

Four primary dependent variables were obtained to represent the participants’ perceived involvement in the four dimensions of mission, policy, administration, and management. For each one of the four activity dimensions the participants were asked to rate the level of involvement for themselves and for the city council as a body. Each dimension includes several specific activities, and the participants were requested to evaluate the involvement level for each activity using a six-point Likert scale (from no involvement [1] to very high [6]). The mean rating for each dimension for the participant and the council was then calculated. Finally, the ratio of the participant’s mean score to the council’s mean rating was calculated for use in the analysis (see Table 2). The study uses a ratio because involvement is not viewed as a zero-sum game between the council and the manager or mayor (Svara, 1988). Some councils might be more involved in these activities than others, thus increasing the overall involvement of both parties. For this reason, a ratio better represents the participant’s relative participation in each activity for that particular municipality.

TABLE 2 Functional Dimension Ratings and Calculated Ratios

Type of respondent	n	%	Functional dimensions
			Mission			Policy			Administration			Management
			Self	CC	Ratio (2)	Self	CC	Ratio (2)	Self	CC	Ratio	Self	CC	Ratio (2)
Mayor	52	21	4.34	3.66	1.22	4.22	3.52	1.34	4.07	2.31	1.84	4.07	2.31	1.84
Appointed CAO	36	14	4.27	3.79	1.15	4.39	3.55	1.37	4.1	2.35	1.68	4.1	2.35	1.68
City manager	165	65	4.34	3.69	1.18	4.5	3.4	1.6	4.4	1.37	2.69	4.4	1.37	2.69
Total/Mean	253		4.33	3.7	1.18	4.53	3.45	1.29	4.43	2.79	1.51	4.29	1.7	2.37

As comprehensive and rigorous as this research attempted to be, there were still several limitations to the data collection and analysis. First, there was a relatively small sample size. However, the sample is fairly representative of the population being studied (see Table 3). Second, there may be concerns about the external validity of the survey relating to ethics. Finally, there is admittedly a logical jump to propose the typology.

TABLE 3 Comparison of Population to Sample

Municipal type	Population		Sample		Responses
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Mayor–council	1,146	38	298	37	88	35
Council–manager	1,850	62	502	63	165	65
All cities	2,996	100	800	100	253	100

The demographics of the sample were broadly representative of public managers for medium-sized cities (see Table 4).

TABLE 4 Demographics of Respondents

Variable	n	Type of respondent				SD
		Mayor	CAO	CM	Total
Gender expression
Male	215	90%	77%	88%	87%
Female	32	10%	23%	12%	13%
Total	247	100%	100%	100%	100%
Race
White	231	96%	100%	93%	94%
Black	5	4%	0%	2%	2%
Hispanic	8	0%	0%	5%	3%
Other	1	0%	0%	1%	0%
Total	245	100%	100%	100%	100%
Education level
Some college and less	24	38%	8%	2%	11%
4-year degree	53	21%	28%	20%	21%
Master’s or higher	172	40%	64%	78%	68%
Total	249	100%	100%	100%	100%
Education field
Public administration	129	12%	58%	63%	54%
Other	112	88%	42%	37%	46%
Total	241	100%	100%	100%	100%
Tenure
Mean (years)	249	7.98	10.36	7.03	7.69	7.17
Ideology
Liberal	29	12%	16%	12%	12%
Moderate	128	39%	41%	63%	55%
Conservative	76	49%	44%	25%	33%
Total	233	100%	100%	100%	100%
Population
Mean (thousands)	249	26.6	24.6	41.1	38.26	33.53

To understand how participants allocated their time, the analysis uses ANOVA to examine the differences between mayors, CAOs, and city managers (see Table 5). There was no difference between mayors, CAOs, and city managers in the percentage of their time allocated to the policy role. However, when the proportions of time assigned to the politics and management roles are examined, there were significant differences. City managers and CAOs assigned statistically the same amount of time to these roles, and both are statistically different from the mayor in the time allocated to the management and politics role. Mayors allocated more time to political activities and less time to management activities than either CAOs or city managers.

TABLE 5 Correlation Matrix—Time Allocations

Political activities			Policy activities		Management activities
ANOVA	F(2,250) = 18.54, p < 0.01		F(2,250) = 0.01, p = 0.99		F(2,250) = 8.15, p < 0.001
CAO city manager	Mayor	CAO	Mayor	CAO	Mayor	CAO
	−0.125064		−0.003141		0.132244
	0.000***		1		0.002***
	−0.096928	0.028136	−0.00255	0.000591	0.105941	0.026303
	0.000***	0.503	1	1	0.001***	1

Notes: *significant at 0.10 level; **significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level.

The differences among the groups for the four functional dimensions discussed above was examined by means of an ANOVA analysis on the ratios to see if any differences existed between the three participant groups (see Table 6). Next, the research used an OLS regression controlling for the municipality’s population, how long the participant had been in their position, and whether the participant had a degree in public administration or some other field of study (see Table 7).

TABLE 6 Correlation Matrix—Ratio of Dimension Involvement

Mission ratio means			Policy ratio means		Administration ratio means		Management ratio means
ANOVA	F(2,250) = 0.54, p = 0.58		F(2,250) = 1.86, p = 0.16		F = (2,250) = 11.22, p < 0.001		F(2,250) = 21.48, p < 0.001
CAO	Mayor	CAO	Mayor	CAO	Mayor	CAO	Mayor	CAO
	−0.070692		−0.034798		0.031087		−0.157364
	1		1		1		1
City manager	−0.046608	0.024084	0.059662	0.09446 1	0.261302	0.230215	0.84689	1.00425
	1	1	0.647	0.272	0.000***	0.006***	0.000***	0.000***

Notes: *significant at 0.10 level; **significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level.

TABLE 7 OLS Regression

Ratios- (city managers omitted variable)
	Mission dimension	Policy dimension	Administration dimension	Management dimension
n	249	249	249	249
Constant	−1.20*** (−23.15)	1.35*** (29.47)	1.555*** (25.61)	2.34*** (14.77)
CAOs	−0.020(−0.30)	−0.085 (−1.44)	−0.12** (−2.58)	−0.855*** (−4.25)
Mayors	0.029 (0.47)	−0.066 (−1.20)	−0.216*** (−2.98)	−0.594*** (−3.14)
Population	−0.0001(−0.27)	−0.0004 (−0.72)	0.001 (1.01)	0.006*** (2.81)
Degree in public administration	−0.024 (−0.49)	−0.004 (−0.08)	0.052 (0.91)	0.300** (2.02)
Tenure in job	−0.0003 (−0.11)	−0.003 (−1.01)	−0.003 (−0.91)	−0.012 (−1.21)
F score	0.23	0.99	4.66***	10.96***
Adjusted R^2	−0.02	−0.0002	0.07	0.167

Notes: *significant at 0.10 level; **significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level.

The results from the OLS regression were as follows: The analysis indicated no difference among mayors, chief administrative officers, and city managers in the ratio of involvement in either mission or policy dimensions activities. Mayors and CAOs are statistically the same, and both are statistically different from the CMs in the ratio of participation in both management and administration dimension activities. Both population and having a degree in public administration are positively related to the management dimension ratio.

While one may argue that low levels of ethical-compliance ethical programs at the local level should have more limited effects than unethical activity at the state or federal level, this is not the case. The erosion of public trust that can occur at the local level hampers the ability of state and federal officials to be effective in their decision-making. The perception of an unethical culture also affects the ability of an organization to attract public-service-motivated individuals who are committed to exercising their discretion in the public trust. The complicated mix of values that affect decision-making among CAOs and whether or not the functionaries identify more closely with professional administrators’ or elected officials’ decision-making could be a proxy indicator for leadership’s orientation toward ethics. If a council seeks to foster a weaker ethical culture, it can starve the locality of the funds for ethics training and adversely select managers with a political-leaning orientation. If the constituents of local administrators and elected officials are unaware of the important distinctions between ethically driven and politically driven managers, there would effectively be few consequences until a scandal occurs for this vicious cycle of selection and cultural reinforcement.

Findings

Based on the previous studies the analysis found that local government managers seem the most exposed to be put in situations that they are most unable to handle. This is due to the lower rate of civil service protections and fewer training opportunities. In an era when more and more small and medium localities have fewer resources, for a council to approve spending money on ethics training for local government administrators that may act as a potential check on their carrying out the council’s wishes is unrealistic.

Substantively, the survey found that mayors, chief administrative officers, and city managers perceive themselves as the most pivotal person in organizational, administrative matters and more involved than their city councils about policy, administration, politics, and management. The analysis also found that the ratios of perceived involvement for all three increase as decisions flow from mission to policy to administrative and management dimensions. Specifically regarding time allocations, unsurprisingly chief administrative officers aligned more with city managers than with mayors. This could be because of higher levels of professional training and the persistence in many areas of the M.P.A. Chief administrative officers align more with mayors about administrative and management decisions. This may be caused by higher levels of the myth of the politics–administration dichotomy among mayors and chief administrative officers. Not to overplay the importance of the M.P.A., but the ethics training that occurs in many M.P.A. programs may explain why those holding the city manager degree differ slightly.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Ethical orientations tend to be situational. Managers deal with mission and policy issues in slightly more political ways. The implication is that when managers have meetings with council members on agenda setting and policy development/proposals/advice, they will be more likely to have a weaker orientation toward the public interest When managers deal with issues relating to staffing, budgeting, coordination of departments, evaluating, or directing, they will be more likely to have a public interest orientation (and a longer tenure as manager).

This analysis proposes that understanding the (dis)inclination toward ethical motivation is rooted in whether or not the manager views the managerial role as inherently political or inherently administrative. Managers more inclined toward administrative, ethical leadership focus on process and are geared to the public interest. This may cause administratively focused CAOs to use the politics–administration false dichotomy as a tool to shield themselves from political complications. Paradoxically, this gives the manager greater independence precisely when confronted with an inherently political problem or policy. Administratively focused ethical operators focus more on loyalty to a profession over the longer term. This causes them to stress the importance of ethics training and leads, in due course to greater familiarity among staff about appropriate ethical behavior. This may also cause reporting rates among administrative managers to be higher than those among political or mayoral-aligning ethical operators.

Politically hyper-oriented ethical managers tend toward legal compliance and are results-oriented, while self-perceiving administratively oriented ethical leaders are more inclined to focus on process values and the public interest. For a CAO, aligning with a mayor while making decisions comes with certain costs and benefits. Politically actuated managers who align with mayors may receive greater support from elected leaders. However, they may also suffer from being linked to failed policies of councils and may be more likely to be replaced when a council’s membership changes after an election. This article calls these values “volatile political support.”

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

This research has implications for the importance of the availability of a variety of forms of ethics training for all local government employees and councils. Once again, the discussion of ethics training refers to training that brings an understanding of the constitutional role of local government employees and the importance of initiation for the public interest in decision-making rather than narrow political interests. Future projects relating to this may include a survey of the substance of ethics training for local government officials with an eye to understanding whether public interest decision-making is mentioned or stressed at all in the curricula. The evidence would indicate that ethics training, certainly for councils and frequently for administrative functionaries, leans toward legal compliance rather a focus on important aspects of the respective roles of elected officials and appointed managers.

CONCLUSION

A better understanding of the perceived administrative and political skills that managers, chief administrative officers, and mayors view themselves as having illuminates the importance of understanding that both elected and administrative officials should have a variety of frames when making decisions. By better understanding the context of political and administrative decisions, researchers can ascertain the importance of a strong ethical culture on allowing medium-sized localities to be more effective in serving their citizens.

Many chief administrative officers and city managers realize that their city council members come from a vastly different experience, as managers and citizens, than those who work in at-will city government positions. Nevertheless, it is important for CAOs and city managers to educate their councils about the role that administrators play in carrying out council demands but also acting as an ethical check on political action. Elected officials and mayors may view a strong ethical culture as a hindrance to the effectiveness of an organization. Chief administrative officers and city managers should be able to explain the importance of an ethical culture as being more than something that stands in the way of meeting the council’s expectations. A strong ethical culture can help an administration not only to keep elected officials and at-will employees out of ethical peril, but also to serve the democratic benefit of better representing the people’s wishes in a locality. This all rests on a strongly embedded ethical culture.