An Empirical Assessment of the Contribution of State Offices of Inspectors General to Corruption Control

Abstract

This exploratory research examines whether the proliferation of state offices of inspector general (OIGs) contributes to corruption control. Using 50-state panel data from 1976 to 2010, preliminary evidence that the number of state-level OIGs is positively associated with the corruption conviction rate is shown. This suggests that state OIGs act as a successful corruption detection mechanism, and therefore, OIGs play a role in corruption control, working to help keep the government accountable.

Keywords:

• corruption
• government accountability
• offices of inspectors general
• panel data analysis
• subnational institutions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank Phil Zisman and Heath Brown for friendly reviews of early drafts and Peter Haxton for help with data collection.

All authors contributed equally to this article.

Notes

1 Every state has an OIG for its National/Air Guard unit, but since they are regulated largely by federal law, these OIGs are excluded here.

2 OIGs for national guard units were excluded, because of their basis in federal law.

3 Note that the official titles for OIGs varied, including for instance, Inspector General’s Office, Office of Inspector General Services, Office of Legislative Inspector General, and Office of Independent Inspector General.