A game-theoretic analysis on the use of indirect speech acts

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss why in some circumstances people express their intentions indirectly: the use of Indirect Speech Acts (ISAs). Based on Parikh’s games of partial information and Franke’s IBR model, I develop game-theoretic models of ISAs, which are divided into two categories, namely non-conventional ISAs and conventional ISAs. I assume that non-conventional ISAs involve two types of communication situations: communication under certain cooperation and that under uncertain cooperation. I will analyse the cases of ironical request and implicit bribery as typical instances of non-conventional ISAs of each situation type, respectively. I then apply the models to analyse the use of conventional ISAs from an evolutionary perspective, which is inspired by Lewisian convention theory. The models yield the following predictions: the use of non-conventional ISAs under certain cooperation relies on the sympathy between interlocutors, which blocks their evolution towards conventional ISAs; in uncertain cooperative situations, people are more likely to use ISAs, which helps their conventionalisation.

Keywords:

• Indirect speech acts
• game theory
• iterated best reasoning
• convention

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Robert van Rooij, Kees van Deemter, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work is supported by the Shanghai Philosophy and Social Sciences Fund [grant number 2017EZX008], the USST Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund [grant number 16HJSKYB17].