Trust, distrust, and the end of politics-as-we-knew-it: the mood of the nation prior to election 2017

ABSTRACT

New Zealand’s party-political system has, in the past, undergone significant transformations. And recent political events around the world have been marked by anti-establishment distrust, electoral disruption and the rise of populist parties. So the present article asks if this country could be on the verge of similar disruption, and whether there is a mood among the public that could precipitate a phase of populism. An online survey run in May 2017 by Stuff.co.nz and Massey University (supported by comparable opinion polls) is used to investigate this. In spite of significant levels of dissatisfaction and desire for changes, the survey did not reveal a mood for disruptive or systemic political change in the short term. Nonetheless, political fragmentation of the kind seen in proportional systems in Europe could occur in New Zealand in the long term.

KEYWORDS:

• Trust
• politics
• elections
• political parties
• opinion polls
• populism

A general election looms in September, and so, in light of unprecedented political events in the world around us, it’s timely to reflect on what’s going on in our own country. I will look back at New Zealand’s political history and recall some transformative moments that reshaped the political landscape. I ask whether we are now seeing another fundamental realignment of values and parties, and a realignment of the relations between communities and governments, challenging the assumptions of ‘politics as we knew it’. I characterise this in terms of trust and distrust. There are real economic and other inequalities at work behind this too. These are addressed admirably by Rashbrooke (2013), however. The present article combines reflection on political history with the results of a recent opinion survey, described below. Hence, it brings recent data to bear on the longer-term questions of the trajectory of politics in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

International opinion surveys reveal declining ‘trust’ in government and media (Twenge et al. 2014; Pew Research Center 2015; Edelman 2017), and this may be correlated with an overall decline in voter participation rates (Martinez i Coma 2016; Solijonov 2016). Political commentators and surveyors draw direct links between an ‘implosion’ of popular trust in governmental institutions and the rise of disruptive populism (Friedman 2016; Wedel 2016; Ries 2017; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017). A survey of New Zealanders that is directly comparable with 28 other countries shows a pattern similar to European countries, with a sizeable ‘trust gap’ between an ‘informed public’ sample (top 25% earners, tertiary educated and significant consumers of media and business news) and the ‘mass population’ – the latter being the more distrusting. This surveyed ‘trust gap’ in New Zealand was not as large as that found in the USA and the UK, but, if it were to grow, it could signify the growth of ‘political populism and anti-establishment sentiment’ (Brain 2016). As a self-initiated online poll, the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey 2017 was not intended to model or predict the intentions of the voting public, but it did test for indicators of such populist sentiments and distrust.

Survey methodology

The data cited below in this article are taken from the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey 2017. These results have not yet been treated to a weighted, multi-variate analysis, and so those used here are weighted only for gender. The Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey was an online readership-engagement survey designed to test the mood of the country ahead of the 2017 General Election, to provide insights into the issues of importance to New Zealanders, and to uncover any underlying concerns around leadership, trust and the political system. It was run from Monday 22 to Sunday 28 May 2017, during the same week as the Budget (25 May). While the sample is self-selected, and hence should not be treated as representative, the number of completed responses (n = 39,644) exceeded expectations. The respondents were 65% male and 34% female (the remaining 1% chose ‘skip this item’ or ‘other’), but the results reported below have been corrected for gender bias. Furthermore, those who are discontented and seeking change may have been more motivated to complete the online survey. So, the survey result in favour of change (see below) should not be assumed to translate into actual decision-making at the ballot-box. To mitigate the problems posed by the self-selected sample, however, I also cite comparable survey results published by polling companies that draw on representative samples. While there are no exact fits between different survey questions and results, the more ‘scientific’ polls do corroborate the present survey.

The survey findings were intended to support news and opinion columns and to develop questions for political leaders at election debates hosted by Massey University and Stuff (Fairfax Media) in August.

Popular discontent

We hear a lot today about so-called post-truth politics, which includes disdain and distrust for established forms of expertise and political leadership. But it’s not outrageous to say that those in the cockpit of government are ‘smug’ and ‘out of touch’.

In the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey, 51% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘New Zealand’s political leaders are out of touch with the people’. Twenty-eight per cent chose ‘neither agree nor disagree’, and 21% ‘disagree’ (n = 39,456). Forty-seven per cent disagreed with the statement ‘Our political leaders care about the things that people like me really value’, while 37% chose ‘neither agree nor disagree’, and 16% ‘agree’ (n = 39,281). This can be compared with an Ipsos poll in May 2017 that asked something very similar to this latter question, but in the negative form, and found 56% say that ‘traditional parties and politicians don't care about people like them’ (Cooke 2017).

That was hardly a ringing endorsement. Such widespread beliefs that politicians are ‘out of touch with’ and ‘don’t care about’ ordinary people and their concerns may indicate that the electorate is open to disruptive populist political campaigners. Again, we need to be aware that the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey sample was self-selecting and therefore not carefully calibrated against the general voting-age population. But even ‘expert’ pollsters can get it wrong. For instance, the widely respected analyst of opinion polls, Nate Silver, on the day of America’s presidential election was estimating Trump’s chances of winning at 28.6%. Opinion polls, as snapshots of a sampled population, are reasonably accurate, if done ‘scientifically’, but don’t rely on them to predict electoral outcomes with great accuracy, especially in a close race, let alone predict post-electoral formation of a government. Inevitably, though, the ‘accuracy’ of opinion polls is judged against the result of the following election or referendum, forgetting that the two kinds of ‘polls’ are completely different events with different methods of data collection.

In New Zealand, before the 2014 election, the opinion polls, on average, were reasonably ‘accurate’, referenced against the election results, according to one ‘poll of polls’ (Pundit 2017). But the Greens, with strong support from the young, underperformed at the election compared to opinion polls, while NZ First, with strong support from the elderly, did better. The latter appeared to benefit from the skewed age distribution of voter participation. And only one or two percentage points – less than the statistical margin of error – may make a big difference when government-formation negotiations commence. Prior to that election, it looked likely that John Key would need NZ First in order to form a third-term government – but National’s final party-vote of 47%, along with the successes of the incumbent support parties, made that unnecessary. So, following the most bizarre election campaign that I can recall, it was business as usual – at least until Mr Key resigned as prime minister in December 2016. That change of leadership raised questions about National’s ability to remain in the Beehive. But the present analysis asks if more fundamental, long-term change is underway.

Historical background

The history of New Zealand’s party-political system is punctuated by moments of substantial structural change. These are briefly summarised here as a prelude to asking if another such shift is possible. The formation of a party system begins in 1890 with the victory of the Liberal Party which dominated the political scene, especially under Richard Seddon, until 1912. From 1912 to 1935 there’s a period of ‘three-party politics’ during which the labour movement forms the Labour Party (in 1916), and the remnants of the Liberal Party split apart. The three-way hung parliament of 1928, with the minority government that emerged from it, is one outstanding example of the complex politics of that era.

The next transformative moment is the overwhelming victory of the Labour Party in 1935, leading to single-party majority government. The National Party was formed from the opposition, and National eventually won office – again with a single-party majority – in 1949. So, from then until 1993, we see a two-party ‘duet’ – a fairly predictable pendulum swing between National and Labour, most of the time favouring National. Most voters felt aligned, even loyal, to one or the other party, so it was the ‘swing’ voters in marginal electorates who basically determined the outcome. It would be clear on election night which party had ‘won’, as one of the two parties would have a majority of seats in the House, guaranteeing it, thanks to the whips, the confidence votes needed to govern and to pass any legislation they wanted.

Now, the great depression of the early 1930s, followed by the Second World War, underlay the political transformation in New Zealand in those decades. Towards the end of the war, the Americans and British reached an agreement about how the post-war economy in the capitalist world would be managed. The subsequent international consensus about trade and exchange rates worked to New Zealand’s advantage. But that arrangement collapsed in the early 1970s, with the end of the gold standard, the oil-price shocks, and rising inflation plus stagnation. The New Zealand economy suffered also due to the entry of Britain into the European common market, and never caught up again with its Western trading partners.

A one-term Labour government was defeated in 1975, leading to a three-term National government under Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. The Muldoon administration was notable for strong state regulation and investment, which, on a sympathetic reading, may be regarded as preserving social-security and full-employment policies that had developed since late 1930s (Gustafson 2000). The 1980s, however, saw the Thatcher–Reagan revolution and the ‘Washington consensus’ that favoured competition, free trade, floating exchange-rates and investor-friendly policy. This caught on in New Zealand from 1984 with the election of the fourth Labour government and the shock-tactic neo-liberal reforms led by the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. This radically changed the political assumptions about the relationship between the individual and the state, while economic deregulation led to disruptive restructuring in farming and manufacturing and in the public sector. It was also a political-ideological shock, as it was implemented by a Labour government – by the traditional party of the working-class and of ‘democratic socialism’.

National (by their own admission) had been ‘outflanked on the right’ by Labour, and so, when National won office in 1990, they picked up the cudgels of neo-liberal reforms and tackled social policy and employment law, issues that Labour had left relatively untouched. The National government caused considerable controversy, however, by breaking an electoral promise regarding a surcharge on superannuation and by implementing cuts in welfare payments.

Public disillusionment with these disruptive reforms led to the next big transformation in the party-political system: the referendum in 1993 on proportional representation, the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. Fifty-three per cent in favour of MMP was a revolt against ‘the establishment’, the political leaders and business lobbyists who were opposed to change. Many New Zealanders were angry at Labour’s betrayal, in the neo-liberal turn, and at National’s broken promises, especially on superannuation. This damaged both major political parties. Before the 1993 election, Jim Anderton quit Labour in anger and formed the New Labour Party; Winston Peters was ejected from the National Party and formed New Zealand First. At that election, NZ First won two seats, and the Alliance (a left-wing pre-electoral coalition of New Labour, Democrat, Green and Mana Motuhake parties) also won two.

Former Alliance MP Laila Harre recently described the 1993 referendum and general election as ‘New Zealand’s Brexit’ (Group Think 2016). Popular anger and distrust in the establishment led to people voting for the tool of change – the spanner in the works of power – that happened to be handed to them. In the process, we got a proportional representation system that put a brake on the executive and that made it easier for smaller parties, and a wider range of political views, to thrive and have some influence.

At the 1993 election, two break-away protest parties had been formed, and both gained seats in spite of the hurdles imposed by the old first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system. While the Alliance was left-wing and NZ First was conservative, they both stood against the tide of neo-liberal reforms. NZ First has also taken anti-immigration positions from time to time. But we can now ask whether New Zealand has already had its ‘brexit’, or whether to expect another such moment.

Political fragmentation?

A common expectation of a bi-partisan left–right pendulum-swing has continued so far under MMP. For many voters, a general election still looks like a race between National and Labour – or simply between the leaders of those two parties – and the pattern so far has been a switch between National-led and Labour-led governments, most often supported by minor parties through confidence-and-supply agreements.

Prior to MMP, back in the 1970s and 1980s, National and Labour combined used to get between about 80% or 90% of the votes in total – but they got 100%, or close to 100%, of seats in the House. Under MMP elections, National and Labour’s combined party votes are lower, varying around 70% to 80% – at the 2014 election 72%. If New Zealand follows the trends in some European countries, that could fall significantly further. The political-party spectrum would become fragmented and the two traditional major parties would face complicated negotiations in forming governments.

Before considering examples of this political fragmentation, though, the June 2017 snap election in the UK headed in the opposite direction, back towards a two-party race. Despite the incumbent Conservative government’s loss of its majority, the Conservatives and Labour both gained voters, and their combined votes amounted to 82.5%, up from 67.3% in 2015.

Looking to European countries with proportional representation, however, the traditional centre-left and centre-right parties have lost ground to more radical alternatives, and their combined votes have fallen below 50% in some cases. In the Netherlands, the Labour-equivalent was demolished in the election in March 2017, and, three months after, a new government had still not been formed. In Italy, this process began in the early 1990s with the destruction of the Christian Democracy and Communist parties, following corruption scandals. This led to the rise of Silvio Berlusconi (who bears many similarities to Donald Trump) and his populist Forza Italia party. A further wave of populist protest voting has since seen the rise of the Five Star Movement led by a former comedian, Beppe Grillo. Established social-democratic parties in Germany and Spain have been reduced to supporting in office their erstwhile conservative opponents – the unpalatable alternative being an impasse in government-formation followed by a return to the polls. France’s traditional left and right parties have both been demolished by a new ‘movement’, La République En Marche!, that set out to break through an ‘obsolete’ partisan dichotomy.

Angela Merkel’s 12 years in office as Germany’s chancellor, and as leader of the Christian Democratic Party, have been underwritten twice by ‘grand coalitions’ with the centre-left Social Democratic Party. In New Zealand terms, that’s like a National–Labour Coalition with Bill English as PM, keeping Winston Peters and the Greens in the opposition benches. MMP was copied from the German electoral system. But I do not make this comparison in order to predict what will happen in New Zealand – only to show what can happen. If New Zealand follows the European trend of party-political fragmentation, it would mean, in the long term, the slow decline of the ‘Labour-or-National’ duopoly, and the rise of more radical left or right parties. The Greens are turning centrist, and so there is no parliamentary representation of the radical left now, due to the demise of the Alliance in 2002 and of the Mana Movement in 2014. NZ First is the most ‘populist’, but it’s a centrist party too, able to coalesce with either National or Labour. So, the right (be it nationalist, conservative or libertarian right) is also under-represented at the moment, assuming that the Conservative Party is now defunct, while the ACT party is only hanging on thanks to Epsom. The four largest parties (National, Labour, Green and NZ First) are all competing for the centre, leaving the field open to radical new entrants who could precipitate political fragmentation.

Many democracies have seen a disruption of the centre-left/centre-right pendulum swing between two major opposing parties; the traditional labour or social-democratic party of the centre-left loses ground to more radical left, green or populist parties, sometimes becoming handmaiden to its former conservative opponent. Sometimes the conservatives suffer too. So, are Labour Parties becoming ‘zombies’, languishing in opposition, tearing themselves apart, unable to form governments, or reduced to being support-partners for conservatives?

New Zealand Labour has lost numbers to both the Green and the NZ First parties. When we wake up on 24 September, the sum of Labour, Green plus NZ First seats may add up to a majority, but it is an ideologically fragmented grouping. The New Zealand Labour Party needs to find a way out of the corner that it’s painted itself into, or it jeopardises its chances to lead government-formation negotiations following future elections.

Not the neo-liberal party

Key’s National-led government since 2008 gradually occupied Labour territory, moreover, leaving Labour with less ground on which to manoeuvre. Coming into office during the global financial crisis, National did not implement a fiscal austerity policy. They ran budget deficits instead. And they continued central achievements of the Clark government, such as ‘Working for Families’ tax credits and paid parental leave, which they had previously opposed. The 2017 Budget raided even deeper into Labour’s territory, boosting low and middle incomes. Although it took them a long struggle, National settled – with a trade union – the first major pay-equity deal with a large low-paid and predominantly female workforce. This is not the same National Party that passed the Employment Contracts Act 1991. Both the Clark and Key governments have shown – especially given the series of natural disasters – that, in this little country at least, the State really does matter. People of all walks of life expect a lot from governments.

Naturally those on the left can argue that National hasn’t done enough for public services and social housing. And economic (and other) inequalities really are a major social problem. But National is no longer the force for neo-liberal reform that it used to be under Bolger and Shipley in the 1990s. The Key–English style has been cautious and managerial, and not bent on neo-liberal deregulation. Recent state-sector restructuring has recombined organisations and centralised control – the opposite of the competitive quasi-market model of the 1990s (Duncan and Chapman 2012). Although National fought hard for a 49% (but note, not 100%) sale of electricity generators in 2011, at the 2014 election they didn’t campaign on any major new policies at all. John Key’s message was ‘strong and stable government’, as if that were all that mattered. To frighten us, they invoked images of a multi-party opposition in disarray. The upshot was that 47% of voters chose the devil they knew. Consequently, the National-led government wasn’t really achieving much – and I do wonder whether frustration over a lack of achievement was one unspoken reason behind Mr Key’s unexpected resignation, in addition to his decline in ‘preferred prime minister’ polls.¹

His successor, Bill English, would be advised to boast about the little they have achieved, to at least give the impression of addressing inequality and social deprivation. National can’t rely as heavily on Mr English’s persona as it did on Mr Key’s, so a strong policy manifesto would make up for that. National argue that their actuarial, big-data-driven ‘social investment approach’ has worked wonders – although I doubt that many people even know what the social investment approach is, or what, if anything, it means for them. (The answer is: if you’re neither on a welfare benefit, nor likely to commit a crime, nor working with people in those categories, it has no direct consequence.)²

Unaffordable homes, homelessness, poverty and inequality, and health are complex inter-related policy problems. A poll in May 2017 found poverty/inequality and housing/homelessness to be the most prominent social and economic issues on people’s minds approaching the election (Roy Morgan Research 2017). In the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey, 74% of respondents (and 45% of National supporters) agreed that there is ‘a major housing crisis in NZ right now’, while only 9% disagreed (and 21% of National supporters disagreed). Health was the leading policy issue (especially among women and the elderly), chosen by 54% of respondents from a list of nine, followed by housing (43%) which was weighted towards the young. (Respondents could choose up to three policy issues.) The prominence of health and housing as leading issues for voters personally was also found in a survey conducted 9–24 May 2017 and published by New Zealand Listener (Clifton 2017).

But how will New Zealanders respond to these issues? With compassion or with resentment? Hope or distrust? Beyond arguing over the critical social priorities and the merits of different policies to address them, we need also to consider the underlying sentiments with which voters are reacting to these problems, and their attitudes towards politicians in general and the political system itself.

Political dis/trust

A deeper question, therefore, is the effect that the anti-establishment tsunami may have on New Zealand’s election. The UK’s Nigel Farage, addressing an American convention of conservative activists, boldly declared in February 2017 ‘the beginning of a great global revolution’ (Owen and Smith 2017) Subsequent elections in the Netherlands and France do not support his prediction, as the far right candidates failed to get into office, although their voter support did grow. But then the populist party that Farage formerly led, UK Independence Party (UKIP), dropped from 12% of votes in 2015 to 1.84% in 2017. Has Nigel Farage’s ‘revolution’ turned out to be a fizzer?

‘It is the establishment versus the people’. ‘It is a rigged system’. Those phrases could come from a Donald Trump speech, but in fact I’m quoting UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s opening campaign speech in April (Corbyn 2017). Admittedly I have taken the words out of context. Corbyn was attacking an economic elite and economic injustices, as well as the Conservative Party, but it’s intriguing to see UK Labour borrowing this now well-worn populist rhetoric. So perhaps Nigel Farage’s claims about a ‘global revolution’ are not entirely wrong. When your opponents start using your words, then you may have won an ideological war. Both sides are convinced that ‘the system’ itself is at fault and is not working for the benefit of all. Globalisation gets blamed too.

The traditional left–right pendulum swing pivoted on the dimension of class, and hence around the responsibilities of the state in social protection, versus a minimal state and investor-friendly deregulation. The fundamental shift that’s occurring now appears to be around the poles of globalism versus nationalism. In the past, class and ethnicity have been key dimensions of political cleavages; now, age and educational achievement seem to be growing in significance.

How may this affect New Zealand politics? Disruptive anti-establishment sentiments do surface among many ‘fed-up Kiwis’ too. The politician able to make the most of this is Winston Peters. Like Trump and Brexit supporters, Peters holds anti-immigrant and nationalist sentiments, being really a product of the Muldoon era.³

Economic nationalist and protectionist policy has best been represented in recent times by NZ First, although not exclusively by that party. The Greens once pushed us to ‘buy New Zealand-made’. And both Labour and National are now at pains to reduce net immigration numbers. This kind of ‘raise the draw-bridge’ policy addresses an underlying desire to ‘take back control’ and to preserve traditional sources of social cohesion and employment. It also responds to a failure to build infrastructure fast enough to cope with recent population growth.

The frustration and insecurity that many feel due to global economic competition, industrial restructuring, labour migration and constant exposure to unfamiliar ideas and practices have meant that those who are least equipped to respond to and take advantage of these changes (in general, those with little formal education and fewer transferable skills) are more likely to react with distrust, and hence to support maverick political figures who announce that we can ‘take back control’ of our nation’s destiny. The associated voter backlash, such as in the USA in 2016, has been propelled by loss of economic security and lack of opportunity – and hence indignation. Competition from foreign economies, and from migrant workers, often gets the blame (Washington Post 2017). Those who voted for Trump and for Brexit, however, tend not to be predominantly from lower-income strata. They are very likely to be middle-class voters concerned about comparative social status and frustrated upward mobility (Mols and Jetten 2016). The Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey found that respondents reporting household incomes in the range $50,000–100,000 per annum were just as likely to be Trump supporters as those below $50,000, with the rates declining only slightly above $100,000.

This kind of populism seeks change, but evokes nostalgia for an imagined ‘national identity’, as in the slogans ‘Make America great again’ and ‘Put New Zealand First again’. If you immigrated here, you are told to do things ‘our way’, assuming that someone in power knows what ‘our way’ actually is. It is an anti-pluralist form of identity politics; it excludes those it identifies as ‘other’.

Results from the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey revealed strong support for protectionist and assimilationist policy that rose with age-group. On the question of foreigners buying property in New Zealand: 20% preferred the hard-line attitude that New Zealand property should be ‘for Kiwis only’; 72% preferred to say that foreign ownership should be ‘strictly controlled’; while only 8% preferred that New Zealand should ‘welcome more foreign investors’ (n = 38,820).

On the cultural question about the ‘message’ that should be conveyed to ‘new immigrants’, 53% of respondents preferred the statement ‘Learn to do things the Kiwi way’, 33% preferred to say ‘Do what you like, so long as it’s legal’ and only 14% said ‘Please bring your way of life to our shores’ (n = 37,604). Cultural integration prevailed over diversity. This compares well with a UMR poll (in June 2017) in which 56% agreed with the statement: ‘Too many people who come to live here from overseas don’t seem to have a good enough grasp of English’. The UMR poll also showed that, the older the age-group, the more likely respondents were to regard immigration as bad for the country (UMR Research 2017). Moreover, on the numbers of immigrants arriving in New Zealand, in the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey, 55% agreed that they were ‘too high’, while 40% chose ‘about right’ and only 5% preferred to say ‘too low’ (n = 38,512).

So there does exist a large constituency for reduced immigration and resistance to diversity. It should also be noted, however, that immigration was only the fifth most frequently chosen social policy issue from a list of nine in the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey. Respondents could choose their ‘top three’, and the three most frequently chosen were, in order, health, housing and environment. Immigration may not be the first thing on voters’ minds. Predictably, though, immigration did feature most highly among NZ First supporters (again corroborated by the UMR poll). Populist politics based on misguided ideas about ‘race’ is nothing new. It was much more pronounced a century ago. But the survey results also showed that Donald Trump would be unelectable in New Zealand, as only 13% said they would have voted for him, had they been able to, while 53% would have opted for Clinton. The remaining third of respondents would either have abstained or voted for one of the two minor candidates. Trump was particularly unpopular among women – with only 7% support – but more popular among NZ First supporters (36%). This result of 13% for Trump is above a UMR poll in April 2016 and a Newshub Reid Research poll in August 2016 that both found only 9% support for Mr Trump, when compared with Hilary Clinton, the latter poll registering 23% for Trump among NZ First supporters (NZ Herald 2016; UMR Research 2016). Trump’s victory in November 2016 may have boosted that support slightly – or the present survey may have attracted disaffected individuals who are more likely to favour Trump. Nonetheless, Mr Trump may have taken anti-immigrant populism to a level that would be unacceptable to a large majority of New Zealanders – although of course other aspects of his policies and his personal conduct would have contributed to this lack of support.

Is our system broken?

So let me turn now to our democratic system of government. Is the system itself ‘broken’? Liberal-democratic constitutions – such as New Zealand’s – rely on a paradoxical mix of trust and distrust. Our representatives, whom we elect as law-makers, from among whom a responsible ministry is formed, are conventionally seen as being ‘entrusted’ with decision-making powers on our behalf. But that trust is only conditional, because history has taught us that no-one can or should be trusted with powers that are unlimited or unchecked. Our prudent distrust of others is institutionalised by a separation of powers that provides checks and balances.

Long gone, however, are the days when many New Zealanders joined political parties. Even more fundamental than partisan loyalty, though, was an underlying sense of a ‘deal’ between the citizen and the state, sometimes called a ‘social contract’, in which, regardless of who held office on the day, there was a basic trust that the aim of government was to assure our security – even though we would argue vigorously over the particular policies needed to achieve that end. There was a trust in the basic institutions, and that they would endure; most adults saw it as both a right and responsibility to vote for people to represent them in those institutions of government. Many people today, however, feel that no current political party represents their values and interests. And the very nature of our public institutions, and the manifold ways in which we relate to them, are radically changing.

The young are accustomed to quite different ways and means of doing business, getting to know one another, learning about events and congregating as communities. These ways and means are increasingly ‘weightless’, borderless and peer-to-peer, rather than institutionally managed. Indeed, they simply bypass many organisational controls. Even those who are experts on the developing global-digital networks don’t understand the power dynamics that arise from these developments. Power-relations and differentials are shifting, but no one really understands how, or where it’s leading. There’s no wonder, then, that questions of political legitimacy and technical or economic expertise should currently be so divisive. Digital technologies can also mean more effective forms of monopoly capitalism and authoritarian politics, by means of winner-take-all global-network markets or state surveillance. And information technology does not provide for the most responsive or responsible human interaction or community. The breaking up of ‘the system’ of power structures necessitates rethinking ‘the system’, and this is causing political trouble.

Often it’s the authoritarian or populist right that has led the renegotiation of power-dynamics, stoking anger and fear about a globalised system with a call to return to the nation’s ‘source’, to build walls, close borders, exclude others and so on. But many traditional left-wing voters too are attracted by these ideas. Labour parties have been divided about how to reconnect with the people they are supposed to serve, to help rebuild their communities, guided by a clear vision. Traditional political groupings and parties are failing to maintain their support bases, while new faces are rising, some such as Marine Le Pen invoking nostalgia for nationhood, others such as Emmanuel Macron promising openness to the world. Parliamentary politics and public services are undergoing fundamental changes. ‘The system’ itself may not be ‘broken’, but it is being broken up and re-formed. We are unable to predict where exactly this is leading, but New Zealand may see more political distrust and party-political fragmentation, following trends overseas.

Opinion surveys by the State Services Commission (Statistics New Zealand 2017), the Institute for Governance and Policy Studies (Colmar Brunton 2016) and Research New Zealand (2017) have suggested that New Zealanders express high levels of trust (and declining distrust) in public services, especially medical practitioners and the police. A post-election survey showed that voters generally expressed a very high level of satisfaction with the voting process (TNS New Zealand 2014). But there are low levels of trust in politicians (Colmar Brunton 2016; Research New Zealand 2017).

The Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey asked questions that approached political trust from a different angle. Respondents were asked: ‘When you consider NZ’s system of government (no matter who’s in office), which of the following is closest to the truth?’ Fifty-six per cent chose, ‘It’s working but needs to change’, which does not signify a complete lack of confidence, while 31% chose ‘It works well’, and only 13% chose ‘It’s completely broken’ (n = 39,213).

While there may be a fair degree of confidence that the system of government at least ‘works’, respondents were less confident that politicians keep their promises – a key aspect of trustworthiness. Only 16% were prepared to vouch that, in general, New Zealand’s politicians ‘keep their promises’, while 58% preferred the option that said they ‘only sometimes keep their promises’, and 26% chose ‘usually break their promises’ (n = 38,755). Under MMP, it is harder for candidates for office to keep all of their promises, even if they are successful in an election, due to the negotiations that may be necessary with other parties. Hence, to say that New Zealand’s politicians ‘only sometimes keep their promises’ need not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of distrust. It may instead be political realism.

A mood for change?

At the time of writing (June–July 2017), it was unwise to predict the outcome of the election, let alone post-electoral negotiations for forming a government. In the Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey, 52% (weighted for gender) opted for ‘a complete change of government’ at the approaching election. This was particularly pronounced among women (61%) and those under 40. Unsurprisingly, this desire for a change of government was strongest among those who said they would vote for Labour and the Greens (95% and 92%, respectively). But NZ First supporters came third on this item, with 75% opting for a complete change.

When asked how much change they believe that New Zealanders want from a leader, 54% of respondents chose ‘gradual change’, 23% chose ‘radical change’ and 23% chose ‘steady as it goes’. Women were more likely than men to suggest ‘radical change’ (26% and 20%, respectively). A ‘radical’ change-agent was most favoured by NZ First supporters (44%) and least by National supporters (3%). Most respondents, therefore, sought a change of government, and most saw the country as wanting leadership that delivers change, be it gradual or radical.

Fifty-five per cent of National supporters regarded ‘gradual change’ as desirable, although they were the most likely to express satisfaction with the status quo and to agree with current policies – with exceptions. Only 37% of them agreed with the statement ‘Our political leaders care about the things that people like me value’, while one half were non-committal. Forty-six per cent of National supporters thought that the government’s approach to minority groups is ‘too politically correct’, compared with 52% who agreed it was ‘basically fair treatment’. Fifty-five per cent of them indicated that the government is doing ‘too much’ in regard to Treaty obligations. In government, therefore, National may be out of step with some of the values of many of its supporters.

When asked about the contenders for the post of prime minister, the survey mentioned no names, but one quarter of respondents chose the option that said ‘I’m backing none of the party leaders’. When this was broken down by party preference, the results varied. Among National supporters, only 7% chose that option, Labour supporters 25%, Greens 38% and NZ First 27%. A healthy 89.5% of National supporters said instead that they had ‘confidence in at least one candidate’ for prime minister. So, this was a different way of approaching the usual ‘preferred prime minister’ polling question (which Bill English was leading at the time). It indicated that National supporters had much greater confidence in the prospects for political leadership of the country than any others. When asked, ‘If you could choose any living person in the world to be prime minister of NZ who would it be?’ (with a free-text response) the seven most frequently cited names were, in this order: John Key, Barack Obama, Helen Clark, Bill English, Winston Peters, Jacinda Ardern, Bernie Sanders.

The idea that NZ First supporters are completely invested in Winston Peters, as party leader and even as a contender for prime minister, is not supported by these findings, as their responses compare very closely with Labour supporters on the question of whether they back any of the party leaders at all. With the possibility of NZ First negotiating the formation of a government with either National or Labour after the approaching election, however, the survey revealed how this poses problems for the supporters of each of the main parties.

NZ First supporters are similar to Labour and Green supporters, in that they are highly likely to see the country as ‘discontented’ and to wish for either ‘radical’ or ‘gradual’ change. Most members of all three parties see inequality as ‘too high’, and disagree with the statement that ‘New Zealand is a land of equal opportunity’. But they begin to diverge on critical issues such as integration of immigrants and global warming. Sixty-two per cent of NZ First voters chose immigration as one of their ‘top 3 election issues’, compared with 22% of Labour and 14% of Green supporters. Eighty per cent of NZ First supporters preferred that new immigrants be told ‘Learn to do things the Kiwi way’, compared with 42% of Labour supporters and 26% of Greens. Two thirds of NZ First supporters said that government policies regarding minority groups are ‘too politically correct’, compared with 28% of Labour and 17% of Green supporters. Forty-four per cent of NZ First voters thought the government was ‘not doing enough on global warming’, compared with 77% of Labour and 92% of Green supporters; whereas 30% of NZ First supporters said that the government is ‘misled by fake science’ on global warming, compared with 6% of Labour and 3% of Green supporters.

So, while three quarters of NZ First supporters said they wanted a complete change of government, the supporters of the other opposition parties expressed diverging views about some key issues, suggesting a lack of political compatibility in negotiating policy, even between Labour and NZ First alone. As far as policy goes, NZ First supporters often appear more closely aligned with National than with Labour supporters. For example, 61% of NZ First supporters said that the government does ‘too much’ in regard to obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, while 55% of National supporters agreed with them. Naturally, supporters of National are much more likely to express content and to approve of government policies than NZ First supporters. The latter want to change the status quo and yet to preserve it as well.

A weighted rolling-average ‘poll of polls’ on 30 May 2017 had National on 44.2%, Labour 29.1%, Greens 13.0% and NZ First 9.4% (Pundit 2017). At the time of the writing, the most recent poll (Colmar Brunton, 1–5 July 2017) had National in the lead on 47% and Bill English as preferred prime minister on 26% (Young 2017). Those figures and other contextual factors (such as stable government and steady economic growth) pointed to the probability of another National-led administration after the election. If there were to be a change of government, however, a surge in votes from the young could be a cause, although there was no reason to anticipate such a surge. Fifty-eight per cent of those under 35 opted for ‘complete change of government’ after the election, compared with 44% of those over 50. But the youngest eligible age-groups (18–29) are the least likely to enrol as electors, and, even if enrolled, they are the least likely to actually vote. So, the present survey results concur with the conclusion drawn from the Listener survey that ‘although a slight majority of voters actually want a change of government, that’s not what they are likely to serve themselves’ (Clifton 2017, p. 10).

Prospects

The danger for a liberal and permissive society arises when a strong leader misleads the disaffected, saying that, if you are like him (it usually is a ‘him’), or more to the point, if you follow him, then ‘you can do anything’ (to quote from Trump’s infamous hot-mike conversation).⁴ And people vote with disillusionment and distrust in the forefront of their minds – even though a common and unspoken trust that the state will continue to exist and to function supports the very expression of their dissatisfaction.

Every election is about trust, as we are entrusting our representatives with legislative and executive powers. But politics today is about trust at a more basic level. Questions about our trust in the system of government itself are at the forefront of political dissension. Freedom of information, for example, is a particularly contentious issue, bringing the future of our democratic processes into question (Edwards 2017). Any suggestion that democracy in New Zealand is fundamentally under threat due to public disaffection is not really supportable, however. The World Values Survey data presented by Foa and Mounk (2017) shows that younger New Zealanders were much less likely than their elders to rate it ‘essential’ (a rating of 10 on a 10-point scale) to ‘live in a country that is governed democratically’. But this age-effect may be more about maturation, and may not represent a long-term trend of ‘democratic deconsolidation’. The survey question itself is ambiguous, as a young and mobile respondent may well think that one option, at some time in life, is to live in a non-democratic country, such as the People’s Republic of China. The question did not ask about living in the country that one calls home. Moreover, between Wave 3 (1995–1997) and Wave 6 (2010–2014) of the survey, in which respondents were asked whether ‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections’ would be a ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’ way to ‘run this country’, the New Zealand response-rate grows only minimally, remaining around the 20% level (Foa and Mounk 2017). The two main case-studies of ‘deconsolidation’ that Foa and Mounk focus on are Venezuela and Poland, which do not compare well at all with New Zealand.

On any international comparison, New Zealand’s electoral and governmental systems are consistently rated very highly – among the best – for observing values such as human rights, freedoms and transparency. Despite the dissatisfaction that drove the change to MMP and the melt-down of one coalition government in 1998, the survey evidence available shows that New Zealanders are now more satisfied with democracy than they were before MMP (Vowles 2016). There is a high level of satisfaction with the conduct of elections (TNS New Zealand 2014) – which are certainly not ‘rigged’.

It was under a FPP majoritarian system that New Zealand saw a prime minister (Muldoon) who showed little respect for the constitution, and provoked the deep division and riots of 1981 in order to win the subsequent election; this was followed, after Muldoon’s defeat in 1984, by Labour implementing rapid economic policy change with no electoral mandate. FPP produced single-party majority governments that most voters had not wanted. Any hypothesis that there was a time when democracy and truth were our guides – after which ‘post-truth politics’ arrives as a fall from grace – is bound to encounter historical obstacles.

To be fair, MMP has not realised hopes that it would sustain high voter turnouts. And one only has to read columns of anonymous online comments nowadays to see cynicism and distrust aimed at both sides of the House. But MMP gives us a moderate style of government and greater public satisfaction with democracy, in spite of its shortcomings. One of those shortcomings so far may be mediocrity. But, in the present climate, we could console ourselves that mediocrity is a better bet than authoritarian leadership or disruptive populism or more neo-liberal deregulation.

The era of disruptive neo-liberal reform in New Zealand extended from 1984 to 1996. The voter revolt of 1993 and the switch to MMP in 1996 brought that to a close. Governments since then have preserved basic neo-liberal policy settings, such as central-bank independence, but they have gradually unwound many of the neo-liberal reforms, especially in public management (Duncan and Chapman 2012). When, for example, was the last time we heard serious talk about competitive private-sector provision in the accident compensation scheme? Well, it was in National’s 2011 election manifesto, and that policy was quietly dropped. Former Prime Minister Jim Bolger, who oversaw many of the neo-liberal reforms in the early nineties, has recently declared them to be a failure economically and socially (Espiner 2017). The Trump presidency has rejected neo-liberal free-trade agreements, and encouraged a turn back towards nationalism. A new orthodoxy could be evolving, led from the right – indeed the far right, or alt-right.

But the left has some similar aims too, as it’s at the level of the nation-state that most distributional conflicts have been fought and resolved in the past. Strong state investment in housing for rent on an income-related basis would do a lot to address the social deprivation that we see today. In addition, it builds publicly owned assets, rather than subsidising private landlords through the accommodation supplement. New Zealand has many other outstanding infrastructural projects that need action and would create employment, as well as relieving major transport problems. The left could transform nationalist politics into a progressive movement, but it requires rather more courage and conviction than we saw in the Labour and Green parties. By jointly pledging themselves to a relatively conservative set of fiscal-responsibility parameters (Robertson 2017), the two parties limited their options in advance of the election.

In summary, though, New Zealand politics, following its ‘Brexit’ moment in 1993 and the shift to proportional representation in 1996, is less overtly polarised than it was, at times, under FPP. In May 2017, the Stuff.co.nz/Massey survey, supported by other opinion polls, nonetheless revealed a range of critical issues, especially housing, inequality, health and immigration. Those who support centre-left parties are the more concerned about inequality and housing, while those supporting the centre-right and NZ First are the more concerned about immigration. It is no surprise that there are some starkly divided opinions among the public about matters such as Treaty settlements and climate change. And there is also a desire for short-term, as well as more systemic, political change. But systemic change looks more likely to happen gradually than suddenly.

Conclusion

The Stuff.co.nz/Massey University Election Survey (corroborated by other opinion polls) revealed widespread political discontent and distrust in New Zealand in mid-2017. This did not, however, appear to be so profound as to produce, in the short term, the kind of political upheaval seen in some other Western democracies such as Italy, France, Spain and the Netherlands – let alone Greece. There was, of course, a constituency in New Zealand, especially among Labour and Green supporters, for a change of government – and also for changes to the system of government itself. But those who supported the incumbent National Party retained a higher level of confidence in political leadership than those supporting opposition parties. Political scandals, broken promises, inequality and unmet needs inevitably erode the people’s trust, but they may not necessarily motivate voters to switch to another party, in so far as voters may assume that ‘they’re all the same’. Their response could also be to abstain from voting. So, while the evidence did not indicate fundamental change ‘just around the corner’, there are nevertheless signs that New Zealand’s party-political landscape could undergo gradual fragmentation due to popular dissatisfaction, similar to that which has occurred in continental European countries with proportional representation. The first ‘victim’ of this fragmentation would probably be the Labour Party.

In addition to the methodological limitations of any self-selected sample that give us caution in reaching conclusions, the present results could also be overtaken by political events and a possible change of ‘mood’. Subsequent opinion polls and the election results could either uphold or confound the present findings. Given globally widespread political disruption and associated distrust in expertise, media, opinion polls and politicians, the present survey tested for the extent of such sentiments in New Zealand. Future surveys could monitor trends in anti-establishment moods among the public, based on trust or distrust, and on the extent to which people may be disillusioned with ‘the system’ of government itself.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Sidah Russell of Massey University and the team at Stuff.co.nz who made the online survey a success. Professor Peter Lineham and Drs Warwick Tie and Damien Rogers supported a public talk (at Massey University’s Albany campus 1 June 2017) that formed the basis of this article. And Dr Toby Boraman gave very helpful feedback on an early draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Mr Key’s resignation speech acknowledged the sacrifices made by his family, asserted that it was a good time for a change of leadership, and stated ‘I have left nothing in the tank’ (Key 2016).

2 Mr English was forced to declare a policy on the universal public pension. John Key had promised not to touch it so long as he was prime minister. With him out of the way, National proposed raising the age of entitlement to 67. Means-testing was ruled out for the time being. But, by delaying change until 2037, Mr English essentially promised to do nothing much at all, as a future parliament could repeal or amend the legislation that he planned to pass in 2018.

3 Winston Peters stood unsuccessfully for National in the Northern Māori electorate in 1975. He won Hunua in 1978, but lost it in 1981. In 1984, he won Tauranga. He shares Muldoon's economic protectionism. The Muldoon-era ‘dawn raids’ on Pacific Island ‘overstayers’ may also have been a formative political experience for Mr Peters.

4 Referring to the Trump voter: ‘Perhaps sick of “playing by the rules”, as his betters have always exhorted, and having so little to show for it, this voter was drawn to the man who could say anything, do anything, and get away with it. America has always loved its outlaws’ (Wypijewski 2017).