New Zealanders returning from overseas: how their experiences of xenophobia could help us respond to superdiversity

ABSTRACT

This article draws on qualitative interview data with 42 New Zealanders returning to New Zealand after living overseas, finding they feel more like a ‘migrant’ than someone coming ‘home’. This is in part because New Zealand people and institutions demonstrate an intolerance to difference, theorised here as a form of xenophobia that inhibits the economic, social and political integration of participants. However, the same experiences and ideas that lead many New Zealanders to frame returnees as an ‘out-group’ can be regarded as a national resource. The article concludes that we should embrace – not ignore or disparage – returnees' awareness of integration issues, transnational networks and cross-cultural experiences as we attempt to maintain social cohesion in an increasingly superdiverse world.

KEYWORDS:

• Returnees
• reintegration
• New Zealand
• xenophobia
• superdiversity

Introduction

Political discourse since the 2000s has acknowledged the economic benefits of New Zealanders engaging in global networks while living overseas (Gamlen 2007). But the experiences of returning New Zealanders are rarely valued and this cohort is expected to easily slot back into society because they are coming ‘home’. Given record numbers of returnees between 2012 and 2016 (Ninness 2018), it is concerning that qualitative life-history interviews with 42 returning New Zealanders found many participants feel more like a ‘migrant’ than someone coming ‘home’. They describe New Zealand people and institutions being intolerant towards the different ideas and behaviours that returnees embody, an experience theorised here as a form of xenophobia (fear or aversion towards foreigners and, more broadly, people, values, customs and beliefs differing from those of one's own culture – Duckitt 2010).

As with the related but distinct concepts of racism and nativism (Sundstrom and Kim 2014), xenophobia involves essentialised stereotypes about in- and out-groups which are used as shortcuts in daily interactions (Baker et al. 2018). This is particularly when the out-group is perceived as posing a threat to resources/values/identity or being a competitor for power/resources/status (Wimmer 1997; Duckitt 2010). While returnees are New Zealand citizens and technically not ‘foreigners’, analysis indicates that they often come to embody new values and customs which lead employers, family members and other New Zealanders to perceive them as part of an ‘out-group’ as if they are foreigners. For instance, the discussion highlights how returnees find their overseas skills and experiences devalued or disparaged, limiting economic, social and political engagement. This supports Sundstrom and Kim’s (2014) view that the core aspect of xenophobia is a civic ostracism that it denies the opportunity to be included in the civic mainstream, which is a precondition for certain social goods and for the agency needed to be fulfilled within a polity. This focus distinguishes xenophobia from racism and ethnocentrism (Sundstrom and Kim 2014), enabling the former concept to be applied to New Zealand returnees, even those identifying with the European/Pākehā ethnic and cultural majority. Returnees also report New Zealand tendencies towards anti-intellectualism and conservatism that they believed made New Zealanders intolerant to not only political ideas from overseas but any change in the political status quo. This highlights that xenophobia ‘is fundamentally a fear about both outsiders and the social order’ (italics added, Baker et al. 2018, 379).

While New Zealand's 2017 election campaign provoked some debate about xenophobia towards migrants (Morgan 2017; Walters 2017), there has been no consideration of how xenophobia affects returnees. This article suggests xenophobia plays out across New Zealand society, inhibiting returnee economic, social and political reintegration. Returnees are nonetheless New Zealand citizens and otherwise relatively privileged (in terms of knowledge of and networks within New Zealand) when compared to the migrants whom we more commonly understand as targets of xenophobia. Recommendations thus stress how returnees might be regarded a resource for New Zealand as it responds to ‘superdiversity’ (Vertotec 2007) or the complex interactions (between variables such as country of origin, ethnicity, religion, language, immigration status or gender) created when 25% of New Zealand's population is born overseas (Office of Ethnic Communities 2016). It is argued that drawing on returnee experiences could reduce the challenges both they and new migrants face when (re)settling in New Zealand, while also contributing to a broader vision of our national imaginary.

Return migration and reintegration

As voluntary, self-initiated return migrants to their ‘home’ country, returning New Zealanders face fewer barriers to reintegration than forced returnees (Kuschminder 2017). Yet evidence suggests they still experience feelings of disappointment, isolation and lack of belonging (Watkins 2012; Ellis 2015; Penke 2016). As with ‘integration’ amongst migrants, reintegration must be understood multidimensionally to encompass these different experiences (Kuschminder 2017). This article is therefore structured around the analysis of New Zealanders' economic, social and political engagement upon return.

Reintegration is also widely understood as a process (not an end point), although early theorising that returnees go through three sequential phases of ‘reverse culture shock’ – honeymoon, culture shock and readjustment – has been challenged by recent research (see Chaban et al. 2009; Kuschminder 2017). For instance, Ellis’ (2015) New Zealand study found that expatriates can now easily, regularly and cheaply stay in contact with their home country, reducing many of the surprises and shocks associated with return and the need to choose between engaging with one country or the other. Indeed, returnees who are locally integrated and transnationally oriented experience the highest sense of belonging and personal satisfaction with return migration (de Bree et al. 2010; Kuschminder 2017).

The New Zealand participants reported here were not asked if they felt ‘successfully reintegrated’ but discussed expectations of return and their fulfilment because returnee expectations are often inaccurate due to both themselves and their country changing. This is a problem given Black (1992) found that managers returning to the United States (US) from international assignment with accurate expectations adjusted and performed better after return than those with inaccurate expectations. Reintegration may also be hindered if returnees develop competencies or are exposed to new ideas while overseas that are incompatible with those at home (Ellis 2015; Penke 2016). Inter-personal tensions can result when friends/family expect returnees to exhibit ‘normal’ pre-sojourn behaviour, whereas returnees feel they have changed and may be critical of their country and their compatriots in new ways (Pocock and McIntosh 2011).

Evidence further suggests that institutional contexts, not just personal interactions, shape return experiences. Andresen and Walther (2013) compared the reintegration of self-initiated returnees in three countries, finding poorer results in Denmark where employers did not value international experience as much as German and French employers. Adler’s (1981, pp. 341, 351) study of returning Canadian corporate and governmental employees also reported that: ‘Home-country managers tended to exhibit xenophobia (fear of foreign things) in assessing the potential and actual effectiveness of returnees’ and ‘[c]olleagues seem to expect returnees to relearn the ways of employees who have never been overseas’. In New Zealand, recruiters have been further identified as obstructive gatekeepers to returnee employment (Pocock and McIntosh 2011; Watkins 2012; Ellis 2015).

Other institutional arrangements are also important, including education systems, housing and political/media discourses that implicitly or explicitly influence stereotypes and group hierarchies shaping belonging. In particular, reintegration policies – or, in their absence, the broader assimilationist or multiculturalist approach – can inform how cultural difference is accepted (or not) by citizens (Crul and Scheider 2010; Kuschminder 2017). In New Zealand, a bicultural framework has incompletely acknowledged the rights and culture of indigenous Māori since the 1980s but no official policy of multiculturalism exists. This means limited support for newly arrived migrants and little emphasis on valuing the diversity embodied by migrants and others beyond appreciating ‘ethnic’ restaurants and cultural festivals (Trlin and Watts 2004). This institutional context not only helps to explain reports of racial/ethnic discrimination in New Zealand (Human Rights Commission 2018; Wiggins 2019) but is crucial to understanding the reintegration experiences of returning New Zealanders. These are analysed following a brief description of the research.

Research sample and design

Forty-two New Zealanders (by birth or naturalisation) who had lived overseas for at least three years – but had resettled in New Zealand for at least 1.5 years – took part in life-history interviews in two New Zealand cities. Combined, participants had resided in more than 70 countries, with many living overseas for multiple periods (sometimes returning to New Zealand to live in between). However, for 28 participants the main country in which they had lived was an English-speaking yet superdiverse destination such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia or the US. The mean number of years spent overseas was 11.4 but only 24 of the 42 participants had been away more than six years. The mean number of years that participants had lived in New Zealand since return was 5.6 years but 30 participants had been back between only 1.5 and six years.

The participant sample was over-represented by women (25 of 42), European/Pākehā (32), those in their 30s and 40s (30), professional occupations (28) and living in households earning over $101,000 per annum (27). However, the sample matches the KEA/Colmar Brunton (2015) expatriate/returnee survey population quite well, suggesting such unevenness is not unusual in this group. Given the small sample overall, these variables were not analysed statistically but quotes are followed by ethnic, gender, age and country characteristics to contextualise participant comments.

A broader research project asked participants about three kinds of citizenship engagement:

• Economic (owning property; paying tax; donations; financial support to family and friends);

• Civil society (informal volunteering; belonging to a community/cultural group, sports club, social justice movement or religious-based organisation; contributions to tribal or ethnic communities);

• Political (voting; membership of a political party, union or political movement; online political activity; petition-signing; participation in protests).

Citizenship engagement prior to leaving New Zealand, while overseas and on return was discussed but only the latter is considered here. Interview transcripts were analysed thematically, both deductively in terms of the types/frequency of citizenship engagement and inductively regarding participant perceptions of the benefits that returnees bring to New Zealand and the problems they articulated when reintegrating economically, socially and politically.

Results

All 42 participants believed that living overseas had benefitted themselves in ways that might also advantage New Zealand. One participant summarised this view, saying returnees should be treated as a:

[t]remendous resource, probably more valuable than the guys that have stayed here. Because they're coming back with experience that is only achievable overseas … . they're probably going back with money. They're coming back with a view point of the world that is not insular. And as a result, New Zealand will be for the better because it'll start looking outwardly instead of … . just looking at our own navel … (European/Pākehā male, 60s, Canada)

Another participant commented that having returned from overseas: ‘I'd like to think that I'm contributing in a smarter way. In a more constructive way, strategic perhaps’ (Māori female, 40s, Korea). These views align with New Zealand immigration policy – which targets professional migrants from around the world at least in part because it is expected they will improve international networks – and initiatives such as the Kiwi Expatriate Association (KEA), which aim to harness New Zealand experts and entrepreneurs overseas for New Zealand's economic benefit (Gamlen 2007; Spoonley 2015).

Alongside gaining international qualifications, work experience or business networks, many participants described how surviving in a foreign country enhanced self-reliance and resourcefulness, as well as awareness of the differences and similarities across humanity:

… [what] definitely got reinforced … is that people all over the world are just the same … . There's a difference between knowing it sort of intellectually and knowing it sort of emotionally, I think. And I think going overseas teaches you the emotional experience of that knowledge. (European/Pākehā male, 30s, Canada/Scotland)

Such cross-cultural and inter-personal skills are increasingly needed given rapid diversification has challenged New Zealand's British settler history, ‘characterized by a strong and exclusive nationalism (“white immigration” policies, indigenous dispossession and marginalization)’ (Spoonley 2015, pp. 658–659). Returnees have experienced migrant integration themselves and often return with knowledge of alternative policy and community settings that could inform solutions to some of New Zealand's enduring economic, social and political problems. In this sense, they have an appreciation of the ‘diversity dividend’: the skills gained from negotiating differences, increasing skills, knowledge and understandings which result in creativity and unexpected synergies (Watts and Trlin 2000). Yet, as the following three sections summarise, many of the difficulties that participants faced in reintegrating resulted from xenophobic views that fail to understand what the diversity dividend can provide. Moreover, they highlight individual and institutional factors discouraging returned New Zealanders from challenging the economic, social and political status quo.

Economic reintegration

For most participants, finding a job using their skills/experience was the key to economic reintegration. Positive narratives of economic reintegration were more common amongst those securing a job before return (six participants) or returning to study (five) or retire (four). Of the remainder, 12 found employment to be a significant challenge, while others had minor issues. One participant described having six jobs since returning six years earlier, others took contract work or jobs unrelated to their skills until able to secure work more suited to them, while some participants gave up careers that were not viable in New Zealand and had to rethink their work trajectories.

Although a handful of participants acknowledged they had underestimated the ease of finding work, most expected they would not earn as much or find the same kind of roles in New Zealand as overseas. Several further acknowledged their own responsibility for preparing for the New Zealand job market; a participant critiqued an acquaintance for being ill-prepared:

… . she had no New Zealand work experience before she went away and she had no interest in the New Zealand news and when she came back, that was a culture shock … . when she was interviewing for jobs she would have come across as being completely off the pulse. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, UK)

Despite having fairly realistic expectations, returnees described many barriers to finding secure and appropriate work, in particular recruiters and employers not valuing overseas work experience. One generously saw this resulting from a lack of knowledge:

… . people don't really understand what that experience means. Like Switzerland is not a country that everybody knows all about. So I guess for an employer they're like ‘So what? If you worked in New Zealand I'd know what that's about.’ So it's less tangible. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, Switzerland)

Two others felt team work was not as valued as in other countries, making people more territorial and self-interested. Less generously, another participant said: ‘you get a feeling that there might be some resentment about the fact that you've travelled’ (European/Pākehā male, 60s, multiple countries). This aligns with Sundstrom and Kim’s (2014, p. 23) contention that xenophobia can include feelings of ‘envy, resentment, or feelings of incongruity’, as well as fear. Recruiters were also perceived as dealing with out-of-the-ordinary experiences and skills by simply ruling returnees out for a job. These barriers were so significant that a participant who had worked in Korea for several years believed that:

… . basically, I face the same challenge as an Asian migrant … People saw me – although being Kiwi – as an Asian immigrant … . my accent had changed a little bit, so people didn't automatically connect me to being a New Zealander or Pākehā white New Zealander … . and so it was really hard to find employment. (European/Pākehā male, 30s, Korea)

While we cannot assume this experience was equivalent to an Asian migrant's experience, research on migrant employment does similarly find widespread intolerance towards overseas qualifications and ways of doing business, often articulated as a desire for ‘New Zealand work experience’ (e.g. Trlin 2012; Chakiamury 2017). New returnees were mystified that earlier New Zealand work experience/qualifications did not count: ‘when I started working in the UK, nobody said “doesn't have any English experience.” Nobody said that in Singapore. Nobody said that anywhere. And what's so unique about the New Zealand environment?’ (European/Pākehā male, 60s, multiple countries). While knowledge of New Zealand laws or context might be important for some jobs, this participant felt a focus on New Zealand experience demonstrated a fear of the unknown – or of being overtaken: ‘if I hire him, how long before he's gonna be sneaking up taking my place?’ Another participant described friends' experiences as ‘almost workplace bullying because they've had, you know, London experience and [were] trying to help bring processes or different technologies into businesses … . and people have not appreciated being told [what to do] from the outside’ (Pākehā/Māori female, 40s, UK). Blogs and comments on returnee websites suggest that being framed as part of a ‘foreign’ out-group is common place for other New Zealanders arriving home from living overseas.

In-and out-group distinctions were also reflected in common perceptions that ‘who you know’ is more important than ‘what you know’, making it difficult to break into local employment networks. A participant who had lived in the US for 20 years illustrates a scenario frequently described by the returnees:

I went to job interviews. When I was clearly a good candidate for the job, didn't get them … . the job I did eventually get stemmed from a coffee conversation with somebody where I had a mutual connection. So I had had an introduction by somebody who knew that person. And that led to a job offer. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, US)

Being considered for a job only if someone the employer knows can vouch for you is another form of xenophobia. While migrant research documents similar problems (Trlin 2012; Chakiamury 2017), returnees are unable to access migrant employment services aiming to break into these social/professional networks. Overall, the findings support Chen’s (n.d.) argument that neither business nor government has worked fast or hard enough to benefit from the diversity dividend.

To a lesser degree than employment, the cost of living also directly impacted economic integration (see also Watkins 2012; KEA/Colmar Brunton 2015). For example:

… . financially, we definitely didn't do the right thing by ourselves [in returning]. We definitely didn't. It would have been better to stay in the UK. Because we had a mortgage with 1.5% interest rate. Really completely financially, we have screwed ourselves. But I still feel like we made the right decision. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, UK)

This participant felt that the quality of her children's New Zealand education outweighed such financial losses but many participants ended up working long hours, reducing hopes for more quality time with family. They were discouraged, however, from complaining about their worsened economic circumstances, since family and acquaintances implied that choosing to leave and return relinquished their right to express critical opinions. This was most notable when their experiences overseas challenged the purported ‘egalitarian’ New Zealand ethos. For instance, a single mother had returned from Singapore where:

… it's quite common to have a domestic helper. Common, extraordinarily affordable and it doesn't take long to get used to having somebody in your home to help you out. So coming back here was a bit of a slap in the face going ‘Ah! I have to be a real parent now. I have to be a real grown-up’. (Eurasian female, 30s, Singapore)

Although the broader issues she faced – housing unaffordability and long work hours – are a problem for many New Zealanders and ‘outsourcing’ of domestic labour is increasingly common in New Zealand, she and two other participants reported family and friends ridiculing them for having had a ‘servant’ while overseas. Wimmer (1997, p. 17) highlights that xenophobia is not only associated with concerns about material resources or migration-fuelled cultural clashes but can also be understood as an:

… appeal to the pact of solidarity into which state and society have entered … . [and] is an element of a political struggle about who has the right to be cared for by the state and society: a fight for the collective goods of the modern state.

In this sense, these participants were excluded from the ‘right to be cared for’, either by the New Zealand government through higher wages or by privately outsourced domestic labour. As noted, Sundstrom and Kim (2014) take this further, identifying civic ostracism (inclusion in the civic mainstream as a precondition for certain social goods or relations) as a central factor distinguishing xenophobia from racism. This positioning of returnees as belonging to an out-group with lesser rights was often reinforced by the interaction that participants had with civil society organisations, family and friends, as the following section highlights.

Social reintegration

Social reintegration can occur both formally and informally. In terms of formal civil society activities, such as sports club membership and civic organisation volunteering, 37 participants engaged before leaving New Zealand, 32 did so overseas and 29 on return. Only one participant explicitly discussed using civil society engagement as a strategy to overcome poor social networks and isolation, while another volunteered in Asian-specific organisations in New Zealand to make his experience of living in Asia relevant to employers. Other participants strategically engaged in civil society overseas but did not deem this necessary on return, presumably because they considered themselves part of the in-group.

Yet, although poor public transport, long work hours and low disposable income were discussed, social dislocation was the greatest barrier to civil society engagement named by participants. They often linked this dislocation to their ‘overseas assertiveness’ or alternative ideas:

… . I was more critical of New Zealand and its perceived contribution to the world … . New Zealand always sort of takes pride in punching above its weight and things like that and I was a bit more circumspect about … how it actually fits in the world and a lot more critical about our claims to being sort of an environmentally-friendly country. (Chinese male, 40s, multiple countries)

Participants also noted New Zealand's small size and its lack of a global outlook, which some saw as being too ‘nationalistic’. Three specifically highlighted they were far more cynical about nationalistic stereotypes or images since their return to New Zealand because they now felt these were untrue. Their narratives suggest this critical stance was not appreciated – perhaps even seen as a threat to the in-group – by many New Zealanders, including those with whom they interacted through civil society organisations.

More commonly, participants reported that even informal social interactions with friends and family held little opportunity to share overseas experiences, which meant large and important chunks of their lives were not discussed. One said:

I also find it [my time overseas] difficult to bring up sometimes … . [my group of friends] hadn't been overseas and so when I came back I had all this exciting stuff and they didn't know the questions to ask to get that out of me and I'm not that type of person that just blurts everything out. (European/Pākehā female, 20s, Japan)

As a result of such difficulties, some participants felt pressure to conform to their ‘old’ self even if this challenged their current sense of identity.

Developing new friends/networks upon return was a further issue for 12 of the 42 participants:

… . I'm a pretty gregarious person and an outgoing – I've never had a problem making friends in the community – and I found it was really difficult here. It was so difficult, people are like ‘Oh, it's nice to see you. We have our friends over here, bye. You're not part of our world’. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, US)

Some therefore gravitated towards people from overseas when back in New Zealand, potentially exacerbating the feeling of not belonging: ‘ … . going back to what you are saying about being an immigrant – it was a bit like that. You don't fit in with your own kind anymore’ (European/Pākehā female, 40s, UK). Others were nostalgic for the New Zealand society they had left:

I was a bit taken aback by – wasn't so much unfriendliness … . there was no sense of community or relationships with neighbours … . it just feels like there's been kind of a breakdown in civil society in New Zealand. (European/Pākehā male, 60s, multiple countries)

‘Memories’ of home are not always reliable and here nostalgia for the past might be associated with length of absence but also age, since the intensity and number of friendships we have in our teens and twenties often declines as we find partners and have families; a female participant in her early 40s specifically noted how old friends were more difficult to socialise with because they had ‘settled down.’ Two participants, however, simply described New Zealanders as rude or cold, with no interest in engaging socially.

Despite these negative perceptions of societal change, eight participants explicitly appreciated New Zealand's multicultural population and, overall, participants felt that living overseas had made many of them ‘more open and – yeah – hopefully more inclusive of other people who come here’ (European/Pākehā female, 30s, US). Another participant elaborated:

I grew up in Dunedin which was a very Caucasian, very conservative society. And I think going to somewhere where it's a very diverse, both culturally, ethnically and by gender and sexuality – you have to learn to be a different, you have to learn to listen … . you're not necessarily the majority. I think the other thing that really impacted on me was that I was an immigrant … . But I didn't look like one … . [that] gives you an eye to what other people face on a daily basis. Whether it be because of the colour of their skin or the fact that they don't speak English very well. And I think it just gives you empathy for what people other than yourself have to deal with all the time. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, US)

Similarly, views of who constituted a ‘New Zealander’ expanded:

… . when I came back to New Zealand, I could hear a New Zealand accent even when I knew it wasn't people's original accents. Like maybe some Indian guy at the markets, I could hear that he had a Kiwi accent on top of his Indian accent … . I guess my idea became a lot more inclusive … . about the people who are like me. Yeah, it was sort of this larger idea of the people who associate with this place. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, Switzerland)

These inclusive characterisations of New Zealanders challenge the perspectives of many remaining in New Zealand: although attitudes towards migrants are generally positive, a Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2016) survey reports a declining number of New Zealanders are positive about migrant contributions to New Zealand and European/Pākehā and Māori, most of whom will have been born in New Zealand, were less likely than other groups to be positive. Overall, migrants from the UK and Australia were favoured over migrants from other countries. This suggests that those who share cultural similarities with New Zealanders are more tolerated than those who are culturally different. Duncan (2018, p. 122) certainly reports 2017 survey data where 53% of respondents thought ‘new immigrants’ should be told to ‘learn to do things the Kiwi way’. Although there is no attitudinal data specific to returnees, an Asia New Zealand Foundation (2018) survey suggests that travel to Asia was the largest predictive of knowledge about Asia (which in turn is linked to more positive attitudes towards Asians) while Humpage and Greaves (2017) highlight how some variables associated with less likelihood to live overseas (such as low education and Māori ethnicity) are linked to exclusive ideas about who can appropriately become ‘one of them’. Ideas that migrants threaten the ‘in-group’ may be reinforced by political posturing, such as the New Zealand First and ACT parties' call for migrants to demonstrate certain ‘New Zealand values’ before being accepted into the country (see Davison and Jones 2016; Bennett 2018). The next section further highlights how a resistance to political discussion and change amongst New Zealanders may contribute to such views.

Political reintegration

Political engagement is not only important for democracy but can enable returnees to feel their views still count in New Zealand, even when they have been absent for some time. Only 32 participants voted on return, seven fewer than before leaving New Zealand (25 voted in New Zealand while overseas). In contrast, the overall number of participants engaging in non-electoral forms of political activity rose from 22 before leaving to 29 on return (17 engaged while overseas).

Both inter-personal and institutional factors which marginalise political discussion explain the weakening of electoral activity. One participant spoke of being criticised by her brother for bringing politics into conversation, even around election time. Another was surprised the New Zealand education system had not given her the same political awareness she found among other young expatriates on the same exchange programme in Japan. A participant who could not vote while living in the US for 20 years nonetheless felt more politically engaged there because she viewed New Zealand politicians as deficient:

… . they don't show up to the supermarket. Like in Chicago, our alderman would occasionally stand by the train station and give out doughnuts and say ‘Hi. I'm Joe.’ So you knew who he was and he was available and you can have a conversation with them on the street … . But here there's no visibility at all. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, US)

Poor visibility may also be linked to weak political affiliations, which two participants associated with New Zealand's Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) environment: ‘The fact you can spread your favours around [means] I haven't felt quite so – quite the need to nail my flag to the mast of one particular party’ (European/Pākehā female, 60s, UK and Germany) and ‘it's sort of irrelevant who you vote for, because … the end of the day, they'll form a coalition for someone else and they'll compromise on the outcome of policies which benefits them but no one else wants’ (European/Pākehā male, 40s, Australia). While Duncan (2018) notes that MMP has overall brought greater public satisfaction with democracy and is better than authoritarian leadership or disruptive populism, he also observes that mediocrity is one of its shortcomings.

This mediocrity may be exacerbated by what participants described as a generalised resistance towards different ways of doing things that is a key component of the xenophobia theorised here. A man who returned after thirty years away said: ‘one of the disappointments I found in New Zealand since coming back is … . the against everything point of view. Anything that comes up’ (European/Pākehā male, 60s, Canada). In part, he felt a lack of international perspective meant that many New Zealanders gripe about small issues and miss the bigger picture: ‘they haven't seen how fucking good they have it. Excuse my English there. But we do have it good’. Another participant, who was away for 12 years, gave an example: ‘I mean we have this thing here about if you tax people more than sort of twenty-something percent, the world is going to come to an end’ (European/Pākehā male, 70s, Finland). He knew from living in Finland that higher taxes could be politically viable yet no one was interested in hearing about, never mind learning from, this experience.

Such political resistance created tensions for returnees because, for many, living overseas:

… . opened up a real thirst for intellectual activities and that sounds very snobby and I'd actually be embarrassed to say in public cos there's the Kiwi cringe like ‘ahh you think you're better than us’ and I hate that. There is a real anti-intellectualism in this country and … it's media-driven and it's politically driven as well … . if you do speak out you get ‘look at that bloody snob’. (European/Pākehā male, 40s, UK)

Another participant also felt that ‘[New Zealand] politics has become extraordinarily anti-intellectual; not quite to the extent of the US but we are seeming to be going down a similar route’ because ‘I don't think people really engage with political issues except for on, you know, a piecemeal basis’ (European/Pākehā male, 40s, Australia). Anti-intellectualism has historically played a strong role in New Zealand politics, with politicians commonly claiming their views are not ideological or representative of an elite; recent debate suggests some New Zealanders are still suspicious of those showing an interest in culture, theory or international affairs (Bradford 2014; Peters 2019). The same participant felt that New Zealanders overall are also more conservative than other nationalities, especially relating to:

… . attitudes towards different ideas that are there from the outside world … . [also New Zealanders] don't actually say the things that they are thinking, whereas other cultures like the Irish or the Australians will. And they won't beat about the bush. I think in some ways we're quite conservative in the extent that we tend to hold things back quite well. (European/Pākehā male, 40s, Australia)

This and other participant narratives suggest that much-needed discussion of political alternatives is inhibited by national characteristics discouraging inter-personal conflict and intellectual debate. The participant above and five others linked this to institutions such as the media, which they felt did not cover political issues in sufficient depth. The New Zealand Herald and publicly-funded Radio New Zealand were specifically criticised for comparing poorly against the investigative, indepth journalism of international media outlets. The participant above experienced ‘culture shock’ when realising that the New Zealand media did not ‘create the right level of debates’ (European/Pākehā male, 40s, Australia) when compared to Australian media. Such a context may have negative consequences for political engagement:

I am still as interested in global politics [but] I'm less interested in New Zealand politics, mostly because of the way it's presented … . everything just seems a bit more petty here. So I don't find myself as engaged … . it's hard to kind of think about the bigger issues like poverty or inequality. Because everybody is kind of fighting over the little details. (European/Pākehā female, 40s, UK)

Not all participants let New Zealand's resistance towards political alternatives stop them, as the increased engagement in non-electoral activities highlights. A participant unable to vote in the US and concerned about the growing conservatism there was significantly involved in social media debates because: ‘I'm looking at America, I don't like what I'm seeing, I wanna make sure the same thing doesn't happen in New Zealand’ (European/Pākehā female, 30s, UK/US). Other participants engaged with international media to overcome the limitations of the New Zealand media or resisted New Zealand's ‘conservative’ tendencies by adopting an assertiveness they associated with the host country they had lived in:

… . Australians are fairly outspoken and very brash a lot of the time … . And I came home and just kind of came back to people who generally like kept to themselves … . I dunno maybe I absorbed some of that Australian energy (laughter). And I came home and combined with this new kind of political ideas and … . and now kind of embody it. (Māori/ Pākehā female, 30s, Australia)

The New Zealand political environment was thus not necessarily a complete barrier to political engagement amongst returnees, particularly in non-electoral activities, but it did stop some people getting as involved as much as they want to be or were overseas. Inhibiting returnee political reintegration is thus a lost opportunity for New Zealand to benefit from their desire to use their valuable life experiences to build a better society. That poor political visibility in the media and communities were also identified as limits on the electoral participation of Asian migrants to New Zealand suggests that improvements in these areas are vital (Barker and McMillan 2017).

Discussion and recommendations

This article's analysis of returnee reintegration experiences suggests that returning ‘home’ is not easy for New Zealanders, with hurdles to overcome in the economic, social and political spheres. Participant narratives highlight the importance of returnees having realistic expectations of return informed by adequate research, planning and willingness to make an effort, for example by using civil society organisations strategically to improve social networks (see Watkins 2012 for detailed individual-level recommendations). But reintegration is also affected by xenophobic attitudes: returnees face in- vs. out-group distinctions which frame them as ‘foreign’. This may not be exactly the same as the xenophobia experienced by migrants and returnees likely hold greater resources for mediating such attitudes in many cases, but arguably both forms of xenophobia stem from the same underlying fear of difference.

These findings suggest that we need to transform our national institutions and national imaginary, as a way of combatting xenophobic attitudes. They support previous arguments that we need to prepare existing New Zealanders for diversity via an ethnic relations policy that includes remedial and proactive measures to foster positive intergroup relations, counteract xenophobic attitudes and combat discriminatory practices in all spheres of social and economic activity (Trlin and Watts 2004). Returnee experiences of being both parts of the in-group (before leaving New Zealand) and the out-group (on return) make returnees ideal candidates to be frontline players as New Zealand grapples with the reality of superdiversity and searches for political alternatives to enduring social problems. Research cited earlier found that being locally integrated and transnationally oriented improved belonging and personal satisfaction amongst returnees, so utilising their international knowledge and connections may not only improve reintegration experiences but may help counter the broader xenophobic climate towards diversity and ‘foreigners’.

For instance, HRC (2018) campaigns have encouraged New Zealanders to think about national identity and ‘racial discrimination in our backyard’ but suffered from a low profile and did not target employers specifically, even though they have been long identified as a major barrier to integration for migrants. Along with more effective monitoring and implementation of equal opportunity legislation, Watts and Trlin (2000) identified a closer partnership between business, government and communities as a way to promote the value of ‘productive diversity’ by, for example, increasing exports or improving client services. More specifically, this article has confirmed an ongoing need for professional education for recruiters and employers that ensures they understand the value of overseas experience to their businesses and the country. Here returnees could play a role, being funded by the government to act as ‘ambassadors’ to explain overseas qualifications, contexts and professional norms. When employed, returnees could also be assigned by employers to mentor new migrants since they know the difficulties of integrating and may bring some appropriate cultural knowledge to the relationship.

Further institutional valuing of the diversity dividend could be found in a national languages policy that incentivises second language-learning; although 10 ‘priority’ languages are now available in primary schools, no New Zealand student is required to learn a second language in school and the number of students learning is declining (Dooney 2017). Many returnees have either learned a new language or discovered the barriers created by speaking only English while overseas, again making them ideal promoters of the value of linguistic diversity. Research suggesting that ‘anticipation of communication difficulties and the desire to protect their grades are major contributors to a tendency [amongst New Zealand university students] to avoid forming groups with international students’ also highlights the urgent need to use pedagogy differently to build confidence in such interactions (Campbell 2016, n.p). If directly engaging with international students/migrants is initially too confronting for some New Zealanders, educational and civil society organisations could ask returnees to share their experiences as a first route for highlighting the benefits of intercultural knowledge. For instance, primary schools could seek parents/children who have lived overseas to speak about the universal features of humanity mentioned by participants, encouraging children to think of themselves and others as global citizens (McCorkle 2018).

Importantly, challenging xenophobia (and addressing other enduring issues, such as disadvantage and inequality) requires not just acceptance of migrants but national reflection and acknowledgement on its colonial history. Kukutai and Rata (2018, p. 30) argue that:

Less obvious than the negative impacts of colonisation are the privileges that it has afforded Pākehā New Zealanders, who live in a political, economic and social system that largely reflects their culture and values. This, in turn, has implications for how national identity, belonging and citizenship are represented to those seeking to make Aotearoa New Zealand home.

Here again, returnees may be useful allies, for discussion above indicates that many participants began to think about their own privilege and understand national identity more inclusively when living overseas. A small number also articulated how they better appreciated Māori culture and its importance to New Zealand's national identity after living overseas; these experiences could inform greater consciousness of issues of privilege and racism amongst New Zealanders.

Rather than adopting a multicultural framework that marginalises Māori, Came and McCreanor (2015, p. 30) stress that this consciousness requires systematically challenging racism in political and economic rhetoric and in media coverage ‘to account for the past, reconceptualise our present, and reconstruct our futures around a respectful and genuine biculturalism’. The participants certainly identified the media as contributing to a broader political apathy, suggesting we need a greater public service focus for media organisations so contributing to: ‘A shared sense of belonging and a willingness to join together for common purposes are important aspects of a harmonious society – a society that is socially cohesive’ (OEC 2016, p. 7). Australia's SBS channel provides an excellent model for how the media can both reflect a multicultural, multilingual population and provide a platform for serious political debate. Deliberative democracy at local and national government level could further facilitate opportunities for returnees and others to constructively share alternatives to the political status quo.

In conclusion, this article's focus on returnee integration has highlighted not only that returning New Zealanders face significant xenophobia but also that they are part of the solution. To realise the diversity dividend and respond to enduring social problems in innovative ways, New Zealand should embrace – not ignore or disparage – returnees. Their awareness of integration issues, transnational networks and cross-cultural experiences could benefit New Zealand as it attempts to maintain social cohesion in an increasingly superdiverse context.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by a University of Auckland Faculty of Arts Research Development Fund grant and was conducted with assistance from Kiri West-McGruer, Jordan King and Rebecca Grimwood.