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Original Articles

Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of the Pakistan-Afghan confrontation

Pages 38-49 | Published online: 13 Jun 2011
 

Abstract

The widespread belief is that the instability in Afghanistan is the result of the entry and later abrupt departure by the Soviet Union and its Cold War adversaries. In fact, the persistence of the conflict is the result of Afghan-Pakistan antagonisms that can be traced to the 1940s, when Kabul opposed the creation of Pakistan. The world's longest unrecognized border, the Durand Line, coupled with Pashtun nationalist claims over much of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, led to Afghan army infiltration in the 1950s. Though peace was negotiated with Pakistan after a crippling embargo of land-locked Afghanistan, this only endured until a coup displaced the King Zahir Shah in 1973. The new policy of Afghanistan turned out to be to fuel the old secessionist claims, leading Pakistan to back Jihadist insurgents in 1974. I find that Afghan-Pakistan conflict is driven by competitive diversionary behavior by both regimes seeking to buttress public support. Afghanistan will find no escape from this insurgency until the international community compels it to address its complicity in provoking Pakistani intervention.

Selon une croyance répandue, l'instabilité en Afghanistan résulte de l'entrée dans ce pays de l'Union Soviétique et de ses adversaires de la Guerre Froide puis, plus tard, de leur brusque départ. En fait, la continuité du conflit est la conséquence des hostilités entre l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan qui remontent aux années 40, quand Kaboul s'est opposée à la création du Pakistan. De même que les revendications nationalistes pachtounes concernant la plus grande partie du Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, la ligne Durand, frontière non reconnue la plus longue du monde, a conduit à l'infiltration du Pakistan par l'armée afghane dans les années 50. Bien que la paix ait été négociée avec le Pakistan suite à un embargo écrasant du pays sans accès à la mer qu'est l'Afghanistan, elle n'a duré que jusqu'au coup d’état qui a déposé le roi Zahir Shah en 1973. La nouvelle politique de l'Afghanistan s'est alors révélée comme instrument pour attiser les vieilles revendications sécessionnistes, ce qui a poussé le Pakistan à soutenir les insurgés djihadistes. Je considère que le conflit entre l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan est le fruit d'une tactique compe ´titive de diversion employée par les deux pays pour renforcer le soutien de leurs populations. L'Afghanistan ne trouvera aucune issue à cette insurrection tant que la communauté internationalene le contraindra pas à assumer sa complicité, celle-ci se révélant lorsqu'il provoque les interventions du Pakistan.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Julian Schofield

Dr. Julian Schofield (PhD Columbia, Capt ret'd) is an associate professor of political science at Concordia University, and specializes in strategic studies. He has conducted extensive field work in South Asia over many years in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is the author of Militarization and War (Palgrave-Macmillan 1997), and has had articles published in Armed Forces & Society, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, as well as others.

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