Less is more: International intervention and the limits of external stabilization

Abstract

When we discuss problems and policy options in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the way we frame the problem will likely influence resulting policy. In what had been (in-)famously termed “AfPak”, based on regional considerations for policy towards Afghanistan, Afghanistan's failed state dragging down Pakistan has become the writing on the wall. This article claims that putting both countries into a single category runs the risk of neglecting their strikingly different paths of state formation and societal composition. While Pakistan has a post-colonial structure, which bears part of the governance problems in its Western provinces, Afghanistan has never had internal cohesion. It merely stayed in place mimicking statehood. Rather, external meddling coupled with an interest to tap external rents dominated internal politics. While public ideology in Afghanistan remains opposed to the state, in Pakistan the state and its institutions are a source of pride, identity and (critical) involvement.

While Pakistan's rivalry with India and fears of encirclement by the latter's engagement in Afghanistan has influenced Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, less international involvement might turn out to be “more”. More engagement of the population in politics is needed in Pakistan, salvaging the state by strengthening civic rights and civilianizing governance through structural reforms which end the British colonial remnants of indirect rule. In turn, letting Afghans take responsibility for their politics might raise Afghan actors’ awareness of what is at stake for them and at the same time diminish the power of the clientelist rentier-network.

Lorsque nous discutons des problèmes et des choix politiques au Pakistan et en Afghanistan, notre manière de les formuler est probablement déterminante pour les décisions politiques qui émergent de ces discussions. Dans ce qui avait été nommé « Afpak », terme désormais tristement célèbre, fondé sur des considérations régionales devant aider à définir la politique à mener en Afghanistan, unÉ tat afghan défaillant qui affaiblit le Pakistan, est devenu l’écriture sur la muraille du Livre de Daniel. Cet article affirme que classer ces deux pays dans une même catégorie fait courir le risque de négliger les différences fondamentales dans ce qui les a conduits vers leur formation et leur composition sociétale. Alors que le Pakistan a une structure post-coloniale, en partie responsable des problèmes de gouvernance dans ses provinces occidentales, l'Afghanistan n'a jamais connu de cohésion interne, et c'est à peine s'il est resté en place en parodiant un É tat. D'ailleurs, c'est plutô t l'intrusion dans les affaires extérieures qui, associée à l'exploitation de rentes extérieures, a dominé la politique intérieure du pays. Si en Afghanistan, l'opinion publique s'oppose constamment à la notion d’É tat, au Pakistan, l’É tat et ses institutions représentent pour la population une source de fierté et d'identité, et l'opportunité de s'impliquer politiquement (implication critique). Alors que la rivalité du Pakistan avec l'Inde, et les craintes d'encerclement par l'engagement de cette dernière en Afghanistan ont influencé la politique afghane du Pakistan, « moins » d'engagement international pourrait finalement signifier « plus » d'engagement : la population pakistanaise doit accroıˆtre sa participation à la politique de son pays pour sauver l’É tat en renforçant les droits civiques et en civilianisant la gouvernance avec des réformes structurelles, afin d'en finir avec le modèle colonial britannique de gestion indirecte. Quant aux Afghans, les laisser assumer leurs responsabilités en matière de politique pourrait avoir comme effet de mieux les sensibiliser à leurs propres enjeux et, simultanément, d'affaiblir le pouvoir du réseau de rentiers clientélistes.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• Pakistan
• state formation process
• statebuilding
• internal reforms
• AfPak

Notes

A vast amount of literature on state failure is concerned with how to categorize, conceptualize and measure it. For a concise overview and a discussion on the implications for policy formulation see Carment et al. (2010).

Elias points to the analytical problem that the state is not a given condition, but its formation is an ongoing process. This distinction is often lost due to the semantic proximity of ‘state’ and ‘condition.’

For a detailed analysis of the ideational background of the liberal paradigm see Kühn (2010a: 198-204).

For example, Rubin's analysis provides valuable insights (2002).

On the Taliban, Ahmed Rashid (2010), first published in 2000, is authoritative.

Originally called United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Jabhi-e Mutahid-e Islami bara-e Nejati Afghanistan), the group was called Northern Alliance by Pakistan's security agencies, indicating its non-Pashtun bias.

A number of mid-level Taliban attended the Loya Jirga, but, once Parliamentary elections were held, reasserted their tribal identities rather than running on a Taliban ticket (Semple 2009, p. 25).

This notion fostered early disengagement. Apparently, the United States assumed Afghanistan to be on the right track, diverting attention and efforts to the invasion of Iraq.

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) may serve as an example. It provided international oversight and investigated many of the allegations of fraud during the 2009 Presidential elections (Kühn 2009). Later, Karzai vowed to ‘Afghanize’ the commission, ridding it of its international members, to control investigations and public appearance. The international community could do little about it: ‘Afghans in the driver's seat’ was one of the ideas of Afghan ownership, meant to strengthen responsibility; however, in the case of the ECC, subverted to expunge Western oversight and influence.

‘Qawm is sometimes translated as tribe, but is in reality a more protean term, referring to any form of solidarity […] Qawm identity might be based on kinship, residence, or occupation. […] In common use qawm may denote various forms of identity: any level of tribal organization; an area of residence such as a village, valley, or town; a linguistically based ethnic group or nationality; or an occupational group similar to a caste. Qawm identity can be somewhat fluid, depending on what level or form of identity is relevant in a particular setting’ (Rubin 2002, p. 25).

The impact of the 2010 floods on the embedding of Taliban structures through social work and humanitarian aid by Islamists remains to be seen.

Personal conversation with Mark Sedra, Senior Researcher, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, ON (February 2010).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Florian P. Kühn

Dr. Florian P. Kühn, Senior Researcher and Lecturer at Hamburg's Helmut Schmidt University, Germany, has conducted research on Central Asia for several years, Publications on topics such as the rentier state, terrorism and political violence, drug economy, and the international community's involvement in the politics of World Society include articles in International Relations, International Peacekeeping, and Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, among others. Recent books, published in 2010 (both in German), are ‘Security and Development in World Society. Liberal Paradigm and Statebuilding in Afghanistan’ and (with Berit Bliesemann de Guevara) ‘Illusion Statebuilding. Why the Western state is so hard to export’.