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Abstract
While Canada will end its combat mission in Afghanistan this year, Ottawa's commitment to provide military trainers, its continued development and humanitarian assistance programs as well as on-going support for its NATO allies means that formulating a long-term Afghan strategy remains paramount. Given that Canada and its international partners support a regional approach to resolving the Afghan conflict, Kabul's neighbors – including Iran – will need to be involved in the process. As such Ottawa will have to revisit its own often fraught relationship with Tehran. Since 1996, Canadian foreign policy toward Iran has been framed by a strategy known as “Controlled Engagement.” This policy limits the level of official contacts between the two states as well as the issues that Ottawa will put on the table for discussion. One of the permissible topic areas is “Iran's role in the region.” DFAIT has interpreted this phrase to include Afghanistan. In other words, the Canadian Government would not have to alter its stated policy to dialogue publicly with Iran. This article argues that Afghanistan provides a shared and meaningful diplomatic space in which Canada, its allies and Iran can cooperate. Further, while operating within pre-existing governmental guidelines, Canadian-Iranian interaction on Afghanistan may also provide a window for rebuilding other aspects of their currently troubled bilateral relationship.
Alors que le Canada arrive au terme de sa mission de combat en Afghanistan cette anné e, l'engagement d'Ottawa à envoyer des instructeurs militaires dans ce pays, à y maintenir des programmes de développement et d'assistance humanitaire, et à y assurer un appui continu à ses alliés de l'OTAN, signifie que l’élaboration d'une stratégie afghane à long terme reste d'une importance capitale. É tant donné que le Canada et ses partenaires internationaux sont en faveur d'une approche régionale pour résoudre le conflit afghan, les voisins de Kaboul – y compris l'Iran – devront être impliqués dans ce processus. Ainsi, Ottawa devra revoir sa relation souvent tendue avec Téhéran. Depuis 1996, la politique étrangère du Canada vis-à-vis de l'Iran a été encadrée par la stratégie « d'engagement contrôlé ». Ce concept limite les contacts officiels entre les deux pays, ainsi que les problèmes qu'Ottawa souhaiterait voir figurer à l'ordre du jour des discussions. L'un des sujets acceptables est « le rôle de l'Iran dans la région ». L'AECIC considère que cette expression doit englober l'Afghanistan. En d'autres termes, le gouvernement canadien ne devrait pas avoir à modifier sa politique officielle pour dialoguer publiquement avec l'Iran. Cet article soutient que l'Afghanistan offre un espacediplomatique partagé et significatif au sein duquel le Canada, ses alliés et l'Iran peuvent coopérer. De plus, en se produisant dans le cadre des directives gouvernementales préexistantes, l'interaction entre le Canada et l'Iran à propos de l'Afghanistan peut également offrir une fenêtre d'opportunité pour la reconstruction d'autres composantes de leur relation bilatérale, actuellement perturbée.
Notes
Email Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, 17 August 2010 (hereafter “Interview with Minister Cannon”).
This UN framework included Afghanistan's six immediate neighbors: Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Pakistan, plus the United States and Russia.
Confidential interview.
Confidential interview.
Interview with Minister Cannon.
Confidential interview.
See Pelletier and Adams Citation(1981) or the more recent Wright Citation(2010).
See Tehran Times and Thompson. Manley acknowledges the phone call with Kharrazi: “I spoke with the foreign minister of Iran in order to …begin to understand what their position would be in response to any kind of action that might be contemplated and how they saw developments in the region (Agence France Presse Citation2001b).”
Confidential interviews with two Canadian diplomats once posted to Iran.
It is unclear when this addition actually occurred. The current DFAIT homepage entry on “Canada-Iran Relations” lists all four areas and links them specifically to the May 17, 2005 statement [See: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/iran/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-iran.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=8&menu=L (Accessed 25 January 2011).] Minister Pettigrew did not mention “Iran's role in the region” in this statement.
Cannon confirms, “At this time, the Government of Canada does not foresee any changes in our level of representation” (Interview with Minister Cannon).
Interview with Ambassador Michel de Salaberry, 17 August 2010.
Confidential interview.
Interview with Ambassador de Salaberry.
Confidential interview.
Notably, Afghanistan has voted against these UN human rights resolutions. While many Afghan officials privately supported Canada's position, the Government balked at going public with it. Kabul feared trade retaliation and a backlash against its citizens living in Iran. While there was a level of discomfort with Afghanistan's vote, Canadian officials recognized the dilemma facing the Karzai Government. “Afghanistan was not opposing Canada,” noted one official, “Kabul was just not opposing neighboring Iran.” Confidential interview.
Interview with Minister Cannon.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Confidential interview.
Canada is part of the Dublin Group established in 1990 as an informal network of like-minded countries working to stem the drug trade by exchanging information and best practices and coordinating country responses. Its “Mini Dublin Group for Southwest Asia” holds meetings in Iran.
Confidential interview.
Confidential interview.
Confidential interview.
Interview with Ambassador de Salaberry.