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Abstract
This article explores the Arctic policies of three of the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean (Russia, the United States and Canada), with special attention to that of the Russian Federation to confirm its status as the Arctic regional power. The fact that Russia - not the US - is the hegemon suggests particular courses of action. Using structural theory as the lens, Canada has two choices: it can either bandwagon with the US against a (supposedly) aggressive Russia or balance with a group of periphery states against Russia. Neither is the preferred choice for various reasons, including a reluctant US Arctic player and the special relationship Canada has with the US. Rather, a Canadian Arctic policy grounded in liberal realism would continue to ensure that Canada had the capabilities to monitor the Arctic and provide search and rescue support in cooperation with its Arctic allies (at the very least to share costs), while recognizing that Russia, by virtue of economic imperative, will try to dominate Arctic discussions. Canada's goal, therefore, must be to maximize Canadian interests, accommodate Russia and the US (when it is in its interest to do so) and keep political attention fixed on the Arctic.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the reviewers and the editor of the CFP journal for their advice and patience.
Notes
We acknowledge that Canada's status as a middle power is not universally agreed and that there exists a debate in the literature about the concept of Canada as a “power of middle rank”. We use “middle power” only as a means of comparing its relative military, diplomatic, economic and other capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and Russia on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.
The eight Arctic states include the five littoral states, which are Canada, Russia, the United States, Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands) and Norway, plus Sweden, Iceland and Finland.
Of these six documents, five address Northern issues specifically. The exception is Paul Hellyer's White Paper on Defence from 1964, in which the North is not mentioned at all. For an excellent, authoritative summary, see Sneyd Citation2008).
The USCG Healy (commissioned in 2000) is the United States' only icebreaker operating full time in the Arctic but it employs diesel technology (not nuclear like the Russian icebreakers) and is primarily designed for scientific research (run by the National Science Foundation).
The coastal state enjoys sovereign rights (i.e., exclusive control) to exploit mineral and non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf (for example, oil and natural gas). Coastal states also have sovereign rights over sedentary species (living resources “attached” to the continental shelf), but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Although a privately held investment firm based in the United States may provide funds to build a heavy icebreaker and deep-water port in Alaska. See Hickman Citation(2011).
The EU will not allow the sale of Canadian seal products in its region; China is, potentially, a very big player in the Arctic (resource exploitation and sea lines of communications); and Canada wants to maintain its leading-state status in the Arctic, which is made more difficult if potentially powerful players are included in the future such as India, Brazil, South Korea, etc.
This refers to the Ilulisaat Declaration (28 May 2008) in which all five Arctic coastal states committed to the orderly settlement of overlapping territorial claims through the established framework of the law of the sea.
It is acknowledged that Canada defends all of North America jointly with the United States and so, in that respect, there is built-in bandwagoning.