For students of foreign policy, international relations, and world politics, and, most particularly for those who subscribe to the realist school of thought, the relative distribution of power and influence within the international system is a matter of considerable import and ongoing interest. In very basic terms, the distribution of power is understood as a function of the system's polarity: with clear differences existing between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems. One might even argue that a system, whether regional or international, could also be ‘non-polar’; though, as a practical matter, a relatively equal distribution of power of influence seems more improbable than the rest. The interest in polarity stems from the premise that the international order is, by its very nature, anarchic and that each state must look to its own interests and capabilities – both to defend itself and to effectively pursue its national interests. Footnote*
A system is seen to be unipolar when a single power is seen to be disproportionately powerful and influential. A bipolar system exists when there is a relatively equal distribution of power and influence between two significant powers and their respective alliance systems. In this case, there are clearly competing ideologies and interests at stake and in play. The difference between these and a multipolar system has to do with the existence of multiple ‘great powers’ or centers of power and influence, with a relatively equal distribution of power and influence between and among the key actors. Leading scholars in the field of international politics have long held that multipolar systems are inherently more stable than bipolar systems, and, as a general rule, inherently more stable than unipolar systems.Footnote1
A system is seen to be unipolar when one state has disproportionately more influence – culturally, politically, economically, and militarily – than any other single state. A unipolar system is different than an empire, in that there is an actual system of states (like units) that are equal in principle, if not in practice. A unipolar system is also different than a hegemonic order in that the former operates within an anarchical environment, while the latter reflects the fact that there is a particular universalization in thought (albeit temporary) of a particular structure of power within and among the constituent units in the system. Finally, as we indicated above, unipolarity is often seen as unstable and inherently short-lived in that it stands in the way of the system's natural proclivity towards balance or multipolarity.
Multipolarity was the norm in modern international relations for nearly three hundred years, from the Treaty of Westphalia through the Second World War – with long periods of peace punctuated by significant periods of warfare. For nearly five decades, during the Post War or Cold War era, the international system was famously bipolar. This period lasted from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, and lasting longer than most seasoned observers would have predicted, the international system has been characterized by a situation where the United States of America has, at least on the surface, had disproportionately more influence than any other state.Footnote2 And, while it is fair to say that there is much debate as to whether we are actually experiencing a genuine ‘unipolar moment’, and keeping in mind that there is a great deal of confusion with respect to how one might measure unipolarity, and that there is even more controversy over whether unipolarity is inherently unstable, there is little doubt that the United States is the only state that possesses the combination of significant economic capability, substantial political influence, and demonstrated political will.Footnote3
In short, the most striking and significant characteristic of our current international political system continues to lie in its fundamentally anarchic nature. The world still lacks any kind of an overarching central authority or a common interstate government. This presents a clear challenge to students of foreign policy in that it is more difficult to determine what exactly drives the foreign policy initiatives of various governments. Not surprisingly, it also presents a challenge to the governments themselves, in that it is much easier to understand the interests at stake than it is to understand and to pursue those interests and what role external influences may come to play. The distribution of capabilities in the international political system has over time resulted in the three configurations noted above: multipolarity, with three or more great powers (1648–1945); bipolarity, featuring two great powers (1945–1991); and unipolarity, with the United States as the sole great power (the state of the system since 1991). Each of these configurations has significantly impacted the foreign policy behavior of states. The number of great powers present at any given time serves to create discernible constraints and opportunities for states. States, in turn, formulate and conduct foreign policy in accordance with “differently structured international-political systems.”Footnote4
At one level, and not without serious discussion about whether the notion of unipolarity continues to be theoretically interesting and practically relevant, this special issue is about systemic change. At a more practical level, however, the articles in this special issue of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal are squarely focused on a single question: how and to what extent does the structure of the international political system affect the formulation and execution of Canadian foreign policy? The papers contained herein analytically assess the effects of a profound structural shift – from the post-World War II bipolar international political system of 1945–1991 to a system that today is considered unipolar – has created in crafting and implementing foreign policy initiatives for Canada.
The conduct of Canadian foreign policy since 1991 needs to be examined in terms of the unipolar moment, if for no other reason than to factor the impact of an increasingly complex and complicated international order into our overall understanding of Canadian foreign. What began as a debate between long-time colleagues over the potential impact of external variables, turned into a more sustained discussion of whether the literature has sufficiently addressed these issues, and, finally, led to a commitment to bring together a number of senior scholars, along with some new voices, and have them systematically address the implications for Canada of the so-called ‘unipolar moment’? We agreed, without much debate, that scholarly accounts of Canadian foreign policy behavior in the post-1991 period have been overwhelmingly rooted in domestic analysis. More specifically, we agreed that most analysts hold that internal, state-level factors specific to Canada produce and explain Ottawa's external political actions. There were some, though these arguments are more dated and less systematic, who argued that Canadian foreign policy is a reflection of the domestic habits of mind of Canadians. The literature on peacekeeping, for instance, argues that it is the nature of Canada, and of Canadians, that led to our preoccupation with, and our meaningful contribution to, peacekeeping.
The literature holds that the divergent foreign policy priorities of Liberal governments led by Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, characterized principally as following a human security agenda which was reliant on considerations of ‘soft power’, and the more defense and security oriented priorities of the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, reflect the differences in their understanding of domestic priorities. Interestingly, the more recent priorities of the current government are much more focused on regional priorities in general and opportunities in emerging markets in particular. All of it, though, is still explained through reference to domestic factors. The international system – namely, the context in which this behavior takes place – is seen to be largely an outcome of domestic political and economic realities, as opposed to a determining (or even contributing) factor in establishing policy priorities and implementing the subsequent policies.
The next step was to circulate an open call for papers. This resulted in a fascinating and diverse collection of proposals from dozens of senior scholars, practitioners, emerging scholars, and students from across Canada and the United States. From that group, we selected twenty proposals from twenty-five scholars, and invited them to present their papers at an international colloquium in Lake Placid, New York (planned and convened by the Center for the Study of Canada, Fulbright Canada, and Canadian Foreign Policy Journal) entitled “Canada in a Unipolar World: New Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy?” In the end, we narrowed the field down to ten papers for the special issue, though we plan to release the full collection in book form. These papers range from those that are largely theoretical to papers that address Canada's specific policies toward various regions, priorities, and issues.
There was no effort made at any point to convince the contributors that unipolarity is the only lens through which to examine Canadian foreign policy, or even the best lens. Rather, we were especially conscious of the fact that the quality and potential contribution to the discipline would be the determining factor in the final selection of papers. And, as it turns out, each of the ten papers offered in this issue were written by scholars who represent differing theoretical, political, and academic predispositions and intellectual priorities. Interestingly, none bought into the unipolar thesis without qualification. What they have in common, however, is their commitment to examine the last twenty years or so of Canadian foreign policy focusing mainly on the impact of external variables. They were each asked to expressly address the following three interrelated questions:
1. how and to what extent do the structural features of the international system, with specific reference to unipolarity, impact on and influence Canadian foreign policy;
2. is it possible to use a specific case study to demonstrate that Canadian foreign policy is affected by structural changes at the level of the international system; and
3. to what extent do other issues (both domestic and other systemic issues) determine the direction of Canadian foreign policy?
The special issue can be subdivided, if you like, into four reasonably distinct sections. The opening section focuses on theory, with contributions from David Haglund of Queen's University and Lasha Tchantouridze of Norwich University. The second section examines Canada's regional policies and priorities, with contributions from Andrea Charron at Carleton University, Joel Plouffe at UQAM and Stephane Roussel at UQAM; Kenneth Holland at Ball State; Costanza Musu at the University of Ottawa; and, Jeffrey Ayres of St. Michael's College alongside Laura Macdonald at Carleton University. The third section specifically addresses three case studies – trade, the environment, and culture. The first piece, which examines Canada's trade policies and priorities, is written by Geoffrey Hale of Lethbridge University. The article on the environment is the collective work of Lisa Ferrari (University of Puget Sound) and Elizabeth Chalecki (Goucher College). The third piece in this section, which focuses on the relationship between trade and culture, is written by Jody Neathery-Castro from the University of Nebraska. The final section, and the final piece, is an insightful look ahead at Canadian foreign policy by John Kirton of the University of Toronto. Again, and at the risk of being repetitive, the editors chose these pieces in an effort to offer a broad and diverse assessment of how external factors may affect Canadian foreign policy.
The first article is by David Haglund of Queen's University, one of Canada's most prolific and most thoughtful foreign policy scholars. He sets out to examine, perhaps even determine, if the current unipolar structure of the international political system has specifically had an impact on the issue of homeland security for Canada. He asks whether Canadian foreign policy in this area has been shaped by unipolarity in general and the fact that the remaining great power is the United States in particular. The first section of his article provides important definitional and theoretical clarity, most especially with regard to unipolarity and unilateralism. Unilateralism, as he correctly points out, has regrettably been caught up and treated synonymously with unipolarity. Unilateralism, as a characteristic of foreign policy, has been present in both bipolar and multipolar periods. Haglund recognizes that structure is not always determining. To understand the foreign policy of states, it is necessary to examine both state-level and international influences. Structure shapes, but is not the exclusive determinant. The second section of the paper focuses on the issue of homeland security, essentially providing an interesting and convincing review of the impact of unipolarity for Canada vis-à-vis the issue of homeland security. The thrust of the argument is straightforward – the empirical evidence clearly illustrates that the current unipolar structure has an impact on Canadian foreign policy and invites the reader to consider this in their overall understanding of Canadian foreign policy.
The second piece, by Lasha Tchantouridze, is a heavily theoretical but inherently interesting article that directly addresses the debate on unipolarity and attempts to come to grips with a large and complicated theoretical literature – much of which is lost on current students of international politics. The strength of this paper is that it specifically answers the question at hand: are we currently in a unipolar system? Moreover, it does so in a way that offers the reader a real opportunity to think about all of this without pre-determining the value of the unipolar concept. In addition, he has focused the theoretical discussion on the larger question of how this all relates to Canada. In so doing, it does a very nice job of situating the debate and discussion in both a theoretical and historical perspective – setting the stage for the more empirical pieces that follow.
The first piece in the section on regional policies and practices, by Andrea Charron, Joël Plouffe and Stéphane Roussel, presents an astute and well-documented argument that concludes that the Arctic, and by extension Canadian foreign policy in that region, demands that Russia be effectively recognized as the hegemon in the region – in spite of the broader unipolar reality. Canada, the authors argue, has yet to engage in any sort of bandwagoning or balancing with the regionally dominant power, and has, instead, largely focused on national or Canada-first initiatives (actions, they argue, that are consistent with what one would expect to find Ottawa undertake in a unipolar environment). To be most effective, Canadian foreign policy in the Arctic must take into account the interests of the sole great power (the United States) at a time of unipolarity in the international political system, but concomitantly recognize and work with the regional realities of the Russian hegemon.
The second article in the section on regional policies and practices deals with Canada and NATO. The North Atlantic area in general, and NATO in particular, has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion over the years. Having said that, it is given a fresh and revealing examination by Kenneth Holland in his article. Specifically, he presents a convincing argument that Canadian foreign policy toward the NATO region has, in fact, been significantly impacted by the unipolar structure of the international political system and that unipolarity does, in fact, matter. This article makes a very strong case by demonstrating that Canadian foreign policy – in this case, Canada's participation in NATO – has been directly shaped by the realities of unipolarity. The paper is especially strong at reviewing Canada's military engagements with NATO after the Cold War. His argument is somewhat contentious, but extremely interesting. He argues that while it is kept fairly close to the vest in policy circles, as it were, and there may be some important exceptions, Canadian policy in the post-Cold War era has been driven by the need to remain more or less in lockstep with the United States.
The next piece, by Costanza Musu, addresses the increasingly important and constantly puzzling issue of Canada's relations with the Middle East and North Africa. She refers to it as ‘the Broader Middle East’. This region covers the area from Morocco to Iran, and involves a series of policy challenges which are, to say the least, complicated and poorly understood. Costanza argues that Canada's limited resources, its role as a middle power, external factors in general, and the United States in particular, have been the key factors in determining Canadian policy toward the region. She also notes the important role that Europe has played in the region and its impact on Canadian policy. In short, she focuses the role of external factors and the increasingly limited maneuverability that Canada has. In the end, bolstered by the events of the Arab Spring, her conclusions are that Canada has to articulate a more coherent strategy if it is to have any influence in the region and protect its interests there.
The final piece on regional policies and practices brings us much closer to home, at least from a geographical point of view. Jeffrey Ayres and Laura Macdonald offer a compelling argument that the politics of perimeter security in North America support their claim that we are living in an era of ‘non-polarity’. It offers a thoughtful, direct, and interesting (if negative) response to the question on the table and to the theme of the conference and the Special Issue. The authors base their argument on the notion that we are living in an international environment characterized by the ‘rise of the rest’, by non-polarity, and by the increasing importance of regions and regionalisms. Regionalism is introduced as an important construct, and surely deserves the attention that they afford it. The authors focus specifically on the value of pursuing border negotiations from a trilateral perspective, arguing (at least implicitly) that the relative influence of the United States is declining – both internationally and in the region. It is a strong argument, with much to discuss and debate. In the end, readers will have to decide for themselves exactly how important regionalism is and whether the world is, in fact, non-polar.
The next section deals with case studies – one on trade, one on environmental issues, and one on the relationship between trade and culture. One could easily make the case that Canada is a trading nation, heavily dependent on US consumers for our overall economic well-being and that trade priorities and policies are driven by domestic realities and shaped by the realities of an economy which produces more resources, more goods, and more services that we can realistically consume. Geoffrey Hale argues, quite convincingly, that Canada's trade relations with the United States, which have been shaped by its geographic realities, by the naturally integrated character of its markets, and by cultural and personal connections with the United States, have experienced significant changes in recent years. Closer continental economic integration under the FTA and later NAFTA were a reaction to broader trends towards globalization and economic regionalization. During the 1990s, he argues, these realities reinforced the ‘unipolar’ orientation of Canada's trade policies and economic relationships. However, subsequent shifts in global economic power arising from the rise of emerging economies and markets, along with the overextension of American and European economies, have created a fundamentally different environment to which Canada's international economic policies must adapt. In the end, he argues that while unipolarity is still a reality in high politics and global security, this concept no longer applies to the economic realm.
The contribution offered by Lisa Ferrari and Elizabeth Chalecki seeks to challenge the structural reality and impact of the current unipolar structure on the potential for the development of a geo-engineering regime; a regime, which the essay asserts, would place Canada, should it exercise the requisite political will, on the cusp of global leadership. The authors advance the argument that polarity differs significantly across issues and that with respect to climate change, a structurally uniform interpretation of international politics is not only misleading but inaccurate. This counter-intuitive tact, as applied to the need for a geo-engineering regime to mitigate adverse impacts of climate change and the roles/leadership that Canada could play, is richly presented. A decidedly policy-specific analysis, the authors successfully bring together a significant blend of international relations and scientific/climate focus policy material and, in so doing, offer an argument that merits our attention and is worthy of further reflection.
The last piece in this section addresses an ongoing and often frustrating issue for students of Canadian foreign policy; namely, what is the proper balance between commerce and culture? Do sovereign states have the right to treat cultural industries differently than other industries and pursue policies that protect those industries, even if those policies contravene commitments made under international trade conventions. Jody Neathery-Castro offers a very detailed and well-documented summary of Canada's ongoing commitment to an aggressive policy of ‘cultural diversity’, or cultural exceptionalism. She argues that Canada has been among the strongest proponents of the argument that sovereign states should be free to protect and promote their cultural industries and that unipolarity (or, at least, US influence) is overstated.
The final section in this special issue of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal is, appropriately, one that directly addresses the issue at hand while, at the same time, looks ahead to what we might expect with respect to how the international system might affect Canada's foreign policy priorities and policies. Interestingly, given John Kirton's longstanding commitment to the notion that Canada is a more important power than most of his colleagues would allow, this is a slightly provocative paper and one that is more in line with the initial premise than most. While the author concedes that there is some real decline in the relative power and influence of the United States, ergo we are exiting the unipolar moment, he does not come to the more common conclusion that Canada might be well advised to distance itself from a declining power. Instead, Kirton believes that systemic change will, or should, have the curious effect of reinforcing the Canadian-American partnership … concluding that an emergent or ‘rising’ Canada can be of great benefit to the United States.
In the end, and keeping in mind that we anticipated a healthy debate on the question of whether or not we are in fact living in a unipolar world, what emerged from this exercise is a series of articles that address the question of how and to what extent external (or systemic) variables affect the policies and the practice of Canadian foreign policy. In the process, we hope that we have provided some new insights into Canadian foreign policy and have introduced some ideas that might spark additional debate.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Michael Hawes
Michael Hawes is CEO of the Foundation for Educational Exchange between Canada and the United States of America, Executive Director of the Canada – US Fulbright Program, and Executive Director of the Killam Fellowships Program. He is a member of the Department of Political Studies (on leave) at Queen's University and an adjunct professor in the Queen's School of Business.Christopher Kirkey
Christopher Kirkey is Director of the Center for the Study of Canada at State University of New York College at Plattsburgh, where he holds a concurrent position as full professor of political science. He holds an appointment as Adjunct Associate Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.Notes
* This project was made possible through the financial and administrative support of Fulbright Canada, the Killam Fellowships Program, the State University of New York College at Plattsburgh, the Government of Canada, and the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. In particular, we would like to thank David Carment and Kevin Arthur at the Journal, whose ongoing participation in this project reflected their role as full partners, and whose patience, good humour, and timely advice reflected a level of professionalism that is much appreciated. We would also like to thank Jean Labrie at DFAIT, Dan Abele at the Canadian Embassy in the United States, and Marta Moszczenka and Dan Kolundzic from the Canadian Consulate in Buffalo. We were very ably supported by Amy Sotherden at the Center for the Study of Canada and by Ava Kovats and Graeme Cunningham at Fulbright Canada. To be honest, they did much of the heavy lifting and deserve more credit than they get. And, most importantly, we are indebted to our various contributors, and not just the ones that made it into this volume. It is their ideas, their passion for their work, and their commitment to advance our understanding of Canadian foreign policy that makes all of this worthwhile.
Not all students of international politics agree on this point. For compelling arguments in favour of the stability of bipolarity, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The stability of a bipolar world,” Daedalus, Volume 93, Summer 1964 and William Wohlforth, “The stability of a unipolar world,” International Security, Volume 24, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 5–41.
Much of the discussion of the concept of unipolarity can be traced to Charles Krauthammer's thought- provoking article in Foreign Affairs. See: Charles Krauthammer, “The unipolar moment”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 70, Number 1, America and the World 1990/91, 1990/1991, pp. 23–33.
There is a fairly strong argument to be made, especially on the economic front, that the rise of China is evidence that the unipolar moment is slipping away. There is also a more complicated, though inherently more interesting argument that ‘world public opinion’ constitutes a kind of second order superpower in that it has the capacity to offset or balance the relative influence of the United States.
See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979) p. 131. The most important contribution to the theoretical and empirical consequences of unipolarity on foreign policy is a dedicated special issue of World Politics, Volume 61 No.1 January 2009.