Canadian military involvement in humanitarian assistance: progress and prudence in natural disaster response

Abstract

In response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Canada launched its largest international disaster-relief effort to date. The most visible aspect of its response came in the form of the over 2000 military personnel who were deployed to Haiti to assist in rescue, relief and recovery operations. As part of Canada's whole-of-government approach, this humanitarian intervention required close collaboration between the Department of National Defence (DND) and its primary civilian partners in humanitarian response, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Using information from 27 confidential interviews with actors involved in the decision-making and administration of Canada's emergency humanitarian assistance, this paper investigates how the Canadian disaster-relief structure is able to facilitate a response of this magnitude, highlighting structural, ideational and decision-making features which foster interdepartmental collaboration. While the response was beneficial in many ways, however, this paper cautions against increased military involvement in disaster-relief efforts. Not only can this affect Canada's ability to uphold the humanitarian principles of responding based on needs on the ground, and in ways that are fair and impartial, it also increases the power of political leadership to shape the magnitude, timeliness and decision to intervene.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Eric Champagne, my dissertation supervisor, for his continuous guidance and support. I am also grateful to Gavin Arbuckle and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

Notes

Semi-structured interviews were conducted between June 2011–March 2012 with representatives from: DND/CF; DFAIT; CIDA, Privy Council Office (PCO); Department of Finance; Natural Resources Canada; and the Canadian Public Health Agency. Interviewees, referred to as respondents herein, included personnel across employee grades and ranks. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Access to Information requests were used to obtain lessons learned documentation, internal memos, and assessment reports pertaining to disaster-relief operations which involved DND/CF, dating from 1998–2010.

Established in 2006, START is the DFAIT branch that is designed to help answer the growing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises. It also administers the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) which was established in 2005 to “provide financial and programming resources to facilitate timely, effective and accountable conflict prevention, crisis response, peace operations, civilian protection, and stabilization interventions in fragile states” (DFAIT 2011b, online). Currently almost a 60-person team, START is made up of four divisions. The Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group (IRH) is the division of focus of this article. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs Division (IRG) provides guidance, direction, and horizontal coordination along geographic and thematic lines. The Peace Operations, and Fragile States Policy Division (IRP) develops and coordinates policy in Cabinet mandated countries of focus, primarily in fragile states and in the areas of conflict management, and international peacekeeping/peacebuilding initiatives. The Coordination and Deployment Division (IRC) coordinates all business processes and reporting for START, as well as is responsible for whole-of-government expert civilian deployments (for a history and further details, see DFAIT 2011b).

Whereas DND works in three levels – strategic, operational, and tactical, with relative decentralization as one moves from one level to the next-centralization of decision-making is more common in DFAIT. One DND respondent explained that Elissa Golberg had “her finger on everything”. Similarly, with respect to the perception of timeframe, what is considered “long term” for each of the three departments is different. While DND may favor short-term solutions for humanitarian action, CIDA's concerns span the spectrum between addressing immediate humanitarian response, early recovery and long term development.

When asked about the location of the Léogâne base, another DND respondent argued, “some people will tell you that why we picked [Léogâne] is because that's where the Governor General is from, which is just nonsense. We picked it because there's an air field there and it was chaos in the air field in Port au Prince”. Recognizing that attributing the location of the Léogâne to political motivations is speculative, it is interesting to note that in the first three ISST reports received by taskforce members, whereas Jacmel is highlighted as an ideal location for deployment of military assets as a result of the DART reconnaissance to Jacmel on January 15, there is no mention of Léogâne.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Aaida Mamuji

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada.