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Abstract
The global governance of development assistance is currently under a process of important transformation in many ways, with the rise of “emerging” donors – such as Brazil, China and India – prompting serious debates over concepts adopted by traditional donors and fomenting novel interactions. One strategy that brings together “emerging” and traditional donors is “triangular cooperation” (a.k.a “trilateral cooperation”); here, two “co-donors” join forces to promote development assistance initiatives in a third country. This article argues that countries can be motivated to engage in “triangular cooperation” for two main reasons: first, its likelihood of improved effectiveness for a lower cost; second: the opportunity it provides for the “co- donors” to strengthen their relationship. This article focuses on this second point, and explores it by analysing the potential for triangular cooperation between Canada and Brazil. The attention is on how this mechanism can help this traditional donor improve its ties not only with Brazil but with Latin American countries in general. Evidence suggests that while there are already levers in place to make this become a reality, there also important hurdles – such as the inherent complexity involved with triangular cooperation and the certain aspect involving the political interaction between Canada and Brazil.
La gouvernance mondiale de l'aide au développement a entamé le processus d'une transformation importante à de nombreux égards, avec l'essor de pays donateurs « émergents » - comme le Brésil, la Chine et l'Inde – qui suscite des débats de fond sur les concepts adoptés par les donateurs traditionnels et sur de nouvelles interactions. L'une des stratégies qui rassemblent donateurs « émergents » et traditionnels est la « coopération triangulaire » (c'est à dire une « coopération trilatérale ») ; ici, il s'agit de deux pays « codonateurs » qui unissent leurs forces pour promouvoir les initiatives d'aide au développement dans des pays tiers. Cet article avance que les pays peuvent être motivés à s'engager dans la « coopération triangulaire » pour deux raisons majeures : premièrement, la probabilité d'une efficacité supérieure à moindre coût ; deuxièmement, l'opportunité de renforcer leurs relations. L'article se concentre sur ce deuxième point en explorant et en analysant le potentiel pour une coopération triangulaire entre le Canada et le Brésil. Il focalise l'attention sur la façon selon laquelle ce mécanisme peut aider ce donateur traditionnel qu'est le Canada à améliorer ses relations non seulement avec le Brésil mais avec les pays d'Amérique Latine en général. Tout porte à croire que tandis que des leviers sont déjà en place pour faire de cela une réalité, il existe aussi des obstacles importants – comme la complexité inhérente à la coopération triangulaire et un certain aspect de l'interaction politique entre le Canada et le Brésil.
Notes
1 The term “emerging” is used here as a shorthand for the non-traditional donors that are impacting the landscape of development assistance's global governance. There is awareness of the contentious definitional boundaries of the term (Manning Citation2006, Zimmerman and Smith Citation2011), but this debate is out of the scope of the present article; the article follows Dane Rowlands' understanding that despite flaws “the term [‘emerging donors’] is used here both because of its correspondence with the term ‘emerging market’ and because it does highlight the challenge to some of the traditional notions of what activities makes a country a ‘donor’” (Rowlands Citation2012, p. 631).
2 “Pivotal” countries are “developing countries that, by virtue of their capacities and experience in promoting South-South cooperation, are positioned to play a lead role in the promotion and application of South-South cooperation, mainly by sharing their capacities and experience with other developing countries in their region or in other regions.” (UNDP Citationn.d.a, Citationn.d.b).
3 “The scale of their cooperation is difficult to determine as neither non-traditional nor traditional donors report separately on cooperation projects. Triangular cooperation programs so far have consisted mainly of technical cooperation and dispersed small projects” (Walz and Ramachandran Citation2011, p. 20).
4 The term “donor” is adamantly rejected in Brazil's foreign policy. The justification is that conjures images of a vertical relationship made up of an active donor and a passive recipient; the term usually adopted is “partner,” with “provider” being sometimes used.
5 Other authors in this special issue also directly address “unconventional” institutional arrangements to specific global governance challenges, such as Chaloux and Paquinb (Citation2013), Gordon (Citation2013) and Grant (Citation2013).
6 “Non-DAC donors are a heterogeneous group: the degree to which DAC approaches and norms in regard to the provision aid finance are applied by non-DAC donors varies from country-to-country” (World Bank Citation2008, p. viii). This category includes “Southern” donors but also: countries that are members of the OECD but not DAC members (e.g., Estonia, Hungary), as well as those who aren't members of DAC (or the OECD) but chose to report to it (e.g., Russia, Poland); the Arab/Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) donors are sometimes treated within South-South cooperation, other times as a separate category within non-DAC donors (Manning Citation2006, Kragelund Citation2008, Zimmerman and Smith Citation2011).
7 This is different from giving donations (such as food and medication after a natural catastrophe), which has a more extensive history and is intended to be an immediate/short-term palliative.
8 In the 1949 Inaugural Speech, President Harry Truman made a point (the fourth one in the speech) that “[the United States] must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas;” for the rather ad hoc origin of the so-called “Point Four,” see Halle (Citation1964).
9 Writing in the early 1960s, Hans Morgenthau said that “Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid” (Morgenthau Citation1962, p. 301).
10 For more on this concept, see Leibowitz and Margolis (Citation1995) and Pierson (Citation2000).
11 Conditionalities relate to the presence of conditions from the donor(s) demanding that the recipient state meet certain goals (or give certain guarantees that it is working toward the goals) in order to receive “aid;” they can be of a political (e.g., related to democracy, strengthening institutions) or economic nature (e.g., macroeconomic reforms, trade concessions), and might not be directly related to the effectiveness or the goal of a particular development initiative. While conditionality relates then to issues concerning broader state policies, “tying” an agreement means placing clear commercial attachments over a specific development initiative. Here, the particular offer is contingent upon the purchase of goods and services from the donor. Both can be present or absent in an agreement, but are independent phenomena.
12 On this theme, classical works include Prebisch (Citation1949); Cardoso and Faletto (Citation1969); Galtung (Citation1971) and Wallerstein (Citation1974).
13 For a thorough examination of China as a donor, see Brautigam (Citation2011).
14 With the exception of the pieces regarding the Bombardier-Embraer and the “beef” controversies, the material on Brazil-Canada foreign relations in Portuguese is practically non-existent. There are some occasional references to relations to Canada in Brazil's engagement with IO – particularly NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association), G8 (Group of Eight) and G20 – but again, nothing of academic relevance on bilateral relations; this point is also highlighted by Hewitt (Citation2012).
15 To be fair, I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out the strong relations occurring below the “leader level” hierarchy, particularly through the strong bilateral exchange in deputy ministers and the overall positive engagement and access that Canadian diplomats have had with their Brazilian counterparts in many areas.
16 For a detailed official report on Brazil as a provider of international development, see IPEA (Citation2011); on a historical overview of Brazil's South-South cooperation, see Leite (Citation2011); on a historical overview of Brazil's use of technical cooperation, see Iglesias Puente (Citation2010); on Brazil's overall logic for engaging in triangular cooperation, see Abdenur (Citation2007).
17 Both of these countries have many development cooperation actions that are unconditional but tied.
18 The Canadian Government also lists two other initiatives, but no details are available from either Canadian or Brazilian sources: “Canada supported Brazil's efforts in Bolivia to exchange best practices in sustainable fisheries between communities living on either side of the border in the Amazon region,” and “Canada and Brazil partnered with the Associação Raio, a Brazilian organization, to improve occupational health and safety for workers in Mozambique.”
19 While this article engages with the broad context and main issues involving Canada and Brazil as triangular “co-donors,” and not on the particular Brazil-Canada-Haiti agreement per se, an in-depth analysis of this case is certainly a worthwhile direction for further research.
20 The Brazilian Cooperation Agency's database reports over 120 triangular projects either concluded or in execution, the absolute majority of them having been signed after 2009.
21 The fieldwork in Brazil (mostly in Brasilia) was conducted between October 2012 and January 2013, with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), as part of the research for a PhD thesis that looks primarily at Brazil's use of technical cooperation as a foreign policy tool. Because of the highly sensitive matter, all of those whose opinions were used in the present article asked to remain anonymous.