The key to the Canada–United States relationship: homeland and continental defence in American strategic culture

Abstract

Since the Second World War, Canada and the United States have worked together to defend North America. However, notwithstanding Canadian concerns about this military cooperation, the United States' main effort has been overseas because American strategic culture is offensively oriented. Thus, American air and missile programs have received little attention, as American policy makers have chosen to deal with security threats such as the Soviet Union by supporting overseas alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and by developing strong strategic nuclear forces. This strategy has been continued after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and will not likely change in the future. By understanding the influence that this offensively oriented strategic culture has on American policy makers, Canadian ministers, civilian officials, military officers and academics can develop foreign and defence policies that can better serve the Canadian national interest.

Résumé

Depuis la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, le Canada et les États-Unis travaillent en collaboration afin de défendre l'Amérique du Nord. Cependant, en dépit des préoccupations canadiennes concernant cette coopération militaire, les États-Unis concentrent leurs efforts principalement sur l'étranger, dans la mesure où leur culture stratégique est offensive. Ainsi, peu d'attention a été accordée aux programmes de défense antiaérienne et antimissiles américains, les décideurs politiques américains ayant choisi de gérer les menaces pour leur sécurité, telles que celles représentées par l'Union Soviétique, en soutenant les alliances internationales comme l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et en développant des forces nucléaires stratégiques puissantes. Cette stratégie a été poursuivie après les attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 et il est peu probable qu'elle change à l'avenir. Ce n'est qu'en comprenant l'influence de cette culture stratégique offensive sur les décideurs politiques américains que les ministres, les fonctionnaires civils, les responsables militaires et les universitaires canadiens pourront élaborer des politiques étrangères et de défense à même de mieux servir les intérêts nationaux du Canada.

Keywords:

• Canada–United States relations
• strategic culture
• air and missile defence
• American foreign and defence policy
• Cold War

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States, and the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs and George Mason University for hosting Canada–United States defense relations: A partnership for the twenty-first century in Arlington, Virginia on 5–6 September 2013. I would also like to thank William Wohlforth, Thomas Keating, Robert W. Murray and Ken Holland for their help in developing this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 While Canada provided one third of the funding for the Pinetree Line, the United States paid for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line.

2 For example, see NSC 5802/1.

3 Sloan also notes that this was the first major report in the post-Cold War era “to highlight and emphasize the need to take measures to defend the US homeland from asymmetric threats” (2005, p. 33).

4 This paper defines North America as Canada and the United States because continental defence cooperation has been bilateral and not trilateral, as it never really included Mexico.

5 Liddel Hart argued that it stressed maritime power and the indirect approach.

6 Linn added that the initial budget for these defences in the 1820s was US$18 million, three times the amount of the national debt of this period (2007, p. 17).

7 The United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti were important because of the American desire to prevent an exodus of refugees to Florida.

8 He is the son of Ron Paul and has taken more moderate positions on foreign affairs than his father.

Additional information

Funding

This project was supported by the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College.