Buying a fighter jet: European lessons for Canada

Abstract

The procurement of Canada’s next fighter jet is a hot potato for the next government. While it was contested on strategic and economic grounds, few observers had doubted before the election of Justin Trudeau that Canada would end up buying the F-35 made by Lockheed Martin. In this paper, we analyze three European programs (the Eurofighter, Saab’s Gripen, Dassault’s Rafale) covering eight European countries (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Hungary) in order to draw lessons for Canada. We analyze the procurement of fighter jets through three overlapping but distinct phases: strategic, commercial and political. Looking at the protracted acquisition process, we argue that the governments of non-aircraft-producing nations almost always confirm their initial strategic decision but end up significantly reducing the number of aircraft purchased. Using the European experience as a point of comparison, the Canadian story becomes predictable. It is not only about the F-35. It is about the procurement of fighter jets in general.

Résumé

L’acquisition du prochain avion de chasse du Canada est une patate chaude pour le prochain gouvernement. Alors qu’elle était contestée sur la base d’arguments stratégiques et économiques, peu d’observateurs ont eu des doutes, avant l’élection de Justin Trudeau, quant à l’achat par le Canada du F-35 de Lockeed Martin. Dans cet article, nous analysons trois programmes européens (l’Eurofighter, le Gripen de Saab, le Rafale de Dassault) qui impliquent huit pays du continent (France, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne, Suède, Autriche, Suisse, République Tchèque et Hongrie) afin d’en tirer des leçons pour le Canada. Nous examinons l’acquisition d’avions de chasse à travers trois phases qui se chevauchent tout en étant distinctes : stratégique, commerciale et politique. En analysant le processus prolongé d’acquisition, nous soutenons que les gouvernements de pays ne fabriquant pas d’avions confirment presque toujours leur décision stratégique initiale, mais finissent par réduire significativement le nombre d’appareils achetés. L’utilisation de l’expérience européenne comme point de comparaison révèle que le scénario canadien est prévisible. Il ne s’agit pas uniquement du F-35. Il s’agit de l’acquisition des jets de combat en général.

Keywords:

• fighter jets
• defence procurement
• Europe

Acknowledgements

The research upon which this article is based was made possible through funding by the Transatlantic Dialogue, a Social Science and Humanities Research Council Strategic Research Cluster. The authors would like to thank Christophe Wasinski, Samuel Faure, Marc de Vore, Moritz Weiss, Srdjan Vucetic and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, which was presented at the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference in Glasgow, 3–6 September 2014.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors

Notes on contributors

Catherine Hoeffler is Associate Professor of Political Science at ESPOL (European School of Political and Social Sciences), Catholic University of Lille, France.

Frédéric Mérand is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director, University of Montreal Centre for International Studies (CERIUM), Canada.

Notes

1. For a better understanding of the notion of path dependence, see Pierson (2004).