Breaking it down Barney style: a framework for cultural interoperability

Abstract

When planning operations, the common maxim is to see yourself, see the terrain, and see the enemy. The idea of seeing your friends is a secondary consideration of seeing yourself. Planning tools focus on formations and quantity. Interoperability standards focus on equipment, doctrine, and procedures. There is no consideration of cultural interoperability. Through many unit and army level ad-hoc processes and repurposing of existing systems such as force development models, operational variables and instruments of national power, the Army has become accustomed to analyzing the culture of other nations. However, a single methodology was never formalized. This paper explores academic theory and military doctrine to synthesize a framework to determine cultural interoperability. The indicators of military cultural interoperability will provide a common starting point for analysis of partner armies and allow leaders to reflect on the requirements for working with partner nations and develop training programs tailored to promote strong friendships.

Résumé

Lors de la planification des opérations, il est généralement considéré qu’il est essentiel de bien se connaître soi-même, ainsi que son ennemi et le terrain. Connaître ses amis est un critère qui correspond à celui de se connaître soi-même. Les outils de planification se concentrent sur les formations et sur la quantité. Les normes d’interopérabilité se concentrent sur l’équipement, la doctrine et les procédures. L’interopérabilité culturelle n’est pas prise en compte. À travers de nombreux processus ad hoc au niveau des unités et de l’Armée, ainsi que d’une réaffectation des systèmes existants, tels que les modèles de développement des forces armées, les variables opérationnelles et les instruments de la puissance nationale, l’Armée s’est habituée à analyser la culture des autres nations. Cependant, la formalisation d’une seule méthodologie n’a jamais été élaborée. Cet article explore la théorie académique et la doctrine militaire pour l’élaboration d’un cadre synthétique devant permettre de déterminer l’interopérabilité culturelle. Les indicateurs de l’interopérabilité culturelle militaire fourniront un point de départ commun pour l’analyse des armées partenaires et pour permettre aux responsables de réfléchir à la question des exigences propres à la coopération avec des nations partenaires et de développer des programmes de formation adaptés pour promouvoir des liens étroits d’amitié.

Keywords:

• culture
• partner operations
• interoperability

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Thomas Crowson is a 26 year veteran of the US Army with a variety of operational and combat assignments throughout Europe, the Pacific and the Middle East. He currently works at NATO Headquarters in Brussels Belgium.

Notes

1. To illustrate, WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Honduras (Golden Pheasant), Desert Storm, Somalia, the Balkans and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan all included partner nations. In contrast, unilateral operations have generally been small, focused operations to safeguard American property or personnel such as Operation Just Cause in Panama, 1988, and Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, 1980.

2. This interpretation is taken from the foreword written by Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, the preface by Training and Doctrine Command Commander General David Perkins, and Chapter 2: Operational Context, pp. 6–14.

3. Although this definition is the author’s, it is informed heavily by Kier, who defines military organizational culture as “a set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of that organization” (p. 70), and NATO interoperability policy, which defines interoperability as “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives” (NATO Interoperability Homepage 2014).

4. “Multinational operations” further details key agreements and the process for development and dissemination of information.

5. The elements of national power, commonly called the DIME, are diplomatic, informational, military and economic. There have been efforts to add financial, intelligence and legal (DIME-FIL or MIDLIFE), but these have not been officially adopted into American doctrine.

6. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy. The process is also used in NATO doctrine with the addition of the letter I to represent interoperability, making DOTmLPF-PI.

7. Political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, physical environment and time.

8. Barney is the protagonist of an American public television children’s show designed to teach kids age 4–6 basic social and cognitive skills. He is portrayed as an exceptionally friendly purple dinosaur and is the bane of parents everywhere. “Breaking it down Barney style” is a common army saying meaning to explain in the most basic manner.

9. All definitions, components and considerations are the author’s unless otherwise noted. However, they have been influenced by the works of von Hlatky and Johnson as well as Joint and Army doctrine.

10. The ASCC commander is the interface between the geographical combatant commander (GCC) and the Department of the Army. The five ASCC commanders, ranging in rank from major general (two stars) to general (four stars), are responsible for all army forces under the control of the GCC. The six United States Geographic Commands are Pacific Command or PACOM (India, Asia and the Pacific), European Command or EUCOM (Europe and Russia), Southern Command or SOUTHCOM (Central and South America), African Command or AFRICOM (Africa minus the Horn of Africa), Central Command or CENTCOM (the Middle East including Pakistan and the Horn of Africa), and Northern Command or NORTHCOM (North America). A field army exercises similar responsibilities, but under a joint force headquarters and usually focused on a specific task or region. There is currently only one standing field army (8^th Army, Korea) in the United States Army, commanded by a lieutenant general (three stars) and answerable to the Commander, United States Forces Korea (four stars). A corps is a standing multipurpose headquarters commanded by a lieutenant general that can fill roles from tactical command to those similar to an ASCC or field army with proper augmentation.

11. Article 2, Section 1 establishes Islam as the official religion of Iraq. Article 2, Section 2 requires freedom of religion.

12. Although this site is from 2013, it exemplifies the state of progress since 2005.

13. Iraqi Constitution, Article 14.

14. During the author’s experience on a MiTT team, the Iraqi National Police Mechanized Brigade, commanded by an Iraqi Brigadier, employed an Iraqi colonel as the company commander of the reconnaissance forces, a position that would be held by a United States captain or commonwealth forces major.

15. To illustrate the problem, as late as 2010, the National Police 1^st Mechanized Brigade, a premier unit, had three subordinate battalions. Two were commanded by Muslim colonels related to the brigade commander. They were equipped with new, state of the art, American-provided M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and assigned to protect the roads between the “Green Zone” and the Baghdad Airport. The third battalion, commanded by a Christian lieutenant colonel, was equipped with Soviet BTR 70s and 80s and was deployed nationwide to quell disturbances.

16. For an example of a cultural smart card, see the Federation of American Scientists website (2015).

17. I will always attribute this word to my first gunnery sergeant, Sergeant First Class David Carter. While he will never be confused with Shakespeare, he always made himself understood in the most creative ways.