I’ll make the list, you go to the store: dividing the labor in Canadian defence purchases

Abstract

Problems with high-price military acquisitions are an ongoing phenomenon in Canada; the most recent being the so-called “ reset” of the F-35. Indeed, expensive purchases in Canada are prone to delays, cost-overruns and cancellations, and generally fail to satisfy both defence needs and procurement-aided industrial ambitions. While factors such as industrial benefits affect timely and affordable deliveries, Canadian outcomes are generally due to an overlap of responsibilities between federal politicians and public servants. For all of the ink spilled discussing what should be procured and how partisan oriented governments block irrational military ambitions, there has only been one well-known attempt to approach the subject with theory. Conscious design brings clarity to a complex process by explaining the necessity of a division of labour in which a governing party sets objective policy goals and public servants follow a process to select instruments which match these goals.

Keywords:

• defence
• procurement
• Canada
• politics
• F-35

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Matthew Kerby, Senior Lecturer at the School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, for his long-time encouragement and outstanding support. The author thanks Russell Alan Williams, associate professor of Political Science at Memorial University, for his very helpful comments and advice. The author also thanks professor Rob Huebert, and Emma Brodie as well as the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In relation to military procurement, suboptimal is one or more of, but not limited to, the following: an outcome that fails to satisfy a country's defence needs and/or its procurement-aided industrial ambitions, or one that falls victim to delays, cancellations and cost overruns.

2. In Canadian military procurement, goals are usually outlined in a defence white paper. Although a white paper goal might include replacing an aging fleet of jets with a new variant, it would not state which specific variant will be purchased. Choosing the product is part of the instrument stage, and is the domain of public service procurement officers. Politicians are generally expert in neither military technology nor the process used to acquire it. They are therefore in a difficult position to make acquisition decisions with any subject matter authority.

3. Subjective political goals refer to rent-seeking behavior where a politician or party will “buy votes with public money” to support their personal career or the prolongation of their government (Howlett et al. 2009, p. 33). Goals in this context are problematic because they place the interests of the individual/party above those of society. An objective policy goal serves the public interest.

4. As former Assistant Deputy Minister (Matériel) at Canada's Department of National Defence, Alan Williams has written extensively on where and when elected officials can influence procurement. He states clearly that since the passage of the Agreement on Internal Trade in 1995, “the government is precluded from interfering in a competitive process. That is, from the time the government provides approval to proceed with procurement until it is provided with the results, it is kept in the dark” (Williams 2012, p. 26).

5. In using “due diligence,” the OAG meant that related departments “performed and documented analyses (of benefits and risks, operational requirements, options, and costs); clarified rules, roles, and responsibilities; consulted with other entities; and obtained approvals and provided oversight” (Office of the Auditor General 2012, p. 9).

6. Most defence contracts signed by the Government of Canada are done so in accordance with the federal Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy. The objective of this policy is to ensure that defence purchases “generate high-value business for Canadian industry” (Office of the Auditor General 2012, p. 14). Through the JSF program's MOUs (i.e., 1997, 2002 and 2006), companies from partner countries were eligible to obtain contracts provided they met “best value” criteria. The MOUs did not guarantee any degree of subcontract business (Office of the Auditor General 2012, p. 14).

7. Determining which projects receive public funding is different than awarding a company the contract to operationalize a project.