Steady march toward greatness? Tracing the evolution of Canada’s international position

Abstract

The Fathers of Confederation believed their creation would go on to one day stand at the front rank of international powers. Using cross-national economic data we can evaluate the extent to which such ambition was realized. This article finds that while Canada’s ascent up the global league tables has been rapid, so too has there been a ceiling as to just how high Canada can rise. Even more, with per-capita wealth now growing so rapidly in parts of the world previously consigned to penury, Canada’s international rank is likely to fall if only modestly so.

Résumé

Les Pères de la Confédération croyaient que leur création durerait jusqu’à pouvoir figurer un jour au premier rang des puissances internationales. En nous appuyant sur des données économiques transversales, nous pouvons évaluer dans quelle mesure une telle ambition s’est réalisée. Cet article révèle que tandis que l’ascension du Canada vers les hautes sphères mondiales a été rapide, il en a été de même pour l’apparition d’une limite de cette ascension. À plus forte raison, avec une richesse par habitant actuellement en augmentation tellement rapide dans certaines régions du monde autrefois reléguées à la misère, le classement international du Canada est susceptible de chuter, même modestement.

Keywords:

• Canada
• GDP
• international rank
• power
• historical statistics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Sean Clark is a research fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. His research interests include the political economy of international security – particularly how it relates to the rise and fall of great powers – and political leadership, leader sclerosis and their relationship to public policy effectiveness.

Notes

1. Holland’s GDP, for example, grew by $1349 million between 1500 and 1600 – a 287 per cent increase! – whereas Canada’s grew not at all.

2. Population, for comparison, had reached a percentile rank of 58th.

3. And from there never after.

4. Figures for 1864–1865 were $14,637,158 CAD in exports to Great Britain and $24,213,582 CAD to the United States. Export totals for all countries that year were $10.5 million CAD in agricultural products, $14.3 million CAD of forestry, $8.5 million CAD animals and their products, $1.9 million CAD of ships, $1.1 million CAD in manufactures, $0.8 million CAD in fisheries and $0.6 million AD in mineral goods.

5. In 1907, for example, Canada’s population growth of 5.0 per cent was the world's fastest. Calculated from Maddison (2013).

6. Versus 77 per cent for Great Britain.

7. In 1900, the distribution of direct and portfolio investment in Canada was 14 per cent from the United States and 85 per cent from Britain; by 1914 this had risen to more than 23 per cent and 72 per cent, respectively.

8. Calculated as the per-capita wealth gap, measured in real 1990 International GK $ using data from Maddison (2013).

9. More specifically, iron, steel and their associated products. CANSIM Table 383-0028. They averaged in the 1920s around 6 per cent.

10. American tariffs had fallen in the interwar years (see Bairoch 1993, p40), but Washington's response to the 1929 crash would completely undo these gains–much much else besides. A five-year tariff war followed Smoot-Hawley in 1930. This hurt Canada more than it hurt the United States, given the former was smaller and more trade-dependent.

11. Britain's predicament, of course, would only get worse. In 1941, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was horrified to learn that the United Kingdom was effectively bankrupt.

12. Exports to all countries plummeted from $1.33 billion CAD in 1928 to $487 million CAD in 1932. This compares to $157 million CAD in exports to the United States, which had again fallen behind the British measure.

13. Nixon, Ford and Reagan, for example, were all surprised that Canada, not Japan, was America’s greatest trading partner.

14. For example, in the 1920s Canada achieved the status of the world's second-largest automobile producer. A great deal of this production was not intended for the domestic market, but was instead destined for Britain as a means to take advantage of the Imperial preference. For example, some 40 per cent of General Motors’ production in Canada was destined for the export market (Nerbas 2013).