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ABSTRACT
Military interventions are without a doubt the most forceful and most costly foreign policy tool extant. But how do they actually come about? The bulk of the existing literature on military interventions points to the head of state and his/her closest advisers to explain intervention decisions. This article argues instead that Intervention Entrepreneurs play a critical role in the political decision-making process of military interventions. Intervention Entrepreneurs are individuals or groups that promote the launch of a specific military intervention because they anticipate benefitting disproportionately from the intervention decision and/or aftermath. To further their intervention proposal, these entrepreneurs employ very similar techniques which include: (1) the creation of a narrative for intervention; (2) the act of spreading and “selling” this narrative to the media, think tanks and other thought leaders; (3) the act of establishing faits accomplis – actions that can create a slippery slope toward intervention such as leaking information or (if possible) pre-deploying troops or other personnel to the intervention theatre; and (4) the lobbying of critical decision-makers (including the head of state) to support the intervention proposal. This article uses the French intervention in Mali (2013) to introduce the concept of Intervention Entrepreneurs and illustrate the strategies and power these actors exert.
RÉSUMÉ
Les interventions militaires sont sans l’ombre d’un doute l’instrument de politique étrangère le plus ferme et le plus coûteux existant. Mais comment se réalisent-ils exactement ? Le volume de la littérature existant à ce jour sur les interventions militaires laisse clairement entendre que c’est le/la chef(fe) d’État et ses conseillers les plus proches qui peuvent expliquer les décisions d’intervention. Cet article s’oppose à ce point de vue en soutenant plutôt que les entrepreneurs d’intervention jouent un rôle critique dans le processus de prise de décision politique d’engager des interventions militaires. Ces entrepreneurs d’intervention sont des individus ou des groupes qui encouragent le lancement d’une intervention militaire précise parce qu’ils anticipent qu’ils bénéficieront démesurément de la décision d’intervenir et/ou de ses conséquences. Pour pousser leur proposition d’intervention, ces entrepreneurs emploient des techniques très similaires qui incluent : (1) la création d’un récit appelant à l’intervention ; (2) la propagation et la « vente » de ce récit aux médias, aux groupes de réflexion et aux autres leaders d’opinion ; (3) l’établissement de faits accomplis – des actions pouvant créer des pentes glissantes vers les intervention, comme par exemple des fuites d’information ou (si possible) le pré-déploiement de troupes ou autre personnel dans le théâtre d’intervention et (4) le lobbying auprès de décideurs essentiels (parmi lesquels le/la chef(fe) d’État) pour qu’ils soutiennent la proposition d’intervention. Cet article prend pour exemple l’intervention française au Mali (2013) pour présenter le concept des entrepreneurs d’intervention, et illustre les stratégies et le pouvoir exercés par ces acteurs.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the people who agreed to be interviewed. Some of them are cited in this article. Others prefer to remain anonymous. To both she extends her profound thanks. For helpful comments and advice, the author thanks Roland Marchal, Stefano Recchia, Bruce Whitehouse, Rachel Beatty Reidl, the participants at the “Problems Abroad? Revisiting the Intervention Trap in an Era of Global Uncertainty” workshop at Carleton University and participants at the 2016 and 2017 Sciences Po – Northwestern workshops on “Security and Stability in the Sahel.” The author is also grateful to the Kellogg Dispute Resolution Research Center at Northwestern University for financial support. Simone Cruikshank Rivera, Hansen Ong and Amelia Strauss provided excellent research assistance. The author also thanks the reviewers and editors at CFPJ for valuable guidance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Marina E. Henke is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.
Notes
1. Many of these interviews were conducted “on background” given the delicate information exchanged (i.e. my interview partners granted me permission to use the information, but they asked me not to identify them by name in this article).
2. Huliaras (Citation1998), Glaser (Citation2014) and Powell (Citation2016) advance a similar argument.
3. On diaspora lobbying see also e.g. Nome (Citation2013), Koinova (Citation2011) and Moss (Citation2016).
4. These interests can include the fulfilment of normative ideals (e.g. the protection of human rights), the protection of ethnic brethren or various types of economic benefits. Elected Intervention Entrepreneurs also often believe that a specific military intervention will increase their chances of reelection. Bureaucrats, in turn, can see in an intervention proposal the opportunity to increase their own centrality and administrative power.
5. This is also often called “framing” (see e.g. Buzan et al. Citation1998, Balzacq Citation2005, Labonte Citation2013, Benford and Snow Citation2000, Fassin and Pandolfi Citation2010).
6. Philippe Chapleau, “Mali: ‘On peut donner un appui matériel, on peut former, mais la France n’interviendra pas’. (François Hollande)” [archive], Ouest-France, 11 October 2012. See also Chivvis (Citation2016, 36).
7. Author’s interview with Admiral Edouard Guillaud, Chief of the French Defense Staff, St Cloud, August 2016.
8. “Paris avait toutes les raisons d’intervenir au Sahel”; “Visée au premier chef par les djihadistes du Sahel, la France défend ainsi ses intérêts économiques et sécuritaires du Sénégal au Niger,” Le Figaro, 22 January 2013.
9. Email communication with Bruce Whitehouse, Professor at Lehigh University, June 2017.
10. It mandated that an actionable plan for military intervention be made by ECOWAS and the African Union within 45 days. The actual deployment was authorized via UNSC Resolution 2085, adopted unanimously on 20 December 2012.
11. Apparently, Susan Rice, the American ambassador to the UN, also hated the idea of AFISMA. She did not believe that it would solve the problem, a French diplomat recalls, “so she did everything to slow down its establishment.” See “Les Etats-Unis bloque la France a l’ONU,” Le Figaro, 12 December 2012; “Mali: histoire secrète d’une guerre surprise,” Le Nouvel Observateur, 10 February 2013.
12. Author’s interview with French official, Paris, August 2016.
13. Le Drian had been interested in defense affairs for a long time. His hometown is the Atlantic port city of L’Orient in Brittany. The city hosts some of France’s most important naval industries and is also a key base for France’s naval special forces commandos. As a member of parliament, Le Drian also served on the defense committee (Chivvis Citation2016, 98).
14. During France’s Libya intervention, all important operational decisions were taken at the Elysée, not the Ministry of Defense.
15. In 2012 (in the midst of the European sovereign debts crisis), it was also rumored that Hollande’s government was planning deep defense cuts (Chivvis Citation2016, 88). A successful military intervention might reduce these cuts to a certain degree.
16. Powell (Citation2016, 17) also alludes to the importance of “grand narratives” in French intervention decisions. Nevertheless, he does not explain where these narratives come from. How are they created?
17. The reason why France had to intervene in Mali was thus that if France did not intervene, “a terrorist state would be created near Europe and France” from which terrorist acts could easily be planned and perpetrated. See also Wing (Citation2016) on the usage of the term “terrorism” in justifying the French intervention in Mali.
18. Cf. Wing (Citation2016, 72).
19. Mr Mandel said: “Je voulais que les esprits soient préparés.” (Author’s interview with Sacha Mandel, Head of PR in the Cabinet of French Defense Minister Le Drian, Paris, August 2016.)
20. Author’s interview with Sacha Mandel, Head of PR in the Cabinet of French Defense Minister Le Drian, Paris, August 2016.
21. The day before the official decision was taken to intervene in Mali, these units were flown to the airport in Sévaré. On 11 January 2013, these units played a crucial role in launching the intervention (Boeke and Schuurman Citation2015, 814).
22. Author’s interview with French official, Paris, August 2016.
23. Author’s interview with French official, Paris, August 2016.
24. Some analysts have also suggested that Hollande saw in the intervention a chance to establish himself as a strong president (Bergamaschi and Diawara Citation2014).