Targeting justice: targets, non-targets and the prospects for peace with justice

ABSTRACT

Ongoing conflicts are increasingly accompanied by calls for judicial interventions by the International Criminal Court (ICC). This has led to an impassioned debate regarding the effects that ICC interventions have on conflict dynamics and peace processes. A primary argument within this debate is that the targets of ICC arrest warrants will reject participating peace negotiations and instead commit themselves to political violence. This paper argues that it just as likely that actors not targeted by the Court may reject negotiating with their adversaries and thus commit to violence. The paper demonstrates this dynamic by examining two ICC interventions: northern Uganda and Libya. In both cases, the ICC’s intervention legitimized its non-targets – the government in Uganda and the coalition of intervening forces and opposition rebels in Libya – while bolstering their commitment to a military solution and their rejection of a political compromise to their respective conflicts. Ultimately, it is concluded, if both international justice and conflict resolution are to be pursued within the same contexts, it is critical to dispel popular assumptions in order to better understand the full spectrum of the ICC effects on conflict and peace dynamics.

RÉSUMÉ

Il est de plus en plus fréquent que les conflits en cours soient accompagnés d’appels à des interventions juridiques de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI). Cette situation a conduit à un débat passionné autour des effets des interventions de la CPI sur la dynamique des conflits et des processus de paix. Dans ce débat, un argument majeur est que les personnes visées par les mandats d’arrêt de la CPI non seulement refuseront de participer à des négociations pour la paix, mais au contraire, participeront elles-mêmes à plus d’actes de violence politique. Cet article soutient qu’il est tout aussi probable que d’autres acteurs de ces conflits, non visés par la Cour, rejettent eux aussi toute possibilité de négocier avec leurs adversaires et, de ce fait, participent à des actes de violence. L’article démontre cette dynamique en examinant deux interventions de la CPI : dans le nord de l’Ouganda et en Libye. Dans les deux cas, les interventions ont légitimé les entités non visées par elles – le gouvernement ougandais et la coalition des forces d’intervention et des rebelles de l’opposition en Libye – et, conséquemment, stimulé leur engagement vers une solution militaire et leur rejet d’un compromis politique dans leurs conflits respectifs. Finalement, conclut l’article, si la justice internationale et la résolution des conflits doivent être poursuivies dans les mêmes contextes, il est essentiel de réfuter les idées reçues pour mieux comprendre le spectre complet des effets de la CPI sur la dynamique des conflits et de la paix.

KEYWORDS:

• International criminal justice
• international law
• conflict resolution
• International Criminal Court
• Libya
• northern Uganda

Acknowledgements

For the opportunity to present and refine this article, I would like to thank the organizers of the workshop “Problems Abroad? Revisiting the Intervention Trap in an Era of Global Uncertainty,” organized by the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal in conjunction with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs, and the Canadian Department of National Defence, in Ottawa, Canada, on 6–7 October 2016. My deepest thanks as well for the thoughtful comments and feedback of the article’s peer reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

† This article draws on research conducted for the book M. Kersten, Justice in conflict – the effects of the International Criminal Court's interventions on ending wars and building peace (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016).

1. This is a novel development in international criminal justice. Unlike prior tribunals, the International Criminal Court was established to intervene in ongoing and active conflicts as opposed to wars that had already concluded. Consequently, the majority of investigations that the Court has launched have been in situations where a conflict is ongoing. This propensity has exacerbated the debate over the effects of international criminal justice on conflict resolution and peacemaking. This may also be a product of broader forces affecting contemporary international organizations more generally. See, e.g. Rowlands and Carment (1998).

2. It is notable that under the administration of Barack Obama, the United States did engage in negotiations with the Taliban (see Brennan 2013; Graham-Harrison 2013).

3. Interview with Felix Kulayigye, 2011; confidential interview, 2011.

4. Interview with Felix Kulayigye, 2011.

5. Ibid.

6. Interview with Bishop Ochola, 2011.

7. Interview with Felix Kulayigye, 2011.

8. Interview with Ayena Odongo, 2011.

9. Interview with Lyandro Komakech, 2011.

10. Ibid.

11. Interview with Ayat Mneina, 2013.

12. Confidential interview, 2013.

13. Confidential interview, 2014.

14. Ibid.

15. Interview with Dirk Vandewalle, 2013.

16. Interview with Mohamed Eljarh, 2013.