Conflict in the absence of war: a comparative analysis of China and Russia engagement in gray zone conflicts

ABSTRACT

Wars between states, especially great powers, are now fought in the gray zone, in which elements of soft and unconventional power dominate the arsenal. The effectiveness of such tools is contingent upon the interconnectedness of the world in the economic and political domains. The liberal international political and economic order provides an opportunity for rapid economic growth – at least for powerful states – but it also creates an opportunity for illiberal states to exploit this environment in their favor. In this paper, I examine the cases of Russia and China which successfully utilize such gray zone tactics to promote their strategic agendas. I argue that Russia and China’s utilization of different tools and technique combinations in their engagement in gray zone conflicts can substantially be attributed to two distinct geostrategic momenta I call “offensive hybridism,” utilized by China, and “hybridism in retreat,” associated with Russia’s actions. My research finds that engagement in gray zone conflicts should not be treated as a homogenous phenomenon to characterize all contemporary interstate disputes. Rather, all participants utilize their distinct tools and combination of techniques, which should be countered with tailored approaches.

RÉSUMÉ

Aujourd'hui, les conflits entre États, en particulier les grandes puissances, se déroulent dans la zone grise où, désormais, des éléments de puissance douce et non conventionnelle dominent l'arsenal. L'efficacité de ces outils est subordonnée à l'interconnexion du monde dans les champs économique et politique. L'ordre politique et économique international libéral offre une opportunité de croissance économique rapide - au moins pour les États puissants - mais il crée aussi une opportunité de tirer profit de cet environnement pour les États non libéraux. Dans cet article, j'examine les cas de la Russie et de la Chine qui ont utilisé avec succès ces tactiques de zone grise pour promouvoir leurs programmes stratégiques. Je soutiens que l'utilisation par ces deux pays de différents outils et combinaisons de techniques dans leur engagement dans ces conflits de zone grise peut être en grande partie attribuée à deux élans géostratégiques distincts que j'appellerai « hybridisme offensif », utilisé par la Chine, et « hybridisme en recul », associé aux actions de la Russie. Mes travaux révèlent que l'engagement dans les conflits de zone grise ne devrait pas être appréhendé comme un phénomène homogène servant à caractériser tous les différends interétatiques contemporains. En effet, chaque participant utilise ses propres outils et combinaisons de techniques distincts, qui doivent être contrés par des approches adaptées.

KEYWORDS:

• Gray zone
• hybrid warfare
• unconventional war
• Russia
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Dani Belo is working on his PhD at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa. He graduated with an Honours Degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of British Columbia, Vancouver specializing in NATO-Russia relations. His research areas include gray zone conflicts, hybrid warfare, ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space, and the Arctic region. Dani also worked as a policy analyst for the Department of Natural Resources in Ottawa. He regularly publishes on topics related to hybrid warfare and gray zone conflict in Ukraine and the Baltics, as well as on minority and diaspora issues in the post-Soviet region.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 2.0 (Schmitt 2017) is an academic study which analyzes specific provisions of jus ad bellum, recommending legal thresholds to determine when a cyber-attack may be interpreted as an armed attack.

2 The Constitution of Russia outlines in Article 61, Section 2, that Russia is required to “guarantee its citizens protection and patronage abroad.” This enables Russia to conduct operations in protection of Russian-speaking minorities if citizenship is granted to Russia speakers living outside its borders.