False start: the 1956 Palestinian refugee movement to Canada

ABSTRACT

In 1955, responding to a recommendation by Chargé d’Affaires, Elizabeth MacCallum at the Canadian Legation in Beirut, Minister of External Affairs Pearson and the Cabinet of Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent agreed to an unofficial UNRWA request to resettle a small number of Palestinian refugees in Canada. An interdepartmental committee was charged with coordinating the movement, which was planned well but executed poorly. This paper examines its planning and operations, along with the perceptions and assumptions of the committee, MacCallum, her staff and the official who traveled to Lebanon and Jordan to interview the refugees. It also delves into the complex reaction of Arab states and Palestinians to the idea, and the delicate situation UNRWA found itself in. Finally, it explores the operational failures and external factors that led one official to label the operation “an ill-fated scheme”. Finally, it reflects on the surprising number of issues in the political context that remain relevant to today.

RÉSUMÉ

En 1955, répondant à une recommandation de la Chargée d'Affaires, Elizabeth MacCallum, basée à la légation canadienne à Beyrouth, le Ministre des Affaires Extérieures, Pearson, et le Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Louis St-Laurent, ont accédé à une demande non-officielle de l'UNRWA de réinstaller un petit nombre de réfugiés palestiniens au Canada. Un comité interministériel a été chargé de coordonner ce mouvement qui a été bien planifié mais mal exécuté. Cet article examine la planification et les opérations de ce mouvement, ainsi que les perceptions et les hypothèses du comité, de MacCallum, de son équipe et du représentant de l'État qui s'est rendu au Liban et en Jordanie pour interroger les réfugiés. Il aborde également la réaction complexe des États arabes et des Palestiniens à cette idée, et la situation délicate dans laquelle l'UNRWA s'est trouvée. Par ailleurs, il explore les défaillances opérationnelles et les facteurs externes qui ont conduit un représentant de l'État à qualifier l'opération de « projet funeste ». Enfin, l'article reflète le nombre surprenant de questions dans le contexte politique qui restent pertinentes aujourd'hui.

KEYWORDS:

• Palestinian refugees
• immigration
• Canada
• foreign policy
• Middle East politics

              PRESS RELEASE

         Department of External Affairs, 1955              Ottawa, Canada

No.100           FOR RELEASE IN BEIRUT AND OTTAWA

             AT 1 AM EST, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1955.

The Department of External Affairs announced today that the Canadian Government has tentatively decided to admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees as immigrants to Canada. This decision has been taken in view of the requests received from Palestinian refugees for immigration to Canada and in the context of Canada’s continuing desire as the fourth largest contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to do what it can to promote the welfare of refugees.

The immigrants would be chosen from amongst English or French speaking refugee applicants in Lebanon or Jordan who have certain specified trades or skills which would enable them to find employment in Canada. Prospective immigrants and their families must also meet certain health and other requirements.

Because of the lack of Canadian immigration facilities in Lebanon and Jordan, the Canadian Government has requested UNRWA to assist with pre-selection of refugee applicants who have the necessary qualifications and UNRWA has been kind enough to agree to provide this assistance. The final choice of immigrants, however, will be made by Canadian Immigration officials who will visit Lebanon and Jordan in the near future for this purpose. Because of the limited number of applicants to be accepted, the Canadian officials will make a selection from amongst applications submitted by UNRWA.

—————————–

This press release, the one quoted above contains a careful blend of truth and fiction. It was the first the public heard about Canada’s intentions. This since forgotten episode in Canadian immigration history offers insight into early Canadian policy toward Palestinians.

UNRWA was established by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) following the 1948 Arab Israeli War, which created 750,000 Palestinian refugees (United Nations, 2003, p. 97). Most of these refugees fled to the West Bank (which was held by Jordan), the Gaza Strip (then held by Egypt), Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and others even further afield (United Nations, 2003, p. 97). Established in 1949 before the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Refugee Convention came into existence in 1951, UNRWA’s mandate was and is to care for “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both homes and means of livelihood as a result of the conflict” (UNRWA, 2020) UNRWA provides education, health care, relief and social services to the refugees and their descendants. Its mandate however contains no protection function.

Introduction

The movement of Palestinian refugees to Canada in 1956 appeared on lists of refugee movements issued by the immigration department in the 1960s. By the time I became Director of Refugee Policy in 1976 it had disappeared from corporate memory (Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1969; as cited in CIHS Bulletin, 2005). In 1989, I was Director General for Refugee Affairs having assignments in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria along with time at our mission to the UN in Geneva. I was exposed to the plight of the refugees and saw firsthand how destabilizing the lack of a solution was. The normal solutions Canada and its partners applied to refugees around the world seemed to offer no answers for the Palestinians. In 1992, when Canada took responsibility for the Refugee Working Group as part of the Middle East Peace Process, I was attached to the Canadian delegation as its refugee policy expert. Finally, I was Canada’s special coordinator for the peace process from 2000 to 2003, focusing exclusively on the refugee issue.

Clearing a file for release to Valerie Knowles, who was writing her book Strangers at Our Gates (Knowles, 2016), I became aware of the 1956 movement. More recently Jan Raska (2015) wrote an account. The file, “LAC RG76, vol.865, file 555-54-607”, is a time capsule from 1955-56. It reflects the world and Canadian reality as it was just before the Hungarian Revolt that put Canada on the path to becoming an active country of refugee resettlement. It intersects with the 1956 Suez crisis and consequently Pearson’s 1957 Nobel Prize. It was a reality on the brink of profound change but where racism and antisemitism were still overt and reflected in official policies, practice and popular culture. In 1955–1956 most Canadians still accepted Mackenzie King’s 1947 policy which affirmed, to put it bluntly, that Canada’s racial composition would not change. While the notorious Chinese exclusion legislation had been repealed, ministerial discretion and administrative arrangements ensured that opportunities for immigration to Canada was reserved for people from Europe, the Old (white) Commonwealth and white people from the United States. The notion of bilingualism and multiculturalism had not emerged, the universal immigration policy – including the point system – was a decade away and the inclusion of refugees in Canadian immigration legislation was twenty years in the future. Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights, Ontario’s ground-breaking Human Rights Code and Pierre Trudeau’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms were all also in the future. The file provided the basis for the following historical case study in which the story is largely told in the words of those who participated.

To the extent that Canada had a refugee policy between 1951 and 1970, a refugee was defined as a person who

as a result of events arising out of World War II was displaced from one European country to another and has not been permanently resettled; or because of fear of persecution on religious, racial or political grounds, left the Soviet Bloc countries since the International Refugee Organisation terminated its activities on December 31, 1951, and has not been permanently resettled. (Memorandum from Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 1970, July 27)

A decision to resettle Palestinians would fall outside this framework but the immigration act of 1952 gave Cabinet broad discretion regarding who could be admitted to Canada. In addition, as Canada sought to improve its position internationally, its capacity to absorb post-war displaced people from Europe had enhanced its relations with its European allies and friends. So, perhaps this could be applied to the Middle East.

Request from UNRWA

This story begins with Despatch 339 of 10 August 1955 from the Chargé d’Affaires of the Canadian Legation in Beirut to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Chargé d’Affaires, 1955):

We have been informally and confidentially approached by officials of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees … with a view to ascertaining whether a way might be found of facilitating the entry into Canada of a limited number of specially selected Palestine refugees for permanent settlement. (Chargé d’Affaires, 1955)

The approach was made by officials responsible for UNRWA’s “unofficial” scheme to resettle 2,000 Palestinian refugees in the USA, acting without direction from UNRWA’s Commissioner.

The Despatch paints a sympathetic picture of the refugees and their situation. Repeatedly quoted in communications within the Canadian government, it bears quoting here.

Canadians newly come to this area are soon made aware of the extent to which the Arab states themselves have contributed to the rehabilitation of those Palestinian refugees who have contrived by some means or other to keep off the UNRWA relief rolls. Of these there are several thousands. In Beirut one meets them in every walk of life. Some are extremely fine people, well educated, efficient, hard-working, adaptable and capable of enduring stoically a great deal of hardship. Some are “graduates” of UNRWA, having escaped from relief either by their own efforts or through training given by the Agency. In a country like Lebanon, where work is not available for all and competition for jobs is intense enough even among members of the indigenous population, it is greatly to the credit of the community that so many Palestinian refugees are allowed to make a living, despite the difficulty of obtaining citizenship and work permits … The level of education among Palestinian Arabs has been relatively high, being comparable with the level of education in Lebanon. The training Palestinians received during the period of the mandate gave them a concept of administrative standards somewhat better than that which prevails here, however, and foreigners in Beirut generally find the efficiency and sense of responsibility of Palestinians to be more dependable than that of the Lebanese. One has to judge individuals on the basis of their personal records, however, since the experience of being uprooted has seriously injured many of them. (Chargé d’Affaires, 1955)

Despatch 339 listed the total regional refugee numbers (See Table 1) and also states that most were, “former peasants and agricultural workers who speak no other language than Arabic, have a strong attachment to the particular plots of land which their forebears cultivated for centuries, and would neither wish nor have the capacity to resettle in Canada.” The proposed immigrants to Canada would be recruited from the “fraction of the refugees who have been taught the English language and who have professional training or technical skills” (Chargé d’Affaires, 1955).

Table 1. UNRWA registered refugee population in 1955.

Despatch 339 reports the refugee population registered with UNRWA in June 1955 as:
Country	Refugees	% of host country population
Lebanon	103,600	7.7%
Syria	88,179	2.3%
Jordan	499,606	56.8%
Gaza	214,601	225.9%
TOTAL	905,986	14.8%

UNRWA authorities were willing to advertise for persons in occupations of interest to Canada, to carry out pre-selection activities and forward applications to the Canadian authorities. UNRWA was willing to pay the passage to Canada of refugees who were in receipt of UNRWA rations and would provide departing heads of family with $28.00 plus $14.00 per dependent (Raska, 2015, p. 457). They would provide free medical examinations and certify refugee status and occupational qualifications. Despatch 339, signed by Trade Commissioner C.E.S. Hughes, acknowledges the “very considerable preparatory work” by Shenstone, Second Secretary, and that the contents had been edited and approved by the Chargé d’Affaires, Elizabeth MacCallum.

The decision to respond and framing the program

On 6 September 1955, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jules Léger forwarded Despatch 339 to Colonel Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. He noted Canada had already contributed $4 million to Palestinian relief and that “It is obviously in Canada’s interest that the refugees be resettled as soon as possible since the practical alternative is for members of the United Nations, including Canada, to continue to share in the cost of maintaining them indefinitely” (Léger, 1955a).

Fortier passed the correspondence to Director of Immigration C.E.S. Smith, an imposing figure nearing the end of a long career and used to commanding much respect. He dismissed the idea saying:

I do not believe that encouragement should be offered in this regard and that Canada should continue as they have in regard to the Shanghai refugees, i.e. in supplying funds for their assistance rather than take any given number for resettlement here. Their ways of life are entirely different to ours and, no doubt, adjustment would take a considerable time whereas in the meantime, we would be taking those who would become more readily integrated. (Smith, 1955a)

On September 21, Léger used Smith’s analysis in a memorandum to Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jack Pickersgill (Léger, 1955b). Smith did not expect opposition to his analysis, yet he received a curt reply from Pickersgill on September 30:

During the discussion at Cabinet the other day on the grant for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, the Cabinet also discussed the possibility of admitting a few carefully selected immigrants from this group, and it was decided that we should take steps to examine the possibility of admitting a small number of these refugees, on condition that they were already able to speak one or other of the official languages of Canada; that they had technical or other skills which would enable them to be placed in useful employment in Canada; and that they appeared, in individual cases, to be reasonably adaptable people who might be expected to become good citizens as other people of Arabic origin already settled here. I should be glad if you would initiate discussions with External Affairs and other interested parties as soon as possible … . (Pickersgill, 1955)

Pickersgill rejected Smith’s recommendations as conveyed to him by Colonel Fortier because Cabinet had already discussed the matter and had decided to accept the recommendations and reasoning of the Beirut Legation and its highly respected head of mission, the Chargé d’Affaires, Elizabeth MacCallum.

Accordingly, Director Smith convened a meeting on 26 October 1955, “to discuss the proposal that a limited number of specially selected Palestinian refugees be admitted to Canada for permanent resettlement” (Draft Minutes, 1955, October 26). In attendance were: C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration; Paul T. Baldwin, Chief, Admissions Division; G.R. Benoit, Chief of Operations; Lloyd M. Hunter, Chief, Settlement Division; H.L. Voisey; T.P. Malone, Consular Division, Department of External Affairs; W.W. Dawson, Department of Labour; J.W. Temple, Unemployment Insurance Commission; and Inspector G.H. Ashley, RCMP.

Director Smith read the memorandum from Minister Pickersgill setting forth Cabinet’s views. Participants discussed whether the Minister’s memorandum was a dictum that a certain number of these refugees be admitted or whether the meeting should merely return a report on the advisability of doing so. The consensus was that refugees were to be admitted and the committee should make firm recommendations on the numbers and the selection criteria. Malone outlined the reasons for Cabinet’s decision:

1. Canada is the fourth largest contributor to Palestine relief and it was obviously in Canada’s best interests that refugees be resettled as soon as possible. By accepting a certain number of these refugees it was felt that it might interest other countries in doing likewise.

2. The large number of Arab refugees represented a dangerous threat to the already delicate political situation in the Middle East and because that area is becoming of increasing strategic importance, any step to relieve the refugee problem would be a useful piece of strategy (Draft Minutes, 1955, October 26).

The committee proceeded cautiously, deciding this first movement should be in the nature of an experiment, with the admission of future groups to be considered in light of their experience with the first group. Dawson suggested 100 workers together with dependants for a total of something between 300–400 souls. It was so agreed (Draft Minutes, 1955, October 26).

Malone suggested that the decision be conveyed to the Chargé d’Affaires in Beirut and asked that the Immigration Branch prepare a list of preferred occupations to be sent to Beirut as a selection guide. Benoit stressed the importance of English or French competency as well as adaptability and asked for a report on the average size of refugee families to assist planning. Director Smith stressed that selection must occur in time to facilitate a spring arrival – which would have unfortunate results. The Legation would be tasked with ensuring that refugees could be returned to Lebanon in particular if the need arose.

On 4 November 1955, Malone sent a telegram to the Legation in Beirut advising that the government had decided to admit 100 Palestinian refugees plus dependants, to be selected in Lebanon and Jordan. Those selected would need to speak English or French and possess “skills and training which would enable them to obtain employment in Canada” (Telegram C-71, 1955). An immigration team would proceed to Lebanon and Jordan in late January or early February 1956. The Legation was asked to determine whether UNRWA could pre-select 300 cases by then and if UNRWA could carry out the pre-selection process without encouraging an expectation that this represented the number to be selected, exposing Canada to criticism by disappointed applicants. The telegram expressed concern about the consequences of UNRWA advertising the movement and expressed the hope that candidates could be selected directly from UNRWA’s records. Instructions on procedures were leaving by diplomatic bag and an early response to the issues it raised was requested.

Instructions to the Legation

The instructions mentioned by Malone took the form of Numbered Letter C-373 of 2 November 1955 signed by Under Secretary Léger (Letter C-373, 1955). The letter reiterated the selection criteria then drew attention to an attached list of occupations in demand in Canada that had been extracted from the list provided by UNRWA.¹ The letter asks whether UNRWA might be able to pay the passage of Palestinians not in receipt of rations, noting that if that was not possible the Canadian immigration team would give preference to those able to pay their own passage. The question of approaching Lebanon and Jordan regarding re-entry guarantees was to be left in abeyance and Canada would be willing to accept refugees traveling on UNRWA documents.

Letter C-373 provided a broad refugee definition: any applicant pre-selected by UNRWA who formerly resided in Palestine and left his or her place of residence as a result of the Palestine war would qualify. The Legation was asked for information on average family size and to remind UNRWA that success would rest on the care taken to pre-select and medically screen candidates. If UNRWA were not ready to receive the Canadian team in late January or early February 1956, movement would be postponed until spring 1957.

Fine tuning

The first of a number of wrinkles was not long appearing. In response to Malone’s November 4 telegram, MacCallum replied that while UNRWA was willing to pre-select the refugees for Canada, its status would suffer if it appeared to be taking the initiative encouraging refugees to resettle outside Arab world. So:

UNRWA hopes you will authorize us to issue a press release here indicating that in view of large number of requests received by Canadian government from refugees for immigration to Canada the government has tentatively decided to admit a very limited number of applicants resident in Lebanon and Jordan who speak English or French and who have special technical skills which would enable them to support themselves in Canada. Owing to lack of Canadian facilities in area, Canada has requested UNRWA to assist in pre-selection … . (Telegram C-73, 1955)

The Chargé acknowledged a press release might be problematic, but since publicity was inevitable, it might be better to control it from the outset. She offered to draft a text for Ottawa’s approval and indicated that in UNRWA’s view a properly worded press release would eliminate most ineligible applicants. The Chargé hoped the immigration teams could come a little later than planned and sketched out the pre-screening procedure:

1. Personal interview in English or French would eliminate those obviously ineligible

2. Eligible applicants would fill out Immigration OS-8 and OS-8A forms

3. Verification of refugees’ status

4. UNRWA would attempt trade tests supplied by International Labour Organisation (ILO)

5. Those of wrong age or with too many unsuitable dependents would be eliminated … 

6. Judgment of personal suitability would be left to Canadian teams. If too many applicants are eligible qualifications could be made more stringent later. (Telegram C-73, 1955)

The points made in MacCallum’s telegram are elaborated further in Beirut’s numbered letter 448 of 17 November 1955. The letter begins by expanding on the desirability of the Legation to issue a press release to protect UNRWA, because:

… the position of UNRWA in the Arab world is somewhat delicate, since accusations are frequently made that the Agency is an Anglo-American tool designed to frustrate the recognized right of the refugees to return to their Palestinian homeland by encouraging them to seek permanent resettlement elsewhere. This is the type of criticism which UNRWA must avoid at all costs. (Letter 448, 1955)

It is worth noting that in 1948 MacCallum had been deeply involved in providing advice and analysis to the Canadian delegation to the UN during the negotiations seeking to end the fighting between the Zionist militias and (subsequently) State of Israel with the Arab states that invaded Palestine as the British departed. MacCallum had argued against the partition of Mandatory Palestine into Jewish and Arab states believing this would lead to unending conflict (Newport, 2014, p. 350). Lester Pearson over-ruled MacCallum as he was committed to the creation of a state for the Jewish people (ibid, p. 363). MacCallum’s use of the term “recognized right of the refugees to return to their Palestinian homeland” is a clear reference to UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 194 with which she would have been intimately familiar (UN General Assembly, 1948).

The letter then addressed technical issues. Interviews should take place in Beirut, Amman and Jerusalem (then under Jordanian rule). UNRWA would not be able to pay the passage of refugees who were not on its rations list, so they asked if Canada could issue assisted passage loans to people in that category. There was no such thing as an UNRWA travel document, but the Lebanese government would issue laissez–passers. Palestinians from Jordan would be issued Jordanian passports valid for five years.

Advising host governments

On November 30, MacCallum and Shenstone called on the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fouad Ammoun, to advise him about the press release scheduled for December 2 and to ask if the Lebanese would be willing to issue re-entry permits to those selected by Canada (Letter 460, 1955). Ammoun confirmed the refugees would be issued laissez-passers with re-entry visas valid for re-entry for the life of the document. The Secretary-General expressed his personal appreciation for Canada’s plans, but mentioned that the Arab League favored repatriation of the refugees in line with the UNGA resolution 194. MacCallum stressed that the program would involve a limited number wishing to make a fresh start and the Secretary-General once more expressed his appreciation.

MacCallum subsequently called on the Jordanian Chargé d’Affaires, Abdulhamid Siraj, on December 1, giving him English and Arabic versions of the press release (Letter 460, 1955). The Jordanian official reacted favorably, promising to send the documents by special courier to his Prime Minister’s office that day and affirming the refugees from Jordan could be accommodated with either Jordanian passports valid for re-entry for five years or, if the refugees wished, laissez-passers with one year re-entry visas (Letter 460, 1955).

The questions in Beirut’s Letter 448 were answered on December 9, 1955 in telegram C-82 (C82, 1955). The Immigration Department had decided it did not want applicants subjected to formal trade testing. While selection should be restricted to occupations on the list, the main criteria should be over-all suitability and adaptability to life in Canada. The selection team would be guided by the Legation’s advice on where processing should take place, but assisted passage would not be available to any of the applicants. Only “normal” family units (i.e. the wage-earner, his wife and children) would be considered eligible. The medical requirements were spelled out and a doctor accompanying the team would perform the physical examination. It would facilitate matters if UNRWA arranged a pre-screening and had completed medical forms available for review.

Instructions to immigration

On 15 December 1955, Chief of Operations Benoit sent Paul Fortin, Officer in Charge, Athens, a message advising him of Cabinet’s decision. The message drew on Malone’s explanation of the strategic reasons for the decision and quotes the Legation’s description of the condition and qualities of the refugees from Despatch 339. For reasons that are unclear the message instructed Fortin to proceed to Lebanon on January 6, several weeks earlier than the Legation and UNRWA had previously been told to expect a team.

Fortin was to proceed with his Stage B officer (background clearances) and a Canadian medical officer designated by Dr Jeffs in London. The refugee definition (“an Arab displaced as a result of the Israeli-Arab war”), and the size of the movement (100 workers and dependants) were spelled out. He was instructed to make selections based on the occupational list previously sent to Beirut. A new element, an age limit of 45 for the workers, was added. The main selection criterion was however the applicants’ suitability and adaptability to the Canadian way of life. The refugees were to be counseled on sponsorship of relatives coming under the waiver classes and that they would have to pay their own passage if they did not qualify for UNRWA support. Fortin was to destine them “IMOP”² to arrive after 1 March 1956 to destinations (See Table 2) in Canada. Neither the early start date of January 6, which was later changed to January 13, nor the 45-year cut-off age limit were communicated to UNRWA or the Legation, with unfortunate consequences.

Table 2. Anticipated 1956 Distribution of Palestinian Refugees in Canada.

Montreal	25	London	5
Quebec	10	Ottawa	5
Hull	5	Windsor	5
Three Rivers	5	Toronto	25
Hamilton	5	Port Arthur	10

(GRB Benoit, Director of Operstion23 April 1956n memo to “All District Superintendents” in LAC RG76, vol.865, file 555-54-607).

An ill-fated scheme – Fortin’s report

On 10 February 1956, Fortin submitted a report to the Chief, Operations Division, on his mission to Beirut, Amman and Jerusalem. The first page of the file copy bears a handwritten note in the margin:

The Director: For Information. This appears to have been an ill-fated scheme. G.R.B. (Benoit) 16.2.56. (Fortin Memorandum, 1956, February 10)

Fortin reports that, as instructed, he, along with Dr. Y. Dupuis and R. Shorey (the “Stage B Officer”), arrived in Beirut on January 13. There they met with MacCallum, Shenstone and various UNRWA officials. Fortin praises the cooperativeness of UNRWA in Beirut, Amman and Jerusalem and then drops a bombshell. UNRWA told him they had not been able to do any pre-screening because it was “too politically delicate for them to undertake the responsibility of refusing to accept applications” (Fortin Memorandum, 1956, February 10). This explains, according to Fortin, the “rather mediocre results of the scheme” as described in Table 3.

Table 3. Palestinian Refugees Selected for Resettlement.

	CASES	PEOPLE
3 (a) Total Interviewed
Beirut	104	324
Amman	42	116
Jerusalem	44	119
TOTAL	190	599
*Of these 190 cases, 134 were single workers and 56 were families (Fortin Memorandum, 1956).
Preliminary Results:
	Pending Travel Documents		Pending Background		TOTAL
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
3 (b) Accepted for Relocation
Beirut	32	54	2	9	34	63
Amman	0	0	12	24	12	24
Jerusalem	0	0	5	10	5	10
TOTAL	32	54	19	43	51	97
	Medical		Civil Selection Criteria		Background		TOTAL
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
3 (c) Applicants Rejected after Interview
Beirut	31	129	8	12	1	1	40	142
Amman	13	45	9	24	0	0	22	69
Jerusalem	8	22	13	19	0	0	21	41
TOTAL	52	196	30	55	1	1	83	252
	Cases	Persons
3 (d) Not Accepted after pre-Interview
Beirut	8	38
Amman	0	0
Jerusalem	13	60
TOTAL	21	98
	Cases	Persons
3 (e) Applications Withdrawn
Beirut	22	91
Amman	8	23
Jerusalem	5	7
TOTAL	35	121

Fortin reports that due to larger numbers and medical delays the team worked in Beirut, January 16^–24, and they “examined” in Amman January 24 and in Jerusalem January 27–28. He notes that rejections on medical grounds were high (from causes like trachoma, tuberculosis and amoebiasis) and that the 45-year age limit resulted in more refusals. He reports that the age limit had not been communicated to the Legation or to UNRWA and suggests it would have been an “excellent idea” if the instructions sent to him on December 15 had been sent to the Legation and UNRWA as well, “It would have helped greatly to dissipate some misunderstandings” (Fortin Memorandum, 1956, February 10).

While the family definition set by Canada had been communicated to UNRWA by the Legation, there were many cases involving single persons wishing to bring a whole string of relatives, old parents, older brothers and sisters not coming within the trade criterion and even aunts. As the single applicants would not come without their relatives, they were refused and this caused ill feelings and harsh words. Some applicants were expecting Canada to provide them with a furnished house, specific jobs and other means of support. When they were told the actual conditions some withdrew their applications (See Table 3e). The short preparation period prior to the team’s arrival meant that few refugees even heard about the mission. Consequently, most of those approved were either UNRWA employees or those on UNRWA rations, and therefore eligible to have UNRWA pay their fare. Only 17 pending cases were in a position to pay their own fare.

After noting there had been negative publicity directed at the Canadian scheme, Fortin closes with an assessment of the viability of further movements:

I have no reason to doubt that there are among the Palestinian Refugees well educated men and women, who can speak either English or French; these people, due to their high level of education, have been mostly employed in administrative and clerical work and would hardly be suitable for establishment in Canada. When we reach the class of tradesmen, I may say that except for a few exceptions, the great majority have a much lower level of education and they are far from being fluent in either language. Although they may have learned the language at school, their day-to-day dealings were with their own people, so they had little opportunity to practice the language learned at school … ”

There was meanwhile a widely held perception at immigration that clerks and administrators could not settle successfully. If there was a second movement, Fortin recommended a minimum four months preparation time and sending out an officer in advance to pre-screen applications.

The Legation’s perspective

The immigration team departed the Middle East on 1 February 1956 and by February 6 Shenstone had prepared three dispatches for MacCallum’s signature. Despatch 35 analyzed how the operation unfolded from the Legation’s perspective, Despatch 33 provided a chronological summary of how the enterprise had been carried out so far and Despatch 34 dealt with media and officials in the Levant. In Despatch 35 (1956) the Legation provided considerably more analysis than Fortin, seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Final Applicants Accepted (Despatch 35).

	Pre-Selected by UNRWA		Tentatively Accepted by Canada
	Applications	Persons	Applications	Persons
Beirut	103	332	36	64
Amman	42	116	12	24
Jerusalem	43	127	5	10
TOTAL	188	575	53	98

The Legation’s take on the outcome was that it was not uncreditable in view of:

1. the experimental nature of the operation, which meant that instructions to UNRWA officials from Ottawa had to be supplemented on several occasions after the programme was launched

2. the reduction, which proved to be necessary, in the length of the period allowed for the operation and

3. the unfortunate case that general disturbances relating to discussions of the Baghdad Pact broke out in Jordan a little more than a fortnight after the Canadian immigration scheme was announced and were renewed about a fortnight before the immigration team arrived in Amman.³

The Legation reports that despite very tight time frames the number of cases generated in Beirut met expectations. Disruptions in Amman meant it produced 85 cases instead of the expected 200. Had more time been available the full target could have been achieved or exceeded. Of the 53 accepted cases, 40 were single persons. UNRWA had hoped for a higher proportion of families to reduce their welfare rolls. Of the rejected cases, 72% were because of the age limit disqualifying the heads of family (Despatch 35, 1956). If one person failed an entire family was disqualified.

Most of those accepted were welders, diesel and automotive mechanics, house painters and typists with a scattering of other occupations – but no engineers, nurses, tailors, masons or housekeeping service workers. Many were UNRWA employees with access to information about the project. The group included Christian Arabs, some twice uprooted Armenians and “fortunately some Muslims” (Despatch 35, 1956).

The Legation remarks that the invidious position in which UNRWA found itself with regard to publicizing the program impacted on the number of refugees who heard about it, despite the Legation issuing press releases on 2 December 1955 and 5 January 1956. Many refugees did not see the newspapers. Many needed time to mull over emigration to a country that hitherto had been closed to them. They also needed to think over how safe it would be for them to disregard accusations of treachery to the cause of refugee repatriation if they left. With the shortness of time between the public announcement and arrival of the Canadian team two weeks ahead of schedule, more time would have made a significant difference, especially in Jordan.

The 45-year age limit had not been communicated to the Legation or UNRWA until the team arrived so UNRWA was unable to screen out over-aged applicants or those who presented their sons as the wage earners (Raska, 2015, p. 471). While UNRWA doctors did an excellent job in carrying out the medical examinations and identifying medical problems, they would not take responsibility for refusing the applicants themselves, necessitating re-examinations in a number of cases. The final problem identified by the Legation was that in Beirut, junior Palestinian UNRWA employees apparently at first attempted to discourage people from applying.

Local reaction

“Dangerous Western Plot to Expatriate Refugees and Bury Them in Oblivion in Canada” - Alef-Ba Newspaper, Damascus. 3 December 1955. (Despatch 34, 1956)

“New effort to stop refugees from thinking of returning to occupied sector of Palestine – Canada welcomes refugees to its territory – Lebanon demands repatriation to refugees’ country of origin” – Ash-Shaab Newspaper, Beirut. 6 December 1955. (Despatch 34, 1956)

Despite such headlines, MacCallum’s assessment of media reaction to the Canadian resettlement operation is that it “aroused much less political opposition than we had expected in view of the friendly warning given to us by … the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry”. She reported that the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, had called on refugees to refuse all resettlement plans, but noted he had waited until the team had finished its work before issuing his comment. She also noted that “In reporting this blast the newspaper The Arab World described Husseini as being the person held responsible by many for some of the worst features of the Arab defeat of 1948” (Despatch 34, 1956).

MacCallum notes the lack of protest from Arab League headquarters and observes there were more protests in Syria, where the Canadian program did not operate, than anywhere else. She observed:

… the Arab governments and refugee organizations, though firm enough on the principle of repatriation itself, are far from being vindictive toward individual refugees who have placed their own personal security above the general interest in repatriation for the displaced Arab population as a whole, although the danger of violence is never completely absent. In this the Arabs seem to be more lenient than were Jewish Committee agents towards those DPs [displaced persons] in European camps who accepted offers of resettlement in North America and were made to suffer for having broken the solid front organized for political purposes instead of demanding transfer to Palestine as the only form of resettlement they would accept. (Despatch 34, 1956)

A report a few months later noted that at the behest of the Mufti, the Canadian resettlement programme was to be reviewed at a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo that week, but events in Algeria, then a French colony, had driven it from the top of the agenda (Letter 135, 1956).

The chronology

The chronology in Despatch 33 fills in a few essential gaps (Despatch 33, 1956). Conversations with UNRWA about resettling refugees in Canada actually started in May 1955 and continued over the months of June and July prior to the preparation of Despatch 339 on 10 August 1955. Despatch 33 also concluded that a delay of an additional 2 or 3 weeks would have resulted in substantially different results.

Departure

The final Legation report stated the pool of refugees heading to Canada had declined to 39 heads of families and 37 dependents (Letter 135, 1956). The first group left Beirut by ship, the S.S. Adana, on 6 April 1956. Shenstone was detailed to see them off and to deliver a short homily wishing them luck but emphasizing that their future in Canada would depend strictly on their own efforts (Raska, 2015, p. 467). Shenstone described this first group as hard working respectable people who would give no trouble.

The trail of the first group picks up in a 23 April 1956 memo to “All District Superintendents” from the Immigration Department’s Chief of Operations, which advised all concerned that the Palestinians would arrive in Halifax on April 24 (Raska, 2015, p. 468). The Immigration Department wanted to make a special effort to welcome the first settlement of Palestinian refugees outside an Arabic country at the port of arrival and destination points in Canada. The rest of this little movement trickled into Canada over the summer.

Impact of the Suez and Hungarian crises

The Legation in Beirut took Ottawa at its word that this was an experiment that might lead to further movements and assured Ottawa that experience gained to date would make subsequent efforts more fruitful. For that to have happened, the Immigration Department would have had to follow up on the refugees scattered across Canada to assess their progress. As so often seems to happen with the Middle East, major events ensured that would never occur.

This happened in the context of the Cold War struggle between the United States and Soviet Union, and the ongoing postwar process of decolonization that had put Algeria at the top of the concern of the Arab League earlier in 1956. On 26 July 1956, just before the last of the refugees’ August 5 arrival in Canada, Egypt’s President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal and, in retaliation, the UK froze Egyptian assets. The crisis grew: Egypt was attacked by Israel on October 29 and jointly by Britain and France on November 5. As events unfolded in the Middle East, the Hungarians rose up on October 23 against their Soviet-dominated Communist regime. Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest on November 4 and when the dust settled tens-of-thousands of Hungarians poured into Western Europe. The Canadian government launched a major resettlement operation that brought 37,000 Hungarians to Canada over the next six months (Troper, 2010, p. 176). At the same time thousands of Brits, disgusted by either the humiliation suffered by Britain when the United States forced them to abandon the Egyptian adventure, or by the folly of launching into Egypt in the first place, decided to leave for better prospects elsewhere. In 1957, 108,989 British immigrants arrived in Canada (Knowles, 2016, p. 175). That year immigration to Canada hit its highest level (282,000) since before World War I, a number unequaled for the rest of the century (Statistics Canada, 2016). Within the year the Pearson Government fell and was replaced by John Diefenbaker’s Conservatives. The economy went into recession and the little band of Palestinians receded from official memory.

Observations and conclusions

Some things do not change. The official hostility of Arab governments and media, and Palestinian society and institutions towards resettling people from the camps to places like Canada remains as staunch today as it was when MacCallum and Shenstone were approached in May 1955. Unlike post war European governments, the Arab states did not (and do not) appreciate Canada offering Palestinians an alternative to waiting for their right of return to Israel. When Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley visited Israel and Palestine in 2001 and mentioned that if, in the context of an eventual comprehensive peace agreement, and if asked by the Palestinian and Israeli governments, Canada might resettle some Palestinians, he was burned in effigy (York, 2001). Scant weeks later young Palestinians from the miserable camps of Lebanon started showing up at the Blackpool Quebec Port of Entry asking for refugee status. Official Arab and Palestinian opposition to third country resettlement of Palestinian refugees as opposed to repatriation remains firm but individual refugees make their own decisions.

In this particular case, one is struck by the speed with which Cabinet reviewed the proposal. MacCallum’s Despatch 339 left Beirut by diplomatic bag on 10 August and by 6 September Under-Secretary of State Léger had written to Immigration Deputy Minister Fortier. Also noteworthy is the seriousness of purpose reflected in the correspondence and the planning process. There are elements of flexibility and pragmatism in, for example, the relaxed attitude towards trade testing, the use of UNRWA forms in lieu of Canadian ones and the insistence that the list of occupations take second place to an assessment of each potential immigrant’s adaptability.

It is not obvious why the government directed the civil service to proceed with this initiative in the first place. The argument that taking a hundred cases out of a refugee population of 900,000 (by 1956) would either ease the donors’ financial burden or reduce the regional instability threat is, to say the least, a bit thin. While Canada was looking for skilled workers in this period it is also clear from the files that the officials concerned were worried about whether the refugees’ skill levels were sufficient and they anticipated difficulty placing them in employment.

The decision to offer to resettle a small number of refugees did not take place in a vacuum. Raska’s account of this movement provides evidence that the plight of the refugees created in the wake of the 1948 war was, in fact, the subject of heated discussion in Parliament and in the press in 1955 (Raska, 2015). Letters to the editor across the country argued for and against assistance to the Palestinian refugees depending on where the writer’s sympathies lay. In the House of Commons, the leader of the opposition, John Diefenbaker, who implied that he had seen the refugee camps for himself, queried the government about the size and effectiveness of Canada’s contribution.

It is important to recall that at the time, Canada had in Lester Pearson an internationalist Foreign Minister who had been deeply involved in shaping the postwar world, and had played an influential role in getting the UN to accept the partition of Mandate Palestine and recognize the State of Israel. At the same time his colleague, Jack Pickersgill, was an exceptionally active immigration minister, as his leadership in responding to the Hungarian crisis later that year would amply demonstrate.

Critically, Pearson and MacCallum had been colleagues in External Affairs and had worked closely on postwar Middle Eastern issues. While they disagreed about the partition of Palestine, Pearson and his colleagues had a profound respect for MacCallum and her deep Middle East expertise: her personal and professional credibility may well have been the crucial element in Cabinet’s decision to accept her recommendation to order the movement (Newport, 2014). Raska (2015) sees the Palestinian initiative as having a long-term impact, both in terms of Canada’s reaction to the refugees generated by Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolt, and in later reforms to Canada’s refugee system. Although the “ill-fated scheme” would not have been forgotten when the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956 unfolded, scant months after the last of the Palestinians had arrived, it seems unlikely it was a factor in the government decision to admit Hungarian refugees.

Rather, the creation of an actual Canadian refugee policy grew out of the long-deferred ratification of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention in 1969, and Cabinet’s resulting decision to adopt the UN Refugee Convention definition and extend the possibility of resettlement to refugees beyond Europe in 1970 (Memorandum from Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 1970, July 27). It was that policy framework and the operational experience gained in the subsequent Tibetan, Ugandan, and Chilean movements, the initial wave of Indochinese and the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers at our borders that were on our minds in 1977–1978 as we teased out the implications of a law-based resettlement and asylum system following the passage of the 1976 Immigration Act. Under the 1972 Act, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention definition and Canada’s commitment to fulfill its obligations as a convention signatory were embedded in Canadian Law, as were the authorizations for regulations to guide Canada’s resettlement programs and to establish a private refugee sponsorship system. By that time, the Palestinians of 1956 were a distant memory; an interesting case on its own merit offering perspective on the politics of the period, but one without a long-term immigration policy impact.

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Additional information

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Michael Molloy

Michael Molloy has 35years of experience in international and refugee affairs. In 1972 he helped resettle 6000 Ugandan Asians. He led implementation of the refugee provisions of the 1976 Immigration Act including the private refugee sponsorship program. He coordinated the 1979-80 program for 60,000 Indochinese refugee. Subsequently he served as Counsellor for Humanitarian Affairs at the Canadian Mission in Geneva and managed immigration operations in Jordan, Syria and East Africa. He was an advisor to the Canadian chaired Middle East Peace Process Refugee Working Group. Following Director General assignments in Ottawa and Toronto he was appointed Ambassador to Jordan (1996-2000) and was Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (2000 to 2003) focusing on the Palestinian refugee problem. Post retirement publications include three books on Jerusalem (“Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem”, “Governance and Security in Jerusalem” and “Contested Sites in Jerusalem”) and “Running on Empty: Canada and the Indochinese Refugees 1975-80”. He is president of the Canadian Immigration Historical Society and Adjunct Research Professor at Carleton University.

Notes

1 The occupations identified for selection included: electrical and mechanical engineers, draughtsmen, professional and nonprofessional nurses, typists, stenographers, tailors, shoe repairmen, cabinet makers, carpenters and joiners, diesel and automotive mechanics, radio and TV repairmen, plumbers, pipe fitters, welders, stone masons, plasterers, painters and paperhangers, bakers, housekeeping service workers and institutional and domestic cooks.

2 IMOP stands for “Immigration open placement”. It identified an immigrant who would need assistance from Immigration’s placement service and might require food and shelter.

3 The Bagdad Pact was established in 1955 to prevent Soviet incursions in the Middle East. Members included Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and the UK. It ceased to exist in 1979.