Has President Trump killed the Middle East Peace Process?

ABSTRACT

President Donald Trump's long-awaited Middle East peace plan was unveiled on 28 January 2020. Some observers have suggested that the Trump vision is less a plan for peace than a unilateral statement of the terms for Palestinian surrender: Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, no refugee return and Israel's annexation of the Jordan valley and all West Bank settlements in exchange for an “archipelago” state and the promise of a $50 billion investment fund. This policy commentary assesses what the Trump plan means for the peace process launched in Madrid in 1991. It reviews the evolution of the Madrid/Oslo process with particular emphasis on the underlying principles the Trump plan appears to contradict. It examines Canada's role in the process, assesses Ottawa's initial response to the Trump plan in terms of long-standing Canadian policy and outlines ways in which Canada could influence the debate going forward.

RÉSUMÉ

Le plan de paix très attendu du président Donald Trump pour le Moyen–Orient a été dévoilé le 28 janvier 2020. Certains observateurs ont suggéré que la vision de Trump relevait moins d'un plan pour la paix que d'une déclaration unilatérale des conditions d'une reddition palestinienne : Jérusalem comme capitale indivise d'Israël, pas de retour des réfugiés et l'annexion par Israël de la vallée du Jourdain et de toutes les colonies de Cisjordanie en échange d'un État « archipel » et de la promesse d'un fond d'investissement de 50 milliards de dollars. Ce commentaire politique évalue ce que le plan Trump signifie pour le processus de paix lancé à Madrid en 1991. Il passe en revue l'évolution du processus Madrid/Oslo en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur les principes sous–jacents que le plan Trump semble contredire. Il examine le rôle du Canada dans le processus, évalue la réponse initiale d'Ottawa au plan Trump, en termes de politique canadienne de longue date, et décrit les moyens par lesquels le Canada pourrait influencer le débat à l'avenir.

KEYWORDS:

• Middle East (Madrid) peace process
• Trump
• Netanyahu
• Israel
• Palestinian

Introduction

President Trump's long-awaited Middle East peace plan was released on 28 January 2020 (White House, 2020). Some observers have suggested the Trump vision is less a plan for peace than a unilateral statement of the terms for Palestinian surrender: Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, no refugee return and Israel's annexation of the Jordan valley and all West Bank settlements in exchange for what one observer has referred to as a “discontinuous Palestinian archipelago state surrounded by a sea of Israeli territory” (Thrall, 2020). Writing in Politico, two former high-level United States “peace processors” observe that the Trump plan, “gives Israel everything it wants, concedes to Palestinians everything Israel does not care for, tries to buy off the Palestinians with the promise of $50 billion in assistance that will never see the light of day, and then calls it peace” (Malley & Miller, 2020).

Has President Trump killed the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) with his plan, or is he just finishing off an initiative that has been dead – or on life support – for almost 20 years? This policy commentary assesses what the Trump plan means for the peace process, Canada's long-standing policy in support of the MEPP and ways Canada could influence the debate going forward.

The Madrid Conference

From 30 October to 1 November 1991, Spain hosted the Madrid Peace Conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It followed a March 1991 President George H.W. Bush speech stating, “The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Bush, 1991) and months of “shuttle diplomacy” by Secretary of State James Baker.

According to the Madrid Letter of Invitation (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991), the process would have separate “bilateral” and “multilateral” tracks. The bilateral track would include negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours, as well as the Palestinians as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian dimension of the bilateral track effectively represented the next step in the implementation of the historic “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” (United Nations, 1978) concluded at Camp David in September 1978. This Framework outlined a process for achieving Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza and established principles for peace treaties between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The Framework's overall goal was to achieve “a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts” (ibid). In other words, to achieve peace with its Arab neighbours, Israel needed to return lands captured in the 1967 and 1973 wars. As a first step in this direction, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed in March 1979 provided for the full return of Egyptian land captured by Israel in 1967.

Consistent with the 1978 Framework, the Madrid process negotiations regarding the Palestinians would be, “conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements … with the objective of reaching an agreement within one year” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991). Once agreed, the interim arrangements would last for five years, with negotiations on “permanent status” beginning in the third year (ibid). The multilateral track added an international dimension with a “focus on region-wide issues of water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991). An Israeli foreign ministry website notes a distinction that, “The purpose of the bilateral track is to solve the conflicts of the past. The purpose of the multilateral track is to build the Middle East of the future” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

Assessing the multilaterals

The multilateral track was launched in Moscow in January 1992. “Working Groups” on arms control and regional security (ACRS), environment, refugees, regional economic development, and water resources were established and held organisational meetings on site. Canada played an important part agreeing to serve as “gavel-holder” of the Refugee Working Group (RWG) and was part of the Multilateral Steering Group which met after each round of working group meetings. Each group met roughly twice per year from 1992 to 1995. Early rounds of the multilaterals were tentative at best. In part, this was due to a lack of progress on the bilateral track. By December 1992, ten rounds of bilateral negotiations in Washington had failed to produce a single formal agreement (Miller, 2008, p. 195). The working groups also struggled with the past versus future distinction between the tracks. This was particularly evident in the RWG as perhaps the most “human” of the groups. Israel boycotted the first meeting in Ottawa in May 1992. The second Ottawa meeting in November 1992 was delayed due to Israeli concerns that one of the Palestinian delegates was an active member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The RWG's family reunification theme inevitably touched on “the right of return”, an issue which Israel argued was reserved for the bilateral track. Similar issues played out in the Environment and Water Resources working groups where it often proved difficult to avoid “rights” issues.

In September 1993, the entire Madrid process was energized by the “Oslo Channel” – successful secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO brokered by Norway. The “Oslo I Accord” was signed in Washington and witnessed by President Clinton, Prime Minister Rabin, and Yasser Arafat. It provided for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and a five-year transition to Palestinian self-government with permanent status negotiations beginning no later than the third year (United Nations, 1993). In essence, the Oslo Channel replicated the 1978 Camp David framework and timetable for Palestinian self-government but established the PLO rather than Egypt and Jordan as the negotiating partner. After almost two years, the Madrid process had a plan and committed leadership.

Canada and the peace process

As Robinson describes in his policy commentary in this volume, Canada struggled to position itself domestically as a player in Middle East peace. Ultimately, however, it would become a strong supporter of the Madrid process. Having played an important part in the 1947 United Nations “partition plan”, sent peacekeepers to the Sinai (1956) and the Golan Heights (1973), and provided long-term assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) (1950), Canada seemed like a natural choice to lead the RWG. This significant role was part of a wider, “whole of government” approach to the peace process that included the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the International Development Research Centre, the Department of National Defence and experts from other government departments.

From the Oslo I breakthrough in September 1993, the RWG moved forward on several fronts (Robinson, 2011). Meeting in Tunis in October 1993, the RWG was the first multilateral group to convene in the region. It identified Palestinian refugee needs and mobilized the resources required to address them (Brynen & Tansley, 1995). A series of Canadian-led missions to refugee camps enabled direct dialogue with the refugees themselves. Some progress was made on the delicate family reunification issue, with more Palestinian refugees allowed to join their families in Israel and the West Bank and the relocation of almost 500 refugee households from “Canada Camp” in Egypt to Gaza. A life-changing scholarship program enabled over 200 Palestinian refugee women to attend universities in Lebanon. Canada participated actively in the other multilateral working groups and hosted an “intersessional meeting” of the Multilateral Steering Group. In short, Canada was all in supporting the multilateral track of the Madrid/Oslo peace process.

Further progress on the bilateral track, including the “Gaza/Jericho Agreement” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994) and a 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty provided additional momentum to the multilaterals. Productive meetings of each working group were held in 1994, several in the Middle East. In October, Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Arafat won the Nobel Peace Prize. In September 1995, Rabin and Arafat signed the “Oslo II Accord” in Washington. Formally known as the “Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza”, (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995), it divided the West Bank into three areas, established a schedule for withdrawing Israeli forces from some and provided for the transfer of specified governance responsibilities to the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA).

Oslo unravels

The peace process suffered a body blow when Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995. In the spring of 1996, a series of suicide bombings shook Israel and an Oslo II target for Israeli withdrawal from parts of Hebron was missed. In May, Benjamin Netanyahu narrowly defeated Acting Prime Minister Peres to become Israel's 9th Prime Minister. Following the announcement of a major new Israeli settlement near Jerusalem in February 1997, the Arab League called for the suspension of all forms of normalization with Israel, including the multilateral negotiations. As progress towards resolving the conflicts of the past faltered, so too did efforts towards building the Middle East of the future.

By mid-1997, the Oslo Accords were unravelling. The 1997 deadline for launching permanent status negotiations was missed, as was the 1999 deadline for ending them. With a commitment to get the peace process back on track, Ehud Barak became Prime Minister in June 1999. Following a failed summit meeting at Camp David in July 2000 and a provocative Jerusalem walkabout by then Likud party leader Ariel Sharon, the Palestinian Second Intifada broke out in late September. Last minute efforts at an agreement based on President Clinton's final status vision failed and George W. Bush became the 43rd President of the United States.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Arafat was deemed to be on the wrong side of President Bush's “War on Terror”. Until Arafat's death in 2004, the peace process was effectively on hold. With a different foreign policy direction taken by the Harper Conservative government in the mid-2000s, Canada disengaged from an active political role (Robinson, 2011) while moving closer to Israel at a political level. Towards the end of his second term, President Bush showed more interest in the peace process, convening an international conference in Annapolis in November 2007. Subsequent intensive talks between Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came closer to a mutually acceptable final status agreement than any previous effort. Facing legal issues, Olmert was forced to resign in September 2008 and Netanyahu returned as Prime Minister in March 2009.

Reviving the peace process was an early priority for President Obama. In a landmark speech in Cairo in June 2009, he called for the establishment of a Palestinian state and a freeze on Israeli settlements (White House, 2009). Speaking at Bar Ilan University the following week, Netanyahu endorsed a two-state solution for the first time. This endorsement was, however, subject to several conditions which the Palestinians would find deeply objectionable, including recognition of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people with Jerusalem as its undivided capital, demilitarization of the Palestinian state and defensible borders for Israel, and no right of return for Palestinian refugees (Netanyahu, 2009).

Obama would have an acrimonious relationship with Netanyahu, particularly over the latter's aggressive expansion of settlements. During Obama's time in office, the settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem increased by over 100,000. (Baker, 2016). Reflecting Obama's frustration with Netanyahu's intransigence on this issue and the peace process generally, the United States abstained on a December 2016 Security Council resolution calling for an end to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Adopted by a 14–0 vote, Resolution 2334 called on Israel to, “immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem”, adding that the establishment of settlements has, “no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation of international law” (United Nations Security Council, 2016).

Deal of the century?

Since Donald Trump became President in January 2017, the peace process has clearly gone into reverse. Prime Minister Netanyahu's positions on a two-state solution have evolved little from his first term (1996–1999) and his 2009 Bar Ilan University speech. What is different now is that, in President Trump, Netanyahu found a partner for his version of that solution. Together, the longest serving Prime Minister of Israel and the norm-busting United States President have been chipping away at the foundations of the established framework for achieving Arab-Israeli peace.

Development of the Trump plan began in November 2017, directed by his son-in-law Jared Kushner. Almost immediately, Trump started making game-changing down payments on the eventual plan. In December, the President recognized Jerusalem as Israel's undivided capital (White House, 2017), effectively taking one of the most delicate issues of the MEPP off the table. In response, the Palestinians suspended contacts with the Kushner team and had no further involvement in the development of the plan. In March 2019, Trump recognized Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights (White House, 2019), unilaterally ruling on the central issue in an eventual peace treaty with Syria. In November 2019, the State Department reversed course on a longstanding legal position, concluding that West Bank settlements do not violate international law (Jakes & Halbfinger, 2019). Where previous peace efforts tried to open doors, Trump was closing them even before the political part of his plan was unveiled.

The full “Peace to Prosperity” plan was released 28 January 2020 (White House, 2020). Flying in the face of land for peace, the plan focused more on what Israel was planning to take than what it was prepared to give. Where previous negotiations envisaged Israel surrendering 90% or more of the West Bank, the Trump plan provided for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and all existing settlements, reducing the Palestinian land area to roughly 70%. The Jordan Valley annexation would effectively establish Israel's eastern border, giving Israel full control over the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Israel would retain full sovereignty over Jerusalem and any capital of an eventual Palestinian state would be outside Jerusalem in the area beyond the existing barrier. No Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return to Israel and any returns to the Palestinian area would be subject to Israel's approval.

In effect, the Trump plan decides all the permanent status issues in Israel's favour and makes the rest of Israel's offer subject to a long list of conditions. They include all the objectionable requirements set out in Netanyahu’s 2009 speech as well as a range of measures to enhance governance, the rule of law and internal security in the Palestinian area. The Palestinians would have up to four years to satisfy the plan's conditions during which there would be a freeze on new West Bank settlements. As and when Israel and the United States are satisfied that the conditions have been met, the United States would recognize what Trump refers to as a state and Netanyahu calls a “state-minus” or “conditional limited sovereignty”. The $50 billion in assistance is effectively a signing bonus which would only come into effect once all the conditions had been satisfied. The funding would come mostly from Arab states and private investment with slightly less than half being directed to projects in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. In sum, the Trump plan is more about Israel's security than Palestinian self-determination. The Economist labelled the plan the “steal of the century” (Economist, 2020). Abbas called it the “slap of the century” and delivered the Palestinian response – “We say 1,000 ‘no's’ to this deal” (Abu Tomeh, 2020).

The Abraham Accords

Within days of the Trump plan's release, Netanyahu pledged to move forward on annexation of the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. Fearing precipitous steps on annexation could scuttle the overall plan, the Trump Administration encouraged Netanyahu to hold off until after Israel's March 2 election. As the election results produced no clear winner, Netanyahu and his closest rival, Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, entered into coalition negotiations. On April 20, a unity government was established with Netanyahu as Prime Minister for the first two years of an anticipated four-year term. The coalition agreement precluded any vote on annexation until July 1, when the mapping of relevant areas was expected to be completed. In the interim, there were mounting calls on Israel and the United States to eschew such a provocative move. Several EU states condemned the proposed annexation as a violation of international law; some threatened sanctions against Israel or recognition of a Palestinian state (Emmott, Baker, Irish, & Lubell, 2020).

Arab states also opposed the proposed annexation. Jordan's King Abdullah cautioned that moving ahead with annexation would provoke a “massive conflict” with his country (Al Jazeera, 2020). In a prophetic mid-June op-ed “It's Either Annexation or Normalization”, the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al-Otaiba, warned that “Annexation will definitely, and immediately, reverse all of the Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and the United Arab Emirates” (Halbfinger & Hubbard, 2020). As it turned out, Israel, the Emirates and the United States were already engaged in indirect contacts brokered by Jared Kushner. On 13 August, the White House announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a “full normalization of relations”. Sealed in a phone call between President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed of the Emirates, the agreement provided for follow-up talks on the establishment of embassies and expanded cooperation in a range of areas including investment, tourism, security, healthcare and the environment. In return, Israel agreed to “suspend declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the President's Vision for Peace and focus its efforts now on expanding ties with other countries in the Arab and Muslim world” (White House, 2020, August 13).

In a scene that evoked memories of the 1993 Oslo Accord, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain gathered on the White House lawn on 15 September 2020 to sign the “The Abraham Accords Declaration”. Named after the patriarch of the three monotheistic religions, the Accords included a common declaration of principles (White House, 2020a, September 15), texts of a “Peace Agreement” between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (White House, 2020b, September 15) and a “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations” between Israel and the Kingdom of Bahrain (White House, 2020c, September 15). President Trump heralded the Accords as “the dawn of a new Middle East” and suggested that other countries would be joining in “very, very soon” (Crowley, 2020). Others were less generous in their praise of the normalization moves. Mahmoud Abbas referred to the initial Israeli/Emirati agreement as a “betrayal” of Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause and recalled his ambassador from Abu Dhabi (Boxerman, 2020).

For the four states directly involved, the Abraham Accords appeared to represent a win-win solution. Bahrain and the Emirates formalized their anti-Iran alliance with Israel and the United States, under cover of halting Israel's annexation in the West Bank. For the Emirates, enhanced access to advanced American weaponry (possibly including F-35 jets) may have been a consideration (Kirshner, 2020). At the minimal cost of putting annexation “on hold”, Israel gained two new peace partners with the potential of more Arab and Muslim states to come, opened new trade and investment opportunities in the region and hedged its bets on the outcome of the United States election. Heading into that election, the Trump administration catered to its Christian evangelical base by supporting Israel and the effort to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran. For Trump and Netanyahu, the Accords provided a much-needed foreign policy win and a welcome diversion from mounting criticism of their management of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the specific context of this paper, the Accords represent a further erosion of the principles which have guided Arab-Israeli peace efforts since 1967. Forget about “land for peace”. For Trump and Netanyahu, the new mantra is “peace for peace”.

What can Canada do?

The Abraham Accords did not formally halt the Trump plan or reverse recent measures which undermine underlying principles of the Madrid/Oslo process. While de jure annexation in the West Bank may be on hold, de facto annexation continues with thousands of new settlement homes approved since the Accords were signed (TOI Staff, 2020). Although Canada welcomed the Abraham Accords (Global Affairs Canada, 2020a), the government's response to the overall Trump plan was more qualified. In a statement by Foreign Minister Champagne issued on the day the Trump plan was released, Canada “recognized the urgent need to renew efforts towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, and committed, “to carefully examine the details of the United States initiative for the Middle East peace process” (Global Affairs Canada, 2020b). Recalling key elements of longstanding Canadian policy, the statement:

1. Reaffirmed Canada's commitment to “achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East” including the “creation of a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and ensuring Israel's security within its own borders”.

2. Maintained that “peace can only be achieved through direct negotiations between the parties” and urged those parties to “create the conditions for such negotiations to take place”.

3. Reaffirmed Canada's “readiness to support meaningful dialogue between the parties toward a negotiated and viable two-state solution”.

Minister Champagne's statement effectively outlined the criteria against which Canada would judge the Trump plan. In this context, it is difficult to imagine a positive evaluation. On the first point, the Trump plan is neither comprehensive nor just and there is no “side by side” Palestinian state. In the West Bank, the Palestinian state would be a collection of what some commentators have referred to as “Bantustans” connected by roads, tunnels and bridges around Israel settlements (Liel, 2020). On the second point, one columnist notes the Trump plan “dismantles 60 years of bipartisan support for a negotiated process between Israeli and Palestinians, in which both make concessions and land swaps that would define the lines of a new map” (Sanger, 2020). There have been no negotiations between the parties for over six years and the Trump administration has made no effort to resume direct negotiations based on the Madrid framework. On the third point, the Trump administration has done nothing to support meaningful dialogue between the parties. If anything, the United States has poisoned the atmosphere for such dialogue by moving its embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, and reassessing the illegality of settlements. As International Crisis Group President Robert Malley remarked, “ … the message to the Palestinians, boiled down to its essence is ‘You’ve lost, get over it’” (Holland, Williams, & Mohammed, 2020).

What can Canada do? Following an open letter, (Larson, 2020) from three former cabinet ministers and over 50 former diplomats (including this author), Prime Minister Trudeau stated “Canada has deep concerns and disagreement” with the Israel's annexation plans and reaffirmed Canada's commitment to a two-state solution (Global News, 2020). Though Trudeau's statement came comparatively late and was considered less forceful than some other international reactions (Star Editorial Board, 2020, June 6), Canada has not followed Trump's unilateral moves on the status of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights or legality of settlements. Nor would Canada be obliged to accept any of the measures proposed in the Trump plan.

Going forward, Canada could work with partners in Europe and, potentially, a new United States administration to revitalize the peace process framework. We can continue to use our development cooperation and other programs to strengthen Palestinian institutions and promote self-sustaining economic growth. The Canadian government has long supported “Track II” research on issues related to the peace process. The Jerusalem element of Ehud Olmert's 2008 offer to Abbas built on the ground-breaking research of the Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI), which was partially funded by Global Affairs Canada. The government also supported an initiative related to the development of President George W. Bush's “Roadmap to Peace” (M. Molloy, personal communication, March 15, 2020) as well as extensive research on the Palestinian refugee issue (El-Rifai, 2019). If Canada and the international community genuinely want a democratic Palestinian state, there is a pressing need for creative thinking on Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. Other timely Track II topics could include more broadly-based approaches to managing the overall peace process and alternatives to the two-state solution.

Conclusion

While the efforts of Presidents Carter, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43, and Obama met with varying degrees of success, they were all based on one common objective – securing a just, comprehensive, and durable Middle East peace based on United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. This objective, particularly the notion of land for peace, was the foundation of the Framework for Middle East Peace and the Madrid/Oslo process. As this commentary has argued, the Trump plan abandons these basic principles, seriously undermining the prospects for a sustainable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Has President Trump killed the Middle East Peace Process? At the time of writing (two weeks before the United States election), the answer has to be “It depends”. Former Vice-President Joe Biden is well ahead of Trump in the polls, some of which predict the Democrats winning control of the White House, Senate and House of Representatives. Biden has referred to the Trump plan as “a political stunt that could spark unilateral moves to annex territory and set back peace even more” (Kampeas, 2020). He opposed Israel's plans to annex areas of the West Bank and further expansion of settlements. While pledging to leave the American embassy in Jerusalem, Biden called the 2018 move “short-sighted and frivolous” and is committed to re-opening the United States Consulate in East Jerusalem (Barrow, 2020). In a statement on the Abraham Accords, he and his running mate Senator Kamala Harris welcomed the normalization of relations between Israel, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates and committed to “work to leverage these growing ties into progress towards a two-state solution and a more stable, peaceful region” (Biden-Harris campaign, 2020). A Biden administration might also be expected to take a less confrontational approach towards Iran, including rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on nuclear non-proliferation, which was concluded in 2015 while Biden was Vice President. The Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran in 2018. On balance, a Biden victory in the November 3 election would seem to portend a return to a more traditional approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including greater engagement with the Palestinians. For the Trudeau government, such an approach would probably be a better fit.

If President Trump is re-elected all bets are off. The Trump plan, including annexation in the West Bank and efforts to cajole more Arab and Muslim states into the Abraham Accords, would likely be renewed with vigour. As this commentary has outlined, the peace process was in trouble well before Trump entered the White House. What he and Netanyahu are doing, however, is reinventing the process to the point that its fundamental elements become unrecognizable. In a letter published in The Guardian, fifty former European Union prime ministers, foreign ministers and senior officials stated, “Peace to Prosperity is not a roadmap to a viable two-state solution, nor to any other legitimate solution to the conflict” (Holland et al., 2020). If Trump is returned to the White House, a stronger response to the “Deal of the Century” will be required. Canada will face a much more challenging policy path going forward and may need to work with other, more like-minded partners to build a legitimate peace.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Viveash

David Viveash was a member of the Canadian Refugee Working Group (RWG) team, headed Canadian delegations to the Environment, Regional Economic Development and Water Resources Working Groups, and participated in a number of Multilateral Steering Group meetings. He served abroad as Head of the Political Section at the Canadian Embassy in Israel (1995–1998), Ambassador to Libya (2003–2006) and Canadian Representative to the Palestinian Authority (2006–2008). Following retirement from the Canadian government, he participated in the Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI) and was Director of The Carter Center Field Office for Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory (2011–2013).