Understanding Russia's security priorities in the Arctic: why Canada-Russia cooperation is still possible

ABSTRACT

Heightened tensions in Russia-West relations have signaled that the Arctic is no longer exempt from the tumult of geopolitics; however, an unrestrained militarization of the Arctic in response to the perception of a hostile Russia may be a hasty move. For the Arctic to remain a zone of cooperation, this will require a proper understanding of Russia's general foreign policy interests, how the Arctic fits into these goals, and the recognition that Russia is a major Arctic power and can therefore be expected to pursue its interests there. This paper presents a brief empirical overview of Russia's power interests as they relate to the Arctic, and tackles some of the assumptions about Russia that obstruct its consideration as a cooperative Arctic partner, notably the current narrative of Russia as willful disruptor of the global order. This paper attempts to clarify just what Russia's interests are and how these might relate to its defence and security initiatives in the Arctic. Cooperation between Canada and Russia in the Arctic will require a better appreciation of just what Russia's interests in the Arctic actually are, rather than presuming motives that imperil cooperation and risk raising the stakes of doing business in the region.

RÉSUMÉ

Les tensions accrues dans les relations Russie–Ouest ont signalé que l'Arctique n'est plus exempt des tumultes de la géopolitique ; cependant, une militarisation effrénée de l'Arctique, en réponse à la perception d'une Russie hostile peut être un geste précipité. Pour que l'Arctique demeure une zone de coopération, il faudra bien comprendre les intérêts généraux de la politique étrangère russe, comment l'Arctique s'inscrit dans ces objectifs, et reconnaître que la Russie est une grande puissance arctique et qu'on peut donc s'attendre à ce qu'elle y poursuive ses intérêts. Cet article présente un bref aperçu empirique des intérêts de pouvoir de la Russie concernant l'Arctique, et traite certaines des hypothèses sur la Russie qui font obstacle à ce qu'elle soit reconnue en tant que partenaire arctique coopératif, notamment le récit actuel de la Russie en tant que perturbateur délibéré de l'ordre mondial. Cet article tente de préciser quels sont les intérêts de la Russie et comment ceux–ci pourraient être liés à ses initiatives de défense et de sécurité dans l'Arctique. La coopération entre le Canada et la Russie dans l'Arctique exigera une meilleure appréciation des intérêts réels de la Russie dans l'Arctique, plutôt que de présumer de motifs qui mettent en danger la coopération et risquent d'augmenter les enjeux des affaires dans la région.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• foreign policy
• Arctic
• Canada

Introduction

Heightened tensions in Russia-West relations have signalled that the Arctic is no longer exempt from the tumult of geopolitics; however, an unrestrained militarization of the Arctic in response to the perception of a hostile Russia may be a hasty move. The harsh physical realities of the region, even with the melting ice, render it a challenging environment to secure and defend, and make it difficult to embrace any resource potential and shipping opportunities that present themselves. It is not in any Arctic nation's interests – including Russia's – to elevate hostilities that might prompt the further militarization of the north. Russia is not a trusted broker of Arctic cooperation at present because of its activities elsewhere, but even though Russia's neighbours view it apprehensively, Russia's priorities in the Arctic have not meaningfully changed. If there is any hope for the Arctic to remain a zone of cooperation, it lies within a proper understanding of Russia's general foreign policy interests, how the Arctic fits into these goals, and acceptance of the idea that Russia is a major Arctic power and can therefore be expected to pursue its interests there. The stakes are high for Canada in the north: the region is vulnerable to both conflict and missed opportunities if Russian interests there are mischaracterized or its intentions delegitimized.

This paper presents a brief empirical overview of Russia's power interests as they relate to the Arctic, and tackles some of the assumptions about Russia that obstruct its consideration as a cooperative Arctic partner, notably the current narrative of Russia as wilful disruptor of the global order. So much of the suspicion about Russia's intentions in the Arctic comes from similar assumptions about Russian disruption of the geopolitical order. This paper attempts to clarify just what Russia's interests are and how these might relate to its defence and security initiatives in the Arctic. The paper concludes by identifying parallels between Russia's Arctic interests and those of its neighbours, notably Canada. Russia is a major power looking to protect its sovereign and economic interests, many of which are more easily achievable through cooperation than they are through competition; therefore, cooperation with Russia in the Arctic is more likely to yield results for all involved. This is a critical moment for Arctic nations, Canada in particular, to decide how to interpret Russia's interests and actions (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018). This paper asserts that, rather than presuming that conflict with Russia in other areas will spill over into the Arctic, perhaps it is possible that cooperation in the north could lay the foundation for engagement elsewhere.

How Russian foreign policy interests animate its Arctic posture

Russia's great power aspirations

Russia's national identity as a great power on the world stage is influential in shaping Russian foreign policy priorities (Clunan, 2009; Light, 1996), even though some in the West believe its power to be in decline. Putin's aspirational reconstruction of Russian power animates foreign policy thinking and agenda setting (Clunan, 2009). Among the many factors that influence this great power aspiration is the West's perception of Russian power and greatness, a perception that is less robust than Russia's own self-image of greatness demands. When it comes to the Arctic, this is visible in Russia's symbolic use of the north as an aspect of its identity and regional power projection. Clunan notes that, “when elites aspire to maintain or regain a country's past greatness, it is likely to produce national interests with a stake in challenging other countries for international status” (2009, p. 2).

Russia views its security interests vis-à-vis the West as a consequence of how it is treated by them, which is similar to the idea of mirror-imaging (Clunan, 2009), in which states see themselves as a reflection of how they are seen by other states (Wendt, 1999). NATO's actions, in part, have nurtured Russia's evolution into an adversary of the West because the West's perception and treatment of Russia have been self-fulfilling (Mearsheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2015). While Clunan argues that Russia does not see itself as exclusively a rival to NATO (after all, its anti-NATO position developed over time), it is evident that Russia's self-image remains one of great power, but over time has increasingly come to see its own weakness reflected in the Western perception of Russian decline. Consequently, Russia came to view NATO's expansion as a denial of Russian power. As such, NATO's increased engagement in the Arctic is of major concern to Russia, as it challenges a key foreign policy objective, and a central feature of its identity.

Some scholars and practitioners have downplayed the continued relevance of Russian objections to NATO expansion, claiming that the conversation about NATO expansion is over, and that this must not be used in perpetuity to rationalize Russia's ongoing aggression toward the west. Problematically, this approach fails to attribute any responsibility for heightened Russia-West tensions to western governments, and fails to capture an honest version of events, which then inhibits the learning of lessons, and risks further enflaming Russian mistrust and resentment. As Tsygankov notes, “the failure to resolve old issues and the emergence of new ones served to accumulate tensions in Russia-West relations and to make each new crisis more risky and dangerous than the previous one” (2018, p. 107). Importantly, the post-Cold War world order was crafted to the exclusion of Russia despite its important role in ending the Cold War. Russia does not see itself as a defeated power, but this view of Russia is reflected in Russia's treatment by the West and this has stoked tensions ever since. It is essential to acknowledge that there really is no “realistic alternative to engaging Russia in a joint effort to stabilize” the global order (Tsygankov, 2019, p. 19). Nonetheless, this has not occurred and an enduring resentment continues to affect Russian foreign policy calculations.

There are essentially three components of Russia's great power identity: global power, regional power, and European power (Renz & Smith, 2016; Roberts, 2019). Russia perceives that it is disregarded by the West as a global power,¹ denied its rightful ambition as a regional power (in its own borderlands), and has been consistently and deliberately excluded from Europe (as NATO expanded eastward). However, Russian leaders continue to pursue policies consistent with this aspirational great power identity as a matter of state survival (Renz & Smith, 2016, p. 20). For Putin, this is not something to be compromised, and will therefore be aggressively pursued.

For decades now, Russian leaders have viewed NATO's dominance of the European security architecture, and its encroachment toward Russia's borders, as a challenge to Russia's interests (TASS 2019). As a consequence, NATO personifies the Western denial of Russian power, and its emboldened presence in the Arctic in recent years is seen as an affront to Russian sovereignty. The Arctic region presents a specific set of interests for Russia, but it also plays a role in Russia's wider pursuit of global power status. Russia's push for great power influence will likely not abate, and how the Arctic fits into this narrative must be understood. At present, Russia maintains the largest military presence in the Arctic and is indisputably the major player in the region. This status enables its pursuit of security and economic interests there, and its Arctic activities have some bearing upon its global power projection capabilities. This does not mean that Russia is looking to flex its muscles in the Arctic per se; however, because Russia seeks great power acknowledgment, and because it perceives that its interests have been denied and delegitimized by NATO, it may perceive NATO member actions or rhetoric in the Arctic as a provocation. This makes cooperation all the more essential to ensure that the Arctic does not become a geopolitical battleground, but instead remains a zone of peace.

Russia's Arctic interests

Russia's interest in the Arctic was reignited in the mid-2000s, symbolized by its infamous flag planting at the North Pole, which raised eyebrows among Arctic neighbours, but is probably better described as an opportunistic stunt (Roberts, 2010). The reality is that Russia has demonstrated an openness to institution building in the Arctic and to working within international legal parameters to resolve territorial disputes through collaboration. To this end, it is a member of the Arctic Council, and adheres to both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and by extension, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSC).

A framework of institutional governance represents the status quo in the region, and in many ways this benefits Russia. There is little real evidence to forewarn of Russian disruption in the Arctic, apart from those who rush to connect its activities elsewhere to its priorities in the North, or assume that its Arctic military spending is inherently more offensive than defensive. In light of recent events, this can be a compelling argument, and is certainly a sensational and timely one; however, it fails to appreciate Russia's interests in the region and may generate unintended consequences if Arctic nations decry the need to defend the Arctic from an encroaching, menacing Russia. But, as Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer wisely cautioned in 2016, the “Russians aren't coming,” and a careful consideration of Russian words and deeds in the region is appropriate.

In fairness, dissonant views about Russia's Arctic intentions exist, in part, because Russia's approach to the region appears contradictory at times. For some, it can be seen through both realist and neoliberal lenses (Devyatkin, 2018a). The former sees the Arctic as an element of Russia's great power aspirations and presents an opportunity to revise the current perception of Russia's relative weakness on the world stage. This view uses the prism of geopolitics to attribute Russian interests to nationalism and expansionism and therefore expects unilateralism and aggression from Russia, focusing almost exclusively on its military activities in the region (Devyatkin, 2018a). On its military presence there, it is worth noting that Russia's presence there is more defensive in nature, consisting largely (though not exclusively) of ice breakers designed to address concerns of a looming environmental disaster as the world races to the Arctic (English & Gardner, 2020). Russia also pursues economic development in the region, and, because this is challenging in a heavily militarized environment, cooperation through institutional governance – the status quo – is the necessary path (Devyatkin, 2018a). In a sense, both interpretations are visible. Russia's security, energy, and shipping interests are complicated and “more nuanced than just an orientation towards conflict or cooperation” (Devyatkin 2018, p. 40). There exists a duality of these elements in Russia's Arctic policies (Devyatkin 2018, p. 40), but “resource nationalism does not necessarily increase the chance of military confrontation” even though it may heighten political tensions (Devyatkin, 2018a, p. 5).

Jorgen Staun also sees liberal institutionalism in Russia's Arctic approach (2015, p. 27). He believes that Putin takes this approach in the region, despite generally seeing the world through a realist lens. Putin understands the benefit of using diplomacy to buttress Russia's great power restoration, an aspiration that is broadly valued across the foreign policy community (Staun, 2015, p. 27). Nonetheless, contradictions exist: Russian leaders also speak of Arctic policy in geopolitical and nationalist terms, but Staun sees this as a “realistic balancing of which foreign policy tools best secure the Russian interests in which situations” (2015, p. 28). This approach sounds a lot like smart power (Nye, 2011), and is not unlike the toolkit available to Western leaders as they navigate the complexities of Arctic governance in the pursuit of national interests. Russia seeks both cooperation with foreign partners in the region as well as the defence of its legitimate economic interests there and does not view these goals as inherently contradictory (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2014).

Russia's own policy documents do appear to contain discordant tonal priorities, and for years Russia has been criticized for conflicting strategies in the region; however, there has been an effort more recently to harmonize Arctic policymaking within Russia (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2019). Its Basics of State Policy of Russian Federation in the Arctic 2000 mandates Arctic activities be “tied to the interests of ‘defense and security to the maximum degree,’” but its 2008 Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Until 2020 and Beyond, and its recently updated 2020 edition, The Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035, see the Arctic as both a zone of peaceful cooperation with others and as central to ensuring Russia's economic growth (Devyatkin, 2018b, p. 5; Klimenko, 2020). The 2020 edition importantly emphasizes the Northern Sea Route as central to the realization of Russia's regional interests, notably the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 2013 Strategy of the Russian Arctic and the Provision of National Security for the Period Until 2020 prioritized an integrated security system to protect sovereignty interests in the North, including naval, air and army presence. Its 2016 Foreign Policy Concept expresses a desire to consolidate Russian influence, in the Arctic and beyond. This validates the linking of the Arctic to Russia's great power aspirations; however, it is important to observe that the Russian word, bezopasnost, means both security and safety (Devyatkin, 2018b, pp. 4–5). Russian security in the Arctic involves both a responsibility to defend the Russian state, and also to keep Russians safe from all threats – these could be military but also “non-traditional dangers such as environmental damage” (Devyatkin, 2018b, p. 3). Russia's economic and environmental priorities are rooted in the development and defence of the Northern Sea Route (Sergunin & Gjørv, 2020). The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation recognizes the Arctic as a region that its Armed Forces must protect, which has been operationalized in its resumption of regional bomber flights and Northern Fleet patrols (Devyatkin, 2018b, p. 4). Russia has also invested in missile systems, its defensive air shield, more Arctic bases, and intensified its Arctic military drills (to respond to NATO's presence there), all of which reflect a desire to maintain its defensive capabilities in the region (Devyatkin, 2018b, pp. 4–5; Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 398). In 2020 Putin announced the appointment of former President Dmitry Medvedev to head the interagency commission of the Russian Security Council on Russia's Arctic interests (TASS 2020), which conveys the importance of the Arctic in Russia's defence and security calculus.

These activities have prompted warnings of Arctic militarization. Pavel Baev foreshadows Russia's use of its Arctic Council chairmanship (2021–2022) to reinforce its identity as a great Arctic power. Baev fears this will drive away investment² and force other Arctic nations to fortify their defenses in turn, further reinforcing the deserved mistrust (2019). Russia has modernized Arctic military bases, ostensibly to monitor shipping through its northern seas (but which may be a response to the US Navy's plans to send combat ships to the high seas to ensure freedom of navigation – a move that also concerns Canada). It conducted Northern Fleet exercises off the coast of Norway in 2019 (largely in response to NATO's 2018 Trident Juncture exercises), commissioned the icebreaker Ilya Muromets to support the freedom of movement of its ships throughout the region, commissioned new nuclear submarines, including a nuclear powered, unmanned vehicle (Poseidon) that can be carried by submarine, and introduced a hypersonic Tsirkon anti-ship missile which can be launched from a nuclear submarine. These activities drive fears of Russian Arctic militarization (Baev, 2019).

Laruelle confirms the economic drivers of Russia's long-standing interests in the region, with secondary nationalist goals of state revival and international recognition (2014), all of which have intensified as Russia grapples with its reputation as a global pariah. The economy is what motivates Russia's interest in the region because it holds the keys to Russia's future as an energy power (Laruelle, 2014, pp. 254–258).

There is a fear that Russia is falling behind rising powers such as China and India when it comes to resource development and the acquisition of new technologies, which could impede its ability to maximize Arctic resources and delay its return to great power status (Laruelle, 2014, p. 258). Russia prioritizes security interests in the Arctic because it is an “outpost of Russia's reassertion as a great power,” and its openness to foreign investment and expertise is essential to its economic security. This creates problems for Russia because, on the one hand “presenting the Arctic as a scene of a new race among great powers” allows Russia to portray itself as a fortress besieged by NATO's advance (Laruelle, 2014, p. 263); however, this risks confirming the popular view among Arctic NATO members that Russia sees the region as just another geopolitical battleground. This may come at a cost to Russia's efforts to cooperate with its neighbours on resource development. Another view is that China's elevated interest in the Arctic has fuelled a reimagining of the region, which presents economic and security opportunities for Russia (Godzimirski & Sergunin, 2020, p. 23). It may be worth considering that the spectre of an Arctic battleground may be a way to legitimize the region's importance – an approach not unlike Canadian Defence Minister Bill Graham's 2005 trip to Hans Island to assert Canadian sovereignty. Russia may not be so different from its neighbours when it comes to defence posturing in the Arctic.

Russia has demonstrated an enthusiasm for institutional cooperation in the Arctic, visible in Putin's 2018 prioritization of both economic acceleration and missile deployment. Russia seeks military strength as a mechanism to advance its security and defence interests in the Arctic, but also recognizes that cooperation may allow the Arctic to be an exception to the confrontational relations Russia has with the West (Baev, 2018a, p. 409). This dual approach is key to Russia's four main priorities in the region: nuclear/strategic (projecting its intercontinental missile capability via the Kola Peninsula); geopolitical (defending Russian sovereignty and preserving the strategic balance in the face of encroachment by China and the US); economic/energy (building partnerships to developing Siberian oil and gas reserves and beyond); and, symbolic (reinforcing the Arctic as a pillar of Russia's northern identity and regional power position) (Baev, 2018a, pp. 410–411).

There is some doubt that both are possible at present because, when Russia behaves aggressively elsewhere, crippling sanctions that limit its ability to pursue resource development are less likely to be lifted (Baev, 2018a). Admittedly, Russia does little to foster the environment of trust it desperately needs in order to rebuild financial relationships and attract foreign capital for development projects. Nonetheless, Russia is an important power in the Arctic region and should be expected to pursue its interests there.

As the US revives its talk of missile defence, Russia's activities in the Arctic reflect this (Baev, 2018a, p. 412). Some attribute this to revisionist tendencies, but perhaps a better characterization is that Russia seeks parity and preservation. The Russian Arctic is surrounded by NATO members and the melting ice opens up vulnerabilities for Russia, which explains both its measures to project power in the region and also its support for the Law of the Sea regime (Staun, 2015). The duality of Russia's approach ensures that it will be ready in case international law – notably the final decision from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSC) – does not go in its favour (Staun, 2015, p. 30).

Russia needs resources to be a great power, and if it cannot access resources (due to sanctions), then it cannot assert power. For some, this is the key to keeping Russian power at bay; however, a less secure Russia may be even more dangerous to the West. The symbolism of Arctic power matters to Russia and raises concern that if Russia becomes disappointed with unprofitable cooperative institutionalism it has practiced there, the impulse to rely on military power may overpower other approaches (Baev, 2018a, p. 419).

Konyshev and Sergunin (2014) downplay Russia's military developments in the region, claiming that its goal is sovereignty and the promotion of Russia's power status. This is best achieved not by challenging NATO in the Arctic, but by using the region as a theatre to demonstrate its world class military capabilities all the while defending Russian sovereignty. The Kola Peninsula hosts two-thirds of Russia's sea-based nuclear forces and is therefore an important piece of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent and guarantor of its power status (2014, p. 324). Russia's militarization in defence of Arctic sovereignty is not drastically unlike Canada's establishment of a military training centre in Resolute Bay (near the Northwest Passage) as a strategically important location. Russia views its military power projection in the Arctic not as coercive, or designed to provoke an arms race, but as a way to assert sovereignty over its EEZ, some of which is admittedly symbolic. Russian policy documents explain that military capability is needed for the prevention of illegal migration, overfishing, and smuggling, and to protect against terrorist attacks, and it is essential for SAR, and ensuring the safety of navigation in a challenging environment (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 171). Unfortunately, this effort at transparency is often interpreted as muscle flexing by other Arctic nations. To be fair it is sometimes difficult to ascertain just what Russia's objectives in the Arctic are, because “there is no single document where Russia's threat perceptions in the Arctic are coherently described” (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 172). The appointment of Medvedev to oversee Arctic matters in the Security Council does convey a renewed prioritization of the region, and may be an important step toward renewing cooperation there, given Medvedev's positive track record with Western leaders.

Misconceptions about Russia's foreign policy priorities and the liberal order

Talk of a new Cold War and Russia's revisionist plans for the international order are prevalent among Western scholars and in the popular media. Russia is often viewed as a casual disruptor, biding its time “until the groundwork has been laid for a rival hegemonic order” (Drezner, 2019, p. 19). The implication is that Russia may not be a significant threat to world order yet, but caution is needed. This view reflects Russia-West relations in general, but when it comes to the Arctic, this view may be mischaracterized. Debates about the demise of the international order abound, in part because of the sense that revisionist powers such as Russia and China are actively working to undermine it. Therefore, it is worth revisiting the assumptions about Russia's intentions in this regard. Another view is that Russia benefits from the global order in a number of ways, and reports of its intention to destroy and replace it may be overestimated. And since much of the basis for assumptions about Russian disruption in the Arctic derive from similar assumptions about Russian revisionism on a global scale, how Russia sees the global order bears revisiting.

It is true that Russia is critical of the liberal order, calling out the hypocrisy of Western nations that enables American hegemony, and defends its place atop the global order even as it presumes to set and apply the terms of international law selectively. Notwithstanding these criticisms, Russia still benefits from the existing order, and may have an interest in preserving it. This has relevance for Arctic relations because so often Russian actions are seen in light of assumptions about its disruptive intentions and therefore its inherent disregard for law, process, and institutional governance. This is an inaccurate characterization of Russia's intentions and needs to be understood.

Clunan (2018) presents the liberal order as comprised of three systems, two of which Russia has resisted, with the third beneficial to Russia. These three facets of liberal order began with an institutions-based “charter liberalism,” and evolved into an all-encompassing set of assumptions about what she calls “liberal humanism and economic neoliberalism,” which have transformed the liberal order since the 1990s (2018, p. 46). It is no coincidence that changes to the liberal order coincided with Russia's turbulent democratization process at which time it was in no position – politically or economically – to offer a coherent alternative. The liberal order presumes the international community's authority to set legal, moral, and institutional standards for democracy and human rights, and to demand these be prioritized above national sovereignty (Clunan, 2018, p. 47). This coincides with the expectation that neoliberal economic principles of privatization, liberalization and deregulation guide macroeconomic policy, and set the terms of trade across the global economic order. It is this liberal order that Russia rejects, in part because of the perception that it is this form of neoliberalism that propped up wobbly transitions to democracy in central and eastern Europe (through failed shock therapy reforms) and insisted upon a one-size-fits-all approach to state-led economic reform that did not work for Russia. Russia rejected the western model, and turned away from foreign expectations of liberal democracy in the western image (Cohen, 2001; Lynch, 2002). Its resistance to certain elements of this liberal order served to reanimate Atlanticism, which has deliberately excluded Russia from European political, economic, and security arrangements.

Nonetheless, Russia has continued to embrace charter liberalism, which in its view serves as “a great power management system” (Clunan, 2018) in which Russia enjoys a prominent position in the UNSC as a legacy of its past. Charter liberalism contains a vibrant treaty system premised upon state sovereignty and multilateralism, which limits the scope of American hegemony, and provides Russia its due status. This is the framework of the Law of the Sea, and Russia benefits from this infrastructure as it navigates the Arctic, sometimes at a disadvantage for the economic and diplomatic reasons discussed above.

Russia is quick to identify the contradictions it sees contained within the current order: sovereignty vs. intervention; pluralism vs. universality; and US hegemony vs. equality and democracy (Romanova, 2018). Russia's exclusion from this order has animated its foreign policy for decades (Romanova, 2018, p. 84). Consequently, Russia reasserts its power on the world stage and demands the respect and deference befitting a great power, arguing that the West exploits the presumption of liberal values that dominates global transactions. Ultimately, Russia's motivations are better described as neorevisionist because it wants to improve, rather than reject, the existing order, and with these improvements, Russia may become one of its staunch defenders (Romanova, 2018, p. 76). In the Arctic, status quo institutionalism and multilateralism provide Russia the mechanisms required to cooperatively pursue its interests. Russia is unlikely to walk away from this arrangement as long as its needs are met. It is likely that if Russian interests are acknowledged there is room for engagement with the West (Romanova, 2018, p. 88).

How Russia's Arctic neighbours interpret and react to Russia's interests and actions is a consequential decision. Arctic nations increasingly view Russia as a threat; however, this view of Russia is not fixed. After all, for years the Arctic was defined by cooperation but recently the region has come to be seen by some as a cold front in the “new Cold War” (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 382). This “new Cold War” caution is largely a consequence of tensions elsewhere but has spilled over into anywhere in which Russian and Western interests overlap (Smith, 2018, p. 590). And if this new Cold War narrative can be constructed it can also be deconstructed. The popular logic among those who portray Russia as the aggressor in the Arctic is to assign blame exclusively to Russia for the state of relations. The presumption is that NATO's Arctic nations would cooperate with Russia but Russia's leaders are simply incapable or untrustworthy. Therefore, when Russia asserts its interests in the region, the default response tends to be self-confirming, claiming Russia is “reverting to its ‘true self’” (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 383).

Russia's great power identity translates the actions of other states into how these impact Russia and its status. When Russian interests are delegitimized, its power status is threatened. When Norway supported NATO exercises in the Arctic it was perceived as a move against Russia. Due to the perception of rising Russian aggressiveness, the decision was made to further heighten the Alliance's Arctic presence (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 384). The decision not to incorporate security as a piece of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council sent a silent message to Russia about western unwillingness to cooperate on security matters with Russia (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 384). There is a parallel here to the West's unwillingness to meaningfully include Russia in post-Cold War European security arrangements. NATO expanded, but engaged Russia only peripherally. Russia has long been treated with suspicion, its interests delegitimized, and its potential contribution to security cooperation resisted. This has shaped Russia's response to the West, which has in turn confirmed NATO's initial impulse to hedge bets against a resurgent Russia. Unfortunately, this confirmation bias continues to obstruct Russia-West relations and threatens to affect the Arctic as well.

Misperception and missed opportunities for Canada-Russia Arctic cooperation

After Crimea, Russia was labelled a dishonest broker and an unreliable institutional partner, including in the Arctic (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 391), despite its involvement in the region's robust institutional framework. Russia's cooperation was quickly undermined by its actions elsewhere which were seen to challenge the international order, its leaders perceived as favouring military force as a tool of statecraft, and wilfully disrespecting diplomacy and sovereignty (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 392). This seems to be the prevailing narrative in Russia-West relations, and there is a serious risk that Arctic relations may succumb to it. If the Arctic can be re-envisioned as a region of cooperation it is going to require the wilful commitment of all Arctic nations (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p. 400), including Canada.

This will not be easy. The 2017 Canadian Defence Policy document, Strong, Secure, Engaged, observes Russia's force projection capabilities in the Arctic, and down into the North Atlantic, which is potentially a challenge for NATO. Canada's military buildup in the Arctic began under Prime Minister Stephen Harper and well before the 2007 Russian flag planting incident. Harper's 2005 call to arms for Canadian Arctic defence contained a host of militarization initiatives, which were reviewed by Justin Trudeau's government, and which resulted in

upgrading the air attack warning systems, monitoring the air and surface situation in cooperation with the United States, Denmark and Norway, upgrading the radar network of the North American Air and Space Defence (NORAD), and extending the zone of responsibility for the air defence systems of the country. (Zagorski, 2018, p. 69)

In Arctic NATO countries there seems to be a reluctance for military restraint in light of Russia's activities (Zagorski, 2018, p. 76).

Such actions and rhetoric may have succeeded in politicizing Arctic sovereignty (which has domestic political advantages) but it also heightened Russian concerns about Canada's intentions in the region, symbolized by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan's 2019 warning that Canada takes the Arctic seriously and intends to send a strong message about its preparedness to defend its security there (Lovetski, 2019). At issue are overlapping Russian and Canadian scientific claims to the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for extensions of their continental shelves between the Arctic Ocean's Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges. Canadian officials have expressed concern about Russian militarization in the Arctic, in part owing to the perception of Russian aggression elsewhere. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Canada's reproach was swift, characterized by strong sanctions, which has escalated tensions between them.

Like Canada, Russia recognizes its vulnerability to melting ice and increased navigation in the Arctic and seeks to defend its interests as needed. Russia's view of the Arctic as central to its strategic energy dominance and regional power status was confirmed in its 2014 military doctrine, its 2020 Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond, and recently reflected in its 2020 military exercises in the Russian Archipelago, the testing of new equipment by Russian Arctic paratroopers, and the modernization of its northern fleet. Russia also shares with Canada concerns about environmental and climate security, protecting northern communities from the impact of increased traffic through the Arctic, and a desire to strengthen SAR. In pursuit of these, Russia has prioritized military operations that strengthen SAR capacity, monitor maritime and air traffic, regulate navigation, and facilitate Arctic research (Regehr, 2017, p. 3).

These initiatives line up with Canada's Arctic priorities. In fact, there are a host of issues about which Russia and Canada remain “only a pole apart” (Phillips cited in Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019, p. 101). The two countries have faced similar challenges relating to Northern development, the effects of climate change, freedom of navigation, law of the sea, and, as the world comes to the Arctic (notably China and the US), raising the spectre of great power competition there, Russia and Canada have a stake in regional stability. Even though both countries have different ideas about how to exercise sovereignty in the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, they share important values in common that inform how this sovereignty is understood and exercised: both seek “the preservation of the marine environment, the safeguarding of Indigenous rights, the safety of navigation, national security, and the promotion of economic development for local populations” (Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019, p. 95). Canada and Russia also agree on the importance of domestic legislation in the control of navigation within their respective Arctic Archipelagos (Gudev, 2019, p. 52). Lalonde and Lackenbauer argue that there are considerable opportunities for Canada and Russia to become allies when it comes to advancing legal arguments for maritime sovereignty, their joint commitment to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) process and their 2018 adoption of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019, p. 96). Russia was actually the first country to make a submission to the CLCS and is now working closely with Canada (and Denmark) to address their overlapping claims (Laruelle, 2020). Both countries have an interest in keeping alive the spirit of the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration and the ongoing work of the Arctic Council.

Unfortunately, the potential opportunities for Canada-Russia cooperation in the Arctic remain outside the public consciousness: instead, a different message seems to take hold that warns, “the Russians are coming!” (Lajeunesse & Lackenbauer, 2016) and fails to appreciate the nuance in Russian foreign policy or its interests in the Arctic, and fails to consider that Russia, as an Arctic power, and a regional power more broadly, has interests that it intends to defend (Roberts, 2021). In fact, Russia can be considered a status quo power in the region, given its resistance to the entry of new nations into Arctic bodies (Laruelle, 2020, p. 6), an approach that is in step with Canada's own resistance to EU membership in the Arctic Council.

Some take the view that to engage with Russia in the Arctic risks legitimizing its bad behaviour elsewhere and this view renders it impossible to think creatively about cooperating with Russia in the Arctic (Roberts, 2021). It is important to remember that Russian foreign policy in general tends to be somewhat reactionary, and is often shaped by Russia's interaction with others (Blakkisrud, 2018). Russia's perception of threat in the Arctic is subject to change, and is influenced by the actions of other powers.

The reality is that Canada and Russia have cause to cooperate on shipping routes, navigational systems, and telecommunications systems in the region but due to the frosty relationship between them at present, this is difficult (Valenti, 2018, p. 49). Canada may be getting in its own way here. Many of the challenges the Arctic presents “involve the securitization of Canada's share of the region's resources and protecting its land and waters; however, none of this can be done in isolation” (Roberts, 2021). For Canada, the perpetuation of the enemy image of Russia prevents needed progress, and could reinforce Russian insecurities, which may in turn unnecessarily perpetuate militarization, competition and rivalry and preclude the kind of cooperation the region has previously enjoyed.

This enemy image is a central narrative currently at play in the Arctic. The stories nations tell themselves and believe about other Arctic powers serve both internal and external interests. Russia's aspiration of greatness tends to be overemphasized by its neighbours: “the Western media tend to over-interpret the official Russian statements,” without an informed understanding of Russian policy in the Arctic (Gritsenko & Tynkkynen, 2018, p. 192). Russian narratives about the Arctic go beyond its utility as theatre for the expression of Russian greatness, but also contain aspirations for domestic audiences about the economic potential of regional energy resources, and of the benefits of regional cooperation to develop them peacefully (Gritsenko & Tynkkynen, 2018). This is often ignored by Western audiences in favour of the Russia-as-threatening-Arctic-power narrative, which serves a domestic Canadian purpose for political leaders who benefit from tough talk about Arctic sovereignty. This feeds Canadian identity-building projects and justifies costly defence activities the region.

Misunderstanding Russia's interests may achieve less than cooperation might. It seems this message was received: a 2019 parliamentary report refreshingly observes the importance of the status quo in the Arctic, noting the similarities between Russian and Canadian interests there (Government of Canada, 2019). The Government of Canada appears to recognize that Russia has, by and large, been cooperative in the Arctic; however, there is also a tendency to link its actions in other places to the Arctic. A senior Arctic official at Global Affairs Canada explained, “Canada sees no immediate military threat in the Arctic, but we remain vigilant and are working with our allies and partners to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation, a goal we share with Russia” (Lovetski, 2019). This is encouraging because the stakes in the Arctic are too high not to work with Russia, or to let the “new Cold War” rhetoric dominate the conversation.

In fairness, Russia is not immune to new Cold War language, which is also used to political advantage there. The rhetoric of Cold War also raises Russia's profile on the world stage because it elevates Russia as a rival to the US, when in reality it is not the global influencer it once was. The sanctions regime has fuelled this narrative within Russia and is usually blamed on the Obama administration (Rotaru, 2019, p. 6), although former Canadian Global Affairs Minister (and now Deputy Prime Minster) Chrystia Freeland took a similarly hard line on Russia in both her advocacy of the Magnitsky Law,³ as well as in her reluctance to engage Russia in the Arctic (Roberts, 2021). Putin claims to resist unproductive “new Cold War” language, only to have his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, warn that NATO activities are “provoking instability in the post-Soviet space,” conjuring up Cold War tropes (Rotaru, 2019, pp. 8–9). There is an appetite for this at home because it is politically expedient to blame the West for Russia's economic downturn caused by “falling oil prices, economic sanctions, and the weak domestic market;” additionally, Russia's GDP has contracted, its currency devalued, and inflation has increased while real incomes have decreased (Rotaru, 2019, pp. 8–9). As Russian leaders look to justify the expense of Russian activity in Syria, and consequent need for military reform, the “besieged fortress” narrative helps to shift attention from rising food prices to a rallying cry for the restoration of Russian power (Rotaru, 2019, pp. 10–11).

Canadian leaders have their own domestic political motivations for talking tough with Russia, but the reality is that,

for 65 years, Russia has passively supported Canada's position that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters. This reflects simple self-interest. Russia's Arctic sea routes are claimed on a similar basis. To challenge Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage would weaken Russian jurisdiction over the various straits that make up the Northern Sea Route. (Lajeunesse & Lackenbauer, 2016)

Russia respects other Arctic nations’ concerns because it has its own priorities. Unconventional security challenges (oil spills and shipping disasters) and SAR are the greater threat to Canada in the Arctic- not the Russians (Lajeunesse & Lackenbauer, 2016). In fact, Russia has been more supportive of Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage than the US has: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo remarked in 2019 on the illegitimacy of Canada's claim there and the US intention to pursue freedom of navigation in the area. It seems Arctic nations have a choice to make about how to interpret Russia's interests and actions in the Arctic. Will they view them through the lens of “new Cold War,” or will they accept the duality of Russia's goals and see the status quo as a legitimate way forward, rendering the Arctic a unique zone of opportunity and cooperation?

Conclusion: Arctic cooperation is a choice

After the Ukraine crisis, and especially after its interference in Western elections, fear and mistrust of Russia have understandably surged. This climate has fuelled talk of a new Cold War in NATO capitals and in Russia itself, and this language has been extended, by some, to the Arctic (Huebert, 2019). For some, the region can no longer be considered in isolation from the pervasive tensions in Russia-West relations (Boulègue, 2019). Realism holds that rivalry among great powers is a feature of the international system, but to deny the importance of cooperation among them, especially in the Arctic where there is a strong record of engagement, is unwise. Ostracizing and provoking Russia is unproductive (Graham, 2019) and will not bring Canada closer to realizing its Arctic goals.

The Arctic region presents a host of opportunities, and there is much common ground to be rediscovered. This paper has suggested that this is best achieved by better understanding and accepting Russian interests in the region, and critically, revisiting often heard assumptions about Russia as disruptor of the global order and therefore underserving of collaboration in the Arctic. The unpopular reality is that Russia benefits from aspects of the existing order, and possesses interests, both globally and within the Arctic, that drive its actions. The West's denial of Russian interests has for too long put Russia on the defensive and, while not the only driver of Russian behaviour, has not enabled an environment of mutual understanding. The Arctic has been an exception, but the current tone of Russia-West relations jeopardizes the cooperation that has been achieved. Accepting that Russia has interests, chief among them a desire to remain (or become) a great power, doesn't cost much; this is doable. Delegitimizing Russia's interests and pushing them into a defensive posture may do more to renew its determination to flex its muscles.

There are lessons from the past to be mindful of here as well: one of the key lessons from the Cold War was that de-escalation only came from engagement. Demonizing an “evil and expansionist” Soviet Union legitimized an aggressive policy of containment (Roberts, 2017; Legvold, 2016), which only served to elevate tensions. But, “when we began to understand Soviet leaders as interest-based actors it became easier to empathize, to understand their interests, and to find common ground. This was how the Cold War ended” (Roberts, 2019). Russia is open to engagement when its interests are legitimized. Russia enjoys a relative position of strength in the Arctic, and so it makes little sense to adopt measures that would weaken its position there, especially given NATO's growing presence in the region. While there may be elements of revisionism in Russian foreign policy, the arrangement in the Arctic, by and large, works for Russia. Russia has “consistently opted for a generally pragmatic and accommodating diplomatic course combined with a wide-ranging modernization and reinforcement of Russia's military capabilities in the region” (Kristense & Sakstrup, 2016, p. iii). While some see this “dual approach” as cynical (Baev in Tynkkynen 2018b, p. 114), it is not unlike the actions of other powers, which themselves express dual, and at times contradictory interests, and yet expect consistency from Russia. In a way, the presence of dual approaches in the Arctic reflects Russia's orientation toward the global order in general and it provides the tools Russia requires to pursue security and economic development, all the while remaining a leader in Arctic governance. Ultimately, Russia benefits from the aspects of the liberal international order that confirm its influence and its national sovereignty. While Russia is no champion of liberal principles, it has echoed its support for treaty obligations and process, especially in the Arctic, a position that renders it, like Canada, a status quo power in the region. Rather than agitating to revise the liberal order, the preference among the Russian leadership appears to be to adhere to the rules that work for it, and attempt to tweak the ones that don't (not unlike other powers). This is why it is so essential to understand just what Russia's interests in the Arctic actually are, rather than presuming motives that imperil cooperation and risk raising the stakes of doing business in the region. There is more evidence of success in Canada-Russia Arctic relations than in Russia-West relations in general. But instead of raising alarm bells about not doing enough to securitize the Arctic, we should instead consider embracing this success as a model for future engagement.

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Kari Roberts

Kari Roberts is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies at MRU. Her research is primarily concerned with Russian foreign policy toward the West, with a specific emphasis on Russia-US relations and Russia's interests in the Arctic as they relate to Russia's wider foreign policy goals.

Notes

1 In 2014, Barack Obama derided Russia as a “regional power” acting out of weakness; this was likely a deliberate attempt to retaliate against Russia during the Ukraine crisis.

2 Here Baev points to Shell's April 2019 decision to pull out of the Baltic LNG project with Gazprom.

3 The Magnitsky law is also known as the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Bill S-226), which allowed for the imposition of travel bans and sanctions on foreigners presumed guilty of human rights violations or financial crimes (i.e. corruption and money laundering). It was enacted in recognition of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who was wrongfully imprisoned and died in a Russian prison after exposing tax fraud.