Assessing Canada’s foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, 1979–2019

ABSTRACT

Since 1979, Canada has had two distinct foreign policy approaches toward the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding. This article labels those “Pearsonian” and “Harperian”. To understand both approaches, it starts with the Jerusalem Embassy crisis in 1979 and moves on through the Middle East Peace Process, assessing Canada’s policy up to 2019. In response to international fallout from the 1979 Clark Progressive Conservative government pledge to relocate Canada’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, a 1980 Stanfield Report helped orient Canadian regional Middle East policy toward a more Pearsonian approach committed to multilateralism and sensitivity for Arab viewpoints. Successive Canadian governments heeded its advice in an attempt to build peace and regional relationships, while remaining Israel’s close friend. By contrast, starting with the Harper Conservative government in 2006, Canada adopted an approach that clearly favours Israel over and at the expense of the Palestinians. It is a foreign policy approach centred on bilateral relationships with what Canadian political leaders consider countries that are like-minded democracies with shared values. This approach mostly describes Canada’s regional approach from the mid-2000s to 2019.

RÉSUMÉ

Depuis 1979, le Canada a deux approches distinctes de politique étrangère envers les Palestiniens et la consolidation de la paix israélo-palestinienne. Cet article qualifie ces approches de « Pearsonienne » et de « Harperienne ». Pour examiner ces deux approches, il commence par la crise de l'ambassade à Jérusalem en 1979 et se poursuit avec le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient, évaluant la politique canadienne jusqu'à l'année 2019. En riposte aux retombées internationales de la promesse du gouvernement progressiste-conservateur Clark de 1979 de relocaliser l'ambassade du Canada à Jérusalem en 1979, un rapport Stanfield de 1980 a contribué à orienter la politique régionale canadienne au Moyen-Orient vers une approche plus « Pearsonienne » engagée dans le multilatéralisme et sensible aux points de vue arabes. Les gouvernements canadiens successifs ont suivi ses recommandations dans une tentative de construction de la paix et de relations régionales, tout en préservant la proche amitié du Canada avec Israël. En revanche, à partir du gouvernement conservateur Harper en 2006, le Canada a adopté une approche clairement favorable à Israël, par rapport aux Palestiniens et à leurs dépens. Il s'agit d'une approche de politique étrangère centrée sur des relations bilatérales avec ce que les leaders politiques canadiens considèrent comme des pays qui sont des démocraties aux vues similaires et aux valeurs communes. Cette approche décrit principalement l'approche régionale du Canada entre le milieu des années 2000 et 2019.

KEYWORDS:

• Canada
• Palestinians
• Pearsonian
• Harper
• Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding

Introduction

A crisis in 1979

Good Evening. The two day old government of Joe Clark appears headed for its first diplomatic crisis, a serious confrontation with the Arab World, and it’s all because Prime Minister Clark seems determined to go ahead with his promise to move the Canadian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. (CBC News Footage, 1979)

Thus, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) anchor Knowlton Nash opened the National News 6 June 1979. He was describing one of the more important crises in Canadian foreign policy history. It began with an electoral pledge in Clark’s 1979 Progressive Conservative Party campaign platform to relocate the Canadian embassy in Israel, leading to a backlash by Arab states that threw his government into disarray.

Following Israel’s victory in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Arab states used a 1973 oil embargo to inflict significant economic pressure on the United States and other Western countries, including Canada, for supporting Israel. B. Abu-Laban describes it as an action used against countries deemed “unfriendly”, as in pro-Israeli (Abu-Laban, 1988, p. 118). This caused oil prices to soar and contributed to a major economic downturn across the West. It exposed the vulnerability of industrialized regions that depend on oil imports, like Eastern Canada, and represented a bonanza of new wealth for energy rich regions like Clark’s home province of Alberta. At the centre of the embargo lay Arab displeasure with Israel’s acquisition of territory by force, its success at winning wars against its neighbours, its treatment of the Palestinian people, and support it relied on from Western powers to maintain its regional upper hand. The economic shock and successful weaponization of oil caused a significant realignment in international power structures, as the West was forced to become more mindful of Arab aspirations (Brynen, 2007, p. 75). The United States became particularly cognizant of the need to balance the contradictory demands of unflinching support for Israel and preservation of close ties to the oil rich Gulf monarchies (Oil Embargo, 1973–1974, n.d.). This sparked United States-led bilateral negotiations with Israel and Arab states culminating in the 1978 Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.

By pledging to make Canada the first country to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, only 12 years after Israel seized it in the 1967 Six-Day War, Clark ran head on into the realignment in Middle East politics. He did that against the advice of his own Ministers and the Department of External Affairs (Hilliker, 2018, pp. 307–308). The relocation would have amounted to de facto recognition of Israel’s acquisition of territory by force and inflame the very point Arab states had protested with their embargo. Though the Clark government would only stay in power for 9 months, in no small measure due to this crisis, its actions and response would have a long-term impact on Canada’s Middle East foreign policy. The Clark experience would also illustrate two ways Canada approaches the region: either as a partisan advocate of its closest bilateral friends and allies, namely (since 1979) Israel and the United States; or as an advocate of a multilateral and internationalist approach, trying to bridge the divide between allies and non-allies.

Approaches in Canada’s Middle East foreign policy

This paper assesses Canada’s foreign policy approach toward the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, which is often done through the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The paper argues there are two ways Canada has approached these matters, roughly corresponding to two time periods: one comprising Pierre Elliott (PE) Trudeau’s Liberal, Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative and Jean Chrétien’s Liberal governments (1980–2003); the other comprising Stephen Harper’s Conservative and Justin Trudeau’s Liberal governments (2006–2019). Martin’s Liberal government (2003–6) was a time of transition in-between. This paper explores the two approaches by describing the first period as Pearsonian in nature, corresponding to the jumble of liberal internationalist ideas – such as a commitment to international institutions, multilateralism, human rights, diplomacy ahead of conflict, mediation and peacebuilding – often associated with Pearsonianism. Bothwell describes Pearsonianism as the Canadian approach to foreign affairs from around the early Twentieth to early Twenty-First Centuries (2017, pp. 27–28). It is named after Canada’s Nobel Prize winning Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) (1948–57) and Prime Minister of Canada (1963–68), Lester B. Pearson, who also played a key role in the creation of Israel in 1948 (Newport, 2014; Tauber, 1998). The second period’s approach is centred on bilateral relationships built on a foundation of (perceived) shared values with “like-minded” Western democracies. The approach is named after a lead proponent, Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

To understand Canada’s foreign policy toward the Palestinians and MEPP, this paper also takes into consideration Canada’s relationship with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) more broadly. The limited scholarly literature that exists on Canada and MENA typically addresses only a few important events, like Canada’s role in the establishment of Israel (1947–48), the Suez Crisis and Canadian peacekeeping in 1956, and the Clark embassy crisis. The literature also tends to focus on Canada’s bilateral relationship with Israel, at the neglect of analysis of relations with other MENA states and societies (Labelle, 2018, p. 170).

In what literature does exist on Canada and the Palestinians, the MEPP and MENA, there is a striking difference in analysis offered by scholars who apply a positivist lens to foreign policy research and those who take a critical, postcolonial perspective. From the positivist side, a traditional line of thinking has been to describe Canada’s role in the region through a liberal idealist lens. There Canada is considered a mostly neutral and fair-minded actor striving for a just and lasting regional peace. Thus, Canada is framed as a quintessential peacemaker acting as an interlocutor between its friends and allies, Israel and the United States, with non-allies among the Arab and Islamic states. A case for this approach is made in a 2007 volume edited by Heinbecker and Momani, Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice.

The liberal-idealist approach is tempered by a realist analysis of Canada’s foreign policy. Scholars like Gotlieb (2005) and Nossal (2003) suggested Canada is less a “do-gooder” state than one pursuing its national interest, regardless of official rhetoric and any outward embrace of international accords. Nossal (2003) has been particularly critical of scholarship that takes Canada’s liberal rhetoric at face value, of Canadian intervention in other states’ affairs, and a Canadian propensity to lecture and moralize onto others about Canada’s superior way of life. He describes this as hypocritical given Canada’s own treatment of Indigenous peoples (Nossal, 2003, p. 1), and how Canada will act swiftly in a zero-sum manner to protect its national interests. Other recent research by Foster (2018) considers Canadian foreign policy through its competition for energy markets. There, Canada operates in tandem with fellow shale oil mega-producer, the United States, competing against lower-cost producers like those found in MENA. In this new era, higher prices and embargoes against Western buyers could be a potential boon for cost-intensive regions like Alberta, who can easily be outcompeted by MENA energy providers.

Critical, postcolonial scholars take particular consideration of race, identity and shared values. This perspective posits that identity draws Canada to naturally empathize with Israel as a fellow Western democracy, like the United Kingdom and United States. This tilt favouring Israel includes racist perceptions toward the “Other” people in MENA, where Arabs have all-too-often been characterized as less civilized, irrational by nature and extremist in their religious fanaticism. Y. Abu-Laban and Bakan (2008) assert that race constitutes a basis of partisan support for Israel in Canada. Scholars like Bahdi (2019), Labelle (2019), and Monaghan and Santos (2020) link this to a general anti-Arab racism permeating Canadian society, which is tied to a shared value of settler colonial dispossession of Indigenous peoples (Bahdi & Kassis, 2016; Labelle, 2019; Monaghan & Santos, 2020, p. 5).

Labelle (2019) notes many Arab Canadians have long perceived racist logic behind Canada’s unequal treatment favouring the Israeli-Jewish discourse over the Palestinian (p. 166). In arguing why, Husseini (2008) observes while more mainstream scholars stress the positivist liberal and realist viewpoints to understand Canada’s MENA foreign policy, factors like religion and shared values are intrinsic to understanding Western support for Israel (p. 53). While a pro-Israel tilt may be longstanding, Brynen (2007) says Canadians began showing increasing sympathy to Palestinians in the 1980s (p. 75), even if it did not translate to elite levels.

Meanwhile, Nossal (2014), Barry (2012), Sasley (2011), and Sasley and Jacoby (2007), describe how electoral politics have shaped Canada’s MENA and Israel-Palestine foreign policy. This was intrinsic to the Clark embassy story, and electoral calculi seem to have morphed over time into a Canadian government propensity to back Israel unquestioningly, regardless of party in power. Though Canada’s dominant ally the United States bears great influence on Canada’s MENA foreign policy (Juneau, 2017, p. 406; McKercher, 2014, p. 329; Stein, 1989, pp. 375–376), Canadian support for Israel has a logic of its own, and occasionally leads to friction with United States regional efforts. In all instances, Canada remains a very close ally of the United States and friend of Israel.

Canada and the early years of the Middle East peace process

The Clark campaign pledge

From 1967 November to 1979 June, Canadian policy on Jerusalem was based on full support of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) S/RES/242, opposing Israel’s acquisition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem – in the 1967 Six-Day War. It called for Israeli withdrawal and a negotiated settlement among the warring states (Flicker, 2002, p. 117). While S/RES/242 was adopted 1967 November, in July that year Canada voted in favour of United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGA) A/RES/2253 condemning any unilateral alteration to Jerusalem’s status by Israel (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993, p. 12). Clark’s 1979 campaign pledge contradicted both resolutions.

Clark had made the pledge to the Jewish community as leader of the opposition, at the Canada–Israel Committee (CIC) 2 April 1979 in Toronto. He iterated support for relocating the embassy by saying, “‘next year in Jerusalem’, a Jewish prayer which we intend to make a Canadian reality” (Giniger, 1979). He reiterated the pledge at his first news conference after his election (Hilliker, 2018, p. 308). Commentators have speculated why he made the pledge and whether an electoral calculus was involved. In a tight election, Clark may have sought to sway Jewish voters in key urban Ontario ridings from a traditional allegiance to the Liberals (Ripsman & Blanchard, 2002, p. 163). Some speculate Clark believed this was the right, principled move (Flicker, 2002, pp. 118–123). Clark’s predecessor and successor, PE Trudeau (1968–89, 1980–84), describes Clark as unwise and “getting into a lot of difficulty” for taking up a cause of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which Trudeau says he himself resisted despite electoral threats from Begin (Trudeau, 1993, pp. 215–216).

External Affairs feared Canada could be cut off from Middle East oil imports, valuable to Eastern Canada, and that Arab investments would be withdrawn at a time Canada needed to borrow regularly for large deficits (Ripsman & Blanchard, 2002, pp. 159–161). Ever conscious of Canada’s close relationship with the United States, officials were worried relocating the embassy would create unnecessary tension (Hilliker, 2018, p. 307). The United States had just overseen a tenuous 1978 Camp David peace agreement and the Carter Administration had an eye on a larger Middle East peace process (Flicker, 2002, p. 124). Canadian officials were also concerned a decade of trying to present Canada as neutral in the region was crumbling rapidly, and its image as a peacekeeper ruined (CBC News Footage, 1979).

The Clark government was hammered by economic and diplomatic threats. The Arab League said any action to move the embassy would be considered an act of aggression against Arab sovereignty. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Arab League said they would stop at nothing to block Canada’s move. Egyptian Ambassador to Canada, Hassan Fahmy, warned the PLO response could escalate to terrorist attacks (CBC News Footage, 1979). In the diplomatic corps, questions were asked as-to-why Clark was risking so much in a move not vital to Israel’s security. Israel’s Ambassador to Canada, Mordechai Shalev, said while appreciated, the move was unnecessary and Israel had no doubt about the depth of Canada’s friendship (CBC News Footage, 1979).

By late June, Clark announced he would appoint former Progressive Conservative Party leader (1967–76), Robert L Stanfield, as “Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa”. Stanfield was tasked with studying the embassy move before any action was taken. This was also meant to give the Clark government breathing room to think. Stanfield’s terms of reference were to: find ways to enhance Canada’s relationship with the MENA countries, determine how Canada could contribute to a just and lasting regional peace, and see if there was a way to compatibly implement the Clark government policy on Jerusalem (Taras & Goldberg, 1989, pp. 158–159).

Stanfield quickly issued a 1979 October interim report urging the government to refrain from moving the embassy. As the 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel had not yet led to broader regional peace, Stanfield cautioned moving the embassy could derail the larger United States effort (Taras & Goldberg, 1989, p. 159). President Carter impressed this point upon Clark in person, too (Taras & Goldberg, 1989, p. 161). By 29 October 1979, the Clark government had abandoned its plans. Opposition leaders accused his government of damaging Canada's credibility (Giniger, 1979). Clark’s minority government fell 13 December 1979. The embassy affair no doubt contributed to its fall (Flicker, 2002, p. 137). The events would also help orient Canada’s MENA foreign policy for the following two decades.

The Stanfield report

Stanfield’s tour took him across the Middle East and his final report would bear the liberal internationalist spirit of Pearsonian foreign policy. While it acknowledged Canada’s Western European roots and closest ties were with the United States, United Kingdom and Israel, the report suggested those ties should not preclude good relations with the broader Arab world. Stanfield felt Canada could and should aspire toward positive relations with everyone, and Canada would be well received if sincere when doing so (Stanfield, 1980, pp. 2–3).

Everywhere Stanfield went, the central message conveyed to him was improving Canada’s standing in the region was tied to its foreign policy on Israel and the Palestinians. Meanwhile, it seemed clear that Israel-Palestine drove conflict in the Middle East. In Stanfield’s view, this endangered world peace while misdirecting scarce resources toward defence that could be better used elsewhere (Stanfield, 1980, p. 2). Ultimately, Stanfield concluded Canada’s contribution to a just and lasting peace was more important than economic interests. So, he felt the most useful role Canada could play in MENA was to become a mediator addressing the conflict between opposing sides. To do that, Canada would need the respect of the governments and peoples of the region, which would require Canada be viewed as fair-minded. That would mean avoiding total identification with one opposing party over another (Stanfield, 1980, p. 14).

Stanfield said Canada was right to have supported S/RES/242 because it offered the best foundation for a comprehensive peace (Stanfield, 1980, p. 6), by providing land for a future Palestinian state. He also said it was questionable how far Israel's concern for security could justify territorial claims in the OPT, if those negated the possibility for a Palestinian homeland (Stanfield, 1980, p. 6). Meanwhile, Stanfield emphasized the Arab governments he met were categorical in asserting there cannot be regional peace until Palestinian’s rights are recognized (Stanfield, 1980, p. 7).

A Pearsonian approach

When Clark made Stanfield’s report public 29 February 1980, Solomon (1980) described it as “pro-Palestinian” in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, noting its support for the Palestinian people’s right to a homeland and self-determination (p. 4). This was one of the Clark government’s final acts before handing power to PE Trudeau 4 March 1980. The report would influence successive Canadian governments. After Trudeau returned to power, Canada established relations with the PLO (see Robinson in this publication). Flicker suggests Canada’s United Nations voting record became more balanced, and notes Canada strongly criticizing Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon (2002, p. 137). In a 1982 press release about the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, the Government of Canada (GOC) called for a negotiated resolution to the “dispute”, Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, peace and secure borders for all states in the region, and recognition of the Palestinian people’s legitimate rights (Department of External Affairs, 1982).

In Canada, views related to Israel and the Palestinians were also changing. Among Liberal party back-benchers, there were growing popular doubts about the legitimacy of Israel’s actions during its invasion of Lebanon (Hilliker, 2018, p. 390). At the public level, Canadians became increasingly concerned with the lot of the Palestinians (Stanfield, 1980, p. 3). Notwithstanding generally low interest in MENA affairs, by late 1982 there was evidence of growing support for the Palestinian cause (Arab Studies Quarterly, 1983, p. 292). This included majority Canadian public support for a Palestinian state, and a fairly even 19 to 15 percent split in support for the respective Israeli and Palestinian narratives (Arab Studies Quarterly, 1983, pp. 292–293). Suleiman argued those opinions were affected by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacres (Suleiman, 1984, p. 105). Yet, when Canadian sympathies appeared to realign in favour of Israel in an unpublished 1984 Gallup poll, with 28 percent expressing sympathy for Israel to 12 percent for Palestinians; by a margin of 38 to 22 percent, Canadians supported a statement that there would be no peace until Palestinians have self-determination (Gallup,1984; as quoted in Abu-Laban, 1988, p. 121). A 1985 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs report on Canada’s Relations with MENA would reinforce Stanfield’s conclusion that Canada had a deep interest in the Middle East’s stability, which was most threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict (Senate Standing Committee, 1985, p. v.).

PE Trudeau was briefly succeeded by Liberal Prime Minister John Turner (1984), whose successor, Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984–93), was himself sympathetic to Israel. At the 1987 Francophonie Summit, Canada refused to endorse a resolution affirming the principle of Palestinian self-determination. Now Canada’s SSEA (1984–91), Joe Clark explained that Canada could not abandon its long-standing objection to the phrase, even if Canada accepted the notion of there being an eventual homeland for Palestinians (Rose, 1987). Mulroney describes then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres thanking him for stopping the “anti-Israeli” motion, and says he assured Peres he would do-so again (Mulroney, 2011, 1986: 5. Tough Decisions). Mulroney also says during “disturbances” in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987, the December beginning of the First Intifada, Canada was the first major industrialized country to offer Israel support at a “critical moment” when even President Ronald Reagan expressed displeasure with Israel (2011, Personal Journal: 1 January 1988). He says his position was Jews alone must make value judgements respecting their national security (2011, Personal Journal: 1 January 1988).

Still, the Mulroney government largely went along with the Stanfield approach. In its 1987/88 Annual Report, External Affairs wrote of special concern were, “human rights abuses arising from the Israeli authorities’ efforts to restore order through their ‘iron fist policy’” (Department of External Affairs, 1988, p. 55). Canada was also ready to support United States regional peace-efforts. Meanwhile, in External Affairs’ 1985/86 Annual Report, it described how Canada would strive for a peace settlement that guaranteed Israel’s security and well-being, but provided, “the opportunity for Palestinians to realize their right to participate in negotiations to determine their future, and to have a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Department of External Affairs, 1987, p. 43).

Clark became something of a champion of Stanfield’s recommendations (see Robinson in this volume). Speaking with measured bluntness to the CIC in 1988, a year into the First Intifada (1987–1991), Clark said, “Human rights violations, such as we have witnessed in the West Bank and Gaza in these past agonizing weeks, are totally unacceptable, and in many cases are illegal under international law” (Barrett, 1988). This could not sound more different in tone from his 1979 pledge and was poorly received by the CIC audience. Despite being one of Israel’s staunchest supporters, the Canadian government was also losing patience with Israel and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s Likud-led government (1983–84, 1986–1992) for not cooperating with United States regional peacebuilding efforts. Meanwhile, the Palestinians were drawing broad global sympathy for their uprising (Intifada) against Israeli rule. By 1988 February, Gallup found 17.5 percent of Canadians sympathizing with Palestinians versus 15.7 percent with Israelis (Canada, 2019).

In 1989, Clark announced Canada would support Palestinian self-determination (External Affairs Canada, 1989). This opened a new era in Canada’s relations with Israel, the Palestinians and the MENA region, and this approach would largely be sustained by the Chrétien Liberal government. With United States leadership of the MEPP through the 1993 Oslo Accord, 1994 Paris Protocol and 1995 Oslo II Accord, Canada had clear signalling from its powerful ally how to approach the peace process. The GOC would itself start, for three decades, to characterize its commitment to Israel and the Palestinians as pursuing the, “goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the creation of a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel” (Government of Canada, n.d.).

During its time, the Chrétien government condemned Israeli settlement building in the OPT for violating international law, (Brynen, 2007, p. 77) as well as Palestinian terrorism and excessive Israeli retaliation. The GOC specifically supported what it called “fair-minded” peace initiatives (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993, p. 23). Canada would support Palestinian self-determination, autonomy and even the possibility of a state, based on a negotiated settlement with Israel; along with Israel’s right to exist within secure borders (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993, pp. 18, 22–23). At the United Nations, Canada parted company with the United States and Australia, joining the overwhelming majority of world states by either supporting or abstaining from resolutions sponsored by Arab states criticizing Israel’s: occupation of the OPT, attacks against civilians and nuclear weapons programme (Barry, 2012, p. 196). From 1992 to 2000, Canada was intensively involved in the multilateral part of the MEPP, notably as chair of the Refugee Working Group (RWG) and sponsor of the Track II Ottawa Process of negotiations. Robinson (2011) writes this mostly happened “below the radar in terms of public perception”, but these efforts became a positive element for Canada’s relations with MENA countries (p. 695). Canada’s leadership role in the RWG was well received and appreciated in Washington and the Western alliance system, too.

The liberal, multilateralist approach became so dominant under Chrétien that many scholars considered it to define Canada’s MENA foreign policy (Heinbecker & Momani, 2007; Jacoby, 2000; Stein, 1989). It reflected a Pearsonian Canada invested in a rules-based international system built on respect for international law and participation in multilateral institutions. At one point on a state visit to Israel, the OPT and Jordan in April 2000, Prime Minister Chrétien was reported saying Palestinians had a right to declare independence unilaterally (Sallot, 2000). Chrétien writes in his memoirs he was only engaging in speculation, but that he was stating the obvious, which was Palestinians would eventually have a state (Chrétien, 2008, p. 348–349).

A new Canadian approach to the MEPP

The Martin Liberal government

Global politics and the Middle East changed following the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks. By then the MEPP was in deep crisis, having the previous year descended into a violent Second Intifada (2000–6). This time the Palestinians were armed and frequently carried out terrorist attacks in Israel, including suicide bombings. Israel had an overwhelming preponderance in might, however, and the occupied Palestinians suffered overwhelming losses (Second Intifada – Summary of Data, 2010). The impact of 9/11 was to transform how Western states like Canada viewed their own security, MENA politics and Israel-Palestine.

Canada and key Western allies like the United States were already inclined to feel more in common with Israel, as compared to Muslims, Arabs and Middle Easterners. An already close political identification between Israel and Canada became tied to a post-9/11 “war on terror” security framework, which positions the interests of Western states as identical to Israel’s (Y. Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2010). As Musu and Arsenault point out in this volume, Palestinian terrorist attacks had a marked impact on Western opinion against Palestinians. Meanwhile, Israel was able to use its experience suppressing Palestinians to market itself as a global expert and ally combating Arab and Islamic terrorism (Y. Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2012, p. 329). Separately, but in this context, change began to take place in Canada’s approach to the MEPP, particularly once Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003–6) came to power. Under Martin, Canada began to align its foreign policy more closely with Israel.

Canada drew attention at the United Nations as it shifted to a more pro-Israel voting pattern (C. Clark, 2004). Leech-Ngo and Swan (2019, p. 34) analysed Canada’s voting patterns on sixteen resolutions that took place every year, 2000–2016, at the UNGA pertaining to issues on Palestine, which may be considered sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. They found a notable shift take place from almost exclusively in favour of all sixteen under Chrétien, to less enthusiastic support under Martin (Leech-Ngo & Swan, 2019, p. 34). That included several Martin-era “no” votes (Leech-Ngo & Swan, 2019, p. 35). Perhaps more remarkable was a change in tone, as the Martin government expressed a desire Israel not be singled out on the international stage. It also stressed the importance of shared identities and values. Then Minister of Human Resources Joe Volpe said,

I think that we've attempted in the past and we continue to try to get a position that's balanced, but clearly we want to reinforce the fact that we support countries that are democratic, that support the same values that we support, i.e. the rule of law, freedom, human rights. And we try to reflect that in all of our actions at the UN. (C. Clark, 2004)

At one point Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Allan Rock, levelled a scathing denunciation of UNGA resolutions on Israel (Clark, 2004). This was echoed by several Liberal MPs who felt Canada cannot support unbalanced resolutions attacking Israel without pointing out similar violations by the Palestinian Authority (Clark, 2004). Martin himself says on entering office he disagreed with the Department of Foreign Affairs that United Nations resolutions on the region had been balanced, saying no doubt in his mind Israel was being singled out (Martin, 2009, p. 350). This included his view the Human Rights Council, which he felt included some of the world’s greatest human rights abusers, had been “egregiously politicized with a deep hostility toward Israel”, and needed to be replaced (Martin, 2009, p. 338). Despite all this, Seligman writes (2018, p. 91) the Martin government did not feel support for Israel should come at the expense of Canadian support for United Nations multilateralism (and Pearsonianism). Martin’s successor would seem not to agree.

A Harperian Middle East foreign policy

On 6 February 2006, Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party came to power. The Harper government brought with it the views of a strand of Canadian conservativism that had not traditionally occupied the upper rings of power in Canada’s conservative movement. The base of that movement prioritized traditional alliances with countries it perceived Canada sharing values with, like the United States and United Kingdom. Many of its members were pro-Israel evangelicals who considered Israel an oasis of democracy and civilization surrounded by dangerous dictatorships and brutality (Barry, 2012, p. 193; JTA, 2014). The movement was sceptical about international institutions and forms of governance, and exhibited hostility toward the myths and ideas associated with Pearsonianism (Bothwell, 2017, p. 30).

Like Clark, one of Harper’s immediate foreign policy tests was in the Middle East. Hamas, a group the GOC listed as a terrorist organization 27 November 2002 (Public Safety Canada, 2019), won the 25 January 2006 Palestinian legislative election. Harper immediately sided with Israel in 2006 March by making Canada the first country, after Israel, to cut off aid and diplomatic ties with the Palestinian Authority (Galloway, 2006). Many followed, led by the United States, in an effort to bring down the new Palestinian government. This marked the beginning of a new Canadian approach to MENA and MEPP foreign policy, which clearly favoured the Israeli narrative over the Palestinian (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007, p. 301). It marked a turn to a type of MENA foreign policy that prioritized partisan bilateral support for a like-minded Western state, over Pearsonian internationalism and Stanfield’s fair-mindedness.

While in power (2006–15), the Harper government departed sharply from previous policy. Like Clark decades earlier, it saw a path to electoral victory that included wooing the support of Jewish voters by taking an even stauncher public stance than the Liberals in support of Israel (Nossal, 2014, pp. 16–17). There is evidence to suggest this was successful at winning votes in key urban ridings (Sasley, 2011). Further, since his party’s core of Anglo-Protestant supporters was not large enough to achieve power, Harper appealed to non-traditional Conservatives, including Jews, on the basis of shared social values (Barry, 2012, p. 191).

While Martin had shifted Canada’s United Nations voting patterns closer to Israel, the Harper government would take a harder line (Leech-Ngo & Swan, 2019, pp. 32–33; Nossal, 2014). By 2008 January, Canada distinguished itself as the only country to vote against a Human Rights Council (2008) resolution calling for Israel to immediately lift its siege on Gaza and for the protection of the Palestinian civilians, in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law. Of the sixteen resolutions Leech-Ngo and Swan analysed, from 2006 to 2010 they found Canada’s votes split fairly even between yes and no, with some abstentions. From 2011 to 2014, they found a near inverse of the Chrétien years, with Canada voting against fourteen of sixteen resolutions (2019, p. 35).

During the 2006 Lebanon War, Harper diverged from Western condemnation of Israel by insisting Israel was defending itself appropriately against terrorism. During the 2008/09 Gaza War his Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon blamed Hamas solely for the violence (Sasley, 2011). In each case, Israel was portrayed as the victim and voice of reason. By 2010 February, without any treaty obligations Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Peter Kent claimed, “an attack on Israel would be considered an attack on Canada” (Chase, 2010). At the 2011 G8 Summit at Deauville, France, Canada refused to offer United States President Obama unanimity on a proposal for Middle East negotiations (Baker & Ljunggren, 2011). Musu observed Canada’s approach shift from one of a positive-sum game, seeing no contradiction in supporting both Israeli and Palestinian aspirations; to a zero-sum approach where criticism of Israeli policies was seen as incompatible with Canada’s friendship with Israel (2012, p. 72).

In 2012 November, Canada sought to block a United Nations vote recognizing Palestine as a Permanent Observer State and threatened to retaliate by cutting off tens-of-millions of dollars in aid from the Palestinians. On several occasions, Harper’s government refused to criticize the construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT. While visiting Israel in 2014 he rebuffed questions about settlements saying he would not stand in the Middle East and criticize Israel (C. Clark, 2014). In a speech to Israel’s Knesset, he reinforced the idea of mutual security when reflecting on a Jewish prayer promising, “through fire and water, Canada will stand with you” (Payton, 2014). In 2015, a “Canada–Israel Joint Declaration of Solidarity and Friendship”, stated their friendship was built, “first and foremost on shared values” around a shared “passionate belief in, and willingness to defend, the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Global Affairs Canada, 2015).

When acting without hesitation in support of Israel, the Harper government argued it was taking a principled position, because Canada and Israel share common democratic values including transparent elections, an independent judiciary, a free press, and human rights (Wiseman, 2012). The Canadian Prime Minister was unequivocally siding with one party over the other. Joe Clark himself wrote in 2014 that Canadian Ministers became, “more categorical in their commitment to Israel than any other international issue”, and that Canada’s support had become more adamant than Israel’s close friend the United States (p. 84). Clark also wrote that beyond the Middle East, a fierce commitment to Israel framed Canada’s approach to international issues, including the United Nations (Wiseman, 2012). Some scholars and diplomats ranked this foreign policy shift the most dramatic in post-1945 Canadian history (JTA, 2014). Lynk (2015) referred to the Harper years as a supine embrace of an Israel deeply at odds with international law and opinion. Clark said Harper’s outspoken and one-sided positions limited, or eliminated, Canada’s capacity to act as a mediator or calming influence on the “increasingly volatile” Middle East (J. Clark, 2014, p. 84). Robinson wrote Canada lost the credibility necessary to contribute to Middle East peacebuilding (2011, p. 718). The foreign policy approach may have helped cost Canada its 2010 bid for an UNSC seat (CBC News, 2010), too. However, unlike 1979 there was not a broad MENA backlash against Canada for any one event or reverse of course by the Harper government.

The Justin Trudeau Liberal government

From 2003 to 2015, Canada’s MENA foreign policy shifted from one of careful balance to one overwhelmingly favouring Israel (Barry, 2012, p. 191). Technically, Canada’s official policies toward the MEPP had not really changed since the 1990s. Rather, there had been a change in style and actions. After PE Trudeau’s son, Justin Trudeau, led the Liberals to power in a 2015 campaign that staked his party’s reputation on reinvigorating the institutional liberal order (Sands & Carment, 2019, p. 285), he immediately proclaimed, “Canada is back” to Canadians and the international community (Browne, 2019). The campaign elicited a sense of optimism Canada would return to a more fair-minded approach to Israel and the Palestinians, too (Seligman, 2018, p. 80).

Differences between Justin Trudeau and Harper are discernible. After gaining power, the Trudeau Liberals began funding the United Nations Refugee and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees with a $25 million 2016/17 fiscal year commitment (Global Affairs Canada, n.d.), followed by $35 million in 2017/18 (Global Affairs Canada, 2019, p. 21) and $30 million in 2018/19 (Global Affairs Canada, 2020, p. 21). This was after Harper cut funding to UNRWA in the 2011/12, 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16 fiscal years in retaliation for the 2008/9 Gaza War. The Trudeau government’s decision came as the United States Trump Administration decided, in 2018, to defund UNRWA as part of a process to: put pressure on Palestinians to acquiesce to a new political deal with Israel (Amr, 2018), redefine and eliminate the right of return for millions of Palestinian refugees (Ahren, 2019), and ultimately eliminate UNRWA (T. O. I. staff & Agencies, 2018). Trudeau’s decision to fund UNRWA not only ran contrary to President Trump’s regional strategy, but sometimes vociferous opposition by Canadian Jewish groups (Csillag, 2019a). It also marked a return to a Stanfield recommendation that Canada fund UNRWA, as part of the international community’s obligation to Palestinian refugees from 1948 and 1967 (Stanfield, 1980, p. 13).

When in 2017 the Trump Administration announced it would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the United States embassy there, Trudeau’s government explicitly rejected following suit (Zilio, 2017). In a declassified email, Foreign Affairs Minister Freeland was advised Canada’s long-standing position was the status of Jerusalem can only be resolved as part of a general Israeli-Palestinian settlement (Webster, 2017, p. 3). Canada even risked President Trump’s ire by abstaining on a 2017 UNGA resolution declaring his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital null and void (Blanchfield, 2017). There an abstention may be effectively understood as an endorsement. Meanwhile, Canada’s Conservative opposition party pledged to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in their 2019 election campaign platform (Conservative Party of Canada, 2018). In 2019 December, two months after being re-elected with a minority government, Trudeau’s Liberals backed an UNGA resolution supporting Palestinian self-determination (Csillag, 2019b).

Similarities between Harper and Justin Trudeau abound. During nine years in power, Harper’s embrace of Israel extended into the domestic sphere. He carried out a crackdown on civil society organizations, government funded bodies and individuals speaking out in favour of Palestinian rights (Y. Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2012; Wildeman, 2017). While there was an opening up after Harper left office, the Trudeau government has publicly disparaged Palestine rights advocates. When in 2016 Western Law Professor Michael Lynk was appointed United Nations “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967”, Trudeau’s Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion immediately joined Israel to severely condemn the appointment (JTA & The CJN, 2016). Trudeau has also gone out of his way to condemn student and community advocates of Palestine rights, including over Twitter (Arnold, 2016) and on campaign (Times of Israel staff, 2019).

Though Trudeau’s government caught the attention of many observers by backing the 2019 December UNGA resolution on Palestinian self-determination, this owed much to its first term (2015–19) voting record. Leech-Ngo and Swan had found, “despite the mild rhetorical shift around moving towards a more balanced’ approach, there has been absolutely no deviation in voting between the previous Harper government and the Trudeau Liberals” (2019, pp. 34–35). The Trudeau government has also been adamant in arguing Israel is singled out unfairly at the United Nations (CIJA, 2017). Those views reflect continuity with the Harper-era “Canada–Israel Joint Declaration of Solidarity and Friendship”, which expressed anxiety over efforts to isolate and demonize the State of Israel (Global Affairs Canada, 2015).

Other investigative work suggests Trudeau’s government has actively helped Israel at the multilateral level in various United Nations agencies (Larson, 2018). Like the Harper government, on 14 February 2020 Canada submitted a letter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) reiterating Canada’s position that Canada does not recognize a Palestinian state, so Palestine does not qualify for jurisdiction in an ICC investigation into Israeli war-crimes in the OPT. The Canadian Jewish News was told this is the same official position Canada submitted in 2018 and 2015 (Csillag & Reporter, 2020). The Trudeau government further supported the expansion of the Canadian Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) to permit goods and services produced in Israeli West Bank settlements, to enter Canada on the same tariff-free terms as goods and services from Israel (Lynk & Neve, 2019). This would economically advantage Israeli settlement growth and directly contradict Canada’s longstanding position on settlements and international law. When in 2019 a Canadian court ruled against Israeli settlement wines being labelled “Product of Israel” for being “false, misleading or deceptive”, in David Kattenburg v the Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of Canada chose to appeal.

Today the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian conflict are much more familiar to Canadians than in the 1980s. Recent polling suggests broad sympathy for the Palestinians. In 2017, an EKOS poll found far more Canadians have a negative view of the Israeli government than a positive one, and most Canadians consider the Canadian government biased in favour of Israel (CJPME & EKOS and Associates, 2017). In 2018, Liberal MP Anthony Housefather told Jewish Canadians his government’s voting record at the United Nations was better than all previous ones (Housefather, 2018). Similarly, in 2018 Seligman argued Trudeau’s policy toward the MEPP had much more in common with Harper than Chrétien (p. 91). A 2020 EKOS poll found three-quarters of Canadians thought Canada should oppose Israeli annexation of Palestinian territory (CJPME & EKOS Research Associates, 2020). It also found 84 percent of Canadians think the ICC should investigate alleged war crimes committed by Israeli officials, with 71 percent saying Canada should not consider stepping in if it is opposed to the investigation (CJPME & EKOS Research Associates, 2020). As Sands and Carment wrote in 2019, “Despite all the rhetoric, Justin Trudeau’s Liberals are as hawkish as the previous Conservative government” (p. 285). This would appear true toward the Palestinians and MEPP.

Conclusion – two Canadian approaches

Canada has adopted two foreign policy approaches toward the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding. This paper has labelled those Pearsonian and Harperian. The Pearsonian approach emphasizes liberal internationalism, multilateralism and peacebuilding. Though it recognizes Canada’s place in the Western camp, it seeks for Canada to build broader MENA relationships. To accomplish these aims, Canada strives to have the appearance of a fair-minded actor to all parties in the region. That is particularly important towards Israel and the Palestinians, whose conflict is considered sensitive to Arab states and of great threat to regional stability. That approach was particularly prominent from 1980 up to 2003. The Harperian approach is premised first-and-foremost on bilateral alliances with nations the GOC perceives to share Canada’s Western liberal and democratic values. Shared identity is important. Proponents of this view consider Israel a lone outpost of civilization in an otherwise dark region. Not concerned with fair-mindedness, it is a partisan approach where Canada clearly sides with Israel. Canada takes the approach regardless of cost to its regional image and relationships, or broader multilateral linkages. The approach became dominant from 2006 onward.

Electoral politics appear to influence Canadian policy, particularly in a contest over some key urban Canadian ridings. Interestingly, as Canadians became more aware of MENA affairs and supportive of the Palestinians, the Harper and Trudeau governments adopted the most partisan foreign policy approach. Though successive governments deferred to the United States’ regional interests, Canada’s Palestinian and MEPP policy has a logic of its own, structured around its close relationship with Israel and electoral politics. Canadian policy even at times contradicted United States aims. Though unclear how it factors into Canada’s Palestinian and MEPP policymaking, Canada’s most zealous embrace of Israel came in a period where MENA oil suppliers were clear competitors to North American energy suppliers. Each approach makes frequent reference to perceived Canadian values, whose definitions are different for different Canadian actors. Further research could be done on what Canadian values may mean in the context of MENA, as well as the factors behind adopting the two approaches now laid out in this paper.

Irrespective of approach, Canada remained a close friend of Israel and close ally of the United States. Pearson had himself been no pacifist, but an advocate of a fairer internationalism and a champion of the Western camp. Likewise, even with the Pearsonian approach to the Palestinians and MEPP, and especially the Harperian approach, Canada never valued the Arab voice over its Western friends and allies, including Israel.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeremy Wildeman

Jeremy Wildeman, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the University of Ottawa.