Talking with the PLO: Overcoming political challenges

ABSTRACT

Until 1980, Canada had only very occasional dealings with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and often viewed the latter as an illegitimate body or terrorist organization. However, in 1980 the Department of External Affairs, recognizing that the PLO represented an important body of Palestinian opinion, and had become a major actor in Lebanon, assigned an officer (this author) to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut with instructions to develop dialogue with the PLO on political and security matters. This policy commentary briefly describes the evolution in Canadian policy toward fully accepting the legitimacy of the PLO as the Palestinian representative in the Middle East peace process. It describes the factors influencing the change in Canada's position, including the views of the international community, PLO acceptance in 1988 of Israel's existence, and Arafat's renunciation of terrorism. As a result, in March, 1989 Canada lifted remaining limits on official contacts with the PLO and accepted the Palestinian right of self-determination, thereby adopting a more balanced foreign policy. This led to Canada being accepted as a significant player in the Multilateral Peace Process, the chair (Gavel) of the Refugee Working Group and a member of the Multilateral Steering Committee.

RÉSUMÉ

Jusqu'en 1980, le Canada n'avait que des rapports très occasionnels avec l'organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et considérait souvent cette dernière comme une entité illégitime ou une organisation terroriste. Cependant, en 1980, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, reconnaissant que l'OLP représentait une part importante de l'opinion palestinienne et était devenue un acteur majeur au Liban, a affecté un agent (cet auteur) à l'ambassade du Canada à Beyrouth, avec pour instruction de développer le dialogue avec l'OLP sur les questions politiques et de sécurité. Ce commentaire politique décrit brièvement l'évolution de la politique canadienne vers la pleine acceptation de la légitimité de l'OLP en tant que représentant palestinien dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. Il décrit les facteurs ayant influencé le changement de position du Canada, y compris les points de vue de la communauté internationale, l'acceptation de l'existence d'Israël par l'OLP en 1988 et la renonciation d'Arafat au terrorisme. En conséquence, en mars 1989, le Canada a levé les dernières restrictions aux contacts officiels avec l'OLP et accepté le droit des Palestiniens à l'autodétermination, adoptant ainsi une politique étrangère plus équilibrée. Cela a permis au Canada d'être accepté comme un acteur important dans le processus de paix multilatéral, comme président (Gavel) du groupe de travail sur les réfugiés et comme membre du comité directeur multilatéral.

KEYWORDS:

• PLO
• self-determination
• Beirut
• peace process

Introduction

Canada’s support for the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people was reiterated in a vote at the UNGA in 2019 (and again in 2020), in what was characterized in the Canadian media in 2019 as a “significant” change of vote (Csillag 2019) – even though Canada had voted for a similar resolution between 1989 and 2006. So it was really just a reversion to form. But the first time Canada voted in favour of that resolution in 1989 was a real change, one which reflected a significant development of Canadian policy towards the PLO and the Israel-Palestine issue.

Although the subject of Canada’s attitude towards the Palestinians and the domestic political influences on it has by no means been ignored in the literature on Canadian Middle East policy (Goldberg and Taras 1989, Lyon 1993), this policy commentary fills in details about two significant elements of the process: firstly, the beginning of a working-level dialogue with the PLO in 1980 and secondly, Canada’s acceptance of self-determination and the subsequent lifting of all restrictions on contact with the PLO in 1989. The author draws on his personal experience as an officer in External Affairs (now Global Affairs) directly involved in the development of Canada’s policy towards the PLO over the period 1980–1992. During this period Canadian policy moved from timid and limited contact, considered politically sensitive within Canada because of the PLO’s terrorist links, to one of recognition of the Palestinian right of self-determination. The role of the PLO in the civil war in Lebanon justified the posting of an officer to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut in 1980 to open up a dialogue on political and Embassy security issues, a dialogue which proved useful to Canada.

During the 1970s the world had begun to move towards seeing the PLO as the relevant representative of the Palestinians, but Canada moved on this file more slowly than most, mainly because of partisan electoral considerations and also fear that recognition of a “right of self-determination” for the Palestinian people might be seen as reinforcing the arguments for Quebec independence. However, as the decade moved on, Canada’s reluctance to move further on the question of Palestinian national rights left it more and more isolated, until the 1988 statement by the Palestine National Council recognizing UN Security Council resolution 242 – which includes recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace in the region – gave Canada an excuse to catch up to its usual international partners, including the United States. As a result of this change, Canada re-established its credentials with the Arab side as a fair-minded party on the Arab-Israeli issue, to the extent that at the Moscow Multilateral Conference in 1992, the PLO and Israel both accepted that Canada should assume leadership of the highly contentious Refugee Working Group in the Multilateral component of the Middle East Peace Process.

Growing recognition of the Palestinian cause

In the 1960s and into the 1970s, for the most part, Canada did not have any substantive official dialogue with the PLO. There was a PLO representative attached to the Arab League Information Office in Ottawa from 1972, but the representative (Abdullah Abdullah) did not have any official contact with the Department of External Affairs. Canada’s reluctance was mainly due to the fact that the PLO was still seen primarily as a terrorist organization, and indeed in the 1970s and even into the 1980s the PLO did not accept Israel’s existence and continued to support a policy of “armed struggle” in various forms. This included high profile aircraft high-jackings and terrorist attacks by Palestinian organizations affiliated with the PLO, such as the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. However, the international community increasingly saw the PLO as an organization with a legitimate political role, and indeed the only Palestinian organization with the power and credibility to be the Palestinian party in an eventual peace process. In 1974, the PLO was accepted as a full member of the Arab league, and that same year the UNGA voted in favour of recognizing the PLO as an observer. Gradually, western European and like-minded states moved in the same direction. Indeed by June, 1980 the EU, traditionally somewhat ahead of Canada on these issues, was already calling in its Venice Declaration for recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to self-determination, and for the association of the PLO in eventual negotiations (Venice Declaration, 1980).

In Canada during the 1970’s there was increasing recognition at the political level of the necessity to take into account the issue of Palestinian national rights as a group, not just individual human rights. However, the whole issue of Canada’s policy stance respecting Palestine remained highly contentious (Bones, 1985; Noble, 1985). This was demonstrated, inter alia, by the decision (following a significant public outcry in Canada) to request postponement of a UN Conference scheduled to be held in Toronto in 1975, rather than to allow a PLO representative to attend (Bones, 1985), and by the 1979 promise of Joe Clark, leader of the Progressive Conservative party, to move the Canadian Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a promise whose timing was largely motivated by electoral considerations (Flicker, 2002). (See also Wildeman’s contribution to this special edition of the CFPJ).

Meanwhile, after being driven out of Jordan in 1971, the PLO leadership and armed forces transferred mainly to southern Lebanon. This upset the rather fine power balance which had existed in Lebanon between the various religious communities and contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1975. Meanwhile, Canada was serving on the UN Security Council in 1977–78, and thus was very involved in the international response to Israel’s 1978 invasion of southern Lebanon which amongst other things led to the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Ironically, although the Progressive Conservatives were able to form a minority government after the May 1979 election, Mr. Clark’s electoral promise respecting Jerusalem was to result in much more public attention to the actual situation in the Middle East. There was a significant outcry by Arab states and by Canadian business sectors, which led to Prime Minister Clark commissioning the Hon. Robert Stanfield to find a face-saving response to criticism of his Jerusalem embassy promise.¹ Mr. Stanfield was asked to address not just the Jerusalem embassy issue but the whole question of Canada’s relations with the Middle East and North Africa. He and his team travelled extensively in the Middle East and also listened to presentations in Canada. In his report Mr. Stanfield noted that the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people was a sine qua non for a negotiated solution, and that internationally the PLO was increasingly perceived as the only spokesman for the Palestinian people which enjoyed the support of a large and significant body of Palestinian opinion. He recommended therefore that despite the PLO’s ambiguous attitude towards Israel and terrorism, Canada should broaden contacts with it on issues affecting negotiations and the peace process, with a view to encouraging that organization towards greater moderation (Stanfield, 1980).

Mr. Stanfield’s final report was presented just two days after the February 1980 election. Its recommendations included:

• Canada should support the Palestinians’ right to a homeland as well as their rights to be heard and participate in the determination of their own future;

• Canada should broaden contacts with the PLO on issues affecting negotiations and the peace process; and

• To encourage moderation and conciliation we must be regarded as fair minded by the parties. (Stanfield, 1980, pp. 7, 10, 14).

On March 3rd Prime Minister Clark resigned and Pierre Trudeau was appointed Prime Minister. The new government did not see a need or political advantage to comment upon the report. Nevertheless, Mr. Stanfield’s realistic appraisal of the situation in the region would help influence the tone and content of Canadian policy towards the Middle East region, including towards the PLO in the coming years.

The value of dialogue

Encouraged by Mr. Stanfield’s recommendation on broadening contacts, the Department of External Affairs decided to assign an officer (this author) to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut whose responsibilities would include liaising with the PLO. This meant that Canada could now speak directly and officially to the PLO, and Canadian policy respecting the Middle East could be informed by first-hand input from the Embassy in Beirut on the implications of PLO policy and developments, in addition to what was available from other sources.

The dialogue was valuable in broadening the sources of information provided to Canada. The Embassy obtained information directly about PLO views and so was better able to analyze and comment upon developments in Lebanon, including on what was going on in PLO-controlled southern Lebanon, and indeed in the broader Middle East region. It also provided the PLO with an opportunity to express its views directly to Canada. For example, in July 1981, during a Canadian Parliamentary delegation’s call on PLO Chairman Arafat in southern Lebanon, the PLO Chairman expressed directly to the Embassy representative at some length his dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Trudeau’s political summary at the 1981 G7 Summit in Ottawa issued just a few days earlier (UofT, G7 Information Centre, 1981). Arafat was especially (and justifiably) displeased with the statement’s failure to condemn Israel for its air raids against Palestinian locations in west Beirut and south Lebanon the previous month, which had killed over 100 people and injured hundreds more. Such direct lines of communication did not exist previously, hampering Canada’s ability to assess reports of Palestinian statements.

The assignment of an officer to Beirut to talk to the PLO had been approved on the grounds that it was desirable not just for political reasons but for reasons of embassy security. At that time Canada’s embassy was located in west Beirut, as were the residence of the Canadian ambassador (T.J. Arcand) and the living quarters of the 14 or so Canadian staff. Although the worst period of fighting in the Lebanese civil war was over, the government of Lebanon, such as it was, had basically no control over west Beirut, and instead different sections of the city were controlled by a variety of militia groups. The militias did not necessarily have good relations with each other, but of one thing people could be sure – no Lebanese militia wanted to mess with the PLO, which controlled the southern part of the city and much of southern Lebanon. So, quite apart from any broader political benefits, on the very practical issue of security for the Embassy and its personnel, talking with the PLO was not only desirable but necessary, as two examples will show.

On one occasion, it was learned that an individual convicted in connection with the murder in 1976 of the United States ambassador to Lebanon carried out by agents of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had just been released after serving a very short sentence. Canada had played a role in getting this individual returned to Lebanon so he could be tried, and while in custody he had issued threats to “get even” with Canada. So his release, especially after serving such a short sentence, immediately raised questions at the Canadian Embassy as to the implications for security of the Embassy and its staff. Would this individual carry out his threats to retaliate against Canada? Accordingly, when he was released, the Canadian Embassy immediately contacted the PLO to express concern about this individual’s threats. A few days later, the responsible Embassy officer was called back to the PLO headquarters to get the reply. It was somewhat (but only somewhat) reassuring, “The individual concerned was acting on the instructions of a PLO member organisation. He will not take any action against Canada unless he is instructed to do so.”² Not the best of reassurances, but at least the Embassy had registered its concern, and no doubt the individual or his masters had been spoken to.

There was always a degree of crime in Beirut, including car theft, but over a period of just a few weeks in 1981 a number of vehicles belonging to the Embassy were stolen. The thefts had not occurred in the area of Beirut the PLO controlled, but knowing the PLO’s influence with Lebanese militias the responsible Embassy officer went to see the PLO and explained the problem, asking for help in getting the vehicles returned. “Let us see what we can do” was the answer. A week later the Embassy got a request to come back in. The answer: “We know where the vehicles are, but they will not be returned.” (They were probably by that time in the Bekaa valley, controlled by the Syrian army.) “However, we know who stole them, and we can assure you that no more cars of the Embassy will be stolen.” And none were. This showed how the PLO could lay down the law for the other militias in West Beirut, even in areas not directly controlled by the PLO, and how a good relationship with the PLO contributed to the security of the Embassy and its personnel generally.

Perhaps the greatest value politically for Canada of this dialogue came during the Israeli siege of Beirut in 1982, when the Canadian Embassy was virtually the only Western embassy still functioning in west Beirut. In those days, the PLO official who was the Embassy’s principal interlocutor (and constantly on the move to avoid having his location pinpointed by Israeli intelligence) began the practice of calling at the Canadian Embassy at night, under cover of darkness, to update the Embassy on the latest developments and to convey the PLO’s views. The Embassy’s reports to Ottawa were copied to Canadian missions in other capitals, such as London, Paris, Bonn and Washington, and as usual Canadian diplomats in turn shared their contents (as deemed appropriate) with counterparts in the governments in the countries to which they were accredited, giving those allied foreign ministries access to additional perspectives on the PLO’s actions.

Keeping the Embassy open in west Beirut during the invasion was not without its hazards, and these were not just relating to physical and personnel safety. There were political hazards as well. The government of Prime Minister Trudeau was on the receiving end of complaints by Israel not just about keeping open the Embassy but also because of the detailed information which the Embassy was providing about the civilian deaths and destruction being wrought by the Israeli bombing of Beirut. This pressure to close the Embassy however was counterbalanced by a degree of public admiration for an ambassador who stayed at his post to serve Canada and Canadians, even though his residence was seriously damaged by the bombing. On July 28th, there was even a unanimous resolution in the House of Commons, commending Ambassador Arcand and his staff for their devotion to duty and recommending them for some form of recognition (a recommendation never acted upon). One of the speakers in the debate, Marcel Prud’homme (Liberal, Saint-Denis), the Chairman of the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence used the occasion to argue for recognition of the PLO as the principal representative of the Palestinian people (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1982, pp. 19771–19772). The scattered applause which this suggestion received showed that even in 1982 there was a degree of support among MPs for a warmer attitude towards the PLO.

As the Canadian Embassy was the last remaining Western embassy functioning in west Beirut, and as a PLO official kept coming to the Embassy at night to relay information, it was felt necessary to raise pre-emptively with Ottawa the question about what should be done in the event that Arafat sought political asylum at the Embassy. Ottawa did not say no, but there was a very clear instruction, “Don’t do or say anything to encourage any such request.” In any event, the Ambassador and Canadian staff were withdrawn by the middle of August, by which time it was evident that the PLO apparatus and most of their fighters would be departing Beirut under an agreement negotiated by the American special representative Philip Habib. At the end of August, Arafat left Beirut on a Greek cruise ship accompanied by French warships.

After the departure of the PLO leadership from Lebanon in August 1982, principal Canadian responsibility for dialogue with the PLO was transferred to the Canadian Embassy in Tunis, the new home of the PLO leadership. After leaving Beirut however the PLO became a more dispersed and heterogeneous organization. While the official headquarters were in Tunis, Canadian embassies in some other capitals in the region also met with PLO representatives, always at a level below the Ambassador. Likewise, during occasional liaison visits to the region mid-level officers from External Affairs would sometimes call on the PLO contacts of the Canadian embassies involved (mostly Tunis, Cairo, and, after 1985, Damascus). This was encouraged by Ottawa but the Department of External Affairs remained very sensitive to any suggestion that the dialogue was going to higher levels, as one example demonstrates. Following the Israeli air attack on the PLO headquarters in the southern suburbs of Tunis in October 1985, which killed over 60 people, the Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Cairo wrote to his PLO contact expressing his personal condolences and attaching a copy of Mr. Clark’s statement deploring the raid. Normal diplomatic practice, one would think. The Palestinian counterpart faxed the letter to Tunis, and three days later the Embassy officer in Cairo was surprised to receive by fax a letter of thanks addressed to him and signed by Arafat. Informed about this, Ottawa replied to the Embassy reminding it of the Canadian policy on level of contact and warning against any reply to Arafat – a warning which was not necessary but which Ottawa felt obliged to put on the record for political reasons.

Meanwhile, in Ottawa, for domestic political reasons there was little appetite at the political level for raising the official level of dialogue. This was mostly because of the continued involvement of Palestinian groups in terrorist acts, such as the high-jacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985, even though there was increasing acceptance in political circles of the PLO’s centrality to any solution to the Palestinian question. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, in a June 1985 report specifically recommended “that Canadian government contacts with the PLO continue at their present level and frequency” (Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs; Report on Canada’s Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, p. 68).

While the information gathered through this dialogue helped External Affairs to have a more complete understanding of developments within the PLO and of the situation in the region more generally, it was of course just one element of many inputs into the overall analysis put together in Ottawa. But the next significant change in Canadian policy respecting the PLO was driven not by anything learned through the reports of Canadian diplomats on their dialogue with PLO counterparts, but rather by events in the occupied territories and in the international arena, and their impact on Canadian public opinion.

During the Palestinian uprising (the first intifada), beginning in December, 1987, actions by Israeli forces received significant negative media coverage in Canada. By 1988, there was growing criticism in Canada of Israeli actions against the Palestinians, which included reports of beatings and the cutting off of food supplies to Palestinian refugee camps. In March, Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), Joe Clark gave a hard-hitting speech to the Canada–Israel Committee criticizing human rights violations under international law, which significantly set back his relationship with the Canadian Jewish community (Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1988, p. 3). The reaction was so strong and immediate on the part of the leadership of the Canadian Jewish community that the next day Mr. Clark felt it necessary to backtrack, sending a letter reconfirming Canada’s “unwavering support” for Israel (Goldberg & Taras, 1989). This episode also underlined the potential domestic political costs of any forward movement in Canada’s relationship with the PLO.³

While Canadian attitudes were slowly evolving, the winds of change were blowing with more force elsewhere, leaving the Canadian position more and more isolated. Responding in part to the intifada, in November 1988, the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers issued a declaration of independence of the state of Palestine. The accompanying PNC political statement essentially accepted the notion of two states proceeding from negotiations based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 242 and 338 and Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. This then set the stage for Arafat to make further announcements in December in Geneva, and in particular a statement, on which the Americans had been insisting, clearly renouncing terrorism, “We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism” (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1989). In return, the United States announced that it was lifting its restrictions on dialogue with the PLO. The following day, the United States Ambassador in Tunis met with a senior PLO representative.

Recognizing Palestinian self-determination … but not the PLO

This left Canada as the only G7 government without senior level (Ministerial or Ambassadorial) dialogue with the PLO, clearly not something which reflected Canada’s interests, particularly as it embarked on a two-year term (1989–90) on the United Nations Security Council. But what was regarded by officials in External Affairs as a no-brainer still took more than three months to work out.

Although SSEA Clark was ready to move ahead, he first had to persuade strongly pro-Israel Prime Minister Mulroney, which proved no easy task and led to disagreements between the two men (Nemeth, 1989). Meanwhile, on the SSEA’s instructions, work was proceeding within External Affairs on drafting language for a possible statement to get Canada out of its lonely position. Arafat’s statement in Geneva and the subsequent move by the United States had certainly warmed the waters. Within the External Affairs bureaucracy there was a degree of impatience to update the Canadian posture, but one official in Minister Clark’s office cautioned, “Be patient. We have to make sure the Minister and Prime Minister are tied down inseparably to this raft before we send it down the rapids.” This was acknowledgment of the potential for political challenges ahead.

There were in fact, two issues that needed to be resolved. First, if Canada were to lift restrictions on high level contacts with the PLO, would that mean Canada was “recognizing” it, and was Canada thereby accepting its claim to be the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people? And secondly, was Canada recognizing the recently declared state of Palestine and/or the principle of self-determination?

The stumbling block regarding self-determination was that it seemed to prejudge the outcome as a state, whereas Canada maintained that whether or not there was to be a Palestinian state should be decided by negotiations with Israel. A further problematic aspect was the strong concern that any suggestion that self-determination and an independent state were two sides of the same coin be avoided, so as not to introduce any complicating implications regarding the question of Quebec separatism. This would have to be addressed in any eventual statement.

On a foreign policy issue with high domestic interest, it was typical for the approval of the Prime Minister to be sought, and sometimes for the matter to be referred to the appropriate Cabinet committee. However, in this unusual case, given the likelihood that such a decision would be controversial, Prime Minister Mulroney referred the issue to full Cabinet. There was also no doubt that it would be Mr. Clark as foreign minister who would make the eventual announcement and carry the proverbial “can of responsibility” for any political fallout.

Thus it was that on 30 March 1989 (the day the Palestinians celebrate as Land Day, an entirely unintended co-incidence) Mr. Clark was able to make the long awaited announcement (Department of External Affairs, 1989a), accepting the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people and lifting restrictions on high level dialogue with the PLO. The statement was hedged with reservations, particularly with regard to the question of an independent Palestinian state,

I want to take this occasion to reiterate that Canada does not recognize the Palestinian state proclaimed last November. However, the proclamation of a state does cast a different light on the question of Palestinian self-determination. Canada has long accepted the right and need for Palestinians to play a full part in negotiations to determine their future. We had been concerned that the phrase “self-determination” was being used as a code-word for an independent state, and that Canadian endorsement of the principle would be interpreted as Canadian advocacy of an independent state. That interpretation is no longer possible, because an independent state has been declared, and not recognized by Canada. That allows Canada to endorse the principle that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination in accordance with the International Human Rights Covenants. That must be exercised through peace negotiations in which the Palestinians play a full part. (Department of External Affairs, 1989b)

Although delayed, this statement, as well as a subsequent change in voting pattern at the UN, finally allowed Canada to be seen as a “fair-minded” interlocutor, as called for almost a decade earlier in the Stanfield report. As a result, Canada left behind the image of one-sidedness that its past UN voting record had suggested. And so, Canada was ready to be actively involved in a period of rapid change in Middle East politics, which within a short space of time saw the beginning of a structured bilateral and multilateral peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours: in 1991 in Madrid, in 1993 the Oslo I Accord between Israel and the Palestinians, and in 1994 the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Thanks to its move back to a mainstream position, by 1992 Canada had the credibility with both Israel and the PLO to be invited to assume leadership of the most politically sensitive element of the Multilateral Peace Process, the Refugee Working Group (Robinson, 2011). Thus, the fair-minded approach recommended by the Stanfield Report (1980) allowed Canada to contribute to Middle East peace-building and to garner international prestige for its efforts. It is a past example of a diplomatic approach that Canada can and should take towards the region and indeed in foreign policy more generally.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrew N. Robinson

Andrew N. Robinson is a retired Canadian diplomat. Besides his posting to Beirut in 1980-82, he was also assigned to Cairo as Deputy Head of Mission from 1985 to 1988, and as Ambassador to Jordan from 1992 to 1995. His Ottawa assignments with External Affairs have included Director of the Middle East Relations Division (1988–1992), and Director-General for the Middle East Peace Process. In this capacity he acted on behalf of Canada as the Gavel-holder (Chairperson) of the Refugee Working Group in the Middle East Peace Process (1995–2000).

Notes

1 Mr. Stanfield was asked to study the whole spectrum of Canada’s relationship with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. An interim report recommending against the Jerusalem move was submitted in October, 1979, and the final report on February 20, 1980 (Stanfield, 1980). See also the article by Wildeman in this issue.

2 On several occasions, this author has shared in quotation marks statements from his own past lived experiences in the Canadian foreign service.

3 Three years later, Mr. Clark’s views on the Palestinian question were still such anathema to the Canadian Jewish community that in March 1991 Prime Minister Mulroney instructed Mr. Clark to extend his trip to the Middle East – which was already underway – by a couple of days so as to avoid him having to speak at the conference of the Canada-Israel Committee about to take place in Ottawa. Mr. Clark extended his trip to include Iran, meeting with both President Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati. (This is still the only visit to Iran by a Canadian Foreign Minister since the Iranian revolution.) As a replacement speaker for the CIC meeting the PM sent Barbara McDougall, whose views on Israel and on the PLO were much closer to the pro-Israeli views of Mr. Mulroney. Five weeks later Mrs. McDougall replaced Mr. Clark as Secretary of State for External Affairs.