What lies ahead? Canada’s engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians: an Introduction

ABSTRACT

This thematic issue of the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal explores Canada’s foreign policy relationship with the Palestinians and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). It does this through a combination of articles and policy commentaries by scholars from the academy and “pracademics” from government. This includes regional experts on Palestine, Palestinian refugees Palestinian state-building and Canadian foreign policy. The topics they cover include Canadian diplomacy on Israel-Palestine at the United Nations, the impact the international community and Canada have had on Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, Canada’s policy toward Palestinian refugees, Canadian development aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and an overview of Canadian foreign policy toward both the Palestinians and MEPP. This introduction sets the stage for their contributions by first providing an overview of the contemporary politics of the Middle East and where Israel-Palestine fits within them, including a brief account of peacebuilding efforts today. It also describes Canada’s not-insignificant contribution to the politics of the Middle East and towards the composure of Israel-Palestine today, and likewise the impact of each on Canada. In sum, the articles each explore a unique and important facet of the ongoing development of Canadian foreign policy toward the Palestinians and the MEPP.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce numéro thématique du Canadian Foreign Policy Journal explore la relation de politique étrangère du Canada avec les Palestiniens et le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient (PPMO). Pour ce faire, il s’appuie sur une combinaison d'articles et de commentaires politiques écrits par des universitaires et des ‘ praticiens ’ du gouvernement. Ces personnes comprennent des experts régionaux sur la Palestine, les réfugiés palestiniens, la construction de l’État palestinien et la politique étrangère canadienne. Les sujets qu’ils abordent comprennent la diplomatie canadienne sur la question israélo-palestinienne aux Nations unies, l’impact de la communauté internationale et du Canada sur la consolidation de la paix israélo-palestinienne, la politique du Canada à l’égard des réfugiés palestiniens, l’aide au développement du Canada dans les territoires palestiniens occupés et un aperçu de la politique étrangère canadienne à l’égard aussi bien des Palestiniens que du PPMO. Cette introduction prépare le terrain pour leurs contributions en offrant d’abord un aperçu de la politique contemporaine du Moyen-Orient et de la place qu’y occupe Israël et la Palestine, y compris un bref compte-rendu des efforts de consolidation de la paix aujourd’hui. Elle décrit aussi la contribution non négligeable du Canada à la politique du Moyen-Orient et au calme régnant entre Israël et la Palestine aujourd’hui, ainsi que l’impact de chacun d’entre eux sur le Canada. En résumé, les articles explorent chacun une facette unique et importante du développement continu de la politique étrangère canadienne à l’égard des Palestiniens et du PPMO.

Introduction

The year 2020 will be remembered for dramatic global events that brought to light both the precariousness of the existing world order and perils in its nature. Everywhere norms seem to be being challenged and social inequalities becoming more pronounced. The future well-being of hundreds-of-millions of people and the stability of entire regions are in question. For the first time in living memory, the Global North appears to be at the mercy to a calamitous event – a pandemic – that has wreaked havoc across the Global South. It already seems inevitable that 2020 will be remembered as a rare historical inflection point where the world changed irrevocably.

Events contributing to that inflection point include the United Kingdom’s formal withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit), the World Health Organisation (WHO) officially declaring COVID-19 a pandemic, the polarizing United States presidential election, unprecedented curbs on civil liberties, and global protests such as ones for democracy in Hong Kong, for political change in Belarus, and against racism and police brutality in the United States. In addition, and as is often the case, many of the most important events of 2020 were centred on the Middle East. These include a Saudi-Russian oil price war that contributed to a collapse in the price of crude, a collapsing Lebanese economy and the devastating Beirut port disaster, the ongoing threat from violent Islamists, Turkey’s continuing intervention in Kurdish regions of northern Syria and Iraq, conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and ongoing, catastrophic civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen.

These were all taking place parallel to larger geopolitical struggles. One pitted Turkey, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Another prominent point of contestation is between Iran and its non-state allies, like Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Kata'ib Hizballah and Yemeni Huthis, against the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. That struggle threatened more than once to (d)evolve into a broader regional war following the United States’ 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord and a policy of “maximum pressure” wielded against Iran; the United States’ high profile assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq to start 2020; the sabotage of numerous Iranian nuclear and scientific installations in the summer of 2020; and the killing of the head of Iran’s scientific nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, during American Thanksgiving. That struggle is also indicative of the unprecedentedly open partnership between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Europe continued to invest billions of dollars in regional programming in search of stability in its Southern Neighbourhood and to keep refugees outside its borders, while Russia and China continued to take advantage of increasing United States retrenchment from a region it has dominated.

In light of the events outlined above, what better time to take stock and reflect on Canada’s historical, contemporary and future engagement in the Middle East, than through one of its primary entry points to the region, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and the Palestinians? This thematic special issue offers an overview of Canada’s relationships and role in this key part of the Middle East. The articles herein consider how Canada has articulated and actioned policy towards the Palestinians, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and the peace process, from the 1950s to the present day. It explores how Canadian policy in these areas materialized, both theoretically and in practice, and what this means for Canada in the region moving forward.

As has been the case since the end of the Second World War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to occupy a central position in regional political dynamics in 2020. On January 28th the Trump Administration’s much anticipated Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People (White House, 2020) was released. This was that Administration’s stab at an Israeli-Palestinian political settlement, which has long occupied an important place in United States foreign policy. Also known as “Trump’s Peace Plan” or, with Trumpian flair, “The Deal of the Century” (Inskeep, 2020), this plan represented a radical departure from past United States policy. It appeared specifically to eschew foundational principles undergirding the MEPP. That included appearing to side with Israeli claims over sovereignty of the entirety of Jerusalem, annexation of large swathes of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and against the legal status of millions of Palestinian refugees. Under Peace to Prosperity, the Palestinians would be left with limited autonomy on a scattering of isolated bantustans whose composure is often referred to in diplomatic circles as resembling the holes in “Swiss cheese.” The details of the plan are in fact so one-sided, it has been referred to in some circles as a, “unilateral statement of the terms for Palestinian surrender” (see Viveash’s article in this issue for a broader discussion of the plan). It could reasonably be argued it is the most one-sided proposal for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since proposals began to be made under British colonial rule nearly a hundred years ago.

Peace to Prosperity was also remarkable for its profound ignorance of the historical and contemporary issues related to the MEPP, and in particular issues fundamental to the Palestinian cause, such as: their aspirations toward national self-determination, a sense of injustice over the original partition of historical Palestine in 1948, a population half-of-which has been forced to live stateless without protection as refugees, and a feeling of abandonment by the international community. In return, the plan sought to placate Palestinians with modest economic promises in return for their giving up on their rights (Amnesty, 2020); a path long trodden when United States administrations try to maintain the status quo. This was proposed while the United States punished the Palestinians by withdrawing hundreds-of-millions of dollars in annual aid appropriations, intrinsic to meeting Palestinian and refugee needs (MEMO, 2021). The United States was wielding aid as a tool to force Palestinians to accede to the new Trump Administration “peace” model in an economy that has been made dependent on foreign aid inflows (Amr, 2018), following decades of well-documented “de-development” of the Palestinian economy under Israeli rule (Nakhleh, 2004; Roy, 1995, 1999; Tartir & Seidel, 2018; Tartir, Dana, & Seidel, 2021).

Peace to Prosperity proved controversial among the international community and even among Israelis (Lazaroff, 2020a), given its one-sided nature and how it seemed to guarantee the end of a two-state solution that all internationally legitimate Israeli-Palestinian peace plans have been based upon. This should not be unexpected for a Trump Administration that was not shy to court controversy and often proved challenging to work with for perhaps the closest and most loyal ally of the United States, Canada. Just as with the North American Free Trade Agreement (now the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement) and its economic rivalry with China, the Trump Administration’s approach to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding was one of many important factors that further challenged Canada’s ability to cling to a rules-based order while maintaining its post-World War II-tethering to United States global leadership.

Historical ties to the Middle East that define Canada as a country

Despite limited scholarship on Canada and the Middle East, the region is important to Canada. Since 1947, Canada has not only been an actor in the Middle East, but at times an important one (Dekar, 1987, p. 2). Already in the 1980s some leading scholars, like Abu-Laban, went so far to describe the Middle East as a traditional area of concern for Canada (Abu-Laban, 1988, p. 116), a view which seemed to be reinforced in government circles at that time (Stanfield, 1980). Those connections include demographic linkages that have only grown since the 1980s. Now over one million Canadians identify as Arab (Statistics Canada, 2017). Likewise, there are notable Kurdish, Armenian-, Turkish-, Israeli- and Iranian-Canadian communities. The majority of the professed faiths in Canada are of Abrahamic derivation, which for millions of Canadians creates a natural sense of connection to the “Holy Land.” This is relevant for Canada’s dominant Christian denominations, a sizable and established Jewish community, and a rapidly growing Muslim one. Canada has consequential foreign policy ties to the region, too. As the articles in this journal describe, that includes to the MEPP and to the Palestinians. In fact, engagement with the region has been so impactful on Canada that it has shaped Canada’s very identity as a state independent from the British Empire, just as Canadians shaped the future composure of Israel and Palestine at the partition of British Mandatory Palestine. Indeed, it would be hard to envisage Canada’s international identity without the Middle East.

Canada: the Foundation of Israel and Suez Crisis

Canada’s early engagement with the Middle East was limited and done mostly in service of the interests of the British Empire. Arguably, and leaving religious connectedness aside, Canadians had in that time shown little concern for the region, with one exception when, as Eayrs in 1957 wrote, “Some quickening of interest may be discerned since 1945, chiefly because of Canada's role as midwife’s helper at the birth of the state of Israel” (p. 97). There, Canada and powerful Canadians played intrinsic roles in the partition of what was British Mandatory Palestine. Supreme Court of Canada Justice (1943–59), Ivan C. Rand, was central in drafting a 1947 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) Majority Report, which proposed partitioning the land into separate Jewish and Palestinian states, with a slight majority of the land being awarded to the minority Jewish community (Khalidi, 1997, p. 11). This concept of partition has dominated most peace models to this day. Rand was also credited with bringing UNSCOP to adopt the Majority Report, as opposed to an UNSCOP Minority Report that called for a federal state (United Nations General Assembly, 1947). Another high level diplomat and future Prime Minister of Canada (1963–68), Lester B. Pearson, was chairman of the United Nations sub-committee responsible for establishing UNSCOP (Husseini, 2008, p. 41). He played a lead role in partition and the subsequent recognition of Israel as a state at the United Nations; while Canada recognized Israel in December 1948. As a result, “Zionists were so grateful to Canada and to Mr. Pearson for the part he played in the whole process that they called him ‘the Balfour of Canada’” (Report on Canada’s Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, p. 49). Zionism represents the ideological organizing principles behind the establishment of the state of Israel. The comparison to British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour was praise of the highest magnitude, for it was Balfour who in 1917 made the “Balfour Declaration” on behalf of the British government, promising the Jewish people a national home in what was Ottoman Palestine (Balfour, 1917).

Canadian interest toward the broader Middle East was aroused following the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal almost immediately after achieving full independence from the British Empire. The Canal was long a strategic transit point of global importance and had been dominated by British and French investors, and workers, since the era of British colonial rule (1882–1956). Britain and France thus conspired with Israel to provoke a military conflict with Egypt, to create the pretext for Britain and France to invade with the excuse of bringing order and peace “back” to the region. The true intention of the aggressor’s was to put an end to Egypt’s nationalization process and dispose of its anti-colonialist, pan-Arab nationalist President, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–70) (Scott, 1996, p. 27). The old tricks of once-Great Powers had though no place in the new world order and the operation happened to the dismay not only of the Egyptian people, but international public opinion and the world’s new Superpowers, the Soviet Union and United States.

Most nations around the world sided with Egypt, and the Soviet Union even threatened to use nuclear weapons. The United States was furious it had not been consulted in advance, with President Eisenhower threatening to throw Britain and France out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to sell off Sterling Bonds. The sale could have crashed the United Kingdom economy not long after a Second World War that left Britain broke. For Canada, this confrontation was extremely concerning because it threatened to undo the special transatlantic alliance that had developed between the United States and United Kingdom in winning the war. This was also a period of transition for Canada. The Suez Crisis came at a time when it was moving away from its historical role as loyal colony of Britain, to deepening ties with a new patron in the United States (Husseini, 2008, p. 43). For this reason, few events as the Suez Crisis would arouse as much anxiety in Canada since the Second World War (Eayrs, 1957, p. 102). As a matter of national foreign policy priority, Canada sprang into action in search of devising a way to maintain harmony in the transatlantic alliance by helping Britain to abandon its intentions for Egypt, while defusing the conflict in the Middle East and the United States’ displeasure with the United Kingdom. Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) (1948–57), Pearson would do this by proposing the world’s first large-scale United Nations peacekeeping force.

Pearson, a former president of the United Nations General Assembly 7th session (1952–53), had worked tirelessly over the years to strengthen the influence of the world body. If not for Soviet vetoes, he may have become its Secretary-General. Working in 1956 with the actual Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, Pearson sought to defuse the crisis by proposing a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to be stationed in Egypt and police the area, providing a way for Israel, France and the United Kingdom to withdraw with minimal loss of face and for Britain to preserve its close relationship with the United States. The invading countries’ troops would be replaced by UNEF forces, whose 6,000 person target strength, achieved by February 1957 (First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) – Background (Full Text), n.d.), was built around a core 1,100 Canadian troop deployment (Eayrs, 1957, p. 102).

There had been much debate in Canada over the correct course of action. Many loyalists, notably in the Progressive Conservative Party, were adamant about supporting the United Kingdom in its time of need. Pearson himself assured the Canadian public that the solution to the Suez Crisis had been sought out by Britain and actually worked in its favor (Lester Pearson & the Suez Crisis 2, n.d.). Meanwhile, there was almost unanimous acceptance in Canada of its newfound importance in world affairs, deriving from Pearson’s peacebuilding innovation. The achievement earned him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 and ushered in what is considered the “Golden Age” of Pearsonian diplomacy, which came to define Canada’s national identity on the world stage. There, Canada was perceived as an even-handed and fair-minded “peacemonger,” willing to leave its place in the western European camp in order to act as an interlocutor facilitating discussions that bridged the divide between communist East and capitalist West, and Global North and Global South (McKercher, 2014, p. 329).

Support for Israel and pragmatic multilateralism

In this Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s, Canadian leadership considered international bodies like the United Nations, NATO and British Commonwealth to be intrinsic to Canada’s security and national interests. That connection to those multilateral bodies became embedded in what we know as the Pearsonian approach to foreign policy. Through them, Canada felt it could play a more significant and independent role in world affairs, allowing it to “punch above its weight,” and this drove Canada to constructively contribute to the well-being of those bodies. Canadian leaders like Pearson and Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957–63) also understood they were living in a rapidly changing world (McKercher, 2014). With decolonization under way, global politics was becoming rapidly less European in character, and this would have a significant impact on international institutions like the United Nations and Commonwealth. By 1961, African, Asian, and Latin American members constituted two-thirds of the United Nations General Assembly. Decolonization in Africa and Asia transformed power relations in these organizations and placed racial discrimination at the top of their agendas. This was an important shift for Palestinians because decolonization was the prism through which the Global South perceived the Palestinian cause.

Diefenbaker was concerned about holding together a majority non-white Commonwealth, which he considered to be a force for good in the world. He felt Canada could not afford to sit back when crises arose in the international community over racial and postcolonial injustice. Worried that newly independent countries embittered against their former Imperial sovereigns in the capitalist West were susceptible to influence from a Soviet bloc that presented itself as a champion of decolonization, he, as well as Pearson, positioned Canada to become sensitive to the aspirations of the non-European peoples of the Global South. They went so far as to vote with the Global South at the United Nations even on positions Canada found unpalatable (McKercher, 2014, p. 336); while championing the universality of human rights (ibid, p. 330); something anathematic to the racist logic colonialism was built upon. This approach was evident when Canadian leaders stepped in during the Suez Crisis, concerned that, in addition to disrupting the transatlantic alliance, it could undermine the Commonwealth by pitting the white former dominions against the rest of its non-European membership.

By the mid-1960s the Middle East had become an important space for the formation of a Canadian national identity and “Pearsonianism” (Labelle, 2019, pp. 172–173). At the same time, Ottawa made “Israel’s right to exist and prosper” a key tenet of Canadian diplomacy, even if this led many to declare Canada, “3/4 impartial on the Israeli side” (ibid, p. 173). Though that contributed to Canada being a notable supporter of Israel, this support was not unflinching. Canada had opposed Israel’s acquisition of territory from Egypt – including the Gaza Strip – during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and also opposed Israel’s acquisition of the OPT – the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip – by force in the 1967 Six-Day War. For this reason, Canada backed United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (S/RES/242), which called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and a negotiated settlement among the warring parties. Canada was also one of the earliest and largest providers of Palestinian aid. From 1950 to 1969, Canada was the third largest contributor to the United Nations Refugee and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (Forsythe, 1971, p. 39). UNRWA’s first Commissioner General in 1949 was also a Canadian, Major General Howard Kennedy (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993b, p. 11).

Still, Arabs were growing frustrated with Canada during this period, and criticized Pearson’s self-proclaimed “even-handedness” because it seemed to favor Israeli actions at the expense of Arab human dignity (Labelle, 2019, p. 171). Even though Canada still saw itself as able to play the peacekeeper role, which requires a sense of neutrality, there was a,

[C]ertain resistance from Arab states to what they perceived to be the lack of balance in Canada’s approach – on the one hand, a deep commitment to the state of Israel with no parallel commitment to the rights of Palestinians to a homeland, and on the other, its minimal relations and trade with the Arab states of the area. (Report on Canada’s Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, p. 50)

As Palestinians pursued their claims for self-determination, this still did not figure as a major element in either S/RES/242 or Canadian policy, other than as, “amorphous ‘refugees’ in need of a ‘just settlement’ to their plight” (Brynen, 2007, p. 74). By 1967 and 1973, Egypt was at odds with Canada over UNEF and especially Canada’s presence in it. As a result, in 1973 during the Arab oil embargo of nations perceived to be pro-Israel, shipments to Canada were cut by 22 percent as it was classified as a “neutral” country that was generally pro-Israel in its policies (Report on Canada’s Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, p. 51). This was at a time when Arab oil accounted for 25 percent of Canadian imports (Report on Canada’s Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, p. 51).

Canada’s image took a particular turn for the worse when in 1979 a short-lived Joe Clark Progressive Conservative government came to power with a campaign pledge to move Canada’s embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which would effectively recognize Israeli conquest of 1967 OPT territory by force. Such a one-sided move provoked a Saudi-led a regional backlash from the Arab world. That in turn led to the appointment of former Progressive Conservative Party leader (1967–76), Robert L Stanfield, as “Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa,” who almost immediately recommended Canada return to a more fair-minded and constructive Middle East policy (Stanfield, 1980).

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process

The Jerusalem Embassy crisis exposed a fault line in Canadian politics, as well as amongst those who took an interest in the Middle East. However, Stanfield’s recommendations and follow-up by the Clark government, and then successive PE Trudeau Liberal (1980–84), Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative (1984–93) and Jean Chrétien Liberal (1993–2003) governments, would represent what many considered a return to a more traditional Pearsonian approach to global affairs. The process of making this return, described by Robinson in this collection, would position Canada to become an important and potentially constructive actor in the Middle East, this time through the United States-led Oslo Peace Process at the center of the MEPP. Thus, Canada was one of only twelve countries invited at the foreign ministerial level to the White House in 1993 for the signing ceremony of the Oslo I accord, which External Affairs said (at the time) reflected Canada’s credentials earned over forty-five years from its commitment to the Middle East and its having, “consistently kept the door open to all parties in the region” (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993a, p. 2). This approach allowed Canada to take on important leadership roles in some of the most sensitive political aspects of the peace process, such as acting as the Gavel holder (chair) of the Refugee Working Group (1992–96) and becoming the sponsor of the Ottawa Track II Process (1997–2000).

By 1993, the Government of Canada would state, “Canada has strongly supported the State of Israel since its foundation in 1948 and is firmly committed to that country’s well-being as an independent state in the Middle East, within secure and recognised boundaries” (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993b, p. 18). Yet, that did not mean Canada supported Israel’s claim over parts of the OPT, including East Jerusalem. Canada’s position in November 1993 was, and save for the last sentence, largely remains,

Canada does not recognise permanent Israeli control over the territories occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip) and opposes all unilateral actions intended to predetermine the outcome of negotiations, including the establishment of settlements in the territories and unilateral moves to annex East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Canada considers such actions to be contrary to international law and unproductive to the peace process. (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993b, p. 22)

Though no longer in the top-three of donors to UNRWA, by 1993, the Government of Canada estimated it had provided a total of $202 million to the United Nations organization (External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993b, p. 16).

Even after Conversative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006–15) embraced a partisan pro-Israel approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict, Canada remained quite engaged with the Palestinians as one of the international community’s top sources of Palestinian development aid (Wildeman, 2018, p. 154; 2020). In fact, of the over $CAD 1 billion in aid Canada spent on the Palestinians between the 1996/97 and 2018/19 financial years (Wildeman, 2020), the Harper government still accounts more than half of that spending. Under the Harper government, Canada also continued – though perhaps reluctantly and below the proverbial “radar” of Cabinet – to support the Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI), a research project aimed, “at providing practical and fair solutions to the Old City of Jerusalem, one of the most contentious and significant issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (University of Windsor, n.d.).

The JOCI was a sort of spiritual successor, on a smaller scale, to the political work Canada had supported under the Mulroney and Chrétien governments. It was an unofficial, but government funded “Track II” project designed to provide ideas for the resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians over Jerusalem’s Walled Old City and the overlapping holy sites it contains. Established by three recently retired Canadian diplomats – Michael James Molloy, Michael Dougall Bell and John Bell – near the end of the Chrétien government – in October 2003 – JOCI employed a combination of workshops, commissioned studies and intensive consultations involving Israeli, Palestinian and international peace negotiators and subject matter experts, to develop ideas for a “special regime” to manage the most sensitive aspects of the Old City. Between 2003 and 2012, JOCI working groups worked out in-depth proposals for the governance and security of the Old City and its Holy Sites under a neutral (third party) administrator overseen by a governance board (Molloy, 2021). The design work included suggestions for an international police force, access to the holy sites, coordination of religious events, archaeology, property transfer, dispute resolution, planning and zoning, utilities and an economic framework (ibid.). The JOCI’s proposals were widely disseminated to policy communities in Israel, the Palestinian Authority/ Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Middle East, the European Union and United States. According to Michael James Molloy, its documentation supported Secretary John Kerry’s final efforts to revive the peace process in the second term of the Obama Administration (Molloy, 2021).¹

By the early 2010s, the Harper government’s policy towards Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had become, “the ‘center of gravity’ of Canadian policy towards the broader Middle East, influencing Ottawa’s approach to the entire region” (Musu, 2012, p. 72). There the “Harper Doctrine” operated, in part, on a belief that previous governments had wrongly “gone along to get along” with Israel’s critics on the world stage (Chapnick, 2016, p. 106). From another point of view, his Conservative government was specifically eschewing the approach taken by previous Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments of empathizing with Global Southern viewpoints in Middle East affairs. It also reflected what Chapnick (2016) refer to as Harper’s “visceral feeling that dogmatically supporting” Israeli interests was simply the right thing to do, regardless of its political cost, irrespective of the number of Conservative members of Parliament seated in the House of Commons and even sometimes without consideration for the expressed concerns of Israelis themselves (Ibid). As described by several articles in this collection, this contributed to a shift in Canadian voting patterns at the United Nations from somewhat sympathetic for the Palestinians – a prevalent viewpoint in the international community – to an overtly pro-Israel stance. This has left Canada voting ever since with a tiny group of states on issues related to Israel and Palestine, that could be counted on two hands, such as Australia, Israel, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru and the United States (United Nations, 2020).

The Middle East Peace Process today

Nearly three decades since Canada’s involvement in the MEPP began and nearly a year since the release of the flagrantly biased Peace to Prosperity, today many have proclaimed the MEPP to be either moribund or, at best, on life support (see Viveash commentary in this collection). In addition to a collapse of the peace process, Palestinians are facing a crisis in leadership with generally low confidence in the Palestinian Authority (Survey Research Unit, 2018, 2020). Adding to the breakdown in the MEPP and domestic politics, 2020 ushered in a new wrecking ball: COVID-19. At the time of writing this introduction, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have handled the COVID-19 virus remarkably well compared to states that enjoy more freedom and have many more resources to draw from. This is despite early fears that the virus would wreak devastation on a population rendered generally quite vulnerable by an occupation that deprives them of the resources they need to deal with any crisis (Tartir & Hawari, 2020). From a more cynical point of view, Palestinians are also a population that has for generations become accustomed to strict lockdowns (Ayyash, 2020). So, they were arguably more prepared for what fighting COVID-19 would entail.

Success at containing the virus did earn Palestinian Prime Minister Shtayyeh and the Palestinian Authority some early domestic accolades after they acted quickly and early, declaring a state of emergency on March 5th (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2020). In fact, their approach was effective enough internally that the early primary source for COVID-19 transmissions ended up being Palestinian workers returning from Israeli construction areas (Tartir & Hawari, 2020). Still, the full impact of how COVID-19 will play out is to be seen and the expectation Western countries will be struggling with their own domestic economic situation suggests aid assistance to the OPT could diminish in the years to come. This could carry significant unforeseen political implications on an often aid-reliant economy.

The status of Peace to Prosperity is meanwhile uncertain. Trump lost the November 2020 United States election, won by a Biden Administration that is likely to re-embrace many of the underlying tenets of the MEPP, such as support for Palestinian refugees and the two-state solution (Magid & Boxerman, 2021). At the same time, it is unlikely to expend significant political capital on Israel-Palestine peacebuilding owing to other significant domestic priorities. Pushback from Europe and international public opinion (Lovatt, 2020), did however lead the Netanyahu government in Israel to put de jure annexation of 30 percent of the OPT on hold (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2020). In return and as a public reward, the United Arab Emirates offered to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords.

This would be a breakthrough for Israel, which had only normalized relations in the region with Jordan (1994) and Egypt (1978). This was also an opportunity for Israel and the Emirates to become public with their unofficial working relationship, which it had been difficult to be open about in the past given how strong sympathies were, and remain, in the Arab world for the Palestinians cause (El-Kurd, 2020). For example, Egypt was once suspended from the Arab League (1979–89) for first making peace with Israel, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 over his role in normalizing relations. Meanwhile, the 1994 agreement with Jordan remains unpopular in a country where the status of the OPT and Palestinian statehood are treated as “high” national security issues (Badarin, 2020).

Bahrain would soon follow the Emirates at normalization, almost certainly at the behest of their Saudi patrons (Najjar, 2020), and on 15th September 2020 they participated in an Abraham Accords signing ceremony on the White House Lawn, alongside the Emirates, United States and Israel. Sudan and Morocco have since joined the Accords, and all actors did this in return for goods provided by the United States. For the Emirates, this included being allowed to purchase the most modern F-35 fighter jets (Wrigley, 2020); for Sudan, being removed from the American state sponsor of terrorism listing; and the United States recognized Morocco’s occupation and annexation of the Western Sahara, at the expense of the native Sahrawi people (Goldberg, 2020; Jakes, 2020).

Polling indicates Palestinians overwhelmingly rejected a process of normalization which they perceive as occurring at their expense, with a majority describing it as a betrayal (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2020). The Accords indeed represent a break from the 2002 Saudi-led Arab Peace Initiative that, like the MEPP and S/RES/242, put forth a land-for-peace formula proposing Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (with East Jerusalem as its capital) in exchange for Arab normalization of relations with Israel. By contrast, the Abraham Accords appear to trade away Palestinian land and rights, in exchange for limited Arab-Israeli détente.

For its part, the Netanyahu government has not backed away from its annexation plans. For one, it has continued to approve the construction of thousands of new settlement homes in the OPT (Staff & AFP, 2020). Second, it suggested on numerous occasions that annexation is only temporarily on hold. For instance, Israel’s Ambassador to both the United Nations and the United States, Gilad Erdan, explicitly stated that annexation may still happen (T.O.I. Staff, 2020), while Netanyahu himself suggested annexation is still on the proverbial table (Lazaroff, 2020b). Even United States Ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, was quoted as saying annexation had not been canceled (Abu Toameh, 2020).

While Palestinians may perceive the Abraham Accords as a betrayal, the Trudeau government celebrated the agreement (Global Affairs Canada, 2020b), describing it as a historic and positive step toward peace and security (Global Affairs Canada, 2020a). As with the Netanyahu government, the Accords were a welcome opportunity for Canada to escape from a tricky political situation. Despite Canada’s muted public response to annexation (Dyer, 2020), it posed a threat to international law and the rules-based international order the Trudeau government has promised to reinforce (Sands & Carment, 2019). Formal annexation may have forced Canada to take a stronger stance against it or risk consequences for its international image by remaining silent. As such, Minister of Foreign Affairs Champagne would state the Government of Canada was pleased Israel had announced its decision to suspend annexation of parts of the West Bank and that,

As a friend and ally of Israel and a friend to the Palestinian people, Canada remains strongly committed to a two-state solution, including the creation of a Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel, and a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. (Global Affairs Canada, 2020a)

The threat annexation posed for Canada’s foreign policy is not light speculation. As happened in 1979 and is described by Wildeman in this collection, Canada’s Israel-Palestine policies impact on how Canada does business in the Middle East and on its foreign affairs more broadly, for example, in fora such as the United Nations.

In 2020, Canada was competing for two open seats on the United Nations Security Council against two smaller competitors, Ireland and Norway, which are known for their constructive engagement in world affairs and robust development aid budgets. Since Canada last competed unsuccessfully for a seat in 2010, Ireland and Norway have consistently had a foreign policy record that is more in line with international law and support for human rights for Israel-Palestine, as compared to Canada, which had one of the worst. That matters in a United Nations General Assembly that is dominated by nations of the Global South, which often identify with and advocate for Palestinians. Once seemingly a lock for election to the body because of its past commitment to multilateralism, the unthinkable happened when Canada lost to Portugal and Germany in its 2010 bid for a seat, ending a streak of sitting on the council once per decade (“CBC”, 2010). That loss was blamed in part on the Harper Conservative government’s shift in Middle East policy from one perceived as being fair-minded toward all actors in the region, to being partisan pro-Israel (“CBC”, 2010).

Despite a rhetorical shift by the Trudeau government promising a return to a traditional Pearsonian approach, which the Harper government had specifically rejected, the gap between image and reality has been so gaping that questions abounded among Canadians themselves if Canada was even worthy of its bid for the seat (Kimber & Kirk, 2020). There was even an energetic campaign led by Canadian civil society groups against their own country’s bid. That campaign attracted supporters that included over one hundred organizations and international personalities, such as Noam Chomsky and former Pink Floyd guitarist Roger Waters (also see Spitka’s commentary in this collection). One of the campaign’s key arguments was,

Since 2000 Canada has voted against 166 UN General Assembly resolutions critical of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. Ireland and Norway haven’t voted against a single one of these resolutions. Additionally, Ireland and Norway have voted yes 251 and 249 times respectively on resolutions related to Palestinian rights during this period. Canada has managed 87 yes votes, but only two since 2010. (Just Peace Advocates, 2020)

The campaign raised so much concern that Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations felt compelled to write a letter to his fellow Ambassadors addressing it (Blanchard, 2020). Whatever impact the campaign and issue of Palestine had, it was a remarkable affair and Canada lost its 2020 bid even more handily than in 2010.

Articles in this special edition

This special issue fills a gap in the academic literature on Canada’s relationship to the Palestinians, while adding to the limited scholarship on Canada’s approach to the MEPP and Middle East generally. Moreover, this issue is unique in that it brings together scholarly articles from the academy, as well as pieces by Canadian diplomats and other civil servants deeply involved in representing Canada and its approach to the MEPP. These past and present foreign policy officials offer first-hand accounts of the “front lines” of Canadian diplomacy in the region.

By bringing together the intellectual reflections of these diverse contributors, who altogether have extensive firsthand experience with the topic being explored, this collection provides a holistic look that will be useful to Canadian officials considering new ways of engaging in the region. Much has been written about the divide in scholar-practitioner interactions. This critique rests on grievances from both sides: with scholars accusing policymakers of falling short in applying context specific decision-making, failing to universally uphold the Government’s commitments, and lacking in-depth theoretical rigor; while policy makers and practitioners accuse scholars of failing to provide policy relevant recommendations from their often-hypercritical theorizing and ivory tower navel-gazing. As Bertucci, Borges-Herrero & Fuentes-Julio (2014) argue, “scholars and practitioners in this field tend to talk past each other, with little impact in either direction” (p. 56). This thematic special issue, however, offers a different approach. By bringing together the practitioner’s emphasis on experience and the scholar’s emphasis on theory and research, the fruits of their interaction paints a more informed, well-rounded picture of Canadian engagement. While each tackles a unique and important facet of Canadian foreign policy, these research articles and policy commentaries work together to argue for a more consistent articulation and application of Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the MEPP.

Former Canadian diplomats, Michael Molloy, Andrew Robinson, and David Viveash offer readers a chance to “peak behind the curtain” of Canadian foreign policy through three key historical moments, respectively: the admittance of Palestinian refugees in 1955–1956, Canada’s policy toward the PLO and recognition of Palestinian self-determination in 1989, and Canada’s involvement in the Madrid Peace Process in 1991 and subsequent role in the MEPP.

Michael Molloy served as the Canadian Coordinator of the Middle East Peace Process (2000–2003), was the Ambassador of Canada to Jordan from 1996 to 2000, a founding member of the Multilateral Refugee Working Group, and Co-Director of the Jerusalem Old City Initiative. In his policy commentary, “False Start: Canada’s Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees, 1955–1956,” Molloy sheds new light and offers new analysis on the details of an unusual 1956 Palestinian refugee movement to Canada, describing important historical processes and events around Palestinian refugees that are relevant to this day. This includes the centrality refugees will play in the success of any peace process, and Canada’s early experiences and former emphasis on that issue. His article also provides context for the way in which race and identity have helped shape Canadians’ views of immigration and foreign policy.

During his time as a 36-year career diplomat, Andrew Robinson served as Chairperson to the Refugee Working Group, and Director General and Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (1995–2000). He also served at the Canadian diplomatic mission in Beirut during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Speaking with first-hand experience and intimate familiarity, in his policy commentary, “Talking with the PLO: Overcoming Political Challenges,” Robinson outlines the Canadian domestic and international events surrounding SSEA Joe Clark’s announcement that Canada would, in 1989, recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination. Likewise, Canada chose to lift remaining restrictions on dialogue with the PLO, which would allow Canada to open formal dialogue with them and thus be able to contribute to international peacebuilding efforts. These were controversial moves, but were vital in setting the stage for Canada to play an active and constructive role in the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process, and were in Canada’s national interests.

Robinson’s piece segues into David Viveash’s policy commentary where he raises the important question, “Has President Trump Killed the Middle East Peace Process?” There Viveash, the Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian Embassy to Israel (1995–1998) and the Canadian Representative to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah from (2006–2008), reviews the evolution of the Madrid Peace Process since 1991 through subsequent decades of the MEPP, placing particular emphasis on lessons learned from Canada’s role in the multilateral negotiations. After reviewing Canada’s initial response to Peace to Prosperity, Viveash considers ways in which Canada might influence the debate going forward and ponders if the Trump Administration’s proposal may finally have marked the end of the MEPP.

In “Assessing Canada’s foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019,” Dr Jeremy Wildeman, a research fellow at the Human Rights Resource and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, and a Middle East research analyst with nearly a decade of experience as a development practitioner in the West Bank, describes how Canada has two different approaches it may adopt at different times in its Middle East foreign policy towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. One is considered a more traditional and fair-minded “Pearsonian” approach, which is centred on multilateralism, and where Canada seeks to build bridges and peace by acting as an interlocutor between its Western allies and countries in the Global South/ Middle East. The other is a more partisan, “Harperian” approach, which is centered on bilateral relationships built on a foundation of (perceived) shared values with “like-minded” Western democracies. That approach is taken at the expense of states or non-state groups like the Palestinians, usually from the Global South, who are not considered like-minded.

In his article, “The International Community’s Role and Impact on the Middle East Peace Process,” pracademic Dr Michael Atallah, a Senior Middle East Analyst at the Privy Council Office of the Government of Canada argues – in a personal capacity – that foreign donors to the Palestinians, including Canada, have played a lead role in shaping and maintaining a turbulent status quo in Israel-Palestine, while propping up global consensus for a near moribund two-state solution. This is tied to their failure to challenge their own assumptions and to adapt to changing realities as the conditions necessary for peace deteriorated around them. This led to a gaping chasm between theoretical aims for peace-building and what was actually happening. This, he maintains, resulted in a process that ultimately undermines peace while permanently damaging the credibility of the international community. He further argues this pushed Palestinians further away from the prospect of self-determination, while allowing Israel to maintain a status quo that endangers its own long-term security.

In their article, “Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” University of Ottawa Professor Costanza Musu and Cornell doctoral candidate Amelia Arsenault describe how Canada has articulated and pushed its views of Israel-Palestine at the United Nations, balancing between sometimes contradictory priorities. In offering this description, the authors note that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long occupied a central place in Canada’s Middle East policy, and how Ottawa has seen itself as an “honest broker” in it. In the process, Musu and Arsenault offer a useful historical account of the lineage of Canada’s United Nations voting and foreign policy.

In her article, “The Personal is Political!: Exploring the Limits of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy Under Occupation and Blockade,” University of Ottawa doctoral candidate Emma Swan draws on her recent field research in the OPT and enters into a detailed discussion of Justin Trudeau’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, arguing that the technocratic and apolitical approach Canada adopts in its development and humanitarian interventions in the Gaza Strip is at odds with the Liberal government’s commitment to feminist-informed international assistance. This calls into question the extent to which the Trudeau government’s quixotic policy espouses fundamental feminist principles related to the political drivers of insecurity faced by women. Swan argues that for Gaza, this renders Canada’s assistance inadequate in addressing the most pressing political-structural factors driving aspects of women’s insecurity, such as Israeli occupation and blockade.

As a former officer on the Middle East Desk for the now shuttered Canadian International Development Agency, University of Ottawa Professor Ruby Dagher fills an important void related to Canada’s role in the economic de-development of the OPT in her article, “Canada’s Economic Assistance to the OPT: Ideology, Politics, and Flawed Responses.” While providing a historical assessment of the economic challenges Palestinians have faced, Dagher argues that Canada’s actions, like that of other donors, have allowed and even contributed to Israel being able to undertake actions that come at a significant economic cost to the Palestinians. Those actions include undermining the possibility of Palestinian economic development and the emergence of a self-sustaining Palestinian economy. Dagher argues this stems from Canada’s unwillingness to engage with the real problems affecting Palestinians and a lack of political will to do something about them, perhaps owing to Canada’s close alignment with Israel.

Finally, Dr Timea Spitka, is a senior fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and a research specialist of human security and of children in conflict, who has extensive practitioner’s experience, including in Israel-Palestine. She offers a policy commentary interrogating Canada’s image as a normative leader in human rights, human security and gender, versus its tendency to waver on those principles when applied to Israel. Spitka argues that taking sides has not helped to promote peace or reduce conflict, that the best route to security for Israel itself is peace and universal human security, and that Canada could re-engage as a constructive peacebuilder – if it so chose.

Indeed, despite a pessimistic forecast about Canadian Middle East policy and regional peacebuilding among the contributions in this collection, the belief that Canada can, should and has done better is a unifying ideal interwoven among them.

Conclusion

The Middle East has, and remains, important to Canada. Likewise, as many of the contributors to this special edition lay out, Canada has at times been able to play a constructive role in the region, and specifically in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There have been periods where Canada has either not been a constructive party or even been a part of the problem. This is not a simple foreign policy relationship.

We need to note that the contributions in this special edition do not focus on the domestic politics of Israel-Palestine in Canada or Canada’s relationship with Israel. While some of the contributors touch upon those factors in their analysis, we make this caveat while recognizing that those issues have become deeply politicized and at times, strongly contested among Canadians. We also recognize the challenge of credibly addressing any aspect of Palestine, the MEPP or the Middle East in Canadian policy, given the career pressure academics face to avoid discussion of it (Bahdi, 2020; Selley, 2021; Zine, Bird, & Matthews, 2020). For that same reason, Canada’s Palestine, MEPP and Middle East policies are automatically rendered important topics for scholarly exploration.

As the authors of this collection demonstrate, since the creation of the State of Israel and the genesis of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Canada has played an important role in seeking solutions to the issues most germane to the question of peace. It is clear from this thematic special issue that as a country, throughout the decades, Canada has often traversed a simplistic “pro-Israel”/“pro-Palestinian” divide, versus a more nuanced, people-centric approach. With many examples of inconsistencies in Canadian foreign policy addressing the Palestinians and the MEPP, and fewer examples of Canada providing laudable leadership in these areas, what remains stable is its sustained involvement in the region.

Given its historical track record of involvement, it is safe to assume Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to elicit attention and involvement on the part of the Canadian Government. The extraordinary events of 2020, including the release of Peace to Prosperity, may be a catalyst for Canada to redefine its policy towards the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding; there may even be signs of this taking place.

Acknowledgements

The guest editors would also like to thank Professor David Carment for his indelible patience and sage support making this special edition journal a reality, Marshall Palmer for his assiduous assistance in seeing all the articles through to publication and all of the contributors for their personal insights and collective wisdom. This collection was inspired out of a Symposium held at the University of Ottawa in February 2019, exploring Canada’s historical and contemporary relationship with the Palestinians. It was co-organised by Dr Jeremy Wildeman (then University of Bath), Professor Nadia Abu-Zahra (University of Ottawa), Professor Reem Bahdi (University of Windsor), Professor Michael Lynk (University of Western Ontario) and Omar Burgan. Most of the articles in this thematic special issue were first presented at the gathering.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeremy Wildeman

Jeremy Wildeman, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Human Rights Resource and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa.

Emma Swan

Emma Swan, Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholar, is a PhD candidate at the School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa.

Notes

1 A history of the Initiative and its main proposals can be found in Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Old City Initiative (Najem, Molloy, Bell & Bell, 2017a). Companion volumes, Governance and Security in Jerusalem (Najem, Molloy, Bell, & Bell, 2018) and Contested Sites in Jerusalem (Najem, Molloy, Bell, & Bell, 2017b) contain JOCI’s commissioned studies. For an analysis of the JOCI and two other Jerusalem proposals see, “Transcript for ‘Is Peace Possible?’ Chapter 4: Jerusalem” (Krieger, 2011).