“All in” climate regime: federated states as autonomous participants to the Paris Agreement the cases of Québec and California

ABSTRACT

In a context where the province of Québec (Canada) and the state of California (United States of America) have committed to take ambitious actions in line with the Paris Agreement independently of their central government, this paper asks whether these federated states are truly implementing the provisions of the Paris Agreement in their own jurisdictions. This paper first describes the climate regime’s gradual expansion beyond United Nations member states to a form of “all in” multilevel and polycentric climate governance. It then identifies what the Paris Agreement expects of signatory Parties and presents case studies of Québec and California to assess whether they meet its provisions. The analysis reveals that both are indeed implementing the key provisions of the Paris Agreement in their own jurisdiction. These findings confirm that some federated states, as part of their paradiplomatic climate strategies, acts as autonomous actors within the global climate regime structured around the Paris Agreement. More broadly, these findings demonstrate the role and contribution of subnational governments in helping to bridge the effort gap to provide an adequate response to the climate emergency.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans un contexte où la province de Québec (Canada) et l'État de Californie (États-Unis d'Amérique) se sont engagés à prendre des mesures ambitieuses, conformément à l'Accord de Paris et indépendamment de leur gouvernement central, cet article pose la question de savoir si ces États fédérés mettent réellement en œuvre les dispositions de l'Accord de Paris dans leurs propres juridictions. Cet article décrit tout d'abord l'expansion progressive du régime climatique au-delà des États membres des Nations-Unies vers une forme de gouvernance climatique multiniveaux et polycentrique « all-in ». Il identifie ensuite ce que l'Accord de Paris attend des parties signataires et présente des études de cas du Québec et de la Californie pour évaluer s'ils répondent à ses dispositions. L'analyse révèle que tous deux mettent effectivement en œuvre les principales dispositions de l'Accord de Paris dans leur propre juridiction. Ces résultats confirment que certains États fédérés agissent, dans le cadre de leurs stratégies para-diplomatiques sur le climat, comme des acteurs autonomes au sein du régime climatique mondial structuré autour de l'Accord de Paris. Plus largement, ces résultats démontrent le rôle et la contribution des gouvernements sous-nationaux pour aider à combler l'écart dans l'effort visant à apporter une réponse adéquate à l'urgence climatique.

KEYWORDS:

• Paris Agreement
• climate regime
• polycentric governance
• federated states
• Québec
• California

Introduction

Adopted in December 2015, the Paris Agreement on climate change defines today’s global climate regime, delineating a series of “mandatory and non-mandatory provisions” for signatory Parties (Bolansky, 2016). Its scope is now nearly universal, having been ratified by nearly all UN member states. The stated goals of the Agreement are: “[holding] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C (…); [increasing] the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development (…); and [making] finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 2.1) Parties to the Agreement commit to regularly submitting national “contributions”, with the expectation that these aggregated contributions will eventually be sufficient to meet the goals of the Agreement. Achieving global climate targets therefore requires that all Parties make contributions that reflect their “highest possible ambition”, while considering different national circumstances (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 4.3).

To achieve these goals, the Paris Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21) also invites “non-Party stakeholders” (i.e. civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities) to “scale up their efforts” to combat climate change (Paris Agreement, 2015, section V). It thus recognizes the role of non-Party stakeholders to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the global effort to effectively address climate change. Their role is essential, as the mitigation and adaptation commitments of the Parties are, at present, clearly insufficient to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2020; UNEP, UNEP DTU Partnership, & World Adaptation Science Programme, 2020).

For many years now, academic circles have been interested in the role played by non-state actors in the fight against climate change (Bäckstrand, Kuyper, Linnér, & Lövbrand, 2017; Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; Jordan, Huitema, van Asself, & Forster, 2018; E. Ostrom, 2009; 2012; Rabe, 2010; Selin & Vandeveer, 2009; van der Heijden, Patterson, Juhola, & Wolfram, 2019). A clear consensus is emerging: adequately addressing climate change requires a multi-level and multi-scale approach, in which non-central government and non-state actors can and should play an active role. It can therefore be said that climate governance by and for central states alone is no longer sufficient to provide an adequate response to the climate emergency. In fact, this governance model is clearly a thing of the past, as several indicators show. Among others: the place given to non-Party stakeholders in the Paris Agreement, the growing number of non-state actors and non-central governments (i.e. cities, regions, federated states) that are implementing ambitious climate measures and policies, and the multiplication of paradiplomatic initiatives all around the world (Chaloux, Paquin, & Séguin, 2015; Eatmon, 2009; Leffel, 2018; Setzer, 2015).

To this end, some subnational governments have been particularly active for several decades now in the global climate regime. The Canadian province of Québec and the U.S. state of California namely are among the leading North American federated states fighting climate change both domestically and internationally. They have set their own GHG emission reduction targets independently of their central government, deployed their own tools and mechanisms to fight climate change, and entered into many bilateral and multilateral climate agreements on their own with foreign partners. More importantly, they have even committed to implementing policies to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, to which they are not Party as federated states. Québec nonetheless declared itself bound to the Paris Agreement in 2016, and California has committed to helping achieve its goals, including by co-creating the Under 2 Coalition (2015) and the U.S. Climate Alliance (2017). They have thus demonstrated their willingness to be considered as a full-fledged, autonomous paradiplomatic actor in the global climate regime.

In this context, it is worth looking at this commitment by Québec and California to the Paris Agreement. The following questions can be posited: To what extent do these federated states manage to implement autonomously the key provisions of the Paris Agreement within their jurisdiction? Consequently, what conclusions can we draw about the role and contribution of subnational governments and other “non-Party stakeholders” to the Paris Agreement and, more broadly, to the global fight against climate change?

To address these questions, we first review recent developments in the global climate regime that encourage subnational governments and other stakeholders to take on commitments of their own. We examine this gradual broadening of the regime from the perspective of recent academic literature on polycentric climate governance and climate paradiplomacy. We then review provisions contained in the Paris Agreement and illustrate, through a qualitative document analysis of recent climate policies and regulations, how Québec and California manage to implement them within their jurisdiction.¹ We finally discuss the role and contribution of subnational governments to the Paris Agreement and the global fight against climate change.

Section 1 – global climate change regime and polycentric governance

The global climate change regime is structured around the UNFCCC (1992). It originally focused on sovereign member states (referred to as “Parties”) and international multilateral organizations to implement decisions designed to meet the ultimate objective of the Convention to “[stabilize] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (UNFCCC, 1992), art. 2) However, this state-centered approach has rapidly shown its limits. Since the sources of GHG emissions causing climate change are distributed across societies, solutions depend on complex webs of interaction between political, economic, and social actors. Moreover, the implosion of the top-down, national-government-centred international climate regime at the 2009 UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen forced a reconsideration of this governance model.

Within academic circles, it was recognized, through the polycentric governance theory, that the regulation of a problem as complex as climate change needs to go beyond the simple traditional governance based on the nation state and also build upon initiatives at all levels of governance (Hale, 2018; E. Ostrom, 2009; Voß & Schroth, 2018). Indeed, as Elinor Ostrom (2009) observed, global issues negotiated at the global level are much more effectively dealt with when “backed up by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and local levels” (p. 4). This line of thinking, associated to the literature on polycentric governance theory, draws on early inquiries into alternative governance models. In the early 1960s, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) developed the concept of polycentric governance, where “multiple public and private organizations at multiple scales jointly affect collective benefits and costs.” (Ostrom, 2012, p. 355). As Elinor Ostrom points out, this polycentric governance approach is particularly appropriate in the fight against climate change because it:

encourages experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of methods for assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies adopted in one type of ecosystem and comparing these with results obtained in other ecosystems. A strong commitment to finding ways of reducing individual emissions is an important element for coping with climate change. (Ostrom, 2009, p. 39)

To this end, the need for such a multilevel and polycentric governance approach to climate change led to many experiments within the UN-led climate regime, such as the 2014 Lima-Paris Action Agenda, the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (2016), and innovative discussion platforms such as the Talanoa Dialogue (2017) designed to mobilize businesses, cities, regions, and local governments (Duggan, 2019). But more importantly, it led the Parties to the Paris Agreement to: “[recognize] the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislation of Parties, in addressing climate change” (Paris Agreement, 2015, p. 1).

However, it is worth mentioning that even before the 2015 Paris Agreement or even the implosion of the international climate regime in 2009, many subnational and non-state actors had been actively implementing programs, policies, initiatives, laws, and regulations aimed at addressing climate change and mitigating GHG emissions, both at the national and international levels. Many subnational governments, notably federated states, had, by that time, adopted their own climate action plans to curb GHG emissions within their jurisdictions (Chaloux et al., 2015; Rabe, 2010; Selin & Vandeveer, 2009). Many have also expanded their actions at the international level by deploying various paradiplomatic strategies to contribute to the fight against climate change (Chaloux & Séguin, 2011; Chaloux et al., 2015; Cunha & Rei, 2011; Eatmon, 2009; Setzer, 2015), thus contributing to this gradual expansion of the climate regime from a state-centric approach to a multilevel and polycentric “all in” form of climate governance.

Québec’s and California’s climate paradiplomacy

Over the last three decades, more and more infra-national jurisdictions have been actively implementing climate policies, with or without the support or encouragement of their national government. Many have also entered into what has been labelled climate paradiplomacy (Chaloux, 2010; Eatmon, 2009; Paquin, 2005), ² projecting themselves globally to find support for initiatives, offering expertise and sharing best practices, sometimes to protect their own interests, but more often to gain positive international exposure that reflects well domestically (Chaloux, 2017).

Québec and California have played very active roles in this area and are recognized for their leadership in North America and globally (Chaloux, 2016; Leffel, 2018). Both states, independently but also sometimes together, have joined, developed or signed multilateral climate initiatives such as the Western Climate Initiative (a collaborative initially focused on developing a cap and trade system in North America), the Climate Group, the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (now Regions4), and Regions Adapt (three multilateral organizations promoting best practices and intelligence sharing, and collaborating on policy development), as well as the Under2 Coalition (a global pledge for net-zero emissions by 2050).

More importantly, both states have adopted emission reduction targets and implemented innovative laws, policies and regulations to curb domestic sources of GHG emissions. For example, California has enacted the toughest regulations on the continent for emissions from vehicles, fuels and energy use by buildings and household appliances. Québec implemented one of the very first carbon levies in North America. Then, together they have introduced a cap-and-trade system covering 80% of the state and province’s emissions.

In addition, California and Quebec have chosen to further their international involvement in the global climate regime by committing to actively participate in the success of the Paris Agreement. California co-created the Under2 Coalition in 2015 and the U.S. Climate Alliance³ in 2017, two initiatives led by and for non-central governments that respectively aim to take “ambitious climate action in line with the Paris Agreement” and implement “policies that advance the goals of the Paris Agreement”. As for Québec, the province officially declared itself bound to the Paris Agreement in 2016⁴, thereby committing to implement it within its jurisdiction (Québec, 2016).

Since then, Québec and California have multiplied their policies, plans and measures to fight climate change, most often in accordance with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. They did so independently of their central government. As such, Québec and California are extremely interesting case studies for analyzing the extent to which non-central governments can play an active role in this now polycentric global climate regime.

To contribute to this discussion, will now examine whether Québec and California are truly implementing the provisions of the Paris Agreement in their jurisdiction. This will answer our question as to whether they are indeed acting as if they were Parties to the Agreement, and whether they can, for all practical purposes, be considered as such.

Section 2 – provisions of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement is an international treaty adopted in 2015 by the Parties to the UNFCCC. It sets a series of global goals designed to enhance the implementation of the Convention and “strengthen the global response to the treat of climate change”, more specifically: “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” (art. 2a); “increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development” (art. 2b); and “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (art. 2c).

To meet these global goals, the Paris Agreement creates a mix of “mandatory and non-mandatory” provisions for the Parties (Bolansky, 2016, p. 150). As Bodansky states:

The particular character of a provision is usually determined by the choice of verb: for example, ‘shall’ generally denotes that a provision in a treaty creates legal obligation, ‘should’ (and to a lesser degree, ‘encourage’) that the provision is a recommendation, ‘may’ that it creates a license or permission, and various non-normative verbs (such as ‘will, ‘are to’, ‘acknowledge’, and ‘recognized’) that the provision is a statement by the parties about their goals, values, expectations, or collective opinion. (Bolansky, 2016, p. 145)

As demonstrated by Bodansky, the Paris Agreement is clearly structured around these types of provisions: “legal obligations” (usually prefaced by the verb “shall”), non-mandatory “recommendations” (usually prefaced by the verb “should”), as well as permissions, statements, and so on (Bolansky, 2016, p. 145).

Some provisions of the Paris Agreement can be deemed applicable to the Parties as a collective, as in “All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies […]” (art. 4.19). Others explicitly apply to Parties individually, as in “Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication […]” (art. 7.10). Still others do not seem to address any Party or group of Parties in particular, as in “Support shall be provided to developing country Parties […]” (art. 4.5). For the purposes of this paper, we focus primarily on the so-called mandatory and non-mandatory provisions (i.e. obligations and recommendations) that explicitly and implicitly apply to individual Parties to the Agreement.

Key provisions of the Paris Agreement

For our analysis, we have grouped the provisions of the Paris Agreement into five categories. We present each category here along with the related articles from the Paris Agreement.

Table

Category 1: Emission reductions and reporting on Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
Aim
Reach global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible and achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removal by sinks of GHG in the second half of this century (art. 4.1)
Emission reductions
Obligations	Recommendations
Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDC and pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions (art. 4.2)	Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets (art. 4.4)All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (art. 4.19)
Reporting on NDC
Obligations	Recommendations
Each Party shall communicate a NDC every five years (art. 4.9), each one will represent a progression beyond the previous one and will reflect its highest possible ambition (art. 4.3)	In the context of their NDC, Parties should take into account existing methods and guidance under the Convention (art. 4.14)
Parties shall account for their NDC in a clear, transparent and understandable manner (arts. 4.13 and 4.8)

Table

Category 2: Adaptation and cooperation on adaptation
Aim
Enhancing adaptive capacity strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change (art. 7.1)
Adaptation
Obligations	Recommendations
Each Party shall engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions (art. 7.9)	Each Party should submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans, and action (arts. 7.10 and 7.11)
Cooperation on adaptation
Obligations	Recommendations
No direct obligation to the Parties	Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, notably, among others, through the sharing of information and assisting developing country Parties (art. 7.7)

Table

Category 3: Conservation and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs
Aim
Conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests (art. 5.1)
Obligations	Recommendations
No direct obligation to the Parties	Parties should take action to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests (art. 5.1)

Table

Category 4: Supporting developing country parties and reporting on support
Aim
Provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties (art. 9.1), give full effect to the development and transfer of technology (art. 10.1) and enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties (art. 11.1)
Supporting developing country Parties
Obligations	Recommendations
Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation (art. 9.1)^5	Developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a variety of sources, instruments and channels. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts (art. 9.3)
Parties shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer (art. 10.2)^6	No direct obligation to the Parties
No direct obligation to the Parties	Parties should enhance understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (art. 8.3)
No direct obligation to the Parties	All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties. Developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties (art. 11.3)
Reporting on support
Obligations	Recommendations
Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to climate finance and transparent and consistent information on their support to developing country Parties (arts. 9.5 and 9.7)	No direct obligation to the Parties
All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity building (art. 11.4)	No direct obligation to the Parties

Table

Category 5: Climate change education and awareness
Aim
Enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information (art. 12)
Obligations	Recommendations
Parties shall cooperate in taking measures to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information (art. 12).	No direct obligation to the Parties

Section 3 – implementing the Paris Agreement at subnational level: case studies of Québec and California

In this section, we analyze whether Québec and California, as subnational jurisdictions, meet this series of provisions and can be considered as a full-fledged, autonomous paradiplomatic actor in the Paris Agreement. To conduct this analysis, we reviewed key current climate change policy frameworks in Québec and California.

For Québec, we analyzed in detail the two climate change framework plans implemented by the province during the period from 2015 to 2021, namely the “Plan d’action 2013–2020 sur les changements climatiques” (PACC2020) and the “Plan pour une économie verte 2030” (PEV2030). We also looked at the 2021–2026 implementation plan for the PEV2030, which provided many details regarding the targets and budgets allocated under this policy framework. Finally, we also reviewed selected government bills, announcements and programs related to the five categories of Paris Agreement provisions outlined above.

We employed a similar method for the California case study. We focused primarily on the state's framework policies for mitigation (i.e. its 2017 Climate Change Scoping plan) and adaptation (i.e. its Safeguarding California Plan: 2018 Update – California’s Climate Adaptation Strategy), in addition to paying particular attention to California's laws that frame its response to climate change, including Assembly Bill 32. We also reviewed California's many international commitments and partnerships to address climate change.

This data collection allowed us to obtain an accurate picture of the current climate commitments and obligations of Québec and California. Ultimately, this led us to determine whether the actions implemented by both subnational jurisdictions were consistent with the provisions of the Paris Agreement.

Québec

Generally, our study of Québec’s climate policies and actions shows that it meets the majority of key provisions of the Paris Agreement.

Category 1: emission reductions and Reporting on NDC

Québec meets most of the provisions of this first category. The province has set an absolute economy-wide GHG emission reduction target of 37.5% under 1990 levels by 2030 (a target comparable, both in content and form, to an NDC), and the objective to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 (Québec, 2020). These targets meet provisions under articles 4.1, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.19 of the Paris Agreement, consistent with the long-term goal of achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks “in the second half of this century”.

In the fall of 2020, Québec passed Bill 44, entitled An Act mainly to ensure effective governance of the fight against climate change and to promote electrification, which includes the communication of a new climate change action plan every five years. This is consistent with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement. However, the law does not explicitly specify that mitigation targets contained in each successive climate plans should show a “progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution”, as stated in Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement. In its most recent climate action plan (PEV2030), Québec raised its reduction target for 2050 (net zero instead of 80%−95% below 1990 levels), but not for 2030 (still −37.5%). By doing so, Québec is not in full compliance with Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement.

Finally, the Government of Québec also publishes a national inventory of emissions by sources, as prescribed by articles 4.8, 4.13 and 4.14 of the Paris Agreement. This inventory has been published annually since 1992 and follows IPCC technical guidelines.⁵ Québec also publishes a yearly progress report on the implementation of its climate change action plan, thereby meeting the provisions under Article 4.13 to “account for its nationally determined contribution”.⁶

Category 2: adaptation and cooperation on adaptation

Québec appears to meet some, but not all, of the provisions in this second category. In 2012, the province adopted its first adaptation strategy with the goal of preparing to minimize the impacts of climate change (Québec, 2020). This strategy expired in 2020. As a result, Québec does not currently have a national adaptation plan. Its new PEV2030 nevertheless sets out some key adaptation priorities for the coming years and allocates $384 million by 2026 for adaptation actions (Québec, 2020). These guidelines are not detailed enough to fully comply with Article 7.9 of the Paris Agreement, but they do put Québec on track to comply with articles 7.10 and 7.11. To be fully compliant, Québec will have to present and update periodically a national adaptation strategy that includes specific and concrete policies and measures to be implemented.

Québec also works with the Ouranos Consortium to develop adaptation projects and tools related to climate change and vulnerability of communities, as well as to increase scientific knowledge on adaptation (art. 7.9c) (Ouranos, 2019).⁷ In doing so, Quebec also meets the provision recommending that Parties to the Paris Agreement cooperate on adaptation, as set out in Article 7.7. Moreover, Québec’s PEV2030 includes $23,5 million over five years to consolidate centres of expertise on adaptation, including $12.5 million over five years to strengthen the expertise and capacity of the Ouranos Consortium (Québec, 2020). It is also worth mentioning that the province is part of the RegionsAdapt initiative, a group of regional governments collaborating on adaptation.

Category 3: Conservation and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs

Québec now complies with provisions under this third category. Québec’s previous action plan (PACC2020) did not include any measures to conserve and strengthen carbon sinks and reservoirs. The PEV2030 now allocates $105.7 million over five years to: (1) avoid the destruction and degradation of carbon reservoirs, (2) increase the sequestration potential of commercial forests, and (3) better understand the role of natural environments in mitigation (Québec, 2021). Of this amount, $90 million is aimed at conserving and strengthening “priority carbon reservoirs”, notably through planting and reforestation in public and private forests. Together with the creation of protected areas (nearly 17% of Québec's land and freshwater territory in 2020) (Québec, 2020), these measures allow Québec to meet the recommendation of Article 5.1 of the Paris Agreement.

Category 4: Supporting developing country Parties and Reporting on support

Québec can be said to meet most of the provisions of this fourth category. Québec created the International Climate Cooperation Program (ICCP) in 2016 to institutionalize climate cooperation between developing countries and Québec actors (private sector, international cooperation organizations, and researchers).⁸ The ICCP is designed to support projects focused on capacity building or technology transfer for adaptation and mitigation with Francophone countries vulnerable to climate change (art. 11.3). This program was one of the first to be established by an subnational government under the Paris Agreement (Chaloux, Sfiligoi, & Simard, 2021).⁹

Since its inception, the ICCP has funded 38 projects for a total value of $30.1 million (Québec, 2021). In doing so, the Québec government meets Paris Agreement provisions to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties on mitigation and adaptation (art. 9.1) and strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer (art. 10.2). Québec plans to renew this program for the period 2021-2026, with an average annual budget of $4.3 million. This amount is equivalent to the amount allocated for the ICCP under the PACC2020. Québec is therefore not in compliance with the provision of Article 9.3, which recommends that the provision of financial resources to developing countries represent an increase over previous efforts¹⁰.

The Québec government also reports on its support to developing countries on a regular basis through the Ministry of the Environment website, thereby meeting most of the provisions set out in articles 9.5, 9.7 and 11.4 of the Paris Agreement. However, additional efforts could be made to improve transparency and access to quantitative and qualitative information about the support provided. Finally, there is no indication that Québec has developed programs or initiatives associated with enhancing understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, as referred to in Article 8.3 of the Agreement.

Category 5: climate change education and awareness

Finally, Québec meets the provisions of this fifth category. The PEV2030 will provide $43.8 million over five years to raise awareness and support the mobilization of Québec citizens, organizations and communities in the fight against climate change (art. 12).

California

Like Québec, the state of California meets most of the provisions of the Paris Agreement. Here is an overview.

Category 1: emission reductions and Reporting on NDC

In 2017, California set an absolute economy-wide GHG emission reduction target of at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. As a member of the Under2 Coalition, California also aims to reduce its emissions by 80%−95% below 1990 levels by 2050 (California Air Resources Board [CARB], 2017). Under Assembly Bill 32 (2006), California is required to update its GHG emission reduction targets once every five years: “The state board [CARB] shall update its plan for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions of GHG at least once every five years.” (Chapter 488) It therefore meets the provisions of articles 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 as well as Articles 4.9 and 4.19 of the Paris Agreement, as it sets short- and long-term GHG emission reduction targets, updates them every five years and aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. To comply with Article 4.3, California will need to raise its 2030 reduction target by 2022 at the latest.

California also complies with articles 4.8, 4.13 and 4.14 of the Paris Agreement, since it maintains an annual statewide GHG emission inventory consistent with IPCC practices (CARB, 2019). These annual inventories report on GHG emissions by economic sector and by gas, contributing to clear and transparent reporting in line with Article 4.13.

Category 2: adaptation and cooperation on adaptation

As for the second category, we find that California is in full compliance with the Paris Agreement. In 2012, California launched its Adaptation Planning Guide to guide local governments on adaptation and resilience planning. This guide was updated in 2020 to incorporate findings from the 2018 edition of the Safeguarding California Plan, a roadmap published each year on actions taken by California’s state government to respond to climate change. The Guide also addresses results from California’s Fourth Climate Change Assessment (2018), an assessment published every three years to estimate climate change impacts under different future emission scenarios. Moreover, since 2015, the State requires that cities and counties include, by 2022, safety elements related to adaptation to climate change as well as resilience strategies in their Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. Since 2018, California also requires that cities and counties update these safety elements at least once every eight years, starting in 2022. These measures enable California to meet the provisions of Articles 7.9 (adaptation planning and implementation) and 7.10 and 7.11 (periodically update an adaptation communication).

Concerning Article 7.7 (cooperation on adaptation), California has entered into several bilateral and multilateral agreements since 2008 to collaborate and cooperate with central and non-central states to fight climate change (California Energy Commission, 2020). Of these 83 agreements, five agreements include an adaptation component, including three with developed states (France, Japan and British Columbia and Washington State) and two with developing countries (Mexico and Peru). In addition, several statewide initiatives in partnership with local governments promote and facilitate community adaptation to climate change.¹¹ California therefore meets the provisions of Article 7.7 of the Paris Agreement.

Category 3: Conservation and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs

These provisions refer to Article 5.1 of the Paris Agreement (2015), which stipulates that “Parties should take action to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests”. Our assessment finds that the State of California has adopted formal policies and quantified targets regarding the conservation of forests as sinks. Assembly Bill 1504 (2010) calls on California’s Board of Forestry and Fire Protection to ensure that its rules and regulations governing commercial logging and harvesting take into account the capacity of forests to sequester sufficient carbon dioxide emissions to meet or exceed the sequestration target set by the Assembly Bill 32 Climate Action Scoping Plan in 2006: 5 million metric tons of CO2 annually. In January 2019, California released its Draft 2030 Natural and Working Lands Climate Change Implementation Plan (reviewed in April 2019), in which the State plans to at least double the pace and scale of state-funded land restoration and management activities by 2030 and beyond (CARB, California Environmental Protection Agency, California Natural Resources Agency, California Department of Food & Agriculture, & California Strategic Growth Council, 2019).¹² With these actions, the State meets the provisions of Article 5.1.

Category 4: Supporting developing country Parties and Reporting on support

Our analysis reveals that California fails to meet some of the provisions of this fourth category. California does not have a program such as Québec’s ICCP that institutionalizes climate cooperation with developing countries and allocates financial resources to assist developing countries with both mitigation and adaptation. Nevertheless, California did conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Peru (2014) that seeks to strengthen cooperation, including in areas of climate change mitigation and adaptation.¹³ A MOU has also been concluded between the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Department of Food and Agriculture of California (2019) seeking to strengthen communication and cooperation on many issues, including climate change adaptation for farmers and ranchers, but not mitigation.¹⁴ It is also worth mentioning that, since 2014, California has been one of the Technical Partners of the Program for Market Readiness¹⁵ (PMR), overseen by the World Bank and intended to strengthen the mitigation (but not adaptation) capacities of 19 developing countries, notably by implementing market instruments (PMR, 2019). California therefore meets the provisions of articles 10.2 (technology development and transfer) and 11.3 (capacity building) of the Paris Agreement.

Although it provides support to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation, California does not publicly report on the financial resources committed to these efforts. Therefore, we can’t conclude that California is in full compliance with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. It is also impossible to obtain quantitative nor qualitative information related to the State's provision of support, meaning that it does not comply with articles 9.5, 9.7 and 11.4 either (reporting on support). Finally, there is no indication that the assistance provided by the state of California aims to enhance understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, as required by Article 8.3.

Category 5: climate change education and awareness

Finally, California meets the provisions of this fifth category. Through its CoolCalifornia online platform, created by California state agencies, universities, and a nonprofit organization, the State provides a wide range of audiences (e.g. schools, local governments, individuals, youth, community organizations, and small businesses) with tools to encourage and help Californians reduce their environmental impact.

*

The tables below provide a summary of Québec's and California's levels of compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement. They are said to be “Compliant” if they meet the obligation or recommendation of the specified article. If they do not, they are said to be “Non-compliant”. In some cases, they are in the process of complying with an obligation or recommendation; they are then said to be “In progress” of complying. Finally, in other cases, they are only partially compliant with one or more of the provisions of the Paris Agreement, and are therefore said to be “Partially compliant”.

Table

Category 1: Emission reductions and reporting on Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)	Québec	California
Emission reductions
Obligations
Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDC and pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions (art. 4.2)	Compliant	Compliant
Recommendations
Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets (art. 4.4)	Compliant	Compliant
All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (art. 4.19)	Compliant	Compliant
Reporting on NDC
Obligations
Each Party shall communicate a NDC every five years (art. 4.9), each one will represent a progression beyond the previous one and will reflect its highest possible ambition (art. 4.3)	Partially compliant	In progress (2022)
Parties shall account for their NDC in a clear, transparent and understandable manner (arts. 4.13 and 4.8)	Compliant	Compliant
Recommendation
In the context of their NDC, Parties should take into account existing methods and guidance under the Convention (art. 4.14)	Compliant	Compliant

Table

Category 2: Adaptation and cooperation on adaptation	Québec	California
Adaptation
Obligation
Each Party shall engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions (art. 7.9)	Partially compliant	Compliant
Recommendation
Each Party should submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans, and action (arts. 7.10 and 7.11)	In progress	Compliant
Cooperation on adaptation
Recommendations
Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, notably, among others, through the sharing of information and assisting developing country Parties (art. 7.7)	In progress	Compliant

Table

Category 3: Conservation and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs	Québec	California
Recommendation
Parties should take action to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests (art. 5.1)	Compliant	Compliant

Table

Category 4: Supporting developing country parties and reporting on support	Québec	California
Supporting developing country Parties
Obligations
Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation (art. 9.1)	Compliant	Partially compliant
Parties shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer (art. 10.2)	Compliant	Compliant
Recommendations
Developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a variety of sources, instruments and channels. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts (art. 9.3)	Partially compliant	Non-compliant
Parties should enhance understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (art. 8.3)	Non-compliant	Non-compliant
All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties. Developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties (art. 11.3)	Compliant	Compliant
Reporting on support
Obligations
Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to climate finance and transparent and consistent information on their support to developing country Parties (arts. 9.5 and 9.7)	Partially compliant	Non-compliant
All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity building (art. 11.4)	Compliant	Non-compliant

Table

Category 5: Climate change education and awareness	Québec	California
Obligation
Parties shall cooperate in taking measures to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information (art. 12)	Compliant	Compliant

Discussion / conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that global climate governance led by central states only is no longer appropriate to provide an adequate response to climate change. We have shown that the international climate regime has adapted to this problem by recognizing the important role of non-Party stakeholders in addressing this global crisis. Notably, the 2015 Paris Agreement relies on an innovative approach by calling on all actors, including subnational authorities, to “scale up their efforts” to combat climate change.

Even before this call to action, Québec and California were taking ambitious steps to address climate change and were active participants in the international climate regime. They had already made several international climate commitments and joined numerous initiatives and partnerships around the world to combat climate change. It can therefore be argued that Québec and California's commitment to the Paris Agreement is part of their long tradition of climate paradiplomacy leadership now recognized by many experts and actors in the field.

In this research, we sought to determine the extent to which Québec and California, as federated states, manage to autonomously implement key provisions of the Paris Agreement within their jurisdiction and therefore be considered as credible actors in global climate governance. Our results reveal that Québec and California are implementing most of the key provisions of the Paris Agreement in their respective jurisdiction. In fact, both fully comply with the provisions of Category 3 (conservation and enhancement of carbon sinks and reservoirs) and 5 (climate change education and awareness). However, there are some gaps and significant differences in the way Québec and California implement the provisions of categories 1, 2 and 4.

Regarding the first category of provisions (emission reductions and reporting on NDC), both set economy-wide emission reduction targets and introduced accompanying policies and measures that have all the characteristics of an NDC under the Agreement. Both report their progress through annual GHG inventories and implementation reports on their respective plans. Following the ratchet clause of the Paris Agreement (art. 4.9), California should be expected to raise its 2030 and 2050 emissions reduction target by 2022. As for Québec, it has raised its level of long-term ambition by aiming for net zero in 2050. We would have expected it to raise his 2030 target in 2020, but the province has left its −37.5% target unchanged. Yet it is widely recognized that progress on mitigation, both in the short and long term, is one of the cornerstones of the Paris Agreement's success. We see this omission by Quebec as a significant weakness in contributing to the Paris Agreement. As for California, it will be interesting to see how important this key provision is considered when the time comes.

With respect to Category 2 provisions (adaptation and cooperation on adaptation), there is a significant gap between Québec and California. The latter proposes a broad and concerted approach to adaptation, including leveraging local government action. We see this approach as one of California's greatest strengths in its implementation of the provisions of the Paris Agreement. On the Quebec side, however, we consider its adaptation approach to be incomplete. Québec has been slow to adopt a national adaptation plan, although its PEV2030 outlines several priorities and adaptation measures that could very well be included in a future national adaptation plan. In any case, quick action is needed, considering that the province is increasingly affected by the consequences of climate change. It should also be noted that Québec has some catching up to do in terms of the balance of funding between mitigation and adaptation. For now, the ratio is more than 12–1 in favour of mitigation.

Finally, regarding the provisions of Category 4 (support to developing countries and communication of support), we also observe a difference in the compliance of the two actors. California is currently deploying minor bilateral technical support to certain governments and does not contribute significantly to climate finance. In our view, this is a significant weakness in California's contribution to the Paris Agreement, considering that support for developing country parties in the fight against climate change is another key element of the Paris Agreement's success. On the Quebec side, however, the province has established an innovative international climate cooperation program that is now recognized around the world. We consider this to be one of Quebec's main strengths in its contribution to the Paris Agreement.

Ultimately, despite some weaknesses on both sides, it is fair to say that Québec and California meet most of the core provisions of the Paris Agreement. That demonstrates the capacities of federated states to participate in achieving the central aim of the Paris Agreement to “strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change" (Paris Agreement, art. 2). Moreover, these findings reinforce – and largely validate – claims about the effectiveness of a polycentric, multi-level global governance approach for coping with climate change. Indeed, these two case studies demonstrate the strong potential of subnational governments in helping to bridge the effort gap to provide an adequate response to the climate emergency. This is further evidence that non-central governments, and more broadly non-state entities, are no longer mere spectators in the global climate regime. They can be considered autonomous actors, directly and actively involved.

Other initiatives clearly demonstrate this direct and active involvement of non-Parties stakeholders in the global response to climate change and the success of the Paris Agreement. For example, members of the Under2 Coalition and the U.S. Climate Alliance have pledged to implement policies in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Member cities of the C40 Network have pledged to “achieve the Paris Agreement's most ambitious goals at the local level.” Members of the private sector also stepped in, as demonstrated by the Business Ambition for 1.5°C Initiative, or the Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance set up by the finance sector, among others.

Further studies on the contribution of non-Party stakeholders to the goals of the Paris Agreement would most certainly identify innovations and best practices to further close the gap between what is being done and what should be done to adequately address the climate crisis. After all, as the world faces the increasing force of climate impacts, this “all-in” climate regime is more than welcome. We need all hands on deck to meet this global challenge.

Declaration of interest statement

The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Hannah Taub for her participation in the data collection.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSH) – Développement savoir under grant 430-2020-00769 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Notes on contributors

Annie Chaloux

Annie Chaloux is a professor at the École de politique appliquée de l’Université de Sherbooke, director of the journal Le Climatoscope, and co-director at the Groupe d’études et de recherche sur l’international et le Québec (GÉRIQ). She holds a doctorate in public administration from the École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) and specializes in environmental and climate policy issues in Québec and Canada, as well as in climate paradiplomacy issues.

Hugo Séguin

Hugo Séguin is a Fellow at the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM) and a doctoral candidate in environmental studies at the University of Oregon. He specializes in environmental and climate policy issues as a senior advisor at COPTICOM, Strategies and Public Relations.

Philippe Simard

Philippe Simard is a research professional at the École de politique appliquée de l’Université de Sherbooke and a researcher at the Groupe d’études et de recherche sur l’international et le Québec (GÉRIQ). He holds a master's degree in applied political studies and works on international climate change policy issues, as well as energy transition issues. He also works as a consultant at COPTICOM, Strategies and Public Relations.

Notes

1 Our analysis focuses exclusively on whether Québec and California are implementing the provisions of the Paris Agreement in their own jurisdictions. While also relevant, we do not examine whether these states are complying with their Paris-aligned policies and measures.

2 The concept of paradiplomacy refers to “direct and indirect international relations developed by non-central governments or other sub-state entities, in a distinct and autonomous manner, with the objective of promoting their general or specific interests on the international stage.” (Translated from Chaloux, 2014, p. 61) The concept of climate paradiplomacy therefore refers more explicitly to the international action of a non-central government in the fight against climate change.

3 The Alliance was created on June 1, 2017, by the governors of California, New York, and Washington, in response to former President Donald Trump's announcement of his decision to withdraw the United States of America from the Paris Agreement. On September 19, 2017, the California State Assembly passed a joint resolution (AJR-20) to ask the United Nations to create a category for the recognition and participation of subnational jurisdictions whose parent countries are not part of or have withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement.

4 It should be noted that Québec's commitment to the Paris Agreement is part of a broader strategy of its climate paradiplomacy. In fact, Québec has declared itself bound to the major international climate agreements, namely the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and more recently to the Paris Agreement.

5 Some of the data presented through Québec’s inventory are slightly different from the UNFCCC categories. The transport sector is separated in the Québec’s inventory while the UNFCCC includes it in the Energy category. Emissions from the industrial sector also differ, since Québec’s inventory includes emissions from processes and combustion, unlike the UNFCCC which presents combustion emissions in the Energy category.

6 All reports are published through the MELCC’s website: http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changementsclimatiques/bilan.htm.

7 Ouranos is a consortium of approximately 450 researchers, experts, practitioners and policymakers from a variety of disciplines working on climatology and adaptation to climate change. Its mission is to “acquire and develop knowledge on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant socio-economic and environmental vulnerabilities, to help policy-makers identify, evaluate, promote and implement national, regional and local adaptation strategies.” (Ouranos, 2020)

8 In 2019, Québec also contributed $3 million to the Adaptation Fund, now under the Paris Agreement (Adaptation Fund, 2020). Over the past 10 years, this fund has allocated more than $830 million for climate change adaptation and resilience projects and programs. Interesting fact: The Adaptation Fund receives a consistent level of support from subnational governments. In 2013, it became the first climate fund to receive a pledge from a regional government when the Brussels Capital Region of Belgium announced its initial $1.59 million pledge.

9 PCCI was one of 15 recipients of the 2019 United Nations Global Climate Action Award (Québec, 2019).

10 It should be noted that during the 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26), the Government of Québec committed $10 million to the Adaptation Fund (Québec, 2021). Reference : Québec. (2021, November). L’énergie verte du Québec et ses actions climatiques ont suscité un vif intérêt à la Conférence de Glasgow sur le climat. https://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/infuseur/communique.asp?no=4682

11 For example, the Alliance of Regional Collaboratives for Climate Adaptation (ARCCA).

12 California expects to reduce emissions by approximately 84 MMT CO₂e by 2045. Modeling projects sustained and increased GHG emission reductions beyond 2045, with an estimated average cumulative GHG reduction of -843 to -924 to MMT CO₂e by 2100.

13 For more details, see Memorandum of Understanding for the Strengthening of the Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the State of California.

14 For more details, see Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the United Mexican States and the Department of Food and Agriculture of the State of California of the United States of America.

15 Québec is also one of the Technical Partners of the PMR.