Whither the G7 and G20?

ABSTRACT

The Group of 7 remains a significant actor in global governance, but the more representative Group of 20 has a greater role. The leaders of the informal G7-G20 are supported by ministers, working groups and other sub-summit entities such as task forces and expert groups. Ministers and working groups carry out the detailed work of both “Gs” and feed into the summits and the ministerial fora. The relationship of the G7 and G20 with international governmental organizations, especially the IMF, the World Bank, the UN, the OECD and the WHO are mutually beneficial. Non-state engagement groups bring expertise and the voice of civil society and business to the two Gs. Canada has played a major role in both fora, including the establishment of the G20 at the leaders' level and participating in and hosting summits, launching and supporting initiatives, producing scholarly contributions and performing an educational function. This article reviews the characteristics, agenda and structure of the G7 and the G20 and the relationship between them; discusses Canada’s role; the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for both Gs; outlines potential trajectories and the challenges the G7 and G20 face; and answers the question: Will the G7 and G20 survive?

RÉSUMÉ

Le Groupe des 7 reste un acteur important de la gouvernance mondiale, mais le Groupe des 20, plus représentatif, joue un rôle plus important. Les leaders du G7-G20 informel sont soutenus par des ministres, des groupes de travail et autres entités de sous-sommet telles que des taskforces et des groupes d'experts. Les ministres et les groupes de travail réalisent le travail détaillé des deux « G » et alimentent les sommets et les forums ministériels. Les relations du G7 et du G20 avec les organisations gouvernementales internationales, en particulier le FMI, la Banque mondiale, l'ONU, l'OCDE et l'OMS sont mutuellement bénéfiques. Les groupes d'engagement non-étatiques apportent aux deux G leur expertise et la voix de la société civile et des entreprises. Le Canada a joué un rôle majeur dans ces deux forums, notamment en établissant le G20 au niveau des dirigeants, en participant à des sommets et en en accueillant, en lançant et en soutenant des initiatives, en produisant des contributions académiques et en exerçant une fonction éducative. Cet article passe en revue les caractéristiques, le programme et la structure du G7 et du G20, ainsi que les relations entre eux ; il aborde le rôle du Canada et les implications de la pandémie de COVID-19 pour les deux G ; il décrit les trajectoires potentielles et les défis auxquels le G7 et le G20 sont confrontés ; et il répond à la question : le G7 et le G20 survivront-ils ?

KEYWORDS:

• G7
• G20
• global governance
• Canada and G7-G20
• Covid-19 and G7-G20

Introduction

Are the Group of 7 (G7) and Group of 20 (G20) likely to survive? To find an answer, this article first reviews the characteristics, agenda and structure of the G7 and the G20; looks at their mutual relationship, then discusses Canada’s role and the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for those two fora It then analyzes various potential trajectories of the two Gs and reviews challenges for both as they face the future. Finally, it presents conclusions based on the discussion.

The 47-year-old G7 (with the first meeting held in 1975) is an informal grouping of seven major developed democratic countries. It remains a significant actor in global governance but the recognition that appropriate and adequate initiatives and actions in response to global problems needed the full participation of major emerging-economy countries led to the creation of the broader, more representative G20 – now 23 years old at the finance ministers’ and central bank governors’ level (Finance G20, with its first meeting in 1999) and 14 years old at the leaders’ level (having started in 2008).

Westerwinter and colleagues (2021) state that while informal practices or structures are also found within formal institutions (for example, using informal communications and processes to reach consensus), they are more common in informal institutions. Informal institutions and networks also operate around global governance institutions, including transnational advocacy networks and public-private partnerships. They further argue that states find it advantageous to shift “action from cumbersome, formal intergovernmental treaties and organizations to smaller, more informal arenas” – a functional response (pp. 1, 12). Vabulas and Snidal (2013, p. 197) consider the G8 (as it was then) “a fairly institutionalized IIGO.”

In the G7 and G20, engagement groups of non-state actors are actively performing advocacy and policy input functions. Other informal connections include the Global Governance Group (3G), an informal group of 30 small and medium-sized countries which represents their interests vis-à-vis the G20 and afford an informal channel of communication between the UN and the G20; and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; all are also G20 members) representing major emerging countries.

Kirton (2013) asserts that the G20 is a hub of governance: “At both the level of ministers and governors and the level of leaders, the G20 increasingly became the efficient, effective, legitimate club at the hub of an expanding network of global governance” (p. 381). Viola (2015), by contrast, views the G20 as orchestrator, arguing that the “appeal of the G20 for member states is its ability to organize and coordinate policy … by orchestrating intermediaries to develop, and, in some cases, implement, policies on targets” (p. 112). Brandi (2019) examines yet another model: club governance, of which the G7 and G20 are examples.

The leaders’ summits are the pinnacle of the G7 and G20, directing the ministers and sherpas who do the planning, preparation and follow-up. Ministers, working groups, task forces and expert groups do much of the detailed work of both Gs. They operate as mandated by the leaders and ministers and are tasked by and report back to the body that appointed them; the appointing body then uses these reports as input for its own decisions and commitments. The work of ministers and working groups is geared to the agenda of the summits.

Sherpas – the leaders’ personal representatives – play a crucial role in drafting and completing the G7 and G20 communiqués and action plans, starting when the summit host finalizes the agenda early in the year of the G7 and G20 host’s presidency. Throughout this process, the sherpas are guided by the priorities and political constraints of the leaders.

The G20 maintains a relationship with international governmental organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, the G7 and G20 engagement groups bring expertise and the voice of non-state actors (business and civil society) to bear on debates within both Gs.

Scenarios for the future of the G7 and G20

Membership expansion or reduction

Past proposals along this line have included Sachs’s 1998 G16 formula incorporating the G8 plus eight developing countries with democratic governance (Brazil, India, South Korea, South Africa, Chile, Costa Rica, Nigeria and Poland). Brzezinski (2009) also called for an expanded G8 that would co-exist with a G2 of the United States and China as most relevant to geopolitical realities. Others wished the G8 to absorb the former G5 of developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) as full members. As for the G20, its focus on economic and financial issues led some to suggest that it be merged with, or its membership expanded to, the 24 members of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF (Dias, 2014).

European overrepresentation has been contentious, with four European Union (EU) members plus the EU itself as permanent participant in the G7/G8. The leaders have not embraced this idea so membership has remained constant. With Russia’s suspension as G8 member in 2014 in response to its annexation of Crimea, the forum again became the G7. The door to resuming Russia’s membership remains notionally open subject to a reversal of its actions, but that is unlikely given current geopolitical realities. G20 membership has not changed and is unlikely to do so.

Coexistence of the G7 and the G20

The G7/G8-G20 relationship may be viewed in three dimensions: competition, coexistence or cooperation, where competition may imply either the continued existence of the G7 alongside the G20 or its eventual replacement by the G20 (Kirton, 2013; Schmucker & Gnath, 2011; Stanley Foundation, 2011). Cooper and Thakur (2013) assert that “[i]n some of its characteristics the G20 is both a rival and a successor to the G8” (p. 14).

The prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Italy, Gordon Brown and Silvio Berlusconi (2009) weighed in on this topic just before the 2009 London G20 summit and other leaders, who had previously been sceptical of the G8, came to accept the advantages of continuing both fora. With the 2008 financial and economic crisis and its aftermath, “[a]ny international mechanism for dealing with the crisis had to include the emerging powers as equal partners” (Bayne, 2011, p. 251). Bayne (2005) had earlier raised issues of the coexistence of the G7/G8 and the G20 once the latter began meeting at the leaders’ level.

An important reason for the continued coexistence of the two Gs is that leaders find it more comfortable to meet in the smaller, more like-minded G7 forum than in the much larger G20. Bayne (2014) asserts that “the G20 is much less of a personal instrument for the participating leaders than the G7” and the G20 “can never replicate the compactness and flexibility of its long-lived predecessor” (p. 36). Reynolds (2014) states that “[t]he evolution of the G7/8 process … should be understood as a constant struggle between the two forms of summitry[:] … the highly personal … and the institutionalized” (p. 21). Many G7 and G20 officials, however, see the G7 and the G20 not as competitors but as parallel institutions.

The reversion of the G8 to G7 was highlighted by the leaders at their 2014 Brussels summit where they reaffirmed their common values – contrasted with the G20 which is united by common interests rather than common values – and their wish to continue this relatively like-minded, more democratic and more intimate forum alongside the G20. As well, consensus on security, human rights and other issues is easier to achieve in the G7 than in the G20.

G7 and G20 agendas sometimes overlap, albeit agenda items are approached differently by the two Gs. Former Canadian sherpa Gordon Smith (2011) held that it would be helpful for “the G8 [to] stay out of any issues destined for the G20” so as not to seem to pre-discuss or, worse, pre-resolve issues on the agenda of the G20. However, leaders can discuss any pressing issues they choose; for example, the 2012 Camp David G8 summit took up, in addition to the security agenda, economic issues (the euro zone crisis) as well as food security. UK Prime Minister David Cameron (2012) indicated that he wanted “to see the G8 taking a broader approach to development” and dealing with security, prosperity and growth. In fact, the G7 has dealt with security issues since the 1978 Bonn summit (Statement on Air-Hijacking). More recently, the G7 leaders held a virtual emergency summit on 24 August 2021, with the heads of the UN and NATO participating, and expressed their “grave concern about the situation in Afghanistan and call[ed] for … ensuring the safety and security of … Afghan and international citizens, … [preventing] a humanitarian crisis, … [adherence to] … international human rights law” and holding the Taliban accountable. They pledged to work to this end with their allies, countries in the region, the UN and the G20. (G7, 2021d)

The G20’s evolving agenda has engendered considerable debate. A 2011 conference on the future of the two Gs suggested the following criteria for the G20: a clear need for collective action; a crisis at hand; a leadership vacuum; lack of capability of other international bodies to set action on the issue in question; and prospects for a positive outcome. Participants debated whether the G20 should keep to its narrower economic and financial focus or expand their agenda in response to pressures.

The two virtual G20 summits convened by the Saudis in 2020 focused predominantly on the pandemic and G20 responses to it, as did the US-hosted 2020 virtual G7 summit. In their Joint Statement of G7 Leaders (G7, 2021c) at the end of the 19 February 2021 virtual summit, the leaders committed to partner with the G20 in combating the pandemic, on debt service suspension for developing countries and on economic recovery.

Focusing on a crucial difference between the G7/G8 and the G20, Fan He asserts that

[a] Cold War mindset and zero-sum game approach would jeopardise, and be poisonous to, G20 cooperation. One only has to look at how geopolitical conflicts tarnished the G8. A similar failure within the G20 would be unacceptable for its membership. (He, 2015, p. 38)

Replacement of the G7/G8 by the G20

This was the preferred scenario of the Canada-initiated L20 (Leaders’ 20) project (English, Thakur, & Cooper, 2005). Truman’s, 2005 formulation also advocated such a development while Heinbecker (2011) considered it “very likely that the G20 will ultimately absorb the G8” (p. 237). Timothy Garton Ash argued that

the G8 is an anachronistic survival of the old, Cold War west … [The G20] is a grouping much more appropriate to the economic, political and cultural realities of the twenty-first century. [I]t would be better to roll the G8 into the G20 and [make] the G20 more serious and more effective than it is now. (Ash, 2011)

Replacement by or coexistence of the G7/G8 with another group

Kenen and his co-authors (2004) called for the streamlining of European representation in the G7 by establishing a G4 of the US, the euro zone, China and Japan. This would include a substantial part of the G8 but leave out Canada, Russia and the UK. In a variation on this theme, Roach’s 2004 proposal would establish a new G5 with the US, the euro zone, China, Japan and the UK, without Canada and Russia. Other variants have included Bradford’s (2005) G12 or G18, and Åslund’s (2006) G13 (the G8 + G5) or G12. Haynal’s (2005) “G-XX” posits a G8, plus a G5 (possibly without Mexico) and an indeterminate number of others from Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other regions. This forum would co-exist with the G8. A proposal of the Stiglitz panel would establish a council of 20–25 members under the aegis of the UN (UN GA, 2009).

The G2 concept

Truman (2005) envisioned a G2 of the US and the euro zone, to co-exist with the G20. Bergsten (2005) argued along the same lines. Later, a G2 of the US and China was mentioned as a configuration (Brzezinski, 2009); this is the present understanding of a G2. These suggestions imply acknowledgement of a long-established process of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations that have become routine around the G7/G8 and the G20 summits – and beyond the summits. With the now antagonistic political environment between the US and China, this concept deserves further attention.

Variable geometry

This scenario involves the G7/G8 continuing as the core of discussions while leaving room for wider participation, depending on the topic on the agenda, with various combinations of the G7/G8, the earlier G5, the Major Economies Forum (MEF), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Global Governance Group (3G). Italian foreign minister Franco Frattini advocated such a process, arguing that “thanks both to its format and to its method, the structure of the G8 summit is still extremely valid today and … its flexibility will allow it to spawn an advanced and strategic model in support of world governance”. He forecast that the 2009 L’Aquila summit would begin with “an initial meeting of the ‘historic core’ group of countries”, to be followed by a joint discussion of items on the summit agenda by the G8 and the G5 plus Egypt. There would follow a meeting that “will be opened up to a representative group of African countries as well” (Frattini, 2009).

Cooper and Schrumm (2011) asserted that “the practice of variable geometry cannot be sustained over the long term” (p. 238). Cooper (2014) pointed to the use of variable geometry by the 3G vis-à-vis the G20, arguing “that small [non-member] countries should have access to the G20 on a functional basis” (p. 101).

Variable geometry has operated at summits through the participation of non-G7 and non-G20 countries. The Charlevoix G7 summit included guests for the discussion of oceans, and the UK host invited four major democratic countries to the 2021 Cornwall G7 summit: Australia, India, South Korea and South Africa. The Japanese host of the 2019 Osaka G20 summit invited four guest countries, plus the heads of the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, ILO (International Labour Organization), Financial Stability Board (FSB), OECD, Asian Development Bank and WHO, and leaders representing four regional organizations: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and New Partnership for Africa's Development.

There have been ad hoc gatherings for a common cause; for example, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) of Australia, Japan, India and the US to address China-related issues, with hints that additional countries would be invited on specific topics such as security issues, technology, and critical materials and rare earths, each with different membership beyond the core. President Joe Biden revived the MEF and convened a Leaders Summit on Climate on 22–23 April 2021 with 40 countries, and a Summit of Democracies is considered. This brings a more crowded international meeting agenda for leaders who are inclined to meet in like-minded groups and may imply a potentially reduced centrality for the G7 and G20.

A “G-Zero” world

Bremmer and Roubini (2011) argued that the G20, rather than being at the centre of global economic and political governance, was becoming a source of disarray and disagreement among its members. They asserted that, with the easing of the global financial and economic crisis, the G20 showed diverging and competing national values among the member states. They further argued that there was no viable alternative, whether a G2, a G3 or other “G"-type grouping. They concluded that “[w]e are now living in a G-Zero world, one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage – or will – to drive a truly international agenda” (p. 2). Bremmer elaborated on this idea in a 2012 book, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-zero World. A counterargument: the G20, despite disagreements, has chalked up considerable successes, and both it and the G7 have continued to be essential actors in global governance, co-operating with the UN and other international organizations.

Canada and the G7-G20

Some of the proposed scenarios would exclude Canada. This would be a great loss as Canada has played an important role in both Gs, often punching above its weight as a middle power. Finance minister and later Prime Minister Paul Martin, with US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, was instrumental in the creation of the Finance G20 forum in 1999 and in 2008 the leaders’-level G20 – a critical role. Martin and Summers chose the membership which has remained constant. Martin remains a tireless advocate of the G20. His 2008 memoir, Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics, describes the antecedents and establishment of the G20.

Canada chaired the Finance G20 for its first three years (1999-2001), and hosted one G20 summit (Toronto 2010) and six G7-G8 summits: Ottawa/Montebello 1981, Toronto 1988, Halifax 1995, Kananaskis 2002, Muskoka 2010 and Charlevoix 2018).

Eight Canadian prime ministers participated in G7/G8 summits: Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1976-78, 1980-84), Joe Clark (1979), Brian Mulroney (1985-92), Kim Campbell (1993), Jean Chrétien (1994-2003), Paul Martin (2004-2005), Stephen Harper (2006-15) and Justin Trudeau (2016-21). Two participated in G20 summits: Stephen Harper (2008-14) and Justin Trudeau (2015-21).

Canada has initiated and supported many important G7/G8 and G20 undertakings. Kirton (2021) provides a detailed account and analysis of Canada’s role, successes and failures in G7-G20 summitry from 1976 for the G7 (and 1999 for the G20) through 2018. He argues that Canada, as principal power, has promoted its interests, goals and strategies “in accordance with [its] distinctive national values [of] … anti-militarism … , multilateralism, openness, environmentalism, globalism, and international institutionalization [plus] … gender equality” (pp. 224-25).

The following G7 and G20 Canadian highlights draw on Kirton’s account. The first G7 political declaration (Ottawa/Montebello 1981); launching the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (Bonn 1985); the “Toronto terms” of debt relief for the poorest countries (Toronto 1988); efforts to reform multilateral organizations (Halifax 1995); gaining support for the Ottawa process on landmines (Denver 1997); focus on terrorism, economic growth, and Africa (Kananaskis 2002); the Muskoka Initiative for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (Muskoka 2010); inclusion of a passage in the communiqué of the G7’s core values (Brussels 2014); and a consensus communiqué on key priorities on economic growth, the future of jobs, gender equality, fighting climate change, and a more peaceful world (Charlevoix 2018).

In the G20, Canada helped launch the labor ministers’ forum and the Development Working Group at the 2010 Toronto summit. Later, Canada had a strong hand in formulating appropriate language on WTO reform and other trade matters, taken up by the other leaders; this is reflected in the Buenos Aires and Osaka communiqués. Canada also had a major role in the 2019 launching of the private sector alliance for the Empowerment and Progression of Women's Economic Representation (EMPOWER).

Examples of Canadian writings about the two Gs include Kirton’s G20 Governance for a Globalized World, an analysis and chronological discussion of the G20 as a hub of governance; Cooper and Thakur’s The Group of Twenty (G20), a history of the G20 that examines informal leadership, multilateral organizations and North–South relations as related to the G20; Hajnal’s (2007) The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation, a history, analysis and reference work on the G7/G8, and his (2019) The G20: Evolution, Interrelationships, Documentation, a similar book covering the G20. Former Canadian sherpa – now senator – Peter Boehm and Tarpinian (2019) reflects on the sherpa experience from a Canadian perspective in The Value of the G7.

The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) has produced many reports and studies; for example, Heinbecker’s The Future of the G20 and Its Place in Global Governance. The websites of the G7 Information Centre (www.g8.utoronto.ca) and G20 Information Centre (www.g20.utoronto.ca), compiled by the University of Toronto’s G7 and G8 Research Groups, provide permanent access to most documents and also include analyses, news and reports on compliance with G7 and G20 commitments.

Covid-19 and the G7-G20

The Covid-19 pandemic, which erupted in early 2020, is a health crisis with major economic implications. It has posed challenges, obligations and opportunities for both Gs.

An immediate practical impact of this crisis on the G7 and G20 was the sudden proliferation of virtual, rather than in-person meetings. The US host of the 2020 G7 summit – originally scheduled for Camp David – announced that it would be replaced by a videoconference, preceded by the leaders’ monthly videoconferences in March, April and May “to coordinate the[ir] response to COVID-19” (Mason, 2020). The March virtual summit issued a Leaders’ Statement on the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impact, promising to accelerate the G7 response to the pandemic, address the economic impact of the outbreak “forcefully” and restore and expand growth. (G7, 2020)

The UK, 2021 chair of the G7, convened a virtual meeting on 19 February. The Joint Statement of G7 Leaders promised to intensify cooperation on the health response to Covid-19 and to cooperate with WHO, the COVAX facility and the G20, and affirmed the G7’s $4 billion contribution to the Covid -19 Tools Accelerator and COVAX. (G7, 2021a)

Shortly before the Cornwall summit, the G7 released its G7 Carbis Bay Progress Report: Advancing Universal Health Coverage and Global Health through Strengthening Health Systems, Preparedness and Resilience. The summit – held face-to-face after almost two years – produced major agreements. Its Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué details G7 commitments and undertakings on the pandemic, economic recovery, trade, taxation and climate. The leaders there also reaffirmed their values of “democracy, freedom and equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” and criticized the behavior of China and Russia. (G7, 2021a) It is difficult to imagine China, Russia or Saudi Arabia addressing such issues in the G20. “[S]hared values in the face of a growing challenge from China and other authoritarian countries could give [the G7] a renewed sense of purpose.” (The Economist, 2021).

The separate G7 Carbis Bay Health Declaration looks beyond the pandemic: “We, the G7 Leaders, commit to work expeditiously and collectively toward the goal of ending the COVID-19 pandemic, while also recognising that the next one could come at any time.” The leaders plan to achieve these objectives by building an “integrated and systems-based One Health approach across all aspects of pandemic prevention, preparedness, detection and response and they promise to work to foster a healthier planet.” The declaration details global steps needed to accomplish these aims, in cooperation with the WHO, UN, G20, WTO and international financial institutions. (G7, 2021b)

Saudi Arabia, holding the G20 2020 presidency, convened two summits. A special emergency summit – first in G20 history – was convened on 26 March after several veteran G20 leaders of the 2008 crisis called for such a meeting (Wintour, 2020). This followed the Finance G20 virtual meeting (which issued a Statement on COVID-19 and the G20 sherpas’ similar statement a week later). The G20 Health Working Group, at its meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 7 March 2020, also issued a statement: The G20 Works on Coordinating Actions on COVID-19 and Pandemics. The special summit was called “to advance a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its human and economic implications” (G20, 2020b). The leaders committed “to do whatever it takes to overcome the pandemic, along with the World Health Organization … , [the] … IMF, World Bank Group (WBG), … UN, and other international organizations”. They made a substantial financial commitment of over $5 trillion for “the global economy, as part of targeted fiscal policy, economic measures, and guarantee schemes to counteract the social, economic and financial impacts of the pandemic”, restore confidence, preserve financial stability, revive growth and recovery, minimize disruptions to trade and global supply chains, provide help to all countries in need of assistance, and coordinate public health and financial measures (G20, 2020a).

The subsequent virtual Riyadh summit again focused on the pandemic. The leaders agreed on financial support; economic recovery; extending the Debt Service Suspension Initiative for developing countries; support for the WTO and the multilateral trading system; the digital economy; taxation; tackling inequalities; and a sustainable future.

The pandemic presented new opportunities for G20 cooperation with international organizations. The major vaccine manufacturers are all in G20 member countrie, so these countries have an important role to play in vaccine distribution, in cooperation with the UN, the WHO, WTO and other IGOs. Fighting the pandemic has also occasioned greater G7-G20 cooperation within the larger multilateral system.

The Global Health Summit, co-hosted in 2021 by the G20 and the EU, issued the Rome Declaration which set out sixteen guiding principles and commitments aiming to achieve “action for global health to support the financing, building, and sustaining of effective health system capabilities and capacities and Universal Health Coverage to improve preparedness, early warning ..., prevention” as well as “detection, coordinated response, and resilience to, and recovery from, the current pandemic and future potential public health emergencies.” (Global Health Summit, 2021)

The Rome summit met on 30–31 October 2021 in person, although Xi Jinping and Putin participated via videolink and three other leaders were represented by lower-level officials. The key agenda items were: global economy and global health; climate change and environment, and sustainable development. On health, additional commitments were made to supply enough Covid vaccines to developing countries in order to achieve vaccination for 70% of the world's adult population by the end of 2022. On the economy, an important result was an agreement to impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large multinational corporations, regardless of where they operate. This was the culmination of years-long efforts by the G20 to reform the international tax system.

G7 and G20 ministers have also been meeting virtually. In 2020, G20 ministers of agriculture and water, and those charged with anti-corruption, digital economy, education, energy, environment, finance, foreign affairs, health, labour and employment, tourism, and trade and investment, met and focused on implications of the pandemic as applicable to their portfolios. In the G7 system, finance, foreign, health, and science and technology ministers met in 2020.

Virtual meetings have posed challenges for leaders and ministers. Opportunities provided by face-to-face meetings are lacking. Personal meetings on the margins of summits are not possible in the virtual world.

Virtual meetings also have positive implications: less travel reduces the carbon footprint of summits and ministerial meetings; and lower the costs of security, accommodation, entertainment and other logistical tasks and resources. With better control of the pandemic, in-person meetings of leaders and ministers have resumed but virtual or hybrid meetings at other levels are likely to continue.

Challenges for the G7 and the G20

The G7 faces the challenge to maintain its relevance and legitimacy in the context of coexistence with the much more representative G20. It also faces the task of achieving better coordination with the G20 and avoiding duplication of effort. For example, when there is agenda overlap between the G7 and the G20, each “G” should concentrate on what it does best.

The G7 ought to recognize that on overarching global issues the G20 is more relevant, more equitable and more legitimate. On climate change, the environment, and global health, no meaningful action can be taken without China, India and other major emerging countries and Russia as equal partners. The G7 must avoid pretensions of leadership in areas not represented in its membership.

Working efficiently and to mutual benefit with international organizations and non-state actors is another challenge for both Gs. These relationships are essential for both sides. Among the IGOs (International Governmental Organizations), the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the OECD, the WTO and the WHO are particularly important.

The G7 and G20 engagement groups bring expertise and the voice of business and civil society to bear on debates within the G7 and G20. The G7 engagement groups are: B7 (business), C7 (civil society), L7 (labor), S7 (science bodies), W7 (women) and Y7 (youth). The G20’s engagement groups are: B20 (which the G20 considers as the official G20 dialogue forum with the business community), C20, L20, S20, T20 (think-tanks), U20 (urban; 25 cities), W20 and Y20.

The dichotomy of efficiency versus representativeness/legitimacy has been a constant in debates: the smaller the group, the more efficient it is likely to be – but smaller groups lack adequate representativeness. Some observers consider the G20 too unwieldy and inefficient, even though it is much more representative of geopolitical realities than the G7/G8. Callaghan (2014) considers it “[t]he great strength of the G20 … [that] it brings together leaders from the major developed and emerging markets and provides the potential for them to make progress on some intractable global issues” (p. 116). The G7/G8 is often praised for the like-mindedness of its leaders. But, as Cooper and Thakur (2013) observe, “Lacking political like-mindedness, [the G20] will be animated more by pragmatism and problem-solving than by ideology and social cohesion” (p. 12). This speaks to common interests as the cohesive factor in the G20.

Even the G20 is not completely representative; it is not universal like the UN. Payne (2014) asserts that, because the “marginal majority” remains unrepresented in the G20, the latter “is always going to be an elite club, or steering committee” (p. 82). Proposals to bridge this gap include institutionalizing G20 participation by the UN Secretary-General as well as the African Union. The latter is important because Africa remains underrepresented; South Africa is the only G20 member from that vast continent. Martin (2013) points out the problem with the idea of South Africa representing all of Africa (the only continent without adequate regional representation) and writes that remedying African underrepresentation would be the only exception to reluctance to open the Pandora’s Box of G20 membership.

G20 summits feature a much larger number of people present in the room – sometimes 50 or more, counting the leaders, finance ministers, invited heads of state or government, representatives of IGOs, and high officials and other support personnel (many G20 countries have large delegations). This militates against smooth functioning and contrasts with the informality in the G7 where more like-minded leaders engage in meaningful discussion, sometimes on a first-name basis. Payne (2014) argues that the commonality of the G7/G8 “cannot be expected to work in the same way at the level of twenty (or more) member states” coming from diverse backgrounds (p. 82). One partial solution (supported by some G20 leaders) may be taken from the practice of the G7/G8 where, starting with the 2008 Birmingham G8 summit, leaders were no longer accompanied by their finance and foreign ministers at summits.

Proliferation of meetings leading up to summits is another problem. Callaghan (2014) notes that the Australian host government website listed “69 separate events in the lead-up to the Brisbane [summit]”. He asserts that “the G20 has become a large and expensive process” (p. 111). Gilman (2015) argues that it would make more sense if leaders met only when absolutely needed, and “revert to the earlier model of regular G20 ministerial meetings to get the job done”. He asserts that the “modest achievements” of G20 summits beginning with Seoul in 2010 could have been attained “as well or even more effectively at the ministerial level” (p. 52). Yet, it is difficult to see how the leaders’ G20 could revert to a much more limited role, especially given the need of global governance on the highest level on a continuous, rather than ad hoc basis.

The G20’s legitimacy has been debated ever since the launching of the leaders’ summits – as has the legitimacy of the G7/G8 all along. Paola Subacchi and Stephen Pickford (2011) examine the legitimacy versus efficiency dynamic, asking whether expansion of G20 membership would increase legitimacy and concluding that, since any expansion of membership would be politically contentious, there are other ways to increase legitimacy: through better representativeness via members taking on representation of a constituency of non-member states; involving non-members on relevant issues; establishing a permanent secretariat; and, most of all, improving transparency and accountability.

The G20 at the leaders’ level has been called a “crisis committee” since its original task was to deal with the financial and economic crisis at its inception in 2008. Once that immediate crisis eased, observers have pondered the modalities of turning it to a “global steering committee” (see, for example, Bradford & Lim, 2010). In practice, the G7/G8 as well as the G20 have evolved to be both: dealing with crises as they occur and acting as a steering committee on many issues (see, for example, Martin (2009) and Merkel (2015)). This view is borne out by the G20’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic as both a crisis responder and a steering committee. Migration and refugee movements are another example of an enduring crisis. Another factor in the G20 as a steering committee is that it remits an increasing range of tasks to other actors. The Hamburg summit, for example, asked several organizations, including the OECD, FSB, WTO, the World Bank Group and other multilateral development banks, the IMF, ILO, IOM (International Organization for Migration) and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), to develop policies and prepare reports. Martin asserted that the G20’s success as a steering committee lies

in its ability to respond to two challenges: first, can it improve the way globalization works for everyone whether they are at the G20 or not … [and s]econd, can it limit the contagion that appears to be the inevitable consequence of the interdependence of nations? (Martin, 2013, p. 729)

Cooper (2012) places the G20 beyond the crisis committee-steering committee framework and considers the G20 to have become a global focus group for its individual member countries and for its constituent groups, such as BRICS. Callaghan, on the other hand, argues that

the first two G20 summits succeeded in stemming the 2008 financial crisis and prevented it from becoming more severe … [but] as for recent G20 summits, the general narrative is that the best days of the G20 are behind it, and that was in its role as a crisis responder. (Callaghan, 2014, p. 112).

Gordon Brown’s efforts around the time of the London summit to restrict protectionism were clearly a crisis prevention measure; without the success of those efforts the 2008 recession could have become a depression. And when the G20 turned the Financial Stability Forum into a much stronger Financial Stability Board (a steering committee measure), regulatory reform of the banking system would not have been possible. The need for both functions continues.

In his report prepared for the Cannes summit, Cameron addressed key aspects of G20 governance: the need for political consensus; enhanced economic policy coordination; strengthening financial sector governance; filling gaps in the governance of global trade; developing more effective global standards; and achieving greater coherence in global governance in the broad sense. To these ends, he made several specific proposals: on the leaders’ role, on engaging other actors, improving its working practices and accountability; and ensuring that the G20 and other global institutions work together more effectively. The report observed that “there is a spectrum of options for increasing the G20’s capacity, culminating in a permanent Secretariat with a policy function” (UK PM, 2011, p. 19). G20 leaders were not uniformly receptive to the idea of a permanent secretariat; when it re-emerges from time to time, it does not gain consensus.

Statements and actions of former US president Donald Trump presented a new challenge for both the G7 and G20. His anti-multilateral stance and behaviour, notably around the Charlevoix G7 summit, cast doubt on previous assumptions about the unanimous like-mindedness of the G7 leaders. Disagreements among G7/G8 members have arisen in the past – usually privately – but at Charlevoix there was an open split between the US and the other six leaders on climate, trade and other issues. In addition, Trump called for reinstatement of Russia’s membership – a red line that the other six members refused to cross. Immediately after the summit, Trump disavowed his endorsement of the communiqué which had been agreed by G7 consensus. Starting with the Hamburg G20 summit, there was an open split on climate between the US and all other G20 members. With the Biden administration, the US has resumed its commitment to multilateralism, including more meaningful participation in the G7 and G20. Other leaders have greeted this development with palpable relief.

Conclusion

Over the years of existence of the G7/G8, then the G20, many have predicted or prescribed the path that these two fora could or should follow. Possible trajectories include: expanding or contracting G7 membership to reflect changing geopolitical realities; continued coexistence of the G7 and the G20; the G20 replacing the G7; another group replacing or coexisting with the G7; a G2 of the US and China asserting supremacy in global governance; variable geometry of summitry involving different countries and IGOs depending on the issue discussed and the venue of the summit; and a “G-Zero” world in which no one country or group of countries can set the global agenda. So far, G7-G20 coexistence as parallel institutions has prevailed and remains the most likely ongoing scenario, and variable geometry also operates.

Complex relationships of the G7 and G20 with formal IGOs having major roles in global governance, particularly the UN, the IMF the World Bank, the WTO and the WHO are crucial for the two Gs and the IGOs, but there is a fundamental difference between the G7-G20 and IGOs: IGOs represent official constituencies, while the Gs operate independently. The G7 and the G20 should continue to define and develop their mutual relationship.

G7-G20 relationships with business and civil society benefit both sides. Non-state actors bring expert advice and the voice of the people to G7 and G20 deliberations. These contacts also enhance the legitimacy of the two Gs.

Canada has played an important role in both Gs, having co-created the G20, hosted one G20 and six G7 summits, and initiated and supported a number of important G7 and G20 undertakings. Canadian contributions to scholarly literature have contributed to understanding the two Gs while enhancing Canada’s profile. Canada is, and remains, an essential member of the G7 and the G20.

The dichotomy of representativeness versus efficiency has been an enduring concern (representativeness in the G7 is more inadequate than in the G20). On the one hand the G20, as a major actor of global governance, must include all systemically significant countries as members, and on the other hand it must consider the risk of reduced efficiency if membership (or the size of delegations) exceeds a certain number.

Expanding or contracting the G20 agenda is another fraught point: staying within capacity or take leadership on all major global issues, not just financial and economic ones. While the G20 continues to be driven by a primarily economic agenda, other significant issues connect with, and can be anchored in, that agenda – climate change, global health, gender equity, migration and refugee matters and other issues.

Is the G20 a “crisis committee” or a “steering committee”? Preventing or managing crises often calls for a steering function. The G20 is in fact both; the Covid-19 pandemic is a case in point.

The G7 and G20 face multiple challenges: a complex and dynamic relationship between them; proposals for membership expansion or reduction; agenda broadening or restriction; relationships with non-member countries, international organizations and non-state actors; institutional changes and procedural innovation; and domestic constraints of members.

Will one or both of the Gs survive, in what form, membership and mandate and with a narrower or broader agenda? The answer, based on this analysis, is that the G20 will likely survive, as long as its leaders are willing and able to recognize their common interests and remain strong participants in informal global governance, subject to the pressure and influence of various actors, unfolding challenges and changing global priorities. It is more difficult to predict the fate of the G7, but it, too, can survive as long as its leaders continue to share common values and preserve the informal, more intimate setting allowing candid interaction among them, and address security, human rights and other matters that the G20 cannot. The G7 must also be willing to acknowledge the greater relevance of the G20 and must cooperate with it.

Acknowledgment

I thank Gillian Clinton for research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Peter Hajnal

Peter Hajnal is Research Associate, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto. He attended fourteen G7/G8/G20 summits as a member of the G7/G8/G20 Research Groups. Pre-retirement, he was librarian at the University of Toronto and taught at the Faculty of Information. His books include International Information: Documents, Publications and Electronic Information of International Governmental Organizations; The G8 System and the G20; and The G20: Evolution, Interrelationships, Documentation.