Canadian foreign politics: is there any chance of making headway in preserving the liberal international order?

ABSTRACT

The US has signaled a retreat from its efforts aimed at promoting nation-building and protecting human rights and democracy worldwide, while China has yet to demonstrate any commitment to embracing the human rights and democracy aspects of the liberal international order (LIO). Canada, a traditional American middle power ally, has been navigating its place in the relationships between two competing powers, China and the US, while attempting to preserve the LIO. Canada cannot afford to unilaterally take coercive measures against China toward protecting human rights and democracy: it is too dependent on trade, investment and science-related collaboration with China. Canada can, however, promote a less unilateralist, more globalist attitude toward international politics. It can play a more active role in improving the work of the existing multilateral institutions and emerging partnerships, while also contributing to shifting the US foreign policy priorities toward more collaborative solutions and approaches in international affairs.

RÉSUMÉ

Les États-Unis ont signalé un recul de leurs efforts visant à promouvoir l'édification des nations et à protéger les droits de l'homme et la démocratie dans le monde entier, tandis que la Chine n'a pas encore fait preuve d'un quelconque engagement en faveur des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie dans l'ordre international libéral (OIL). Le Canada, allié traditionnel des États-Unis, en tant que puissance moyenne, s'est efforcé de trouver sa place dans les relations entre deux puissances concurrentes, la Chine et les États-Unis, tout en essayant de préserver l'OIL. Le Canada ne peut se permettre unilatéralement de prendre des mesures coercitives à l'encontre de la Chine pour protéger les droits de l'homme et la démocratie : il est trop dépendant du commerce, des investissements et de la collaboration scientifique avec la Chine. Le Canada peut cependant promouvoir une attitude moins unilatéraliste et plus mondialiste à l'égard de la politique internationale. Il peut jouer un rôle plus actif dans l'amélioration du travail des institutions multilatérales existantes et des partenariats émergents, tout en contribuant à faire évoluer les priorités de la politique étrangère américaine vers des solutions et des approches plus collaboratives dans les affaires internationales.

KEYWORDS:

• Liberal international order
• middle power
• confrontation with China
• Canada’s role
• human rights and democracy
• collaboration

The US has signaled a retreat from its efforts aimed at promoting nation-building and protecting human rights and democracy worldwide, while China has yet to demonstrate any commitment to embracing the human rights and democracy aspects of the liberal international order (LIO). These developments and the great power competition between the US and China undermine the LIO, so, reaffirmed commitments to multilateralism are needed (Emmers, 2018). The middle power states are believed to at least slow the disintegration of LIO if not halt its deterioration altogether (Paris, 2019).

The rise of China, its approach to international politics, and US–China competition over establishing and maintaining international rules pose a challenge to Canada, along with other middle power states. Canada faces a choice to either take a hardline approach to China, risking economic losses to the Canadian economy, or to continue a policy of engagement, thus potentially increasing the risks of heavy dependence on China and further legitimizing China’s antidemocratic leadership internationally. Significant confrontational measures around trade and investments toward China could harm the Canadian exporting industries of wood pulp, vehicles, fish, mineral fuels, fertilizers and food. In the past, the Canadian government decided not to retaliate when, after Ms. Meng’s arrest, China imposed a de facto ban on imports of Canadian canola, pork, beef and soya. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada initiated the adoption of the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations; however, while the document condemns government-sponsored arbitrary detentions, it does not imply any economic sanctions for this behavior. Trudeau’s government has not formally banned Huawei from its 5G networks even though the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the other four members of the Five Eyes intelligence network, have done so.

In this contribution, the author argues that Canada, a middle power state and traditional ally of the US, cannot afford to unilaterally take coercive measures against China in the realm of protecting human rights and democracy; it is too dependent on trade, investment and science-related collaboration with China. Canada can, however, promote a less unilateralist, more globalist attitude toward international politics. It can play a more active role in improving the work of the existing multilateral institutions and emerging partnerships, while also contributing to shifting the US’s foreign policy priorities toward more collaborative solutions and approaches in international affairs.

Liberal international order (LIO)

For the purposes of this contribution, the LIO is defined through adherence to the following principles of international relations: protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, free movement of goods and capital, multilateralism in international politics and democracy, and support for political and civil freedoms as universal human rights. The term liberal international order is sometimes used interchangeably with the term rules-based order; however, rules-based order emphasizes the Westphalian system and its principles around sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention that marginalizes states’ responsibilities in the areas of ensuring and protecting human rights and supporting democracy domestically. The LIO is credited with working toward increased rates of economic growth, improving standards of living and establishing a global human rights regime (Lake, Martin, & Risse, 2021, p. 226). Some analysts view the LIO as a way for the US and Europe to promote a particular ideological agenda around the liberalization of trade and finance as well as globalization, which may help them further “preserve their own power and privilege” (Kundnani, 2017, p. 7).

Despite expectations, states with democratic regimes are not always in compliance with the principles of the LIO, and the US is the most vivid example of how its actions in the international arena challenge that order. The US Senate has been historically reluctant to ratify international treaties that limit American sovereignty. The US never ratified the Rome Statute that establishes the International Criminal Court, it refused to join the Convention on the Rights of the Child and it is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, Trump’s decision to pull the US out of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), to leave the Paris agreement and to cut funding to the World Health Organization in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the US’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) further undermined the US’s commitment to multilateralism and cooperative solutions in global affairs.

As Ikenberry notes, “the international order offers a buffet of options and choices” and some states “can embrace some rules and institutions and not others” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 24). The government of China is publicly in support of the Westphalian international order, which embodies the values and principles around respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and the primacy of state interests over individual rights (Lake et al., 2021), while privately continuing to further erode international standards around human rights. Over the course of the last seven years, China has strengthened its role as a global lender, as it has provided funding for infrastructure projects in Asia, Africa, and Europe through the Belt and Road initiative, and has offered “products (including in some high-technology sectors like telecommunications) that are competitively priced and welcomed in global markets” (Pollack & Bader, 2019). China established the China–UN Peace and Development Fund, the South–South Cooperation Fund, and the Climate Change South–South Cooperation Fund. In the summer of 2020, China began offering vaccine assistance to Middle Eastern, Latin American and African countries (VOA News, 2021), which represents a projection of its soft power onto developing nations abroad. At the same time, Russia and China initiated a campaign in the UN to begin drafting a global treaty to combat cybercrime (Ignatius, 2021), while supporting cyber-espionage campaigns to steal security-sensitive data and applying cybertechnologies to threaten Chinese Uyghur activists, journalists, and dissidents located abroad (CSIS, 2021).

Economic liberalism, which is part of the LIO and promotes market-capitalist rules within countries and free trade between countries (Lake et al., 2021), has benefited China while allowing its government to remain a more powerful player for the state under the conditions of “(re-) embedded” liberalism (Weiss & Wallace, 2021, p. 8). Despite initial expectations that its leadership will take steps to democratize the country in the wake of China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese government did not evolve into an open democratic government consistent with liberal norms and principles. The Chinese Communist Party is engaged in efforts to undermine democratic practices domestically to help the ruling parties to control the opposition, civil society and media news in other countries. The Chinese government exports surveillance systems and trains government representatives to use them in countries with rampant human rights violations and autocratic leaders: Egypt, Serbia, Cambodia, South Africa, Kenya, and Cuba (Scott & George, 2020). The Chinese government vehemently denies reports of abuses in Xinjiang and crackdowns on democracy in Hong Kong, accusing the US and its allies of hypocrisy and violating the international principle of respect for sovereignty.

Illiberal states are not the only actors famous for promoting actions leading to the decline of democracy domestically. Democracy backsliding in the US, Brazil, India and some member states of the European Union (IDEA, 2021) further undermines the legitimacy of international order based on democratic principles. For example, Trump’s questioning of the official results of the 2020 election together with restricting voting regulations at the state level have eroded trust in the fair electoral process. Snowden’s leaks in 2013 about government involvement in collecting millions of Americans’ telephone records as well as the National Security Agency’s tapping into the servers of private internet firms to spy on people’s online communication have also revealed the issue of state-sponsored mass surveillance in the country.

The proactive membership of the two major powers, China and the US, in international institutions is crucial to achieving concrete results in areas of global concern, such as global health, development cooperation, the environment, security and climate change. However, both China’s and the US’s international efforts seem to be driven by purely national interests as they focus on their rivalry for power and prestige.

Canada as a middle power state and its involvement in sustaining the LIO

Middle power states in the international arena generally have “an ability to keep a distance from major conflicts, a degree of autonomy from the major powers, a dedication to international stability, and a commitment to gradual world change” (as cited in Wood, 1988). These features help middle power countries like Canada advance international cooperation and find peaceful solutions to conflicts. Since the end of World War II, Canadian representatives have played an important role in promoting and upholding the values and principles of human rights, free trade, democracy, and international peace and stability. Canadian leadership was instrumental in the Ottawa Process to ban landmines, in the development and international recognition of the Responsibility to Protect, in the Kimberley Process to ban conflict diamonds, in the creation of the International Criminal Court, and in the introduction of the concept of human security.

In the area of strengthening a multilateral free trade order, Canada organized and led the work of the Ottawa Group on overcoming the impasse in the Appellate Body of the WTO and other reforms in the organization, while the current US administration, following Trump’s rhetoric, insists on its right to protect essential security interests from the interference of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Greber, 2021). It remains to be seen whether the Canadian government’s efforts to restore trust in the US’s commitment to free trade internationally will succeed. So far, the Biden administration has not unblocked the appointment of new members to the WTO’s Appellate Body. In addition, the US government increased the duty on Canadian softwood lumber for the second time; and Biden’s proposed Build Back Better Act establishes a tax credit that favors vehicle assembly in US plants in violation of the new trade agreement between the US, Mexico and Canada, as well as other international trade agreements. These protective measures for US producers further weaken trust among the trading partners of the US, and Canada can impose retaliatory tariffs.

Canada has been also engaged in negotiations with the EU to develop an economic, political and trade partnership under the auspices of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The same parties are engaged in discussing a new Canada–EU Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials, intended to reduce disruptions in the supply chains that rely on minerals and raw material inputs (EU Commission, 2020).

Canada is one of the most active members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The partnership currently includes 11 countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The deal is now in force for seven countries that have ratified the agreement: Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam (Baliño, 2020). The partnership will likely continue to expand, as the UK, South Korea, Taiwan, China and the Philippines have expressed their interest in joining it. An expansion of CPTPP would signal the willingness of participating countries to boost collaboration around the issues of trade. It might, however, face serious challenges due to the divergent interests of the current members and new candidates, especially China and Taiwan. It is unlikely that China will be easily accepted into the treaty. Political and economic tensions between China and other members of the partnership, especially Australia, Japan, and Canada, will shape the negotiations on China’s accession to CPTPP. It is also unlikely that the accession process will push China’s government to critically reconsider its policy regarding state-owned enterprises, domestic subsidies, labor, and human rights and procurement, which Western countries consider to be significant obstacles to more liberal trade with foreign partners.

The CPTPP treaty covers only 12 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP), and it was also followed by the much larger Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement that was signed in 2020 (Dade, Zhengyang, & Ciuria, 2021). RCEP, which represents 15 countries and 29 per cent of the global GDP, includes two of Canada’s top three trade partners (China and Japan) and several of its principal competitors for those two markets, including Australia and New Zealand, but excludes the US. Having two major trade agreements in Asia without the US advances regional trade cooperation and establishes export markets outside of US control. The lack of US participation in the two major Asia-Pacific free trade partnerships risks further broadening the divide between Washington and Beijing, while increasing the possibilities of conflict between the different economic blocs. It also limits Canada’s leverage to affect China’s more assertive efforts internationally through applying the rules of an international free trade regime, and agreements.

Policy engagement with China

Canada’s engagement with China has grown over the years. China represents the second largest export market for Canada: it provides capital investments for its resource industries, and sends a proportion of its students to study in Canada. In 2016, the two countries’ representatives held talks on a possible free trade agreement; at the same time, Canada planned to increase the number of Chinese visitors to 1.2 million by 2021 (Economist, 2021). Chinese state-owned firms’ interest in acquiring ownership of Canadian energy companies and mines has faced different responses from the Canadian government. The actions of the Canadian government in this area range from supporting to initiating more thorough reviews of the potential risks of acquisitions to blocking deals with Chinese companies. In 2017, the Liberal government approved the buyout by Chinese investors of Vancouver’s Norsat International, which makes high-tech satellite technology; after a national security review, the deal did not go through. A year later, the Trudeau cabinet rejected the sale of Canada’s third largest construction company to China Communications Construction Company International Holding (CCCI), one of the largest companies owned by the Chinese Communist Party, for “national security” reasons (Nikiforuk, 2018). In 2021, the Canadian government blocked Chinese state-owned enterprise Shandong Gold Mining Co., Ltd., from acquiring TMAC Resources, a junior gold mining company in northern Canada, on national security grounds. As one of the consultant firms notes,

key concerns appear to have been TMAC’s location on an inlet to the Northwest Passage which serves as a shipping route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans – and potentially raises Canadian sovereignty issues – and TMAC’s proximity to one of a chain of Canadian early warning radar stations. (JD Supra, 2021)

Even though in 2012 the Harper government approved a $15 billion sale of the Canadian oil firm Nexen to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, the deal was done under the condition that “there would be no further sales of Canadian oil sands companies to state-owned firms approved, except in exceptional circumstances” (Whittington, 2012). When the Liberals returned to power in Canada under Justin Trudeau’s leadership, the discussions of a potential free trade agreement between Canada and China began. Many Chinese firms already enjoy broad access to the Canadian market due to Canada’s transparent and fair business regulations, which is not reciprocated by the Chinese leadership; some Chinese economic sectors remain closed to Canadian goods, services and investments (Noakes & Burton, 2019). Moreover, Canada’s insistence on progressive mutual standards for labor, environmental, and gender issues has not moved both countries closer to signing a free trade agreement (Lim, 2020, p. 30). In addition, tensions with China might contribute to strengthening the Canada–India partnership in the realm of free trade.

Human rights and democracy components of the LIO and Canada’s role

Canadian efforts to develop an economic partnership with China became more difficult to sustain when China’s actions in the area of infringing on human rights and curbing democracy and autonomy in Hong Kong reached alarming levels, and when its leadership started to engage in “hostage” diplomacy. A set of responses to China’s oppressive measures against local activists and democracy defenders has followed from the US and its allies, including Canada.

The Liberal government in Canada has openly criticized China’s crackdown in Hong Kong and made it easier for Hongkongers to come to Canada. The Canadian government, together with the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and 56 other governments jointly denounced the arbitrary detention of foreign citizens by states for political purposes. The US and Canada have publicly committed to collaborating in holding the Chinese government accountable for human rights abuses and its violations of international law. In one of his speeches, President Biden mentioned that “human beings are not bartering chips … we're going to work together to get their safe return. Canada and the United States will stand together against abuse of universal rights and democratic freedoms” (CBC, 2021). Britain and Canada have teamed up to denounce China's clampdown on democracy in Hong Kong. Toward that end, the European Union, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have jointly sanctioned Chinese officials over human rights violations of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. Canada’s opposition political party leader even called on the Canadian Prime Minister to boycott the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics (Campbell, 2021). Canada joined the US, Australia, Japan, Britain and New Zealand’s diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, protesting China’s human rights record.

The Chinese government has been actively using existing domestic and multilateral international channels to oppose the critics and the position of powerful democratic states on the situation of human rights in China. Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry, called the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations a “despicable and hypocritical act,” and said it amounted to a “confession” by Canada that it had erred in detaining Ms. Meng (Associated Press, 2021). The current membership of the Chinese government in the UNHRC allows it to win some members’ support for condemning the actions of those countries who allegedly interfere in Chinese internal affairs. For example, when Canada, the US, the UK and the EU imposed sanctions against four Chinese officials suspected in the persecution of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in China's western Xinjiang province, China’s permanent representative to the UNHRC used the platform of the international body to firmly oppose the “groundless accusation” of grave violations of human rights. The escalation of tensions between China and the Western powers over the situation in Xinjiang was further reflected in China imposing tit-for-tat sanctions on British, Canadian and European Union politicians, diplomats, and academics (Economist, 2021). Together with Russia, China even called for a United Nations Security Council summit over what they called heightened “global political turbulence” (Aljazeera, 2021). The growing body of academic literature also discusses the “Palestinization” of the conflict in Xinjiang, drawing various parallels between the Israel–Palestine and China–Xinjiang conflicts (Smith Finley, 2019; Clarke, 2015). In the view of some human rights organizations and certain representatives of the Global South countries, the US’s and Canada’s long-standing support of Israel without public condemnation of the human rights violations of the Palestinians by Israeli officials makes their commitments to human rights insincere.

Canada and other countries’ critiques of human rights violations in other states will not appear as credible if their governments abuse human rights at home and overlook those cases within the ally states. Canadian leadership disappointed human rights defenders worldwide when it did not provide any remarks that would openly condemn sending federal security officers after peaceful protesters in 2020, voter suppression practices or restricting reproductive rights in the US. Canada could improve reconciliation efforts with First Nations, limit the export of military technology to countries with a record of human rights violations, and ensure that Canadian extractive companies working abroad comply with human rights standards. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US, four members of the Five Eyes partnership, initially opposed efforts to adopt the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and voted against it.

Security concerns

China’s government supports multilateralism in international relations, calling for the upholding of the norms of sovereign equality, peaceful resolution of disputes and non-interference in internal affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021), while continuing its aggressive actions in the South China and East China Seas. Increased crossings of China’s military jets into Taiwan's air defense zone have also increased fears that the Chinese government might decide to invade Taiwan.

The US and its allies expect the Canadian government to take a tougher stance on China to deter or compel its behavior around military buildup. Canada is not an official member of the military alliances of the world democracies, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or the security pact between the UK, the US and Australia (AUKUS), yet it has increased its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada also remains a long-standing ally of the United States through the bilateral North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). To counter a growing military presence in the north from Russia and China, the US and Canada will be upgrading a network of defense satellites and radar in the Arctic; in the near future, representatives of the two states plan to conduct a joint air defense exercise in the region (Sevunts, 2021).

Conclusions and policy recommendations for Canada

The foreign policy priorities of China and the United States remain focused on promoting international influence, dominance and sustaining stability domestically. While sharing a border, values around democracy and human rights, and history with the US, Canada has strong economic ties with both the US and China. Economic dependency and the risks of retaliation from both China and the US pressure Canada to take a more cautious and plurilateral approach.

The recent unilateral protective measures of the US against Canadian imported goods neither contribute to rebuilding trust between the two countries nor help to maintain the LIO. The US’s possibilities to exert political pressure on Canada should not drive the Canadian government to unquestionably accept American officials’ stance on China’s threat or to stay quiet when the US’s actions also question the stability of LIO principles. In addition to following a course of action that would help Canada to pursue its strategic interests, commitment to the collectively agreed-upon rules of the international order and to multilateral decision-making should largely shape Canada’s responses to the actions of the Chinese government that are viewed as a threat to the LIO.

As a democratic country, Canada should not stay silent regarding China’s human rights record, and it should continue to work with other countries on strengthening the international human rights system. A better performance by Canada in protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples and migrants, and concrete actions to address sexual harassment and violence in the Canadian military, will demonstrate to other states that the Canadian government takes the international standards of human rights seriously.

To minimize the cost of further potential trade bullying on behalf of China, Canada would need to decrease its reliance on trade partnership with China and diversify into new Asian markets. It had already started taking these steps when it recently launched formal trade talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

It has become even more critical to sustain the WTO’s relevance for trade liberalization, considering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on world trade and taking into account that countries choose to negotiate bilateral, trilateral and regional free trade agreements over reinvigorating the WTO. Canada can contribute to strengthening the WTO by encouraging the US government to bring the WTO Appellate Body back into operation. The Canadian government can also show its dedication to the principles of the LIO by continuing to closely monitor and challenge the actions of other countries that violate existing obligations under the auspices of free trade agreements, as has been the case with the announced increase in the import duty on Canadian softwood lumber.

Canada’s government should attempt not to bind itself to the overly confrontational and escalatory measures of the US against China around security. While different political leaders in Canada promote a closer integration in the US-led security order in the Asia Pacific, the Canadian government should minimize its involvement in actions that could be interpreted as offensive toward China, so as to not risk a violent confrontation in East Asia in 2022.

Heightened tensions with China, however, may push the Canadian government to redirect some of its budget priorities toward increased contributions to its military forces and greater financial assistance to strengthen NATO. As one of the founding members of NATO, Canada might also need to intervene to reduce internal contradictions within the alliance. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey appear to have developed strong ties with China, thus diminishing the chances of offering the US unwavering support should military conflicts escalate (Mounk, 2021).

Canada could challenge China’s assertive efforts in Southeast Asia through providing aid to regional development through the Asian Development Bank or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or by engaging in efforts toward the diversification of global supply chains. These efforts would not involve an open confrontation with China, but they could help the states in the Indo-Pacific region to be more resilient in the face of China’s more assertive actions toward Taiwan in the South China and East China Seas.

Canada could also play its role in reinforcing the ILO by shifting the “democratic club” countries’ priorities toward cooperative actions around the issues of the environment, climate change, public health, trade liberalization and peacekeeping operations. For example, Canada can do its part for international climate change policies by setting a good example for other heavy carbon polluting countries such as the US, China and Australia to commit to concrete measures in reducing reliance on fossil fuels and providing financing for developing countries – the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. After the US rejoined the Paris Agreement, China expressed its willingness to work together on climate issues. However, the current shortage of energy sources in China, geopolitical and trade-related tensions with the US, and prioritizing economic growth amidst the global pandemic might stall progress on cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

The issues of global concern will not be solved without the meaningful involvement of countries with illiberal political regimes, which warrants scholars’ and international policymakers’ engagement with the question of what the current priorities of the LIO are and how critical the democratic components of it are for the stable future of the world.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yuliya Rashchupkina

Yuliya Rashchupkina is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department, also cross-appointed with the School of Climate Change and Adaptation at UPEI since July 2019. She received her PhD in Global Governance and Human Security from the University of Massachusetts Boston in 2019. Her current research interests involve questions around China-U.S. relations, multilateralism and global governance, the international political economy of decarbonization, and international development.