American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view

ABSTRACT

In this article, I aim to explain why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2006 and 2011 to deal with the Afghan irregular warfare. During this time, the United States and Canada adopted with similar levels of intensity the “clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN objectives; namely: (a) fighting against insurgency, (b) maintaining stabilized areas and training Afghan forces, and (c) helping reconstruct the absent, weak, or corrupt governance in Afghanistan. These similar engagement levels are surprising considering the periods between 2001 and 2005 and 2011 and 2014 when Canadian and American strategies were dissimilar as expected from their relative standing in the international system. I use a process-tracing methodology and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy to unravel this puzzle.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article, je cherche à expliquer pourquoi et comment les États-Unis et le Canada ont adopté des stratégies de contre-insurrection (COIN) similaires entre 2006 et 2011 pour faire face à la guerre irrégulière afghane. Au cours de cette période, les États-Unis et le Canada ont adopté, avec la même intensité, les objectifs COIN « clear », « hold » et « build », à savoir : (a) lutter contre l'insurrection, (b) maintenir les zones stabilisées et former les forces afghanes, et (c) aider à reconstruire la gouvernance absente, faible ou corrompue de l'Afghanistan. Ces niveaux similaires d'engagement sont surprenants si l'on considère les périodes 2001-2005 et 2011-2014, au cours desquelles les stratégies canadiennes et américaines étaient différentes, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, compte tenu de leur position relative dans le système international. J'utilise une méthodologie de suivi des processus et le réalisme néoclassique comme théorie de la politique étrangère pour résoudre cette énigme.

KEYWORDS:

• Afghanistan
• Canada
• United States
• Counterinsurgency (COIN)
• Irregular Warfare

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The argument presented here has been developed in more detail by the author in the book American and Canadian Counterinsurgency Strategies in Afghanistan (2023).

2 By addressing Monteiro’s (2011-2012) work, I aim to sophisticate the neoclassical realist approach’s system level. Within the extensive neorealist scholarship, this work is suitable to address the United States’ strategic options since it theorizes them within a unipolar structure, which impacted the Afghanistan intervention’s strategic environment. After all, the United States was the sole great power during the intervention, meaning that coalition forces were unwilling to keep up with its material capabilities, and regional powers cannot check its supremacy.

3 The analysis of American war funding (“clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN components) is based on Livington & O’Hanlon (2014, p. 15), Belasco (2014, p. 62), and SIGAR (2014, p. 74-75).

4 The analysis of Canadian war funding (“clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN components) is based on Perry (2008, p. 724), OPB (2008, p. 13, 29), and DFATD (2015). Original figures are in Canadian dollars. The historical exchange rate used is 1: 1.0470107843 (July 31, 2011).

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Federmán Rodríguez

Dr. Federmán Rodríguez is an assistant professor and bachelor coordinator of the International Relations program in the Faculty of International, Political, and Urban Studies at the Universidad del Rosario in Colombia. He has a Ph.D. in political science from Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. His teaching and supervision at Rosario focus on comparative politics, international politics and international security, while his research is focused on American and Canadian foreign and security policies.