Expert Evidence About Memory

Abstract

The author analyses the repercussions of three decisions of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in relation to the admissibility of expert opinions by psychologists about the operation of memory: R v JH; R v TG (deceased) [2005] EWCA Crim 1828, R v Snell [2006] EWCA Crim 1404; [2007] 2 All ER 974, and R v Bowman [2006] EWCA Crim 417. He argues that the decisions do not break significant new ground but constitute an orthodox consolidation of the position that evidence about the processes, limitations, and risks of memory is not admissible save in unusual circumstances, such as where the memory purports to relate to the experiences of a very young child and is attended by otherwise inexplicable levels of detail. This means that in most circumstances, in spite of the wealth of empirical research on the subject, the scope for psychologists to give evidence about memory remains very constrained.

Key words:

• counter-intuitive evidence
• empirical psychology
• expert evidence
• memory
• psychologists
• risks of error

Notes

1.See http://www.psyc.leeds.ac.uk/people/martinc/, accessed 1 September 2008.

2.That view was subject to his overall reservations about the inherent unreliability or fallibility of all human memory, including adult memory, which led him to the conclusion that the truth of the content of memory could not be fully assessed without independent corroborating evidence.

3.For admission of evidence about ‘false memory syndrome’ see R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687.