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Abstract
In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)Footnote1 and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L,Footnote2 the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.
Notes
1. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
2. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458.
3. Intellectual impairment is a term used here to include both intellectual disability and cognitive impairment. Intellectual disability is defined by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) as ‘characterised by significant limitation both in intellectual functioning and adapative behaviour as expressed in conceptual, social and practical skills, which are apparent prior to the age of 18’. AAIDD, ‘Definition of Intellectual Disability’ <http://wwww.aaidd.org> accessed 17 April 2015. Cognitive impairment refers to a loss of brain function that can express itself in a variety of conditions including Alzheimer's disease, dementia, autism, multiple sclerosis and acquired brain injury.
4. Frances Owen and Dorothy Griffiths (eds), Challenges to the Human Rights of People with Intellectual Disabilities (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 2008). See also Office of the Public Advocate, ‘People with Intellectual Disability or Cognitive Impairment Residing Long-term in Health Care Facilities: Addressing the Barriers to Deinstitutionalisation’ (October 2013).
5. Eric Emerson, Challenging Behaviour, Analysis and Intervention in People with Learning Difficulties (CUP 1995).
6. ‘Behaviours of concern’ is an alternative term used to challenge the stereotypes and prejudices about people with disability and encourage a more holistic view about environmental and other reasons why people with disability may express behaviours that put themselves or others at risk of harm. See Jeffrey Chan and others, ‘Is it Time to Drop the Term “Challenging Behaviour?”’ (2012) 15 (5) Learning Disability Practice 36.
7. Emerson (n 5).
8. Ian Freckelton, ‘Mental Health Law’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (2nd edn, Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2014) 699–741.
9. See Kim Chandler, Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘Rethinking Restrictive Practices: A Comparative Analysis’ (2014) 14 (2) QUT Law Review 90 for an examination of the legislative frameworks for restrictive practices in Australia.
10. Nick O'Neil and Carmelle Pesiah, Capacity and the Law (Sydney Law Book Company, Sydney 2011) [7.5.8].
11. O'Neil and Pesiah (n 10) [7.5.8]; DLH [2013] NSWGT 4 (17 April 2013); SDF [2013] NSWGT (17 January 2012). Indeed, in South Australia, the tribunal is authorised specifically to empower substitute decision-makers (and others) to detain and/or restrain a person with impaired capacity: Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 32.
12. In Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 [435] Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ discussed the common law principle that express statutory authorisation, in unmistakable and unambiguous language, is required to engage in what would otherwise be tortious conduct.
13. O'Neil and Pesiah (n 10) [7.5.8]; NSW Guardianship Tribunal, Position Statement: Behaviour Intervention and Support in Applications Relating to a Person With Intellectual Disability (2006) 4.
14. Re Beth [2013] VSC 189; Re Thomas [2009] NSW SC 217.
15. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (In re F).
16. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458 (R v Bournewood).
17. See Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454.
18. ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ GARES217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183 plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).
19. ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
20. Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ‘General Comment No 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of the Person’ (107th session, Geneva, 11–28 March 2013) 3.
21. Human Rights Committee (n 20) 4.
22. Human Rights Committee (n 20) 2.
23. Human Rights Committee (n 20) 2.
24. Lexis Nexis, ‘Liberty and Security of Persons’ Introduction [80]–[100] Halsburys Laws of Australia (7 October 2011) 3; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 423 (Crennan and Bell JJ) citing Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 (per Gleeson CJ).
25. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70 [86] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Winberg JJ) quoting Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v VFAD of 2002 (2003) 196 ALR 111 [108]–[112].
26. Wayne Morrison (ed), Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (vol 1, Cavendish 2001) 101.
27. Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 74, 79 (Isaacs J).
28. Magna Carta 1297 (Imp) cl 39.
29. Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355 [25]–[28] (Bell J). Bell J identified these statutes as in force here to specified extent. These include for example the Magna Carta 1297 (25 Edward 1, cl39); Bill of Rights 1688 (1 William and Mary, ss11, cl11); Petition of Right 1627 (3 Charles 1, cl10); and various Habeas Corpus Acts which are in force in Australian states and territories by virtue of various application acts and reception acts.
30. Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355 [25] (Bell J).
31. Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 74, 79 (Isaacs J).
32. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177 (Goff LJ).
33. Malette v Shulman [1990] 67 DLR (4th) 321, 336 (Robins JA).
34. Lexis Nexis (n 24) [80]–[100].
35. Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355.
36. Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 426.
37. See for example Criminal Code (Qld) s 355; Criminal Code (WA) s 333; Criminal Code (NT) s 196; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31.
38. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172.
39. See for example Criminal Code (Qld) s 335; Criminal Code (WA) s 333; Criminal Code (NT) s 188; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20.
40. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 10(4); Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 42; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 418–423; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 29; Criminal Code (Qld) ss 271–273; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15; Criminal Code (TAS) s 46; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 248; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 322K–322M.
41. Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177.
42. Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645 [661] (Wilson, Dawson, Toohey JJ); R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 [460] (Dixon CJ).
43. McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157.
44. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 72 (Lord Goff); Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J); Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey JJ).
45. Ben White, Lindy Willmott and Shih-Ning Then, ‘Adults who Lack Capacity: Substitute Decision-making’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (2nd edn, Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2014) 193–253 [7.180].
46. Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J).
47. Reniger v Fogossa (1552) 1 Plowd 1.
48. Mouse's Case (1609) 77 ER 1341.
49. Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 676 (Dickson J).
50. Michael Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting the Choice-of-Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability’ (2007) (82) 19 Tulane Law Review 191. Hoffheimer describes the failed attempts at the codification of a general defence of necessity based on the Model Penal Code in the United States. See In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147 where Brooke LJ describes the failed attempts at codification of a general defence in the United Kingdom since the early nineteenth century [222]–[223] and the Law Commission between 1974 and 1993 [225]–[228].
51. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2223 (Lord Wolf CJ).
52. R v Conway [1989] 1 QB 290; Police v Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117.
53. R v Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652 [653]–[654] (Simon Brown J).
54. Taipa v the Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95 [36].
55. Hoffheimer (n 48) 191, 205; R v Howe [1987] AC 417, 419.
56. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206; In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.
57. R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.
58. R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 670 (Menhennit J); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 (Young CJ, King J); R v Abdul v Hussein [1999] Crim LR 57 (Rose LJ).
59. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 746 (Davies LJ); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 (Young CJ, King J).
60. R v Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, 653–54 (Simon Brown J).
61. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 (Young CJ and King J).
62. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2226 (Lord Wolf CJ).
63. Hoffheimer notes that the majority of states in the United States have refused to codify a general form of the defence and that 17 out of 19 states that do codify it impose additional requirements such as imminent harm: Hoffheimer (n 50) 191.
64. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP 2000) 789; Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J); George P Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (1973–74) 47 Southern California Law Review 1269.
65. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 64) 789; Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J); Itzhak Kugler, ‘Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)’ (2004) 68 (5) Journal of Criminal Law 440, 442.
66. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232.
67. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J).
68. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 249 (Dickson J).
69. Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 678 (Dickson J).
70. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 250 (Dickson J).
71. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book III (D Ross tr, 1975) 49 quoted in Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 241 (Dickson J).
72. Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon's The Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630) (Garland Publishing, New York 1978) quoted in Hoffheimer (n 50) 191, 201.
73. Bacon (n 72) 191, 201.
74. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Pt II (1651) (Pelican, 1968) 157 quoted in Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 241 (Dickson J).
75. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 248 (Dickson J).
76. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 250 (Dickson J).
77. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 251 (Dickson J).
78. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 251 (Dickson J).
79. Kugler (n 63) 440, 442.
80. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 243 (Dickson J).
81. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1274.
82. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232.
83. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232; Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616.
84. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 274 (Wilson J).
85. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 252 (Dickson J).
86. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ).
87. In R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 McNaughten J arguably imported the concept of necessity as a general defence when at the time that there was no defence of a therapeutic abortion. McNaughten J found the word ‘unlawfully’ with respect to the offence of unlawfully procuring a miscarriage, imported provisions found elsewhere in the Act. The Infant (Preservation) Act 1929 section (1)(1) also provided that no person would be guilty of an offence if they acted in good faith and for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother. While Brooke LJ puts forward this as an example of the utilisation of the broad general defence in In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147 (at 231), in Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616 Dickson J argued (at [678]–[680]) that the judge had not expressly relied on the defence of necessity and further that he thought this doubtful authority for the general defence given the uniqueness of the facts and law in R v Bourne.
88. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] 1 Ch 734, 746 (were Edmund Davies LJ said that as far as his reading goes ‘it appears that all the cases where a plea of necessity has succeeded are cases which deal with an urgent situation of imminent peril’); R v Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652 (where Simon Brown J said that imminent peril of death or serious injury was an essential feature of the defence); R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (where Wolf LJ stated that after reviewing the authorities that except for some of the medical cases the way to reconcile the authorities was that the defence is available where the defendant commits an otherwise criminal act to avoid an imminent peril or danger to life or serious injury).
89. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; In re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Family Division Reports 338; Re S (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1.
90. Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Family Division Reports 338 (Butler-Sloss LJ); Re S (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1.
91. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 12 (Lord Donaldson MR).
92. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 71 (Lord Goff).
93. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 71.
94. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 74 (Lord Goff).
95. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 52 (Lord Bridge).
96. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 55 (Lord Brandon) 69 (Lord Griffiths) 75 (Lord Goff).
97. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 75 (Lord Goff).
98. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 78 (Lord Goff).
99. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
100. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458.
101. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 495 (Lord Steyn).
102. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458. 486 (Lord Goff found that L had not been detained) 490 (Lord Lloyd concurred with Lord Goff) 492 (Lord Nolan found that L had been detained) 495 (Lord Steyn found that L had been detained).
103. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 488 (Lord Goff) 490 (Lord Lloyd) 492 (Lord Nolan) 497 (Lord Steyn). Ultimately in HL v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 761 the European Court of Human Rights did find L's right to liberty had been violated and that neither access to judicial review or the common law doctrine of necessity provided sufficient procedural safeguards in accordance with article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
104. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 488 (Lord Goff).
105. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 489 (Lord Goff).
106. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) came into force in 2007.
107. The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) also commenced in 2009. They provided for administrative procedures to be followed in the case of incapacitated adults not covered by the Mental Health Act who were deprived of their liberties in care homes or hospitals. They were introduced following the finding in HL v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 761 that there was a lack of appropriate procedures to safeguard against arbitrary detention.
108. In Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 54 (Butler-Sloss P).
109. In Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38.
110. In Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 44 (Butler-Sloss P).
111. See for example In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 106; S (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction) (No 1) [1995] 3 WLR 78; C (Mental Patient: Contact) [1993] 1 FLR 940; W (An Adult: Mental Patient) (Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381.
112. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.
113. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.
114. Lords Justices Brooke and Walker were most explicit in their recognition of the common law defence of necessity as providing justification for the surgery, (Brooke LJ at [236] and Walker LJ at [255]) with Ward LJ focusing on the conflict of duties faced by the doctors and the importance of the law enabling them to choose the ‘lesser of two evils’ (at [203]). In this case the exceptional nature of the case was emphasised, and wider application of the findings discouraged.
115. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 202 (Ward LJ); 236 (Brooke LJ); 254 (Walker LJ).
116. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 240 (Brooke LJ)
117. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 239 (Brooke LJ). In In Re F Lord Goff had stated that the relevance of emergency was that it may give rise to a necessity to act in the interests of the assisted person without first obtaining their consent, but emphasised that it was not the criterion or pre-requisite (In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 75 (Lord Goff)).
118. R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ).
119. Bernadette McSherry, ‘The Doctrine of Necessity and Medical Treatment’ (2002) (10) Journal of Law and Medicine 10, 10.
120. Criminal Code (NT) s 33; Criminal Code (Qld) s 25; Criminal Code (WA) s 25; Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 41.
121. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322R.
122. Queensland Parliamentary Papers (CA 89–1897) (footnote to the relevant section in the Draft Griffith Code).
123. R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.
124. R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.
125. O'Neil and Pesiah (n 10) [12.2.2]; Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621.
126. Rex v Coate (1772) Lofft 73; Symm v Fraser (1863) 3 F&F 859; Scott v Wakem (1862) 176 ER 147; Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621.
127. Re Hawke (1923) 40 WN 58 (NSW).
128. Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621.
129. Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621, 627 (Walsh J).
130. B v Forsey (1988) SCHL 28 Per Lord Keith at [63], Lord Griffiths at [68]; Darcy (bht Diane Aldridge) v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 413.
131. Hunter and New England Area Health Service (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J).
132. Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
133. Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218.
134. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454.
135. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. Also see the analysis of Colleen Davis, ‘Separating Conjoined Twins: A Medical and Criminal Law Dilemma’ (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 594.
136. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 [15] (Chesterman J).
137. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 [17] (Chesterman J).
138. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 [19] (Chesterman J).
139. Criminal Code (Qld) s 25.
140. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 [19] (Chesterman J).
141. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 202 (Ward LJ).
142. Criminal Code (Qld) s 291.
143. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, [22] (Chesterman J).
144. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 278 (Wilson J).
145. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, [22] (Chesterman J).
146. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 248 (Dickson J).
147. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 248 (Dickson J).
148. Simon Gardner, ‘Necessity's Newest Inventions’ (1991) 11 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 125, 132.
149. Gardner (n 148) 125, 132.
150. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 64) 823.
151. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 64) 823.
152. Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 678 (Dickson J).
153. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
154. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458.
155. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 71 (Lord Goff).
156. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1991) 86.
157. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 156) 86.
158. See Chandler, White and Willmott (n 9).
159. Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland's Guardianship Laws (Report 67, 2010) 361; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Final Report (Report 24, 2012) 337. Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Richard Laufer, ‘Consent Versus Scrutiny: Restricting Liberties in Post-Bournewood Victoria’ (2014) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 654.
160. While the authors have termed this the ‘integrity problem’, integrity is a term utilised by Ronald Dworkin. In Law's Empire in particular, Dworkin developed the concept of law as integrity, a conception of law which first presupposes that people have legal rights that follow from past decisions and that they are entitled to a coherent and principled extension of past political decisions even where judges profoundly disagree about what this means. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).
161. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1307.
162. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1304.
163. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1304.
164. Dworkin, Law's Empire (n 160) 134.
165. Alan Brudner, ‘A Theory of Necessity’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 339, 342.
166. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734.
167. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 743 (Lord Denning).
168. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 744 (Lord Denning).
169. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 744 (Lord Denning).
170. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 744 (Lord Denning).
171. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 64) 791.
172. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1302.
173. Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (n 64) 1269, 1274.
174. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 156) 90.
175. Buck v Bell 274 US 200 (1927).
176. Robert J Cynkar, ‘Buck v Bell “felt necessities” v “fundamental values”’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 1418, 1441.
177. Re Eve [1986] 2 SCR 388 [56] (La Forest J).
178. Jeff Goldhar, ‘The Sterilisation of Women with Intellectual Disability: A Lawyer Looks at the Medical Aspects’ (1991) (10) University of Tasmania Law Review 157, 163.
179. Goldhar (n 178) 157, 158.
180. Cynkar (n 176) 1418, 1442.
181. Buck v Bell 274 US 200, 206 (Holmes J) (1927).
182. Buck v Bell 274 US 200, 206 (Holmes J) (1927).
183. In his book, The Common Law, Holmes contends that the legal standards against by which we are supposed to be judged do not conform with any objective standards or principles but ‘the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which Judges share with the fellow human men’. Holmes’ view of the common law was that ‘it grows spontaneously and adapts itself to the social reality as a natural result of judicial rulings that are legislative in nature, though not necessarily relying on any kind of logical thinking’. See Augusto Zimmermann, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives (Lexis Nexis, Butterworths 2013) 220.
184. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 481 (Lord Goff).
185. Brudner (n 165) 339, 342.
186. Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 678 (Dickson J).
187. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 274 (Wilson J).
188. Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 278 (Wilson J).
189. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 201 (Ward LJ).
190. Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 [22] (Chesterman J).
191. Gardner (n 148) 125, 135.
192. Gardner's suggestion for a rights-based justification is an attempt to answer this question. Gardner prophesises that where otherwise unlawful actions vindicate a superior right to the interest protected by the rule that is broken, that judicial intervention to protect such a right may be less offensive to democracy where the right in question is entrenched in higher constitutional law for example. Gardner (n 148) 125, 135–36.
193. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 230 (Brooke LJ).
194. In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 182 (Ward LJ) 243 (Walker LJ); R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 488 (Lord Goff) 490 (Lord Nolan); In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 78 (Lord Goff).
195. Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 258 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ).
196. Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 259 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ).
197. Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 270–71 (Brennan J); Ian Kennedy, ‘Patients, Doctors and Human Rights’ in Robert Blackburn and John Taylor (eds), Human Rights for the 1990s: Legal Political and Ethical Issues (Mansell 1991) 81.
198. Kennedy (n 197) 91.
199. In In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, the House of Lords held that the best interests of the person for whom medical treatment is being considered, must be determined by reference to whether the doctor acted ‘in accordance with a responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion’. This is what is known as the ‘Bolam Test’, in effect the principles laid down in the leading medical negligence case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLE 582. Various commentators have criticised this approach as effectively delegating the task of determining best interests to the medical profession. (See Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism (CUP 2010) 180; Kennedy (n 197) 81.
200. Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193, 200 (Butler-Sloss P); also see In re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15; R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879.
201. Donnelly (n 199) 181; also see Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law Com No 231, 1995) 44; Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193. The balance sheet approach essentially involves the drawing up of a balance sheet, with factors of benefit and countervailing ‘dis-benefits’ listed. An estimate of the likelihood of the gain or loss that might accrue is made, and only if the account is ‘significantly in credit’ will the judge conclude best interests as in Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193, 206 (Thorp LJ). This approach was formalised in a practice direction, and has now been utilised in a wide variety of cases including cases concerning withdrawal of life sustaining treatment: see for example In re M (Adult Patient) Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment [2011] EWHC 2443.
202. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896.
203. P and Q v Surrey County Council [2011] EWCA Civ 190; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2011] EWCA Civ 1257.
204. HL v United Kingdom 40 EHRR 761.
205. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896.
206. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896, 919, 922.
207. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896, 919.
208. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896, 905.
209. Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] 1 AC 896, 905.
210. R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 492 (Lord Steyn).
211. HL v United Kingdom 40 EHRR 761 [120]–[124].
212. HL v United Kingdom 40 EHRR 761 [120].
213. Notwithstanding the enactment of human rights instruments in two Australian jurisdictions: the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
214. See Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454.
215. Freckelton (n 8) 699–741.
216. See Chandler, White and Willmott (n 9).
217. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, quoted in Zimmermann (n 183) 220.
218. Kennedy (n 197) 106.