Sentencing and mental disorder: the evolution of the Verdins Principles, strategic interdisciplinary advocacy and evidence-based reform

Abstract

In DPP v O’Neill, the Victorian Court of Appeal excluded personality disorders from the scope of the sentencing principles that apply to offenders with mental health problems around Australia (the ‘Verdins principles’). This decision was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of personality disorders and had the potential to create serious injustice for many marginalised people. To redress this problem, the authors engaged in a unique process of strategic advocacy, which resulted in the Victorian Court of Appeal overturning O’Neill in the recent case of Brown v The Queen. This article examines the evolution of the Verdins principles, the problems that arose in O’Neill, the collaborative strategy used to address those problems and the successful outcome of that interdisciplinary strategy.

Keywords:

• interdisciplinary collaboration
• law reform
• mental disorder
• mental health
• mental illness
• personality disorder
• sentencing
• strategic advocacy
• strategic litigation
• Verdins principles

Ethical standards

Declaration of conflicts of interest

Jamie Walvisch has declared no conflicts of interest.

Andrew Carroll has declared no conflicts of interest.

Tim Marsh has declared no conflicts of interest.

Ethical approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

Notes

1 See, eg, Channon v The Queen (1978) 20 ALR 1; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465.

2 See, eg, R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269.

3 Channon (n 1) 4–5 (Brennan J).

4 Ibid.

5 See, eg, Frank B Cross, ‘Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law’ (2007) 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev 21.

6 (2015) 47 VR 395.

7 Verdins (n 2). The DSM-5 defines a personality disorder as ‘an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment’: American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 5th edn, 2013) 645. For further information, see ‘Phase 6 (2015-2020): Limiting the Principles’ below.

8 Jamie Walvisch and Andrew Carroll, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Personality Disorders: A Critical Analysis of DPP (Vic) v O’Neill’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 417, 419.

9 There is a very high prevalence of personality disorders amongst offenders in Australia. For example, in their study of mental disorders amongst prisoners in New South Wales, Butler and colleagues reported a prevalence rate of 43%: Tony Butler and others, ‘Mental Disorders in Australian Prisoners: A Comparison with a Community Sample’ (2006) 40 Australia N Z J Psychiatry 272, 275.

10 [2020] VSCA 212.

11 Ibid.

12 The defence has roots in Roman, Jewish and Islamic law: Michael S Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (CUP 1984) 65–66. The current law in many jurisdictions is based on rules established in M’Naghten’s case in 1843: R v M’Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718.

13 (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 198, 199 (Street CJ).

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 [1961] NSWR 935, 936 (Evatt CJ, Herron and Ferguson JJ).

17 David A Thomas, ‘Sentencing the Mentally Disturbed Offender’ [1965] Crim L R 685, 694.

18 Glanville Williams, ‘The Courts and Persistent Offenders’ [1963] Crim L R 730, 742.

19 [1964] Qd R 539, 541 (Mansfield CJ).

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid 545.

22 R v Pedder (Supreme Court of Queensland, 29 May 1964) 3.

23 Ibid.

24 [1966] 2 NSWR 565, 569 (McClemens J).

25 Ibid 572 (Maguire J).

26 (1974) 9 SASR 452.

27 Ibid 453.

28 Ibid 453–4. While Bray CJ’s statements were made in a dissenting judgment, the other judges did not disagree on this issue. Bray CJ’s statements were subsequently endorsed in R v Masolatti (1976) 14 SASR 124.

29 Channon (n 1).

30 Ibid 7 (Brennan J); 21 (Deane J); 28 (Toohey J).

31 Ibid 7.

32 See, eg, R v Hodgson (1967) 52 Cr App R 113.

33 Channon (n 1) 7. It appears that Deane and Toohey JJ agreed with this position, although their statements in this regard are somewhat ambiguous: ibid 21, 28.

34 (1979) 143 CLR 458.

35 Ibid (Jacobs, Stephen and Murphy JJ; Mason and Aickin JJ dissenting).

36 Channon (n 1) 4 (Brennan J), 28 (Toohey J).

37 Kocan (n 24) 567 (Sugerman JA).

38 Pedder (n 22) 4 (Gibbs J).

39 See, eg, Gascoigne (n 19).

40 See, eg, Kiltie (n 26).

41 See, eg, Kocan (n 24).

42 See, eg, Kiltie (n 26) 454; R v Dole [1975] VR 754.

43 Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 June 1978.

44 Ibid 2 (Young CJ).

45 Ibid 5.

46 Ibid 7–8 (Lush J).

47 Ibid 5 (Young CJ).

48 See, eg, R v Anderson [1981] VR 155; R v Thiele (1986) 19 A Crim R 105; Hurd v The Queen [1988] Tas R 126.

49 See, eg, R v Hopkins (Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 October 1985); DPP (Vic) v Bannam (1985) 14 A Crim R 475.

50 AG v Pattison (Supreme Court of Victoria, 9 December 1981), quoted in Bannam (n 49) 478.

51 See, eg, Thiele (n 48); R v Smith (Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, Kaye, O’Bryan and Tadgell JJ, 18 April 1986).

52 R v Hatherley (Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, Young CJ, King and Beach JJ, 6 February 1986).

53 Ibid 3 (Young CJ).

54 Ibid 4. A similar conclusion was reached in the earlier case of Pattison (n 50), however, the Court did not explicitly address the definitional issue in that case.

55 Hatherley (n 52) 4 (Young CJ). Similar reasoning was later used to preclude the application of the Mooney principle to paraphilia: DPP (Vic) v Steels (1987) 24 A Crim R 201.

56 Mooney (n 43) 8 (Lush J) [emphasis added].

57 Pattison (n 50) (Young CJ), quoted in Bannam (n 49) 478.

58 See ‘Phase 6 (2015-2020): Limiting the Principles’.

59 Veen (No 2) (n 1).

60 Veen (No 1) (n 34).

61 Veen (No 2) (n 1) 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

62 See, eg, R v Kilmartin (1989) 41 A Crim R 22; Boyle v The Queen (Western Australia Supreme Court of Appeal, 30 January 1990); Juli v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 31; R v Man (1990) 50 A Crim R 79.

63 Boyle (n 62).

64 Juli (n 62).

65 Man (n 62).

66 See, eg, R v Scognamiglio (1991) 56 A Crim R 81; R v Letteri (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 18 March 1992); R v Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R 244; R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67.

67 Letteri (n 66); Engert (n 66).

68 See, eg, Kilmartin (n 62); Man (n 62); Scognamiglio (n 66).

69 Hatherley (n 52).

70 See, eg, Juli (n 62).

71 Parnis v The Queen (1993) 49 FCR 304; R v Bus (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 November 1995).

72 Veen (No 2) (n 1) 474 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

73 Engert (n 66) 68 (Gleeson CJ).

74 Scognamiglio (n 66) 85 (Grove J).

75 R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398, 400 (Charles and Callaway JJA and Vincent AJA).

76 See, eg, Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204.

77 See, eg, R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587.

78 Between 1996 and 2007 (when the Verdins decision was handed down), this decision was cited over 140 times.

79 See, eg, R v Jiminez [1999] NSWCCA 7; R v Maddeford (2001) 79 SASR 1; R v Hamid [2002] VSCA 9.

80 See, eg, R v Hilton (2005) 157 A Crim R 504.

81 R v Skura [2004] VSCA 53, [33] (Smith AJA).

82 See, eg, Mooney (n 43).

83 R v Harb [2001] NSWCCA 249.

84 See, eg, R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48; Lauritsen v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 442; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255.

85 R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267.

86 R v Richards and Gregory [1998] 2 VR 1, 11 (Winneke P); R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376, 381 (Batt JA).

87 See also Benitez v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 166.

88 See, eg, R v Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431; R v Matthews (2004) 145 A Crim R 445; R v Ayoubi [2006] NSWCCA 364.

89 See, eg, Matthews (n 88); Ayoubi (n 88).

90 Tsiaras (n 75) 400 (Charles and Callaway JJA and Vincent AJA).

91 See, eg, R v Williams [2000] VSCA 174; R v Ulla (2004) 148 A Crim R 356.

92 See, eg, R v Manlio [1999] VSCA 174; Watson v The Queen [2000] WASCA 119; R v Sypott [2003] VSC 327.

93 See, eg, R v Pavlov [2001] NSWCCA 13; R v Mailes (2003) A Crim R 353; Skura (n 81); Matthews (n 88); R v Chambers (2005) 152 A Crim R 164.

94 Chambers (n 93).

95 [2006] VSCA 265.

96 [2005] NSWCCA 91.

97 Lauritsen (n 85). It is interesting to note that in reaching this decision, the Court cited R v Arnold (1991) 56 A Crim R 63. However, Arnold was not a case involving personality disorders, and Justice Ipp never referred to ‘mere personality disorders’ in the way attributed to him.

98 Verdins (n 2).

99 Ibid 271 (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).

100 Ibid 272.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid 275.

103 Jamie Walvisch, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental Functioning: Developing Australia’s “Most Sophisticated and Subtle” Analysis’ (2010) 17 PPL 187, 191.

104 Leach v The Queen (2008) 183 A Crim R 1, 6 (Basten JA).

105 Walvisch and Carroll (n 8).

106 See, eg, DPP (Vic) v Moore [2009] VSCA 264; DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1.

107 Bowen v The Queen [2011] VSCA 67, [27] (Warren CJ).

108 For example, the principles have been applied to schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, dysthymia, acquired brain injury, intellectual disability, postnatal depression and post-traumatic stress disorder: Walvisch (n 103) 188.

109 R v Chambers (n 93).

110 Pyke (n 95).

111 See, eg, R v Robazzini [2010] VSCA 8; R v Hamilton [2011] VSC 77; Stensholt v The Queen [2014] VSCA 171.

112 See, eg, R v Zhang [2009] VSCA 236; R v Bayley [2013] VSC 313; DPP (Vic) v Anderson (2013) 228 A Crim R 128.

113 See, eg, Pilgrim v The Queen [2014] VSCA 191; DPP (Vic) v Hicks [2014] VSC 266.

114 [2010] QCA 96.

115 Ibid [28] (Chesterman JA).

116 For a more detailed version of these arguments, see Walvisch and Carroll (n 8) 428–39.

117 Ibid.

118 Jamie Walvisch, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Mental Health Problems: A Principled Approach’ (PhD Thesis, Monash University 2015) 12, n 60. If lower courts and other jurisdictions were also taken into account, this figure would be substantially higher.

119 See, eg, R v Vuadreu [2009] VSCA 262, [37] (Ashley and Weinberg JJA).

120 Mune v The Queen [2011] VSCA 231.

121 R v Miller [2015] VSC 180.

122 Ibid [33].

123 O’Neill (n 6).

124 Ibid 405 [40]–[41].

125 Ibid 413 [70]–[71] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA).

126 Ibid 413 [71].

127 Hayes (n 114).

128 See text accompanying n 115.

129 On the definition of ‘personality disorder’, see n 7 above.

130 American Psychiatric Association (n 7) 647 [emphasis added]. For detailed discussion of this issue, see Walvisch and Carroll (n 8).

131 Chambers (n 94). See text accompanying n 95 above.

132 Ibid 172 [29]. As noted above, this was accepted by the Court as a mitigating factor.

133 Andrew E Skodol et al, ‘Functional Impairment in Patients with Schizotypal, Borderline, Avoidant, or Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder’ (2002) 159 Am J Psychiatry 276.

134 Jamie Walvisch, ‘Defining “Mental Disorder” in Legal Contexts’ (2017) 52 IJLP 7.

135 See, eg, DPP v Bruno [2018] VSC 822; DPP (Vic) v Herrmann [2019] VSC 694.

136 See, eg, R v Liao [2015] VSC 730; R v Price [2016] VSC 105; Di Paolo v The Queen [2019] VSCA 194.

137 O’Neill (n 6) 421 [100] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA).

138 See n 9 above.

139 Donald A Bonta and James Bonta, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (Anderson Publishing 2017) 88–113.

140 David Weisbrot, ‘The Future for Institutional Law Reform’ in Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform (Federation Press 2005) 20.

141 Marcia Neave, ‘Institutional Law Reform in Australia: The Past and the Future’ (2005) 23 Windsor YB Access Just 343, 351–2; Jeffrey Barnes, ‘On the Ground and On Tap – Law Reform, Australian Style’ (2018) 6 TPLeg 193, 197–8.

142 Michael Kirby, ‘The Decline and Fall of Australia’s Law Reform Institutions – And the Prospects of Revival’ (2017) 91 ALJ 841, 847–8.

143 Michael Kirby, ‘Law Reform – Ten Attributes for Success’ (The Law Reform Commission of Ireland, 17 July 2007) 4. See also Neave (n 141) 365.

144 Don Weatherburn, Law and Order in Australia: Rhetoric and Reality (Federation Press 2004); John Pratt et al (eds), The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Willan 2005).

145 See Tawanda Hondora, ‘Civil Society Organisations’ Role in the Development of International Law through Strategic Litigation in Challenging Times’ (2018) 25 Australia ILJ 115, 116.

146 See, eg, ibid 123; Catherine Corey Barber, ‘Tackling the Evaluation Challenge in Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Litigation Organisations’ (2012) 16 IJHR 411, 412; Monica Roa and Barbara Klugman, ‘Considering Strategic Litigation as an Advocacy Tool: A Case Study of the Defence of Reproductive Rights in Colombia’ (2014) 22 Reprod Health Matters 31, 31.

147 Ole Solvang, ‘Chechnya and the European Court of Human Rights: The Merits of Strategic Litigation’ (2008) 3 Secur Hum Rights 208, 211. See also Verónica Michel, ‘Judicial Reform and Legal Opportunity Structure: The Emergence of Strategic Litigation against Femicide in Mexico’ in Sarat Austin (ed), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (Emerald Publishing 2020) 28.

148 Victoria Legal Aid is an independent statutory authority established to provide legal aid to the community.

149 Analyses of previous strategic litigation cases highlight the importance and effectiveness of taking a multi-disciplinary approach: see, eg, Open Society Justice Initiative, Strategic Litigation Impacts: Insights from Global Experience (Open Society Foundations 2018) 91, 94.

150 Walvisch examined the Verdins principles in his PhD dissertation and has written numerous articles about sentencing and mental health: see, eg, Walvisch, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental Functioning’ (n 103); Walvisch, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Mental Health Problems’ (n 118); Walvisch, ‘Defining “Mental Disorder” in Legal Contexts’ (n 134); Jamie Walvisch, ‘Mandated Treatment as Punishment: Exploring the Second Verdins Principle’ in Claire Spivakovsky, Kate Seear and Adrian Carter (eds), Critical Perspectives on Coercive Interventions: Law, Medicine and Society (Routledge 2018); Jamie Walvisch, ‘“Mental Disorder” and Sentencing: Resolving the Definitional Problem’ (2018) 26 JLM 159.

151 Simon Bronitt, ‘Is Criminal Law Reform a Lost Cause?’ in Ron Levy et al (eds), New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in Contemporary Law Reform (Australian National University Press 2017) 142.

152 Walvisch and Carroll (n 8).

153 On the importance of the awareness-raising phase of strategic litigation, see Roa and Klugman (n 146) 33–4.

154 Patrick Geary, Children’s Rights: A Guide to Strategic Litigation (Child Rights Information Network 2009) 18.

155 DPP v Brown [2020] VCC 196, [3].

156 Ibid [61].

157 Ibid [68].

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid [64].

160 Ibid [73].

161 Ibid [69].

162 Brown (n 10) [51].

163 DPP v Brown (n 155) [81].

164 Ibid [82]–[84].

165 Ibid [83].

166 Walvisch and Carroll (n 8) 425.

167 DPP v Brown (n 155) [89].

168 Ibid [93].

169 Ibid [123]–[124].

170 Ibid [90].

171 Ibid [109].

172 See n 135 above.

173 DPP v Brown (n 155) [123].

174 Brown (n 10) [9].

175 Ibid [5], [59].

176 Ibid [6].

177 Ibid [28].

178 Ibid [61].

179 American Psychiatric Association (n 7).

180 Ibid 16 (emphasis added).

181 Brown (n 10) [6].

182 American Psychiatric Association (n 7).

183 World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems: ICD-11 (11th edn, WHO 2020).

184 A trait has been defined as ‘a variable underlying a relatively stable disposition toward particular behavioural patterns … building blocks to characterise someone’s personality functioning’: Kristian E Markon and Katherine G Jonas, ‘The Role of Traits in Describing, Assessing, and Understanding Personality Pathology’ in Steven K Huprisch (ed), Personality Disorders: Toward Theoretical and Empirical Integration in Diagnosis and Assessment (APA 2015) 64.

185 Brown (n 10) [68].

186 I Freckelton, ‘Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental Functioning: R. v Verdins, Buckley and Vo’ (2007) 14 PPL 359, 362.

187 DPP v Brown (n 155) [84].

188 O’Neill (n 6).

189 Brown (n 10) [8].

190 Ibid [29].

191 Ibid [60] [citations omitted].